The dangerous classes in late Victorian England : some reflections on the social foundations of disturbance and order with special reference to London in the eighteen-eighties by Bailey, Victor
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/136848 
Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications
THE DANGEROUS CLASSES IN LATE VICTORIAN ENGLAND
Some Reflections on the Social Foundations of 
Disturbance and Order with special reference to 
London in the Eighteen-Eiehties.
Victor Bailey, B.A., Dip. Crim.
Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of P h .D ., to the Centre for the Study of 
Social History, University of Warwick.
June 1975.
C O N T E N T S
Acknowledgements
Summary
Abbreviations
Illustration; 'A Quiet Sunday in London; or, The Day of Rest' 
Introduction
1. The Magistracy and the Urban Elite
2. London’s Juridical Structure and Professional Enforcement
3. The Magistracy, 'Mob' Riot and Vic'orian Elections
4. The Magistracy between Skeletons and Salvationists
5. The Dangerous Classes and the Threat of Social Disturbance: 
the Middle Class Perspective
6. The 1880s, the West End Riots, and London's Dangerous Class
7. The Dangerous Classes in Trafalgar Square: 'Bloody Sunday' 
and London's Juridical System
Conclusion
Appendices
Bibliography
iii
iv
vi
vii
1
13
81
104
134
174
216
241
278
280
299
i i i
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
X would like to express my gratitude to the Institute of Historical Research 
for their award of a research fellowship in 1973.
I would like to acknowledge the permission received from the Home Office to 
consult documents which are not, at this time, open to public access.
X am grateful to Dr. Roger Hood, University Reader in Criminology and Fellow 
of All Souls College, Oxford, for his constant encouragement in the final 
stages.
My special thanks are due to Professor Royden Harrison, Director of the Centre 
for Social History, whose supervision made doctoral research enjoyable and 
productive.
X am indebted to M/s, Barbara Coysh for her excellent typing, an.i he- 1 constant
interest in the thesis. I am also grateful to M/s. Sylvia Coleman ar.d
M/s. Vivien Wilson for typing, respectively, the bibliography and appendices.
IV
S U M M A R Y
Legal systems are deeply affected by the social situation in which they 
function: by the content of contemporary debate on poverty, crime and dis­
order; by the social relations of the propertied and the poor. They have 
been infrequently analysed in terms of such influences.
Historians have too readily accepted, for instance, the accolades to the 
reformed urban legal structure of the 1830s; eager to record the Benthamite 
march of progress to efficient yet disinterested juridical authority. The 
'utilitarian' formula of judicial administration, unclouded by partisan con­
cerns, was inherently unlikely. The form of judicial appointment, alone, 
provides cause for scepticism. Crown appointment to the borough bench never 
extinguished a spoils system of magisterial reward for political service, dis­
pensed by the urban patriciate. Emphasis on the reformed features of London's 
legal framework has similarly obscured the fact that even within this professiona 
structure, social end political factors played a decisive role in law enforcement 
due notably to governmental responsibility for social order. A detailed overview 
of the urban and metropolitan legal systems is provided in the first two chapters 
with the intention that it will inform the subsequent appreciation of the bond 
between the social and legal components of popular disturbance in the 1880s.
The chapters on election and religious disturbances assess the relationship 
between the social character of disorder, the socio-political interests of the 
lay magistracy, and the resultant pattern of law enforcement. Integral to 
the assessment is the urban elite's tolerance of forms of riot which sustained 
more than challenged the current arrangement of social authority. In contrast, 
London's social elite felt threatened by the denizens of the East End slums, 
foci of the outcast poor, the alien and the criminal. An examination of the
Vmetropolitan legal policy, devised to repress unemployed disorder in the mid- 
1880s, consequently centres on the middle-class fear of the "dangerous classes" 
a mental construct which embraced the apprehensions of pauperism, crime and 
riot. The overall aim in what follows has been to relate the insights of the 
social historian to an understanding of the administration of law.
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4886. INTRODUCTION
The nature of a system of lay magistrates, drawn from each community, 
ensures that behind the term, 'justice of the peace', there lies a social 
as well as a legal institution. A lay magistracy necessarily reflects the 
agrarian or industrial structure of the larger society, recruited,as it is, 
from the local dignitaries of rural and urban regions. In the absence of 
an elective magistracy, the system of co:optation by social peers ensures 
that the Bench corresponds,with some proximity, to the upper echelons of the 
local social hierarchy.^ For this reason,the borough commissions of peace 
in the first half of the nineteenth-century, recorded the developing social 
and legal authority of the middle-class, far more accurately in fact than 
their parliamentary representation ratified their political authority. Within 
ten years of the reform of the borough legal structure in 1835, the Benches 
were the preserve of the manufacturing, industrial and professional 'bour­
geoisie'. For the rest of the century, the social composition of the urban 
bench was unaltered. The magistracy was necessarily recruited from those 
townsmen with social and economic standing in the community, its principal 
role to represent legal authority in the enforcement of established moral 
and social codes. In consequence, magisterial behaviour was informed by 
distinct social attitudes and values. Established social beliefs more easily 
influenced magisterial judgements, since 'plain common sense' was revered 
as the faculty required for judicial service, not formal instruction in the 
complexities of the law. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the 
social location of the urban legal representatives, and also to interpret 
what perceptions and anxieties affected the judicial response to urban dis­
order in the late Victorian period. The overall approach has been firstly 
to assess the legal structure and officials of the provincial borough and 
the Metropolis, with respect to the maintenance of public order; and,
’ secondly, to examine the social attitudes underlying the policy of public
order which urban legal authorities devised in the face of different types 
of disturbance. Distinct perceptions of the poor, of criminality and of 
social disorder influenced the preservation of the peace. This was espec­
ially apparent in London, where the middle-class consciousness constructed, 
from out of a particular social and economic setting, an image of a 'danger­
ous class': a destructive and predatory product of the slums. The image 
was of a social stratum which combined the fears of crime, pauperism and 
vagrancy; which was estranged from the existing social order. Interpretations 
of public disorder in the late nineteenth-century often referred to the 
'dangerous classes': a comprehensive diagnosis which revoked the need to 
understand the causes of urban destitution. In London in the 1880s, this 
mental conception overshadowed public discussion of the threat of social 
upheaval, and inevitably leadened the legal policies devised to maintain 
public order.
Before outlining the exact content of each chapter, it is useful to look 
at the previous work on social disturbance. In the early historical work 
on public disturbance, the apparatus of public order - the Home Office, 
the magistracy, the police and the military - was closely scrutinized. F.O. 
Darvall in 1934 provided the first detailed account of the disturbances 
which affected England between 1811 and 1817, principally of Luddism. In 
doing so, he related his research on the geographical location, the organ­
ization, and the causes of Luddism to the machinery and the forces of public 
2order. So too the historian of the Chartist threat to public order, F.C. 
Mather, concentrated on the success of the legal institutions in repressing 
'mob' disturbances.^ In particular, an assessment was made of the efficiency 
of the new police force in the face of Chartist unrest. The new preventive 
policing, designed to allay disorder before it developed, was seen to emerge 
out of the .hallenge posed by the major periods of Chartist activity in 1839, 
1842 and 1348, and was interpreted (in that well-used explanation of social
change) as part of the 'general march of progress'. In these studies, 
social insurgency and its repression provided the yardstick for an estimate 
of the nature and efficacy of the machinery of public order.^
Investigation of the system of public order, especially when confronted 
by extensive and recurrent outbreaks of Luddite or Chartist riot, naturally 
emphasised the role of the Home Department. This was notably the case in 
London, where the Home Secretary held final responsibility for the Metropol­
itan police and the stipendiary magistracy.^ But the Home Office also played 
a co:ordinating role in provincial districts. In the later stages of the 
Regency disturbances, civil action, directed by the local magistracy, was 
increasingly overlaid by deployment of the military, the whole co:ordinated 
by the Home Secretary and his small staff.7 In the three major periods of 
Chartist disturbance, Mather traced 'a common cyclical pattern' in the inter­
action between disorder and the legal machinery, when local energies were
gprogressively sustained bv national direction. Nevertheless, the local 
magistracy was described as the central component of the framework of public 
order, notably in the early stages of disturbance. In his chapter, 'The 
Machinery of Order', Darvall emphasised the role of the lay magistracy, assert­
ing as one of his concluding points - "The local justice was the main
9support of the whole machine, upon whom its efficiency rested." An import­
ant step in Mather's account of 'The Ladder of Authority' in the Chartist 
era, was the general sessions of the county magistrates, and the newly-stocked 
borough benches.*0 The timing and scale of Chartist unrest often bore a 
direct relationship to the activities of a socially-exclusive county magis­
tracy. Parochial concern to avoid expenditure, a mistrust of civil expedients 
in the repression of disorder, led to needless requisitions of troops before 
local measures had been exhausted.** Conversely, hesitancy or overt refus­
als to act by frightened or sympathetic magistrates, affected the functioning 
of the apparatus of public order.Similarly in the boroughs, the generally
4
7increased efficiency of the municipal authorities in response to Chartist 
insurgency, was hindered by the political sympathies of some urban benches.  ^
Whilst the sources of differing magisterial behaviour were not clearly re­
vealed, there was at least the recognition that modes of law enforcement
in moments of social disturbance depended on social and political as well 
14as legal judgements.
Recent studies of popular disturbance in Britain, notably of the eight­
eenth and early nineteenth centuries, have been concerned more with the 
participants in the riots, and the generalized notions held by the rioters, 
than with the juridical structure and personnel which restrained them. Most 
prominently, George Rude^ promoted the investigation of the social composition 
of the eighteenth-century London 'mob', and insisted, above all, that the 
oehaviour of the historical crowd traced patterns of regularity, inspired 
by conscious and rational m o t i v e s . A s  a consequence of closer empirical 
estimate of the social background of the 'pre-industrial’ crowd, the emotion­
al ascription of all riotous activity to the 'rob', 'the slum population', 
or the 'criminal elements' was revised.^6 Whiiot Rude has perhaps re-drawn 
the social divisions too sharply, and protested too strongly against the 
inclusion of criminals in the 'pre-industrial' crowd, his basic point stands,
that a cross-section of London's working-class was to be found in the
17eighteenth-century 'mob'.
The new investigative lens also challenged the stereotypes applied to 
the 'mob' in terms of the motives of the historical crowd. Emphasis has 
instead been placed on the disciplined character of social protest, and on 
the coherent set of values which underlay riotous behaviour. Hence, for 
eighteenth-century food riots, Edward Thompson has objected to the image of 
crowd behaviour as a crude response to economic stimuli - bad harvests, high 
food prices. In its place, the crowd's own objectives became the focus; 
the food riot interpreted as a complex form of popular action. The riots
swere seen to be in defence of a 'moral economy' of the poor consumer,
against the postulates and practice of 'laissez-faire' political economy.
Or again, for early nineteenth-century labour disorders, Eric Hobsbawm has 
used the phrase, 'collective bargaining by riot' to describe protests which
formed an essential element of industrial negotiation, alongside, or as a
19substitute for, bargaining procedures through trade unions. ' Historians 
of the crowd have thus disclosed riotous incidents as a vital means of locat­
ing social and economic values amongst otherwise inarticulate sections of 
the population. In the Gordon riots of 1780 and in the 'Church and King'
riots of the 1790s, the 'reactionary' feelings of anti-Catholicism and
20anti-Jacobin chauvinism were clearly revealed. Conversely, a crucial 
'progressive' trend of political consciousness has been traced from the Wilk- 
itc 'mobs' of the 1760s to trie Chartist demonstrations of the ISdOs."
Crowd actions have emerged as important signposts to the course of political 
events, plotting the development of the mass Radical movement in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
This is not to say that the role of the juridical bodies was entirely 
neglected in the recent study of the historical crowd. George Rude"'recog­
nized that an important consideration to the outbreak, duration and success
22of social disturbance was the repressive force which met it. Further,
the very situation of social disturbance in a denser social and political 
context, more clearly uncovered the motivating concerns of the magistracy.
In eighteenth century food riots, the behaviour of certain magistrates could 
be explained alone by their sympathy with popular notions of the rights and
obligations surrounding food production and consumption. Their hesitancy
23heightened the social legitimacy which the crowds claimed. Similarly, 
the continuance of the Gordon riots for some seven days required a knowledge 
of the complacency displayed by the City of London magistrates to 'No-Popery' 
mobs (as long as Roman Catholic chapels, schools and houses alone were
18
0wrecked) as a result of their own misgivings about the Catholic Relief 
24Act. Again in the Birmingham Priestley riots of 1791, it was necessary
to relate the justices' tolerance of the 'Church and King' bands to the
25former's hostility to religious dissent and political reform. The social 
basis of the resolution or reluctance of the magistrates to confront pub­
lic disorder was, therefore, a relevant subsidiary theme in the recent 
research on the historical crowd. No longer prepared to recite the formal 
motions made by the magistracy to restrain disorder, the motives of the 
local authorities were sought in closer documentation of their socio-polit­
ical interests and convictions.
The social foundations of legal restraint or suppression of disturbance,
forms the main theme of this thesis. The emphasis is on disturbance in
urban areas, predominantly in the 18S0s. Historians have, in general, neg-
27alected the outbreaks of disordei in the later nineteenth century. In 
this period there was no semi-revolutionary threat, as was posed ac certain 
moments by the Luddite and Chartist movements. In the late i860«-,, revol­
utionary possibilities emerged out of the coma of mid-Victorian prosperity, 
but if there was a semi-revolutionary threat, it was essentially at the 
second or third remove .O th erw is e, only the outlying rural areas were
affected by any extensive form of social protest, as in the crofting riots
2 8in Scotland, the tithe riots in Wales in the 1880s. In the late Victorian 
period, the threat to public order more commonly came from single incidents 
of election, religious or labour disturbance (although the last-mentioned 
could often disrupt urban order for an extensive period of time). For these 
instances of riot, the borough magistracy claimed an unhindered responsibility 
Interference in the independent jurisdiction of the borough bench was 
generally avoided by the Home Secretary. In contrast, the metropolitan 
response to the threat of disorder rested almost solely in the hands of 
the Home Secretary and the Chief Commissioner of Police. But if the
7maintenance of order in London was in more strictly professional hands, 
it was no less influenced by social and political pressures. For the break­
down of order, both in the metropolis and in provincial boroughs, the aim 
has been, in all, to reveal the social determinants of the different dis­
turbances, and of the legal response made by the borough magistracy and 
the Home Office.
In the first two chapters there is an outline of the judicial structure 
in the provincial boroughs and in the metropolis. An attempt has not been 
made to provide a full account of the machinery for enforcing the law, but 
there is a selective discussion of those elements crucial to the restraint 
of social disorder. This entailed placing the emphasis, in the first chapter, 
on the lay magistracy of the provincial boroughs: the officials most respon­
sible for law enforcement in times of disorder. Jealous cf their legal in­
dependence, the borough magistracy dispensed wide discretionary powers, hus­
banding peacekeeping measures according to their personal interpretation of 
the threat to social order. It was tnerefore considered relevant to examine 
more extensively the social location of magisterial elites. This occasioned 
an examination of the social and economic criteria required by candidates 
for appointment to the bench, and of the political channels through which 
appointments were secured. What emerges is a spoils system of judicial 
placement, shared between the two major political parties. Appointment to 
the bench was an extensive, vestigial form of political patronage. A magis­
tracy was a social perquisite used for the reward of party loyalists, and 
conferred upon the representatives of the town's middle-class elite. In 
contrast, the metropolitan legal system was characterized by a professional 
stipendiary magistracy and a metropolitan police force, both of which were 
at the disposal of the Home Secretary. Chapter two examines the public 
order role of the Home Secretary, the Metropolitan police force, and the 
stipendiary magistrates of the London police courts. By means of evidence
sdrawn from public disorder in the 1880s, it becomes clearer how the policy 
to maintain the social peace of London was devised by the executive sector 
of the legal structure. In place of the extra-mural role of the unprofess­
ional magistracy in the boroughs, London's order was delegated to tne govern­
ment's key political representative in the sphere of law and order. Ths 
remaining chapters of the thesis build on this overview of the machinery and 
personnel of public order.
In chapters three and four, two different types of social disturbance 
are examined,both of which affected provincial boroughs with their own bench 
of magistrates. In each of the chapters, which in turn deal with election 
and anti-Salvation Army riots, there is discussion of the nature
and the scale of response made by the magistracy, and an assessment of the 
social basis of the mode of law enforcement, liie aim was to locare and 
explain magisterial attitudes to the disturbances, and to relate this to 
the pattern of enforcement arranged. The general guiding contention is that 
the legal response evoked by public disorder bore a direct relationship to 
the socio-political content of the actual disturbances, and to the socio­
political interests of a legal personnel which was recruited from amongst 
a social elite, intimately involved with the urban economic and political 
structure. The form of public order was a function of the interaction between 
the nature of the disturbance and the interests of the magistracy.
In the final three chapters there is an examination of the unemployed
riots which afflicted London in the mid-1880s. It is commonly stated that,
29after the 1820s the capital played a diminished role in national protest.
In relation to organized protest movements like Chartism, this was indeed 
the case. The metropolitan police force, resting on the twin virtues of 
a united control and professional efficiency, remained the model for provin­
cial forces in its numerical strength and quality, and in its ability to
maintain the public peace without recourse to military assistance 30 But
sdrawn from public disorder in the 1880s, it becomes clearer how the policy 
to maintain the social peace of London was devised by the executive sector 
of the legal structure. In place of the extra-mural role of the unprofess­
ional magistracy in the boroughs, London's order was delegated to the govern­
ment's key political representative in the sphere of law and order. The 
remaining chapters of the thesis build on this overview of the machinery and 
personnel of public order.
In chapters three and four, two different types of social disturbance 
are examined,both of which affected provincial boroughs with their own bench 
of magistrates. In each of the chapters, which in turn deal with election 
and anti-Salvation Army riots, there is discussion of the nature
and the scale of response made by the magistracy, and an assessment of the 
social basis of the mode of law enforcement. 1ue aim was to locate and 
explain magisterial attitudes to the disturbances, and to relate this to 
the pattern of enforcement arranged. The general guiding contention is that 
the legal response evoked by public disorder bore a direct relationship to 
the socio-political content of the actual disturbances, and to the socio­
political interests of a legal personnel which was recruited from amongst 
a social elite, intimately involved with the urban economic and political 
structure. The form of public order was a function of the interaction between 
the nature of the disturbance and the interests of the magistracy.
In the final three chapters there is an examination of the unemployed
riots which afflicted London in the mid-1880s. It is commonly stated that,
29after the 1820s the capital played a diminished role in national protest.
In relation to organized protest movements like Chartism, this was indeed 
the case. The metropolitan police force, resting on the twin virtues of 
a united control and professional efficiency, remained the model for provin­
cial forces in its numerical strength and quality, and in its ability to 
maintain the public peace without recourse to military assistance. But
9laudatory recognition of the qualities of the metropolitan force, with
the related assumption that professional, preventive policing gave the
death blow to extensive rioting has led to neglect by historians of the
unemployed disturbances of 1886 and 1887. That is an over-statement,
however. The economic and social crisis, of which the riots were a part,
has in fact been examined for its impact on developing attitudes to state
intervention in the realms of poverty and urban degeneration. It has been
recognized that the riots themselves brought the problem of unemployment
closer to the forefront of political discussion; that the threat of social
disturbance, in part, forced a critical re-appraisal of private philanthropy
31in its relief of poverty, bad housing and unemployment. There still re­
mains, however, a need for a closer study of the disturbances for what they 
reveal about the metropolitan system of public order. The mid-1880s were 
difficult years for successive home Secretaries and Chief Commissioners of 
Police. If the riots were seen, in retrospect, as influential to ’lie 
growth of state collectivism, at the time the unemployed agitation was con­
sidered to be primarily a problem of public order, not of soci-il distress.
The riots certainly defied all forecasts that public disorder in London was 
a thing of the past. Fears were immediately generated by the riots of 
the imminent social upheaval of the East End 'masses'. Such fears of an 
invigorated social ferment in the 1880s were mediated through the metropol­
itan legal structure. The social pressures on the legal structure in this 
period, and the policy which emerged to maintain London's order are the 
major themes of these chapters.
In chapter five an account is provided of the obsessive metropolitan 
anxiety for a 'dangerous class', an extraordinary construct of the middle- 
class mind, but with some relationship to objective urban circumstances. 
Within this distinctive social concept, contemporaries amalgamated different 
fears - crime, vagrancy, poverty and revolution. They imagined a coincidence
of petty crime with popular disturbance: criminal depredation was inter­
preted as of the same genus as organized confiscation. For the rich, the 
single category, the 'dangerous class' was a configuration of diverse social 
strata - a feared conjunction of the criminal and the loafer: the unemployed 
and the casually employed. The 'dangerous class' did however bear some 
relation with social reality, most notably with the industrial and social 
structure of London. In the second half of the nineteenth-century partic­
ularly, London was the haven of casualized industry - in dock work, in the 
building trade, and in the small-scale clothing trade and food industry. 
'Pre-industrial' features, in economic organization and productive relations, 
clung on most tenaciously in the congested East End. The resulting pool 
of under-employed labour confused contemporary attitudes to the East End 
population. Casual labour was thought to shade imperceptibly into those 
social groups mor** clearly unattached to the industrial economy, existing 
'without visible means of subsistence' - vagrants, paupers and cri.finals.
The confusion of different social groups was also made easier by tne simple 
physical proximity of an urban proletariat, in all its characters, spatially 
segregated from the propertied West End. It was these social and economic 
conditions which formed the objective reality out of which the middle-class 
mind created the 'dangerous class'. The fear of a 'dangerous class' was 
not however, a permanent feature of the normal course of events. It belonged 
to certain moments in London's history. Economic depression, and the 
consequent rise in unemployment, in the early 1880s, promoted one such 
moment when the latent dread of 'anarchy' from the 'dangerous class' was 
openly expressed.
In chapters six and spven the emphasis turns to the unemployed dis­
turbances of the 1880s. The chapters examine respectively, the contemporary 
interpretation of the disorder of the mid-1880s in terms of a 'dangerous 
class', and the influence that the prevailing interpretation had upon the
11
policy of public order devised by the metropolitan legal authorities. The 
earliest incident in February 1886, when a contingent of the unemployed 
rioted in the heart of the West End, crystallized the developing fears of 
social upheaval. In the aftermath of the riots, the dominant interpretation 
placed all blame on the city 'residuum', the slum proletariat, and was con­
cerned to exonerate the 'respectable working-class'. Enhanced police vigil­
ance was demanded of the Home Secretary; a mandate from the middle-class 
constituency for firmer repression of the unemployed and the unemployable.
The final chapter investigates the effect of these pressures on London's legal 
system, in relation to the government's decision in November 1887 to prohibit 
meetings of the unemployed in Trafalgar Square. A legal policy to combat 
the threat from a 'dangerous class' emerged hesitantly in the autumn of 1887. 
By way of the internal Home Office debates on the closure of Trafalgar Square, 
it is possible to reconstruct how the policy of public order was formulated 
and what conflicting pressures affected the Homo Office. The Home Secretary, 
Henry Matthews, was aware that there would be damaging political repercussions 
if the government was held responsible for renewed incidents of property 
damage from bands of unemployed. He was particularly pressured by tho Chief 
Commissioner of Police, Sir Charles Warren, in the autumn of 1887, to act 
decisively against the 'mob disorder' which disgraced the centre of London.
But the difficulty remained that the Home Secretary needed to construct a 
sustainable legal case for the prohibition of public meeting and procession­
ing. Judicial decisions could not be predicted in advance, and hence the 
Home Office's hesitations to act against 'mob' disorder. When the decision 
was finally taken in early November to close the Square, a firm legal case 
still did not exist, in the conviction of the Attorney and Solicitor Generals. 
But the threat posed by the bands of 'roughs' wandering around the West End 
outweighed legal niceties. It had been decided to rely on the inadequate 
legal provisions in the Metropolitan Police Act (2 and 3 Viet, c.47 S.52)
12
rather than risk renewed disturbances. The Home Secretary's policy to 
combat the threat of the urban 'residuum' was not however obstructed by the 
magistracy. In the subsequent legal challenge to the political decision to 
close the Square, the stipendiary magistracy displayed extreme reluctance 
to act against the executive. Not for the first time, the judiciary in­
competently defended the right of public meeting and processioning. It was 
confirmation of the decisive role the executive was conceded in forming the 
legal policy for London. In the process of constructing a public order 
policy, social and political as well as strictly legal considerations were 
evaluated.
Previous investigation of the law of public order in the late Victorian 
period has borne the traces of its parentage. Criminal lawyers or law pub­
lishers have commonly made only passing reference to the historical context.3 
Quite correctly, for their purpose, the emphasis was on the Queen's Bench 
judgements which formed precedents in the warehouse of case law. A meagre 
generosity was shown to social reference. If lawyers have too often dis­
regarded the discipline of historical context, social and economic historians 
have likewise remained cautious in approaching the law, its administration 
and enforcement. The historian's equipment in legal matters in fact seems 
to become increasingly depleted. But it has become more apparent, in the 
occasional work which has gone beyond conventional legal history, and in 
some contemporary criminological work, how the criminal law and its enforce­
ment is inadequately understood unless it is placed within its total social 
context, analyzed as part of a culture.3  ^ The social historian of public 
order can no longer neglect these lessons. In the following pages, and 
for the examples chosen, the aim has been to interpret the maintenance of 
public order in its relation with social and political as well as legal
concerns.
13
CHAPTER ONE
THE MAGISTRACY AND THE URBAN ELITE
In the first chapter, a sketch is provided of the judicial structure 
and personnel of the provincial boroughs. The aim has been to document 
those aspects of the legal apparatus of urban areas which were important to 
law enforcement, when there was a breakdown in public order. In the first 
section on the legal structure of provincial boroughs, the emphasis rests 
on the lay magistracy, who normally held responsibility for police action 
in times of public disturbance. An examination is made of the prior necess­
ity for any successful candidate to show his social and economic contribution 
to the community, and of the social standing which an appointment to the 
Bench conferred. A magistracy was the final seal of social respectability. 
Such required criteria for appointment ensured that the magistracy were 
drawn from a limited social elite, the urban middle-class: which claimed 
local political as well as legal authority. Despite the Municipal Corpora­
tions Act of 1835, which sought to separate the judicial and administrative 
(including policing) functions of borough law enforcement, the same people 
who were magistrates were often also town councillors, and even members of 
the Watch Committee (in charge of the local police force). A tight overlap 
in personnel between bench and council chamber, characterized many provin­
cial boroughs. In the preservation of public order, this urban elite, on 
the magistracy and on the council, claimed an independent authority which 
was largely unimpeded by the Home Office. In all, one is documenting a 
juridical structure which was activated by a social elite, which held magis­
terial authority, interpreted what each form of social disturbance represen­
ted, and autonomously administered the measures to maintain public order.
The final part of this section traces more closely the political determinants 
of magisterial appointment. The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835
14
intentionally placed the appointment of the borough magistracy in the hands 
of the Crown (or Lord Chancellor), to ensure that justices were in no way 
tainted with party prejudice, which was considered incompatible with impar­
tial administration of the law. But Crown control of appointments could 
not avoid either party political involvement, or the elevation to the bench 
of party loyalists. In many towns, the nomination procedure for magistrates 
was a compromise between the two main political parties. The implication, 
finally, is that the political nature of appointment influenced magisterial 
behaviour in the maintenance of public order.
The Judicial Structure of the Borough
In the 1830s, dissatisfaction was so intense with the state of urban 
government that a new blueprint for the boroughs had to be drawn. It inevit­
ably approached the problem of the administration of jusr.ice, since the 
investigation of the unreformed Corporations in 1834 had specified the appal­
ling state of borough law enforcement.* In a context of class dissension 
in the early nineteenth-century, ways were canvassed to provide a form of 
borough law enforcement which diluted the obvious correspondence, to be 
found in the counties, between legal authority and social and economic dom­
inance; but which at the same time assured an efficient protection for indus­
trial property. The institution of the police force was one way of screen­
ing judicial authority from direct correlation with economic authority, par­
ticularly when a differentiation of functions between the local police author­
ity and the magistracy was established. As the 'London Review', the new 
journal of utilitarianism, argued in 1835, no aspect of the judicial system
ought to be associated with borough government. "Judicial and administrative
2duties should never be united in the same hands," opined John Stuart Mill.
In the Municipal Reform Act of 1835, local government was placed firmly in 
the hands of the new Corporations. Integral to this, the control of the 
police force was assigned to the Watch Committee of the Town Councils. On
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the model of metropolitan police reform, the borough magistracy were strip­
ped of all but their judicial functions.^ It has become accepted, in con­
sequence, that in 1835 an important principle was established. According 
to Josef Redlich - "Justice was separated from municipal administration."’’
A magistracy, unimplicated with the corporate structure, was more assured 
of claiming public confidence; of dispensing impartial judgements. Institut­
ional divorce between the magistracy and local government was to provide 
assurance that the manufacturer and the workman would equally receive justice. 
The interpretation of the law was no longer to be confused with its adminis­
tration.
A heuristic sketch of county government emphasises the legal features of 
borough reform. Before 1888, the county magistracy were firmly in the saddle 
of judicial, administrative and financial author'!ty.*’ County justice- held 
a confusion of administrative and judicial powers. In particular, direct con­
trol of the county police was maintained by way of police committees, part 
of Quarter Sessions government. A prepared apologetic was available for 
the unrepresentative nature of county government, and for a government which 
encompassed administrative and judicial powers. This stressed the intimate 
role of the magistracy out of Quarter Sessions, "where they were enabled to 
act," said Sir Eardley-Wilmot, "as friends of the poor, and heal disputes as 
arbitrators and referees."^ In 1821, G.B. Mainwaring had spoken of the 
'gratuitous magistracy1, expending time and learning for societal order,
g
"independent guardians of the public interest." The tradition was of an 
independent rural jurisdiction and of an intimate form of law which defended 
itself against Utilitarian assumptions of professionalism and a fixed, 
'rational' legal system. Until 1888, attempts to replace Quarter Sessions 
by an elective council or by county boards, failed to reform a system trans­
parently based on the social and economic strength of landed society. Quarter 
Sessions remained an essential part of a structure of social authority: the
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magistracy were 'substantial men',
firmly bound over to the peace - identified with the 
observance of the laws - and taking their natural part 
as leaders in a well ordered society.^
The counties largely maintained this system of judicial administration; an 
inextricable blend of administrative work under judicial forms, in which 
county magistrates were simultaneously judicial and administrative officers.
In the boroughs, however, a different conception of the magistracy and of 
the law was established. Legal authority which openly depended on social and 
economic superiority was not acceptable to the borough reformers. They con­
structed, instead, a judicial system in which the law was defined as a 
Utilitarian tool to prevent crime and maintain the peace; conferred on a con­
stabulary recruited and regulated by a Watch Committee of elected councillors; 
and scrutinized by a separate magistracy, appointed by the Crown, distanced 
from parochial concerns, and theoretically unrestrained by any local con­
stituency.
The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 required each Town Council to 
appoint "a sufficient Number of their own Body" who, with tiie Mayor, would 
be a Watch Committee, which committee was then required to appoint "a suff­
icient Number of fit Men...to act as Constables."^ The Watch Committee was 
the appointing and disciplinary authority over the police. The committee 
(or two borough magistrates) could also dismiss individual policemen; and,
12until 1919, could adopt its own regulations and rates of pay for constables. 
The Watch Committee also appointed the head constable, and laid down police 
policy for him to execute. An absolute power in police administration was 
thus held by the watch committee of the council. Home Office direction was 
restricted to the receipt of a quarterly report of the numbers and equipment, 
and a copy of the rules made by the watch committee for the guidance of 
constables.^  In 1835, the principle of local government control of borough 
policing was clearly established.
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Between the Select Committee on Police in 1853, and the County and 
Borough Police Act of 1856, the power of the Municipal Corporations in pol­
ice administration was however severely challenged. The Select Committee 
located a number of abuses in borough police organization, particularly in 
the appointment and dismissal of constables, and in the refusal of borough
forces to amalgamate with county forces, despite having themselves insuff-
14icient police to maintain order. As a result, legislation was framed in 
1854 which would have left only a few large boroughs with independent police 
forces.^ To defeat this intention, the political strength of the Municipal 
Corporations was immediately mobilised. But the determination of the 
Corporations to retain self-government in police administration could not 
defeat the introduction, in the 1856 Act, of Exchequer grant-aid to boroughs 
with a police force, and the associated test of efficiency made by the 
Inspectorate of constabulary.^  They succeeded, nevertheless, in avoiding 
the worst implications of the Select Committee of 1853, before which (they 
complained) they had not been called to give evidence. Above all, they 
resisted the loss of watch committee control of the police, which would have 
resulted from merger with the county constabulary. Central oversight of 
the borough constabulary by way of inspection and the grant-in-aid, eradic­
ated some of the most obvious abuses, revealed at mid-century. The municipal 
councils, however, largely retained their authority over law enforcement 
which, in their opinion, the Municipal Act of 1835 granted. Advantage 
continued to be taken of the indeterminate formulation in the 1835 Act, 
with regard to control of the borough police. Authority rested clearly with
neither the Home Secretary (who clearly held final authority over the metro-
17politan police), head constable, nor watch committee. And the Act had 
purposely separated the magistracy from control over the police. In this 
'no-man's land', the watch committees regularly established an authoritative 
control over the constabulary. In all, borough police forces were independent
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entities under the authority of local government. And central invasions 
were invariably defeated by the cry of local autonomy.
There was one important situation, however, in which the watch committee
were not solely responsible, in which the magistracy generally claimed full
control of the police force: that of riot or public disturbance. The position
of the magistracy with regard to the borough police was unclear. The Municipal
Act of 1835 had divested the borough justices of their administrative duties
in the unreformed corporations, including police administration. Yet, the
18police were required to obey the 'lawful commands' of magistrates. This 
seemed particularly the case in times of riot, when the magistracy had conven­
tionally preserved the peace. During the debate on the Local Government Bill 
in June 1888, Henry Fowler said that whilst the elected Council appointed 
and paid the head constable, in his experience the Mayor and magistrates 
held responsibility for public order: ''the Town Council or the Watch Committee 
had nothing to do with the preservation of the peace"; "the control of the 
Chief Constable and the responsibility of the peace had been permanently 
severed." In fact, there was no unanimous agreement upon tills demarcation 
of power. Josef Redlich considered that the powers held jointly over the 
police by watch committee and magistracy (embodied in section 158 of the 
Municipal Corporations Act, 1882), invariably resulted in a joint committee 
of the two bodies to arrange common action during disturbances. Through the 
joint committee, with the mayor (as chairman) linking the two separate 
enclaves, "a serious practical difficulty created by the Municipal Corporations 
Act is solved." But Redlich was too categorical in his description. There 
is a sense in which throughout the century this demarcation was being worked 
out. During the anti-Catholic riots in Birmingham in 1867, the magistracy 
had taken charge. In the watch committee meetings following the riots, the 
councillors were far from unanimous as to who should have held responsibility 
over the police. Councillor Roberts thought it strange that whenever such
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an emergency arose, the watch committee was overruled by magistrates,
21"many of whom knew but little of the working of the police force." It
was evident, he said, that "the Watch Committee had no power whatever."
Councillor Taylor was indignant at the Committee's low standing:
If the committee were merely to do the drudgery, and to 
be ignored when the hour of trial came, he thought they 
occupied a very mean position.22
Alderman William Brinsley however informed the committee that both the magis­
trates and the justices' clerk had told him (as chairman of the watch committe 
that the magistrates had full control of the police. Brinsley, himself, con­
sidered that the magistrates had control over the police in times of disturb­
ance, although the watch committee had to be consulted in reference to ex- 
23penditure. Later in the year, Brinsley witnessed a rowdy scene during the
municipal election in St. Mary's Ward, but he took no action considering
24that "out of that [Watch] Committee he had no power over the police."
It was this opinion which largely heji the day by the 1880s.
During the Salvation Army riots in the early 1880s, deputations either
for or against the Army, would wait upon the mayor and magistrates. The
special constables sworn in at Salisbury in 1882 protested against the lax
administration of justice, in the following terms:
the magistrates have failed in their duties as guardians of 
the public order in this city in allowing the license they 
have to disturbers of the public peace, with the understanding 
that the police were not to interfere.25
And the instructions issued by the Home Office from the 1860s onwards had
always reminded the magistrates, in times of disturbance, of their common law
26duty to preserve the peace. In October 1881 the Home Office was asked for 
advice on Salvationist processions,on behalf of the justices and town coun­
cil of Stamford. The Home Secretary advised:
While it is the duty of the local magistrates by every means 
in their power to preserve the public peace, they must at the 
same time exercise their discretion...as to whether the conduct 
of a body of persons in persisting in parading the streets is 
likely to produce a riot or serious disturbance of the peace.“
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In times of disturbance, then, the absolute control over the police 
force normally held by the watch committee, and the usual severance between 
police control and magisterial office could be altered. During riots, threat­
ened or actual, powers of control over the police (as over the military) 
were assumed by the magistracy, who were invested with common law responsibil­
ities for preserving the peace; and the watch committee qua committee relin­
quished authority to them. In the exceptional circumstances of public dis­
turbance, the statutory control of the police, given to the Town Councils 
in 1835, retreated before the common law liabilities of the justice of the 
peace.
The Borough Magistracy.
It is essential, then, to deal at length with the borough magistracy,
the central particinants in the enforcement of the law of pub .lie order. The
first feature worth emphasis is the social prestige which an appointment to
28the Bench conferred. The lay magistracy, of course, worked in the light
29of critical surveillance of their habits, opinions and sentences. By 
1894, the 'Spectator' thought the incessant scrutiny of magisterial decisions 
had made the bench a 'thankless office': "an ordinary Magistrate begins to 
feel as if he were seated in a pillory."* 28930 *32 Yet, the 'puli' of the magisterial 
bench was undiminished throughout the century. Fears that the mundane duties 
of the justice of peace, or public criticism of his judgements, would reduce 
the number of candidates were unfounded. Applicants were always in excess 
of appointments in both borough and county, according to Lord Loreburn,
Lord Chancellor between 1905 and 1912. Some 20,000 were recommended but not 
appointed in England and Kales in the three and a half years between 1905 
and 1909 - a ratio, it was further estimated, of three applications to every 
one appointment. By 1911, the total number of magistrates in the commission
for both counties and boroughs in England and Kales was 23,000 (boroughs, 6600
32counties, 16400). There was a hurried scramble in the boroughs for
magisterial appointments prior to or closely following every change of 
government. Correspondence took place between local party leaders and ass­
ociations, and their parliamentary representatives. The latter ferried the 
nominations to the Lord Chancellor. Other nominations poured in from magis­
trates already on the Bench; from trade unions, cooperative societies, tem­
perance societies; from friends of nominees, and from the nominees themselves? 
In the boroughs, the bench was the ultimate official roost, a customary tri­
bute to the long years of council room service. President of the Licensed 
Victuallers Defence League in 1910 forwarded the claims of his retail traders
for a magisterial post: men "who look upon it somewhat as the distinguished
34service order of their municipal career." Although these traders had 
served as "ex-officio" magistrates, when mayor of their town, they were not 
allowed to win "this crowning position" of placement in the Commission of 
Peace.
Public estimate of the distinction a magistracy conferred was almost
uniform. One Warrington magistrate elevated to the Bench in 1870 through
the energies of Peter Rylands, Member for the town, was considered 'an enigma'
when less than delighted at his appointment:
I was, the other day, congratulating him upon his newly- 
acquired honour, when he was ungracious enough to say, 'he 
did not seek it,' 'he did not want it,' and 'he thought it 
no honour'...I think he has been treated with great consid­
eration, which, I regret to say, he does not seem to value.35
Customarily the response was one of gratitude. Letters of reply to the
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster were always appreciatory. Isaac Watt
Boulton, engineer, was appointed to the Ashton Bench in 1880 - "I am deeply
36sensible of the honor you propose to confer upon me". William Lees, cotton
manufacturer, was appointed to the Stalybridge Bench in 1887 - "I beg to
37express my sense of the honour done to me in the appointment." The ful- 
somest letters usually came from labour representatives, as John Cheetham, 
Wigan checkweighman and secretary to the Pemberton District Miners Association,
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who wrote to James Bryce in September 1892:
Kindly accept my warmest thanks and my assurance that the 
duties of this important office shall be discharged to the 
best of my ability impartially and with a due sense of 
fairness between all classes whose cases I may from time to 
time have to adjudicate on. I shall endeavour to so dis­
charge the duties of this office as shall bring dignity and 
Respect for the Law and those who administer it. I thank 
you most sincerely for your kindness thus conferred upon me 
and the great class of the community amongst whom I move.38
In both borough and county, the appointment to the bench normally conferred
real social prestige, as well as juridical authority.
The extent to which a magistracy was a decoration, an honorary award,
was reflected in the number of non-acting, and even non-resident magistrates
in the Commissions. J.W. Maitland conjectured around 1880 that 'titular
justices' constituted one-half of those named in the Commissions - justices
39who had not taken the oaths to allow them to become ’acting magistrates'.
The problem was an inveterate one. As early as 1837 one of the 'unpaid' had
pressed for an active bench, and suggested removal for those not qualifying
at Quarter Sessions within twelve months of appointment, or not attending
40a Quarter Sessions for any twelve months period. A much greater challenge
came in 1888 with the Justices of the Peace Bill, which unsuccessful?;'
recommended that justices should be disqualified if inactive for twelve months
41and their names removed from the Commission. In practice, duties consequent 
upon appointment were only gradually insisted upon by the Lord Chancellor, 
and as late as 1910 Sir Kenneth Muir Mackenzie, Permanent Secretary to the 
Lord Chancellor, said:
There is not the least doubt that there is a very large 
number of magistrates who do not do much.42
Attendance figures at Quarter and Petty Sessions for one year prior to
June 1887 for a sample of five counties revealed that approximately 27*6 of
the magistrates were completely inactive; 36% were active at either quarter
or petty sessions; and 36% were active at both quarter and petty sessions.
Active magistrates were those listed as attending sessions at some date betweei
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June 1886 and June 1887. The highest proportion of inactive magistrates 
was in attendance at quarter sessions, where 59% were inactive. In compar-
ison, at petty sessions, 67% of the justices were active, 33% were inactive.
For the boroughs, attendance figures at petty sessions for 1910 showed
that for a sample of all the boroughs in ten counties (or 3155 magistrates) ,
68% (2158) attended regularly. When occasional attendances were included,
44approximately 87% (2755) of the magistrates were included. The borough
figures for 1910 are not strictly comparable with the county figures for 1886-
87, since no definition was given of 'occasional' and 'regular' attendance
in the former case. If it is presumed, however, that all those listed as
attending petty sessions in 1910, both regularly and occasionally (87%)
would have been listed as active magistrates in 1887, then, in petty sessions,
borough magistrates placed in the commission were a more energetic body than
their county opposites. Of course the scale of attendance in boroughs could
vary between magistrates. Of eleven active justices in Wigan in 1866 only
45six realized attendances of any magnitude at petty sessions. And individual
L-oroughs could still find difficulty in forming a court. The clerk to the
justices of Stalybridge pressed the Conservative member for the town, T.H.
Sidebottom, to remedy the situation of eight justices attending to their duties
46out of a possible fifteen - "the rest never put in appearance." Prior to
this, the Chancellor of the Ducliyhad been informed of the Stalybridge Bench
- "There are 13 borough magistrates of whom 5 attend regularly 5 never attend
and 3 seldom."47 In 1909, St. Helens Trades and Labour Council complained
that courts could not begin since magistrates had not arrived:
The officials of the Court were, consequently, reduced 
to the necessity of going out to seek some individual 
Magistrate in order that the business of the Court might 
be proceeded with.4®
But it was the counties which carried the largest 'dead weight' of inactive 
magistrates, notably from the aristocracy, clergy and squirearchy. Even in
4Sthe counties the middle-class magistrates were the most active on the bench.
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But if a more active magistracy reflected a higher sense of responsibility 
for magisterial duties in the boroughs, it did not reduce the reluctance to 
remove inactive justices from the commission. Clerk to the justices in 
Bristol, Mr. T.H. Gore, was extremely reticent to admit the principle that 
non-acting magistrates should be removed. No attempt had been made to ask 
the Lord Chancellor to reduce those on the Clerk's non-acting list (some 
sixteen justices in 1910 out of 79 in the commission), and Gore much pre­
ferred to use a 'working list' of attending justices, separate from the full
,. _ . . . . 50list of justices m  the commission.
By 1910 however, according to Sir Kenneth Mackenzie, there was an informal 
system of removal for inactivity, in which new appointments were made depend­
ent upon the resignation of the inactive magistrates in each county and borougl 
The Lord Chancellor's letter suggesting resignation was usually complied 
with, but the implication of disparagement at being 'removed' from the 
commission meant that some inactive magistrates were truculent - a./d where
r ino consent was given, the non-attendant stayed in the commission In 
Lancashire assurance was demanded that the new appointee would share in the 
duties of the bench. Tom Milburn, ironfounder of Stalybridge, in December 
1884 replied:
as the Right Hone the Chancellor of the Duchy, simply 
requires of me the assurance that I am 'prepared to devote 
the time for the proper discharge of my Magisterial duties'
I give him that assurance unreservedly.52
But any device to increase the number of active magistrates ran into official
reluctance to malign a magistrate by removal. Lord Shuttleworth, Lieutenant
for Lancashire, and a former Chancellor of the Duchy, evidenced how removal
from the bench was considered a 'serious stigma' on a man:
it would be a grave thing for me to recommend to the 
Chancellor of the Duchy that a man should be removed against 
whom there has been no accusation of misconduct.53
For the same reason the Lord Chancellor kept no roll of attendance, only
the ad hoc arrangement in which inactive justices were canvassed before new
appointments made. Non-attendance itself was not an offence considered 
sufficiently grave for removal. Sir Kenneth Mackenzie admitted that 'ade­
quate attendance' was necessary, but:
a man might be a good and useful magistrate to the county . 
who did not go often to petty sessions or quarter sessions.
Similar arrangements existed for non-residence. From 1874, justices'
clerks in Lancashire boroughs sent lists of those who had become disqualified
in the previous year to the Duchy office. James Kirk, coal merchant of
Stalybridge, ceased to occupy any premises in the town, whilst still an owner
of property, but two years later in 1876 he again occupied premises, and,
the clerk wrote - "I apprehend is again qualified to act".^ Removal from
the Commission, as opposed to mere disqualification to act, was also pressed
for non-residence, although usually resisted. In April 1881 the Corporation
of Ashton-under-Lyne applied to the chancellor of the duchy for a new
commission which would contain only active magistrates. In consequence Henry
Vernon was told that since he had net acted for over eight years and was now
medical officer of health for Southport, his name would be omitted from the
Ashton Commission. Vernon was horrified by this information,
inasmuch as I value the position and so far as I am aware 
have done nothing to forfeit it. The change of residence 
was for health and other reasons and so long as I was 
resident I attended to my magisterial duties regularly and 
diligently and during the Murphy riots at considerable risk 
to my life...
It is hardly necessary to add that the removal of a magistrate's 
name from the Commission of the peace is prima facie a great 
disparagement to his reputation. 1 should constantly be under 
the necessity of explaining for years to come how it was that 
having been once a Magistrate I had ceased to be one, and 
the explanation might not appear to everyone sufficiently 
good to remove the stigma which the bare statement of the re­
moval carries with it prima facie.56
To avoid the injury to his social position he was prepared to go to Ashton 
"often enough to attend according to the rota regularly as when resident."
In furtherance of his case Vernon wrote to the chancellor of the ducfy,John 
Bright, to whom he reiterated:
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I should feel very acutely that removal from the Commission 
would be a personal and social degradation.57
At first Bright thought he should remain in the Commission, since he did
not want to place him on the Southport Bench, "where his party are fully
58represented", and since his case appeared sound. The clerk to the duchy
drafted a letter which stated that if Vernon insisted on placement in the
59new Commission, then the chancellor would agree. But, this letter of
April 21st was altered to read that Vernon's request would be submitted to
the chancellor; and, after Bright had made further enquiries into Vernon's
case, the clerk wrote on May 9th:
under the circumstances of your case he considers that the 
usual rule ought to be adhered to and that as you cannot act 
as a magistrate for the Boro, your name should be omitted 
from the new Commission.60
By the end of the century however the Chancellor of the Duchy was prepared
to leave the decision as to disqualification with the non-resident nimself,
if he was anxious to remain active; and removal of the non-resident from
the commission without his approval was not usually enforced. Elsewhere a
similar reluctance was evident. Sir Kenneth Mackenzie said:
I do not know of anyone being actually removed on account 
of non-residence 61
To inspire all to attend for fear of removal from the commission would
have been contrary to the principle that the bench was a dignity as well as
a duty - and would incidentally have flooded the benches since the commissions
were customarily over-loaded for everyday needs. The magistrate was thus
placed in the commission for life, either recognition of the economic and
social position occupied by the appointee, or reward for long years of
faithful service to a political party. Lord Loreburn encapsulated perfectly
the distinction thought to accrue from appointment when he said, before the
Commission on the Selection of Justices:
The position of justice has always been regarded as an honour 
and the crown of an honourable and successful career. Of 
late years it has, I think, more and more become an object of
social ambition among considerable classes in the 
population. I am glad to believe that it stands high 
among local distinctions. It is regarded as something 
like a decoration...There are a great number of people who 
wish to be appointed merely as a social distinction.62
The social distinction of a magisterial appointment in borough and
county was formally conferred by the Lord Chancellor, except in the Duchy
63of Lancaster where the chancellor of the duchy was responsible. Advice on 
county magistracies was taken by the Lord Chancellor from Lords Lieutenant, 
a privilege demanded by the latter as a de facto right. The lords lieutenant 
also looked enviously at the reformed corporations in 1835. In fact, recom­
mendations for borough appointments in the late 1830s, rested with the Home 
Secretary. Lord John Russell, the Liberal Home Secretary at that time, was 
berated by Conservative spokesmen for usurping the Lord Chancellor's powers.^ 
Liberal party defenders insisted that Russell was in an especially good pos­
ition, merely to recommend men to the Chancellor; but Lord Khamcliffe still 
thought,
It was a new thing to hear of a Secretary of State inter­
fering in such matters.^5
Russell's successor as Home Secretary from August 1839, Lord Normanby, remain­
ed personally involved in appointments to the borough commissions.^^ And, 
under the next Conservative government, the Home Secretary, Sir James Graham, 
was, according to Joseph Parkes in 1841, "swamping the Municipal magistracy." 
In the Duchy of Lancaster also, the Home Secretary was involved, before 1858, 
in the selection of borough magistrates. The Home Secretary examined the
lists submitted by the boroughs, and when satisfied requested that the chan-
6 8cellor of the duchy issue the commission. In April 1858 however the selec- 69
69tion of magistrates was conferred on the chancellor of the duchy. When 
Warrington town council memorialized the Home Secretary for additional magis­
trates, Spencer Walpole minuted:
as the Chancellor has thought it advisable that he should 
appoint the Borough Magistrates in other parts of England,
I have agreed to leave the appointment of the Duchy's 
Magistrates to the Chancellor of the Duchy.
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The duchy office was at first reluctant to assume this duty, considering that
it lacked the means possessed by the Home Office for scrutinizing candidates. 
But shortly after mid-century, the pattern was established that the Chancellor 
of the Duchy and the Lord Chancellor held undisputed authority in the actual 
conferment of magistracies, and this remained the practice for the rest of the 
century.
In conferring magistracies there were certain ground rules or criteria
which the Lord Chancellor was expected to follow in principle. There seemed
fairly general accord that the appointee should be a respected member of his
community, with sufficient wealth or property to remain above bribery, and
with the leisure to be available for court room service. Agreement between
the Lord Chancellor and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was reached
on the magistrates for the new commission for Stalybridge in 1859, but
Randal Kidgway was omitted, because, according to Nassau Senior:
he is not in a sufficiently independent position to be made 
a Magistrate: he is merely the paid manager of some cotton 
works.72
There was possibly stronger agreement amongst those on the county bench over 
the criteria to be used by the lord lieutenant. In 1838 the Duke of Welling­
ton's formula for county appointments was very exclusive:
Magistrates must be gentlemen of wealth, worth, consideration, 
and education; that they should have been educated for the bar, 
if possible; and that, above all, they should be associated with, 
and be respected by the gentry of the country.73
The emphasis was on large incomes, leisured life and a common value system.
Breaking into this elite was difficult, and there were recurrent examples of
merchants, manufacturers and farmers failing to find a sponsor, or unsuccess-
74ful in face of the lord lieutenant's scrutiny. The social exclusiveness 
of the county bench was severely criticized however in the latter half of 
the century by the Liberal party, who progressively lost supporters capable 
of satisfying such high standards; and by the early representatives of 
Labour whose parliamentary questions concerning the county magistracy invar­
7
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iably raised the proportion of working-class justices. But the shift 
in criteria away from wealth and station was by no means rapid; and in the 
counties at the end of the century, was difficult to detect. Amendment of 
the law in regard to qualifications for appointment of county justices was 
continually resisted, as in 1897 when the Society of Chairmen of Quarter 
Sessions objected that a new Bill held no proper securities that those qual­
ified by education and experience to exercise judicial functions, would 
alone be appointed.7<* Not until 1906 was the property qualification of £100 
rateable value dropped, the only positive step taken against the landowners 
predominating on the county bench. Yet, before the First World War, this 
measure hardly transformed the composition of the county magistracy.77 In 
the boroughs the criteria had been slowly re-defined, in response to demands 
for a more representative magistracy, until Campbell-Bannerman could say in 
1907:
I think a seat on the Bench ought to be a reward fcr local 
public service, but not for either social rank, property 
connection, or any other consideration of that kind.78
Yet this was a proposal for the future rather than description of the immed­
iate. In practice the social composition of the bench in both county and 
borough reflected only a modest deviation from the criteria of wealth, 
leisure and high social standing.
There is a larger point of substance here. Appointment to the bench 
awarded social prestige, but it also implied the prior attainment of social 
standing in the local community. Magisterial appointment was the seal of 
approval for a social reputation slowly built up by energetic commitment 
to local economic and social interests. And this was particularly the case 
in the boroughs. Personal cases best illustrate the involvement in urban 
life of candidates to the bench, and the way that local influence and author­
ity was vital to recommendation for magisterial service. Nominations sent to 
the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster invariably itemized the nominee's
75
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wide-ranging service to the community. W.R. Deakin, nominee of the Wigan
Free Church Council in 1906, was treasurer of the Liberal 'Two Hundred',
an experienced town councillor (having lost his seat at the last election
in 1905 on the Education Question), president of the Temperance Council,
treasurer of the Wesleyan Mission, property owner, large employer of labour
as a wholesale preserve manufacturer, and well-known for his philanthropic 
79work. The 'leading citizens' whom the Lord Chancellor appointed to the 
commission of peace were not only leading business men and manufacturers, but 
also members of a social elite which saw public office as a natural exten­
sion to their control in other areas. Those who courted appointment to the 
bench were the same individuals who already held economic authority and 
social standing in the community, and who had often blooded themselves 
running for municipal office. It was those therefore who held leadership and 
authority in other spheres who received the nomination to the bench. Their 
unquestioned social legitimacy to secure appointment rested on a toral 
status acquired through involvement in a diverse number of areas within the 
local community. One Preston appointee to the bench had no doubt what 
explained his candidature:
This would appear to be a recognition of the services I have 
given to my native town as a Councillor and Alderman and as 
Mayor during the past 20 years.80
In consequence, the overall social composition of the borough magistracy 
was heavily weighted in favour of the urban middle-class. The first appoint­
ments in the 1830s set the pattern. Industrialists and businessmen of some
81substance secured placements. By 1885, middle-class magistrates dominated
the borough benches: merchants, manufacturers, bankers, surgeons, brewers,
solicitors and wealthy tradesmen. When doctors, physicians and barristers
are included, some 75% of half of the borough commissions of peace in 1885 were
82composed of middle-class justices. The beneficiaries of municipal reform 
in 1835 had extensively annexed the magistracy. There was, naturally, a
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diversity between the boroughs, often reflecting the dominant form of 
industry situated there. In Glossop (Derbyshire) in 1867, the first five 
magistrates were all millowners, representatives of the town's 'cottonocracy' 
In Ashton-under-Lyne in 1885, out of 41 on the commission, there were 33 
resident and active magistrates. Six were merchants, two surgeons, one solic 
itor, four gentlemen, and fifteen were associated with cotton manufacture.
A similar pattern emerges for Stalybridge, Blackburn, Bolton, Oldham and
Preston. At Wigan,however, the cotton trade shared the bench with merchants
84and colliery proprietors. In Nottingham and Macclesfield, the bench was 
weighted in favour of the lace and silk trades respectively. In southern 
towns like Folkestone and Hastings, the bench contained a larger number of 
bankers, doctors and 'gentlemen'.
Within the parliamentary returns of borough justices in 1885, and again
in 1892, working-class occupations are much harder to find. According to '
Home Secretary Asquith, in the year prior to May 1893, sixty-nine working
men had been appointed to borough benches, thirty-three of whom had been
85appointed in the Duchy of Lancaster. But judging by the overwhelming numbe
of applications received by Labour party headquarters in 1906 and 1907, from
local Trades Councils and Labour Representation Committees, working-class
magistrates were still exceptionally few in number. James Sexton, of the
National Union of Dock Labourers, spoke of the Liverpool magistracy - "We
86have practically no labour representation on the bench here..." By 1910, 
Ben Turner, alderman and magistrate of Batley, was dissatisfied at the 
speed with which the borough bench in Yorkshire was becoming socially more 
representative. Four of the main Yorkshire towns (Leeds, Bradford, Hudders­
field and Halifax) listed by Turner, had thirteen 'representative working men 
out of 257 on the commissions; and the latest fourteen appointments to the 
Batley and Dewsbury commissions had ignored working-class nominees. Arthur 
Henderson, one of the commissioners on the Royal Commission of 1910 thought
3:
it was increasingly common practice for trades councils to sponsor working
men for the bench, and Ben Turner had attended the Commission as represen-
88tative of the Yorkshire Federation of Trade and Labour Councils. In 1905
William Lodge, secretary of the Ashton Trades and Labour Council, was
89appointed to the Ashton bench. In Bristol, according to the clerk to the 
justices the six to eight working-class magistrates (out of a total commiss­
ion of sixty active justices) were "generally members, or nominated as mem-
90bers of the Trades Council." One was a former president and secretary 
of the Trades Council, recently appointed as superintendent of the Bath lab­
our exchange. Borough appointments were given, significantly, to those 
representatives of organized labour who could clearly show a social legiti­
macy and respectability. Only those were appointed who could claim to hold
authority over large numbers of working-class people, which would ensure
91that their summary decisions were accepted. But few working men, even 
trade union officials, were made magistrates before the turn of the century. 
The lowest rung of the social ladder penetrated in any quantity by the Lord 
Chancellor was that which supported the shopkeeper and wealthy tradesman.
The borough commissions retained their excessively 'bourgeois' composition and 
only gradually admitted representatives from the working-class. The accel­
eration in this sphere had to await a stronger labour party complement on 
the town councils, and the consequent allotment of magisterial appointments. 
The working man held a legal legitimacy to be appointed, insofar as there 
were no restrictive qualifications, yet it was those who secured authority 
and leadership in other spheres who received the nomination to the bench.
The two major parties alone had the ear of the chancellor, and by the grace 
of the local elites in the boroughs, the politically unaffiliated and the 
working man appeared in the commission.
It remains to emphasize the overlap between local government and the 
magisterial bench. The notables whose involvement in urban government placed
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them in a distinct social strata, who formed the political elite of the 
towns, were the ones commonly elevated to the bench. The sharp division 
of functions, enshrined within the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, 
between those who held judicial powers and those who were responsible for 
urban government (including police administration), was in practice severely 
depreciated. The documents leave a vivid impression that the hallowed divis­
ion between judicial and administrative functions of local government was 
neither available nor desired. Between 1839 and 1899, of one hundred and
eighty-eight justices who had been or were on the Birmingham Bench, ninety-
92eight or approximately one half had been or were on the Town Council.' In 
1859, Birmingham Council complained to the Lord Chancellor that only one in 
the present Commission of Peace was a member of the Council, and argued 
that it was necessary "for the convenience of the Council" and for "the gen­
eral good government of the borough" that the Co.nmission should "contain
93the names of several members of the Council.". The intimate association 
which the magisterial Bench maintained with local government was character­
istic of probably a majority of boroughs. In Basingstoke in the early 1880s, 
the Council nominated to the Commission only those who had been or were 
fellow-Councillors. A self-styled radical on Basingstoke Council vainly
argued that there was no reason "why a man outside this Corporation should
94not occupy the position of magistrate." But the other councillors insisted
on the selection of 'tried horses' - those who had first been selected by
the burgesses. In 1910 a Hereford magistrate similarly told the Royal
Commission on the Selection of Justices that of twenty-seven magistrates,
twenty were or had been town councillors, "so that the Bench consists almost
95entirely of persons who have been elected to the local public bodies." ‘ He 
felt this imposed strains on those carrying both judicial and council work, 
and made attendance in court unreliable. It was this pattern, present in a 
host of towns, which the Home Office discovered in 1881. The case of "R. v.
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Gibbons" temporarily threw the clerks to the justices into panic, since 
it had been ruled that where fines had to be paid to the Corporation, magis­
trates who were also members of the Council were disqualified from adjud­
icating.^ Offences under the borough bye-laws, assaults upon borough con­
stables, and so on, were trapped under the ruling. As the Preston clerk 
complained:
...if nearly two thirds of the magistrates are disqualified 
in these cases the Magisterial Business cannot be carried on 
and must shortly come to a dead lock.97
Of twenty-nine magistrates in Preston, sixteen were members of the Corporation 
Similar statistics were recorded for other boroughs - Norwich (12 out of 28 
active magistrates were on the Council); Stockport (18 out of 25 active jus­
tices); Dover (all but one of the 14 active justices); and Bath (a majority 
of the 18 magistrates were on the Town Council). In addition, fovtv-six 
other boroughs wrote to the Home Office and described a similar confusion
S8of bench and council. By the end of the year, however, relief was afforded
by "R. v. Handsley", which established that 'substantial interest' alone
99would disqualify a magistrate.
Thereafter the issue was occasionally raised. In Winchester in 1907,a 
magistrate objected to other magistrates, who were councillors, adjudicating 
on corporation prosecutions. Significantly, he gave his view of the role 
of the local magistracy - a distant echo from the Act of 1835. Where diff­
erences arose between corporation and citizen, he said,,
the bench as in the past should be in the position of a court 
of appeal by whom all who may be concerned would feel that jus­
tice was being meted out.I0®
In 1910, the clerk to the Newcastle justices was still concerned with this
problem. He thought that too many magistrates should not be members of the
local council since, through its various committees, the council was a
busy suitor in the magistrates' court:
I have to be very careful... that the magistrates do not take part 
in any of those cases in which they may have directed proceedings 
to be taken.101
The overlap of officials affected not only the prosecution of education or
sanitation cases, but also the police prosecutions which were the responsibil
ity of the watch committee of the council. A Gravesend councillor in 1897
informed the Home Office that at a recent selection for the committees of
the council, nine were appointed to the watch committee, six of whom were
borough magistrates. The councillor raised objections at the time:
I expressed my opinion that it was illegal for these gentlemen to 
sit as members of the Watch Committee hearing the different charges 
brought before them, by the police and others, in their capacity 
as members of that Committee and to adjudicate upon the same cases 
in their capacity as Magistrates upon the Bench.
The Home Office's reply went against the councillor. Members of the watch
committee who were also magistrates would be disqualified in cases in which
the police had been directed by them to prosecute, but if they had not been
present when the prosecution was resolved upon then they could act. There
was thus no reason why magistrates should not be on the watch committee.
Yet it was a seminal way of linking the local authority and the beech; of
103linking the personnel in local government and justice. The tignt overlap 
of personnel jeopardized the expected independence of judicial from municipal 
authority; it ensured that the magistracy in fact formed part of the elite 
of provincial notables involved in urban government.
The extent to which the magistracy formed an integral part of the social 
elite which dominated borough government, is more understandable when the 
appointment of the magistracy is examined more closely. Nominations to the 
bench sometimes emerged from town council meetings, and regularly from the 
local political notables of both main parties. But first, there follows a 
section on the jurisdiction and authority of the borough magistracy, in 
which it is argued that the magistracy claimed a position of independence, 
both from the county magistracy and the central government: and this was 
particularly the case with regard to the maintenance of public order.
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The Borough Magistracy - Jurisdiction and Authority
The actual jurisdiction held by the magistrates in the borough courts 
was dependent on the juridical authority granted to or claimed by the partic­
ular town. In the boroughs, the administration of justice held none of 
the simplicity of quarter sessions management in the counties. Sir James 
Fitzjames Stephen was less than definitive in content and tone in his "His­
tory of the Criminal Law" when describing the borough courts of summary
104jurisdiction and quarter sessions. However, he wrote before the Municipal 
Corporations Act of 1882 which was the clearest statute for description of 
the borough courts and jurisdictions.  ^ Confusion arose over the different 
types of borough in respect of judicial institutions and authority. There 
was a hierarchy which ran from boroughs without their own commission of peace 
which shared jurisdiction with the county magistracy; to boroughs with 
their own commission, their own quarter sessions, and a'non-intromittant' 
clause in the town's charter, which excluded the county bench from all 
jurisdiction.County magistrates exercised jurisdiction with the borough 
magistracy, in those boroughs with a commission of the peace but no court 
of quarter sessions, and also in quarter sessions boroughs where an ancient 
charter did not exclude them. Boroughs like Ashton-under-Lyne, Clitheroe 
and Bury, with commissions granted in 1849, 1873 and 1877 respectively, 
were without courts of quarter sessions, and the county magistracy held con­
current jurisdiction. The county bench also held jurisdiction in Bolton, 
Blackburn and Burnley where there were separate commissions, and also 
quarter sessions courts granted in 1839, 1886 and 1893, but where no charter 
excluded the county justices. In all these boroughs however, with and
without Quarter Sessions, the concurrent jurisdiction was not in fact exer-
107cised; and this seems to have been the common pattern. In Wolverhampton,
West Bromwich and Wednesbury, there was no 'non-intromittant' clause in any 
of the charters, but again the county bench did not exercise jurisdiction
A
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within the boroughs. The pattern applied to the Midlands capital of
Birmingham, according to the stipendiary of the city in 1900:
The Warwickshire county magistrates have jurisdiction to sit 
in this court, but they never come; indeed, since I have been 
here (11 years) no county magistrate has ever sat as a county 
magistrate.109
By 1913, a return of summary courts showed that the county justices did 
not act in most of the 172 boroughs where they possessed concurrent juris­
diction. Exclusive jurisdiction of the borough magistracy was reserved,
in principle, for boroughs like Derby and Bristol where the county magistracy 
were excluded by virtue of their charters granted respectively in 1682 and 
1373. Similarly in Stamford, Leicester and Wigan, exclusive jurisdiction
was established by charters granted in 1273, 1464 and 1662. In all, there
111were seventy-four boroughs in 1913 with such exclusive jurisdiction.
But the main point remains that., in practice, the borough magistracy were
rarely disturbed by the county bench in their summary jurisdiction of the
criminal law. The urban benches established themselves as independent in-
liers, cropping out at points within the larger county boundary.
In 1888, 216 boroughs in England and Wales had separate Commissions
of the peace, with or without separate quarter sessions. In 103 boroughs,
mainly those with above 10,000 population (74 in number), quarter sessions 
112had been granted. By 1910, there were 251 boroughs with separate
commissions of the peace, 103 boroughs with separate courts of quarter 
sessions. To obtain a separate court of quarter sessions, every borough 
had to petition for one, agreeing to employ a Recorder whose appointment 
was vested in the C r o w n . T h e  award of quarter sessions was highly valued 
in the realm of civic vanity.*1^  But cheese-paring attitudes could some­
times overpower civic pride, as when the proposal in 1886 to gain sessions 
for Rochdale was rejected by the town council. The lay magistrates did
not act at quarter sessions, holding no criminal jurisdiction. The recorder 
of the borough was the sole judge of the court, a trained barrister ot at
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least five years standing. His was an honourable office, not well paid, 
but hardly over-worked; demanding attendance at sessions for only a few 
days a year.*^ The other professional ingredient of urban justice, was 
the stipendiary magistrate. His legal talents prevailed in an increasing 
number of boroughs, where it was felt necessary to advance the regularity
and promptitude in administration of justice 118 The Stipendiary Magistrates
Act of 1863 allowed urban districts of more than 25,000 inhabitants, which
were not boroughs, also to apply 119 Yet, even by 1910, only twenty boroughs
and urban areas had stipendiaries: testimony, for Maitland, that the lay
120magistracy could manage without a trained lawyer. He omitted to mention
the nature of the reasons for refusing local petitions to appoint a stipendiai
In particular, they were a threat to unpaid justices, jealous of losing their
power and authority. Reluctance to surrender those power- often vetoed a 
. „ 121stipendiary appointment.
Furthest removed from the professional stipendiary was the Mayor (a^d 
ex-Mayor) as 'ex-officio' magistrate; the only reminder of the unreformcd 
corporations, the only corporate official who experienced automatic confer­
ment of judicial power. In 1835, J.S. Mill had considered the retention of 
'ex-officio' justices a deviation from the principle "of withdrawing all
judicial powers from the functionaries who carry on the local administration",
122abut he was wrong to predict the annulment of 'ex-officio' powers. The
'ex-officio' was certainly the only magistrate beyond the Lord Chancellor's 
jurisdiction, at least until 1906. In the last half of the century there 
was a recurrent correspondence between the provinces and the Home Office in 
which the 'ex-officio's' powers were challenged, principally in small boroughfl 
without a separate commission of the p e a c e . I n  boroughs with their own 
bench of magistrates, disagreement was also possible. In Birmingham in 1859, 
the Mayor's precedence over the borough magistrates was questioned. The Mayoi, 
rested his case on the provision in the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835,
39
that the mayor shall 'have precedence in all places within the borough'.
For two years the mayor (supported by the town council) and the justices
were in conflict, during which time the mayor was not allowed to preside
over the meetings of magistrates. A Queen's Bench decision in 1860 settled
123the issue in favour of the justices, but in August 1861 a bill was passed 
conferring precedence on the mayor over the borough magistrates - "be entitled 
to take the chair at all meetings of justices held within the borough."*^8 
The 'ex-officio' thus retained an influential role in the borough legal struc­
ture.^^5 If the magistrates in the commission could prove awkward, the 
town councils invariably considered the two years' training whilst mayor 
and ex-mayor a worthy qualification for permanent appointment to the commis­
sion of peace. It was the Birmingham town council in 1859 which had memor­
ialized Lord Chancellor Cheirsford asking for more council members to be 
placed in the commission, and which had stressed that in the last twenty years
since incorporation, only eleven mayors had found theiT- way on to the commis-
125sion, and for the last seven years no mayor had been included. The
mayoral chair was thus considered a preliminary to permanent appointment to
the bench, a period of legal training whilst jointly on the bench and chair-
126man of the watch committee. In Halifax in 1883, the new mayor was welcomed 
to the bench with an expression of hope that his full appointment would 
follow:
for when a man's fellow-citizens had such an opinion of him 
as to elect him chief magistrate, that very confidence ought 
to be a sufficient justification, after his term of office, for 
continuing him on the bench...12/
So too in Preston the ex-mayor was nominated for a magistracy on the grounds 
that:
It has been almost the invariable practice to place all who have 
served the office of Mayor in the Borough Commission sooner or 
later and generally before the expiration of the two years.*28
By the end of the nineteenth-century, labour organizations consistently
supported 'ex-officio' magistrates in the belief that the 'ex-officio'
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approximated closer to an elective magistracy, and in the knowledge that
it was the only accessible, if temporary, route to the bench for the lower
129class, with the promise of eventual elevation into the commission.
In boroughs, both with and without separate commissions of the peace, 
the magistracy were given almost unimpeded discretionary powers in the admin­
istration of justice, an independence rarely fettered by the Home Office or 
the Lord Chancellor. Power to remove magistrates from the commission rested 
with the Crown (or its representative, the Lord Chancellor), but it was 
exercised in exceptional circumstances as the Royal Commission on the Selec­
tion of Justices was told:
The removal of a magistrate from office for any cause but serious 
misconduct, or proved incapacity, or disqualification might be 
permissible in law, but would be regarded as an act of an uncon­
stitutional character.140
After 1906 when the Lord Chancellor was given authority over 'ex-officio'
magistrates, it was again rare to remove one for misconduct ir- the temporary
141exercise of his judicial functions. Complaints against magisterial mis­
conduct often went to the Home Office first, which either sent them on to the 
Lord Chancellor, as in the case of Honiton in 1882; or instructed the com­
plainant to send the allegations direct to the Lord Chancellor, as in July
1884 when William Booth complained that the Worthing magistrates had pub-
142licly declined to protect the Salvation Army. Cases of misconduct were 
also sent direct to the Lord Chancellor - or to the Chancellor of the Duchy 
of Lancaster, who received information in August 1901 that Robert Halliwell, 
Wigan magistrate, had failed to declare his shareholding interests in a case 
before the licensing committee.143 Lord James arranged an interview with 
Halliwell, after which a letter of reprimand was sent to him, but he was 
left in the commission.144 The Home Office could however act independently 
in cases of misconduct of justice. As "Harrison v. Bush" (25 L.J.R.25) 
decided, a magistrate was appointed and removed from office by the Crown, and
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the Secretary of State could advise the Crown just as much as 
the Lord Chancellor to remove a man from the Commission of the 
Peace.l4b
The Home Secretary, according to H.B.Simpson (principal clerk of the Home
Office) in 1907, "as representing the Crown, and as Minister of Justice, has
a certain undefined authority over magistrates."1*15 He was able to call for
reports from magistrates, issue circulars to all magistrates, and proffer
advice to individual benches who asked for it; but, said Simpson:
in such cases care is taken to avoid any appearance of interference 
with the discretion with which magistrates are vested by the law.
The Secretary of State has no power to quash or modify any orders 
made by magistrates ...
There was particular Home Office reluctance to intervene in times of
disturbance when the mayor, magistrates and watch committee were held to be
responsible for preserving the peace. In March 1868 William Murphy, ar.ti-
catholic orator, asked the Secretary of State to grant him protection "from
Fenian and Popish Mob Law" in Rochdale to which the Home Office replied that
the local authorities were responsible for borough law enforcement,
and that Mr. Hardy cannot interfere witli them in the exercise 
of their discretion 6 presumes that they know 8 will do their 
duty.148
In April Lord Denbigh wrote to Gathorne Hardy complaining that the Irish were
not protected against attack in Stalybridge and Ashton - and suggested the
government should be more energetic. Hardy replied privately to Denbigh
that the government were not responsible, that it had always assisted the
local authorities, but that the Home Office "has no means of action but
149through the local authorities." ' The usual presumption was that the magis­
trates would not neglect their duties. Earlier in 1868, Sir George Bowyer, 
on the evidence of a fellow-catholic, had asked for the Ashton magistrates to 
be reprimanded for failure to act, but when the Ashton mayor sent a full 
description of the magistrates' exertions, the Home Office concluded that 
no blame attached to the Ashton authorities.150 Similarly, during the 
Salvation Army riots in the 1880s, the customary Home Office response to
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complaints against the magistracy was that the Secretary of State had no 
power to interfere. Bramwell Booth's request to the Home Secretary for 
protection for the 'Army' in Honiton, in December 1882, provoked the official 
minute - "There is no evidence here upon which the S of S can interfere.
He has hitherto refused to do so and that must be adhered to."151 In Sep­
tember 1881, Adolphus Liddell, Permanent Under Secretary of State, had minuted 
in response to G. Sclater Booth's information that Basingstoke was restive 
again after the recent imprisonment of opponents of the 'Army':
It would never do for S of S to take one side or the other in 
this matter. He has told the magistrates what their duty is § 
how to do it, S beyond that I would not step a foot.^
The Home Office were always anxious to avoid entering local partisan dis­
putes. They occasionally sent a copy of the complaint to the mayor or to 
the clerk to the justices of the borough, with a reminder that the preser­
vation of the peace rested .'dth the local authorities. They commonly provided 
advice on the steps to be taken against public processions and meetings; and 
less frequently asked for a full report from the magistiates, and questioned
1'why tne ringleaders of the disturbances had not been apprehended and punished.' 
But more often official minutes drafted replies which established that local 
autonomy meant the responsibility for enforcing the law rested with the borougl 
judicial bodies and not with the Home Secretary. William Booth in July 1884 
complained that resolutions had been passed in Worthing calling on the magis­
trates to refuse protection to the Salvationists; and further - "It appears 
to be clear that this advice has met with only too ready response from the 
local Bench" - since they refused to grant summonses against certain 'skel­
etons'.154 The Home Office deliberated on whether to send Booth's letter to 
the magistrates or to reply that the Secretary of State could not interfere 
with the discretion of the magistrates in refusing or granting summonses. 
Liddell preferred the last course, "as these foolish men bring these attacks 
on themselves very unsuccessfully."155 Home Office officials between 1880
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and 1885 made a habit of unmasking their attitude to the Salvation Army 
as when 'Captain' Lizzie Rushforth wrote from Basingstoke in 1881 complain­
ing that no police protection was given. The Home Office minute began:
It is the old story. The Salvation Army provokes a riot by 
processions and harangues in the streets and is much 
aggrieved because the police cannot protect them from moles­
tation.
The magistrates, according to the official minute, had heard the cross summons
and dismissed them both, "giving good advice which proLably neither party will
157atake. There seems to be nothing to enquire about." Por the Home Office,
the borough magistracy were to be trusted to deal impartially with both sides 
in anti-catholic or anti-salvationist disturbances. Private complaints from 
an aggrieved party were referred back to the locality, even when the complain­
ant insisted that the local authorities were inactive or directly complicit.
As Crown-appointed officials, the lay magistracy were not lightly removed 
from the Commission of Peace by any government, and their discretionary 
authority was rarely challenged.
The Appointment of the Magistracy
It is now necessary to examine more closely the form of appointment to the 
magistracy. So far, only the role of the Lord Chancellor, or the Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, has been mentioned. Contemporary political theory 
also emphasized this feature in the mode of appointment to the borough magis­
tracy, since it constituted an elemental part of the reform of the urban legal 
structure. Investing the Crown with the sole right of appointment to the 
borough commissions of peace was part of the larger attempt to separate 
municipal government from the administration of justice. Shortly after the 
Municipal Reform Act of i835 became law, the Duke of Wellington spoke of the 
"extreme importance of dividing the administration of justice from the 
Municipal Government of the Corporations." Incorporation of that principle 
into the bill had been the reason, he said, "that 1 gave my vote in favour
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of vesting exclusively in the Crown the appointment of Municipal Magis- 
158trates." The administration of justice was to be kept free from a close 
liaison with the municipal authorities by rejection of a self-elected, 
corporative magistracy, characteristic of unreformed corporations; and by 
refusing popular election of the magistracy by the ratepayers. Although 
the Whig government promised a purer administration of justice, it was the 
Lords who were able to take the credit for amending the Whig bill, by in­
sisting that the appointment of borough justices should rest with the Crown 
and not with the municipal corporations themselves. Crown responsibility 
for magisterial appointments has continued to form part of the judgment that 
the 1835 Act established a separation of judicial and administrative functions 
According to Redlich, "magisterial was severed from corporate office":
Hitherto the municipal magistracy had been as a rule locally 
elected or appointed and had nearly always come from the cor­
porate body. Henceforth the magistrates were to be appointed
by the Crown...159
Old assumptions within the unreformed corporations that administrative and 
judicial duties were coterminous, that the office of magistrate could be 
combined with corporate office, were disowned in 1835. Degeneration into 
partisan justice, a breakdown of faith in the urban bench, was to be avoided 
by a magistracy which was clearly seen to be unimplicated in municipal 
affairs. The point is worth further assessment, however, for which it is 
necessary to restore the narrative of events in the 1830s, when the appoint­
ment of the borough magistracy was, in principle, put on a different footing.
A major anxiety of the commissioners investigating the boroughs in 1833 
and 1834 had been the appalling state of the corporative magistracy, not 
only in the exclusive fashion in which they had immunized themselves from the 
communities which they governed, but in the complete retraction of faith in 
the justice they dispensed. In Leicester the distrust had party political 
content, with "suspicion of the integrity of the magistrates in cases where 
political opponents are concerned, especially in cases of a political
of vesting exclusively in the Crown the appointment of Municipal Magis- 
158trates." The administration of justice was to be kept free from a close 
liaison with the municipal authorities by rejection of a self-elected, 
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refusing popular election of the magistracy by the ratepayers. Although 
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Lords who were able to take the credit for amending the Whig bill, by in­
sisting that the appointment of borough justices should rest with the Crown 
and not with the municipal corporations themselves. Crown responsibility 
for magisterial appointments has continued to form part of the judgment that 
the 1835 Act established a separation of judicial and administrative functions 
According to Xedlich, "magisterial was severed from corporate office":
Hitherto the municipal magistracy had been as a rule locally 
elected or appointed and had nearly always come from the cor­
porate body. Henceforth the magistrates were to be appointed
by the Crown...1^9
Old assumptions within the unreformed corporations that administrative and 
judicial duties were coterminous, that the office of magistrate could be 
combined with corporate office, were disowned in 1835. Degeneration into 
partisan justice, a breakdown of faith in the urban bench, was to be avoided 
by a magistracy which was clearly seen to be unimplicated in municipal 
affairs. The point is worth further assessment, however, for which it is 
necessary to restore the narrative of events in the 1830s, when the appoint­
ment of the borough magistracy was, in principle, put on a different footing.
A major anxiety of the commissioners investigating the boroughs in 1833 
and 1834 had been the appalling state of the corporative magistracy, not 
only in the exclusive fashion in which they had immunized themselves from the 
communities which they governed, but in the complete retraction of faith in 
the justice they dispensed. In Leicester the distrust had party political 
content, with "suspicion of the integrity of the magistrates in cases where 
political opponents are concerned, especially in cases of a political
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complexion." The commissioners in the conclusion to their report were 
convinced of a widespread antagonism towards the municipal magistracy, 
"tainting with suspicion the local administration of justice."^* But at 
first there was no suggestion that the appointment of the justices should 
be removed from the hands of the corporations, in order to guarantee an im­
partial magistracy. Instead, the Radicals, anxious to make the reform of 
the boroughs another extension of the principle of representation (sequel 
to the Reform Bill of 1832) put their demand for an elective magistracy.
In the early years of the 1830s it was invested with a presumption that the 
demand would be successful. Francis Place and Joseph Parkes looked forward 
to magistrates "elected by the whole community by ballot". In August 1833 
James Kennedy prematurely introduced a motion to give every £10 householder
who could vote for parliamentary candidates, the right to vote for their 
162magistrates. He withdrew the motion for popular election of the bench
in order to await the Commissioners' Report into the Corporations, but it
was part of the confident expectation that an elected judiciary would be
conceded. Hence, the 'Leeds Mercury' in February 1833 - "It is highly
probable that...those who exercise magisterial duties...will in future be
163elected by the same constituency who elect the Members of Parliament."
Lord John Russell's Bill did not in fact propose popular election. In­
stead, it conceded nomination of borough magistrates by the elected council, 
and it retained a relic of the previous system which had been indicted as of 
"questionable expediency" by the commissioners, the mayor as 'ex-officio' 
magistrate. The Radicals were disappointed that the public could not 
choose their magistrates, but were consoled by what they interpreted as coun­
cil election of the bench. John Roebuck's suggested scheme of borough 
'judges' had similarly placed the selection in the hands of 'the legislature
of the corporation', or council. Popular influence, according to Roebuck,
• j 165could work through removal of council members who had selected the judge.
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Nomination of magistrates by councils, the argument went, would at least
prevent the borough magistracy from being the self-perpetuating preserve 
of Tory and Anglican gentlemen; it would take the appointment out of the 
hands of the aristocracy. Parkes was content with the 1835 Bill:
We clear the roost from top to bottom...give a simple Town 
Council - magistrates elected by the Council, confirmed by 
Royal ggmmission...the only condemnable point Magistrates for
But even Council election of magistrates failed to become a statutory pro­
vision, the Whigs formally abandoning it in the face of opposition from the 
Lords. Nomination by town councils was absent from the section on borough 
justices in the final Act, the Crown being invested with full powers of 
appointment. This retreat irritated Parkes. In a letter to E.J. Stanley 
in September 1835, he argued that it established a body independent of 
municipal authority, and
it most injuriously divides the responsibility of the Conservation 
of the Peace which ought to be exclusively in Municipal Elective 
Authorities.
But fears of disunity between the Whigs and Radicals, which might jeopard­
ize the Bill, silenced Parkes. He adopted the view that this was little
169discount on the positive benefits of the Bill. Aod anyway, the Radical's 
pressure for local self-government was accomodated by Russell who, as Home 
Secretary, vindicated the verbal assurances that recommendations from 
the councils would be consulted.170 For this, Russell earned criticism from 
the Lords and from fellow-Khigs.
Early in 1836 Lord Wharncliffe challenged the right of the Home Secretary
to interfere in magisterial appointments, and recounted again how the Lords
had amended the Municipal Bill to take the nomination of justices out of
171the hands of the town council. The obvious dangers in using the town
councils were recounted by the Earl of Ripon - "it might become a matter of 
canvass among persons desirous of the office of justice to obtain the 
nomination of the Councils." Lord Melbourne's ministry was intensely
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embarrassed in 1839 by incidents in Birmingham and Newport which validated
the charges that bad appointments had been made to the bench, through
council recommendations. Charles Greville recorded the Duke of Wellington's
tirades against the Birmingham magistracy, and appended his own opinion:
When Lord John Russell resolved and avowed his resolution 
to neutralise the provision of the Act which gave the appoint­
ment of magistrates to the Crown instead of to the Town Council 
(as they had proposed) by taking the recommendations of the Council, 
he incurred the deepest responsibility that any Minister ever did, 
for he took on himself to adopt a course practically inconsistent 
with the law, for the express purpose of placing political power in
In part, opposition to Russell and his policy of inviting council nomin­
ations reflected concern for the neglect of Lords Lieutenant in the nomin-
174ation procedure, and for borough benches packed with Whig nominees. But 
such prejudices were rationalized into a plea that the administration of 
justice would suffer accordingly. The presumption was that magistrates 
elected by ratepayers cr town councils would be compromised by reliance on 
their constituents; that duties would be abandoned to mollify their con- 
stituents.
If at first the appointment of justices was not vested exclusively in 
the hands of the Crown, with Lord Russell systematically appointing justices 
on the basis of council nominations, the principle was progressively eulogizec 
that the magistracy, by virtue of the Municipal Act of 1835, was removed 
from association with the corporate structure. Crown responsibility for re­
stocking the commissions of peace was intended to avoid the worst failings 
of the unreformed corporations, by ensuring a magistracy picked by the Lord 
Chancellor. Departure from full self-government to centralization in the 
conferment of judicial powers reflected concern that a magistracy elected 
by the ratepayers or by the town councillors would approximate the corporative 
magistracy recently exposed by the municipal commissioners as having for 
feited all public confidence in the local administration of justice. If
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municipal councils were the electing bodies, the bench, it was feared, 
would be packed with the partisans of the party triumphant in the Council.
A system of appointment vested in the Lord Chancellor, however, would ensure 
proper scrutiny of nominations, guaranteeing a magistracy in no way comprom­
ised by local pressures.
Contemporaries were less convinced that the Municipal Bill brought a 
renaissance in legal probity. For a start the 'ex-officio* judicial powers 
of the mayor had been preserved. This meant that in boroughs without a 
separate commission of Crown-appointed magistrates, the borough justices 
held office by direct virtue of their connection with the town council.
In boroughs granted a separate commission cf the peace the first appointments 
between 1835 and 1839 were made from lists sent by the town councils,
the Whig Home Secretary, Lord Russell, respecting the government's verbal
177piovision to consult such lists. John Frost, the Chartist loader, des­
cribed how in 1835 "the council of the borough recommended me as a proper
178person to be a justice of the peace." Immediately then, the boroughs 
were implicated in what was catalogued as a Whig attempt to pack the magis­
tracy with partisans. For the rest of the century a sustained charge was 
heard that appointments to the bench were made through party channels, for 
party purposes, and conferred upon party workers. The presumption was that 
magistracies were political appointments, rewards to party faithfuls. The 
result was that the promised separation of borough magistracy from implic­
ation with municipal affairs was stillborn. Borough politicians were not 
alone convinced that appointments were partisan; they were determined to 
benefit from the most lavish form of patronage available in local political 
life. Attenuation of political morality in the approach to magisterial 
appointments ensured that the bench was an implicit element of the urban 
political structure, haunt of the elders of municipal parties and town 
council. Vesting final responsibility for the borough magistracy in the
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Crown was unable to guarantee a magistracy disinterested in local concerns, 
and a judicial structure independent of the economic and political frame­
work of urban society. There was quickly established a system of recruitment 
through party political channels, of candidates intimately involved with 
municipal government. The magistracy, in consequence, was never the neutral 
agent of social control, described in Utilitarian formulae. The adminis­
tration of justice was rarely freed, as J.S. Mill expected, "from intermixture|
179in the other affairs of the world."
To assess the contemporary indictment that Crown appointments to the bench
did not resist serving the partisan needs elaborated by political agents
and parliamentary representatives, it is first useful to look at the scale
of appointments to borough commissions of the peace. Appoint-ments were made
periodically, as in Bristol, where, between 1890 and 1910, according to the
clerk to the justices, there were "about 13 to 15 each time there has been a 
i. 8Ufresh commission." New appointments in Birmingham were also usually made 
in batches, particularly between 1880 and 1914, when approximately 220 magis­
trates were appointed. In 1880, twenty new magistrates were appointed to 
the Birmingham bench in two batches. Again in 1892, two batches of twelve 
and fourteen magistrates constituted the twenty-six new appointments for 
that year. As to overall figures for the urban magistracy, the return 
for January 1866 totalled 2,062 magistrates from 178 boroughs with commissions|
in England and Wales. By June 1885, 206 boroughs with commissions had just
182over three and a half thousand magistrates. Thereafter, the pace of 
appointments seems to increase. In the next eight years there were 2,800 
new appointments, 800 in 1892 alone. Consequently, by 1892 there were 
4,300 magistrates in the borough commissions. The large number of new appoint] 
ments in comparison with the increase in the absolute number of magistrates 
at any one time, illustrates the high turnover of magistrates in the com­
missions. Replacement for deaths or retirements through old age accounted
for a substantial proportion of every new batch of magistrates. Between 
1885 and early 1893, whilst the absolute increase in magistrates in the 
boroughs was 651, there had been 2925 new appointments. The total figure 
of magistrates in the commissions continued to increase after 1892, with 
obvious relation to population increase. Applications for new appointments 
were often sent to the Lord Chancellor by officials in boroughs where 
population growth was rapid; and at the end of the century the Lord Chan­
cellor had adopted loose guidelines which fixed a ratio of one magistrate
184per 1,000 population for the 10,000 to 50,000 population range.
Newcastle upon Tyne's population increased from 145,000 in 1881 to 286,000
185in 1910, whilst its bench advanced from 35 to 86 magistrates. By 1910
the total number of urban justices in 240 boroughs with separate commissions
had reached 6900, a figure made possible by the excessive number of appoint-
j 86ments made by the Liberal government in 1906. It is this increasing 
number of magistrates in the borough commissions, and in particular the 
large turnover which deaths and retirements produced, which illustrates the 
great scope there was for patronage through appointments to the urban bench.
With greater relevance for a discussion of the system of promotion to 
the borough benches, it is possible to provide a statistical impression of 
partisan appointments. The following statements are based on returns of
187magistrates in Parliamentary Papers, and returns in Crown Office papers.
The returns do not always identify a Ministry's appointments according to 
political allegiance, so literary evidence has had to help out where this 
is the case. The years in which there was one or more changes of Ministry 
usually witnessed a large number of new appointments to the bench, either 
during the last months before a Ministry resigned, or immediately after a 
party returned to power. Hence, in 1880, Disraeli's Ministry added 237 
justices to the borough commissions in its last four months between January 
and April. In the remaining months of 1880, the Liberal party added
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195 magistrates - a total for the year of 432 new appointments. A higher
annual figure for appointments also appeared in 1886, when there were two
changes of Ministry, as a result of which 420 magistrates were appointed.
And it was the same in 1892. In that year, the Conservatives appointed
381 justices between January and mid-August; and the Liberal party appended
433 justices from August until the end of the year - an annual total of
814 appointments. Figures are not available for 1893 except for the first
an
two months, during which time the Liberals appointed 219 justices.^indicat­
ion that 1893 was probably an excessive year for borough appointments. It 
meant that in the six months between August 1892 and February 1893, the 
Liberals had added approximately 650 magistrates to the borough commissions. 
Explanation for the sharp rise in appointments in 1892 and 1893 must refer 
to the Liberal party's determination to appoint more Liberal magistrates.
This was notably the case for the county magistracy, which was heavily 
weighted with Tory party appointments, but the pressure exerted oi the 
Lord Chancellor in relation to the county magistracy also influenced nomin­
ations to the borough commissions. The borough benches wtre, it seems, 
well supplied with partisan appointments. Lord Herschell pleaded to
Liberal party 'watchdogs' that, whereas in August 1892, 22% of the borough
188magistracy were Liberals, by November 1892, the figure had risen to 36%.
And the rise in 1893 might well have been larger than in 1892, since James 
Bryce, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, seems to have made a large
number of Liberal appointments to Lancashire towns, as well as to the county 
189commission.
In March 1894, the Conservatives returned to office. Again, figures 
are not available for 1894. For the next eleven years between 1895 and 
1905, the Conservative party added 2,500 new justices to the borough 
Commissions. How many were Conservative party supporters is unknown, but 
it was certainly believed by most Liberals that a large proportion were such.
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Appeals for new appointments to be made by the Liberal government of 1906 
invariably argued that Conservatives had gained a majority on the bench 
because of appointments in the last ten years. Tory predominance on the 
Wigan bench, according to John Cheetham (Divisional Chairman for Stephen 
Walsh, Member for Ince) stemmed from appointments made during the thirteen 
years of Conservative rule:
Since 1893 the Conservative party have added I think 32 names 
to the list in ^jgan of those 28 are Conservatives 4 Liberals.
No Labour men.
Again in 1906, a Wesleyan Methodist of Wigan, and an old worker in the 
Liberal cause, prefaced his recommendation of a candidate for the bench with 
the following statement:
That the Tory party have during recent years utilised their 
power for the purpose of placing therein supporters of their 
cause throughout the country is evident to all fair minded 
people.
In 1906, in consequence, the Liberals flooded the boroughs with new 
appointments, mainly between March and August (when 577 new appointments 
were made), and again in November (144 appointments). Out of approximately 
240 boroughs with separate commissions of peace, 166 received additions in 
1906. St Helens received eleven new justices, Preston - eleven, Wigan- nine, 
Sheffield - eight, Newcastle - fifteen, Leeds - eighteen, Birmingham - twenty 
four, Bradford - twelve, and Southampton - twenty two magistrates. Accord­
ing to Asquith, the Liberal Prime Minister, the appointments aimed to offset 
the preponderance of justices belonging to the Conservative party, which 
Lord Loreburn found on taking the Great Seal. The political complexion of 
appointments between 1906 and 1909, when approximately 1500 magistrates were 
appointed, illustrated the attempt to balance the political composition of 
the magistracy: although even these figures fell below the expectations of 
some Liberal party supporters. As Asquith reported:
53
Ir» Engl ish and Welsh boroughs he [the Lord Chancellor] 
appointed 1,100 Liberals, 284 Conservatives, and 115 persons 
whose politics were unknown.19^
These figures superficially reveal the character of partisan appoint­
ment to the magistracy. What underlay them was a developed system of 
party-political patronage. The full extent of the system was only publicly 
revealed in 1910 before the Royal Commission on the Selection of Justices,
when witnesses recounted their experience, stretching back to the 1880s, of
193the different political channels used to secure a magistracy. In the
second half of the nineteenth century the appointment of magistrates became
a burning political issue, and especially so in the counties after 1886, when
political realignments due to the Home Rule Bill, created a further imbalance
in representation on the county benches in favour of the Conservative and 
194Unionist party. In large part, the Royal Commission of 1910 was a result 
of this controversy in the counties, between 1886 and 1910, over the exer­
cise of patronage in judicial appointments. Conservative electoral success 
between 1895 and 1905, and a Liberal lord Chancellor (Lord Loreburn) unpre­
pared between 1906 and 1909 to submit to party pressure to correct the polit­
ical imoalance in the county commissions, explains the resilience of the 
traditional methods of magisterial appointment, and the grant of the long- 
awaited Royal Commission in 1909. The Radical government, elected in 
1906, had finally decided to ventilate the issue of magisterial patronage.
Borough appointment procedures had received less attention since the 
1880s than had the counties, and were mentioned less frequently before the 
Commission in 1910. Yet borough appointments were in no way above party.
Lord Selbome, Chancellor from 1880-1885, in a debate on the county magis­
tracy, chose as his most unpleasant duty, the appointment of borough 
justices :
There was constant pressure to obtain appointments for every 
reason except the fitness of the persons recommended for the 
performance of judicial duties, and most especially for 
political reasons.196
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The point becomes clearer by means of a short overview of the contemporary 
approach to the selection of magistrates. Ever since 1836 and the appoint­
ment of the first commissions, accusations that justices were being elected 
for party purposes had been voiced in both Houses. According to Lord 
Whamcliffe, the borough benches by 1838 were predominantly Liberal in com­
plexion, the Home Secretary having illegitimately claimed the powers of the
Great Seal and packed the magistracy with nominations received from the
197 # „ N •*town councils. By 1858, there was an element of deja vu about parliament-
198ary debates on the issue of the magistracy. The party in office would 
plead the necessity only to balance the political composition of the benches, 
the opposition party would insist that the system of packing the bench by 
furious correspondence with the incoming Chancellor should be renounced.
But the different methods of appointment to the borough commissions never 
strayed too far from an intimate association with party organizations, party 
bosses, and from Members of Parliament who felt obliged to carry home 
rewards for their loyal party workers. In an era when political patronage 
was abating, the comparatively inordinate number of placements to the
19cborough bench was an oasis in the desert of rewards for local party service. 
Each party vied with the other to distribute this small-change of political 
reward. And successive Lord Chancellors found it impossible to silence 
party claims for magisterial patronage which came in before a Ministry re­
signed, or consequent upon electoral success.
The statements of honest integrity by Home Secretary or Lord Chancellor 
were never likely to dam the pressure exerted on them by parliamentary re­
presentatives and local party organizers. The inevitability of political 
influence was accepted. Different equations were at stake. Local parties 
might expect to have half the Bench, or again, to be represented in propor­
tion to their strength in the electorate. In 1858, in response to the uni­
lateral Conservative appointments to the bench, and to Walpole's attempt to
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defend this as an exercise in equilibrium, Messrs Bright and Roebuck 
argued that parity on the bench did not accord with the political allegiances 
of the borough populations: that three-quarters of the borough inhabitants 
were Liberals, and thus, "in the boroughs the majority of magistrates ought 
to be L i b e r a l s . T h e  local party which matched the national government 
expected at the very least a few magistrates over the odds - customary re­
ward for parliamentary success, or, as the St. Helens Liberal press defined
201magistracies, "the usual honours which accompany a party success." More 
often, the municipal supporters of the same party as the Lord Chancellor ex­
pected sufficient appointments to balance the opposition's advantage under 
the previous government. In lists forwarded by local agents, the party
strengths on the bench were invariably traced, as were the politics of the
202magistrates appointed under the previous Ministry. In many towns, in­
consequence, nomination procedures assumed a certain logic of their own. 
Unspoken rules were decreed and held to by both sides for long periods.
Leader of the Liberal party on Wigan Council, Mr. R. Johnson, explained to 
the Chancellor of the Duchy why one of his list of five nominees was a Tory 
and Churchman:
When the Conservatives made five justices, they always asked 
for the names of two liberals to be made at the same time.203
In a number of boroughs, finally, the parties devised through political com­
promise, joint lists which, the secretary to the Lord Chancellor affirmed,
204were scrutinized less closely. Joint lists economized on time discrim- 2056
205inating between claim and counter-claim. Hence, Lord Halsbury, knowing
the difficulties of sifting borough nominations, especially when the mayor
(only equivalent to the Lord Lieutenant in the counties) was normally "a
very violent partisan on one side or the other," encouraged party whips on
206each side to agree to a joint recommendation. If the local factions
were in accord, then the Lord Chancellor conferred the appointments. The 
boroughs, then, where party appointments were shamelessly indulged in, were
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ironically little troubled by the late century furore over appointments 
to the bench. It was the counties which were most disturbed, as one party, 
especially in the late 1880s, developed an unacceptable mastery. In the 
boroughs, standards were more realistic, and also sufficiently generous to 
both parties for no one to protest for long. A willingness by the Lord 
Chancellor to account for political strengths on the borough benches meant 
that party interests were more equitably served. Magisterial appointments 
created party jealousies and fired party invective, but they did not produce 
such disparity throughout the borough commissions in favour of one party, 
that the system of patronage lost (as in the counties) its equilibrium.
In the counties, where political views were supposedly unconsidered, where 
a political naivety was feigned, there was far more turmoil than where 
political appointments were expected, and where the parties were gratified.
In 1893 the 'Spectator' was forced to concede that more Gladstonian magis­
trates /ere required in the county commissions:
but we do not want to see the appointments made, as in the towns, 
by the 'sitting member', if his party is in, and by the local 
caucus when the sitting Member belongs to the Opposition. 7
There follows a closer scrutiny of the different political channels
through which appointments to the bench were acquired. Firstly, the role of
the 'sitting Member' for the local borough constituency. John Bright in 1858
had criticized the Home Secretary for gratifying the 'discreditable scramble'
in the youth of Lord Derby's Ministry, but Bright himself had indulged in
the spoils system, and was to do so again before his appointment in 1873 to
the Chancellorship of the Duchy of Lancaster. Lord Granville was canvassed
in August 1854 "about Rochdale magistrates". In 1865, Clarendon satisfied
two of Bright's candidates, whilst in 1869 Bright approached the Chancellor,
Lord Dufferin, only to find him less than hasty to satisfy the Manchester
208Liberals on whose behalf he was working. The Duchy of Lancaster offers
in fact numerous instances of the role of parliamentary members in canvassing
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the Chancellor of the Duchy for the appointment of 'worthy candidates'.
The member for Warrington, Mr. Peter Rylands (and a magistrate on the 
Warrington bench) was kept busy filtering nominations to the proper sources, 
for appointment to both county and borough benches in Lancashire. Where
the influence of the Chief Whip could be of use, it was asked for, and the
210Whip usually complied. In 1870 Rylands was assured that two recent elev­
ations to the borough bench in Warrington had given satisfaction 'to the 
inhabitants generally' although one of the candidates had thought it no 
honour. But Rylands' correspondent stoically continued:
__whether he appreciates it or not, you have the satisfaction
of knowing that you have faithfully redeemed your promise.211
Years later Rylands was successful in securing the appointment of two magis­
trates to the Burnley bench, this time with greater civic justification -
212"in recognition of their services in connection with the Royal Hospital."
A familiar pattern prevailed in many other Lancashire boroughs. Member for
Ashton-under-lyne, Milner Gibson, went through the Lord Chancellor in August
2131859 to obtain three appointments for Stalybridge. In December 1862
Gibson submitted information asked for by the Chancellor of the Duchy, E.
Cardwell, on the Ashton magistracy. Regarding the active justices, Gibson
said, "the Liberals are in a large minority," and the five recommendations
he made were intended to achieve a Liberal majority, "to which they are
entitled by numbers, wealth, intelligence and public spirit":
It certainly appears to me a monstrous thing that they should 
be in the present minority, they ought beyond question to have, 
at least, a small majority...
I am very much pressed upon these matters and I am aware of 
their political importance. I hope you will do the best for us 
you can.214
Further north, in Preston, both Conservative members successful in 1874, 
canvassed Colonel Taylor for appointments. John Holker, appointed Solicitor 
General in 1874, endorsed a list of three nominations "from my friend at 
Preston" in 1878; whilst Edward Mormon two years earlier had asked the
209
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Chancellor to appoint William Goodair (cotton manufacturer), and Hermon's
215partner, William Pollard. And in Wigan, Thomas Knowles, the sitting membei
in 1877, submitted to the Duchy Office a request for more appointments
which had been sent to him by Nathanield Eckersley, magistrate and previous
216Conservative member for the town.
By the beginning of the next century the story was the same. At the 
end of 1909, J.A. Seddon, Labour member for the Newton Division of Lanca­
shire (South-West) pressed the claim of Dr. Dowling for appointment to the 
St Helens Bench, with the annotation:
...in view of impending G. Election I don't want the Irish 
Electors to harbour any grievance which might help the Tories.
In the following January, 1910, Seddon's list of recommendations was again
supported by reference to political imperatives:
We have had a hard fight in the St. Helens e, Newton divisions 
they gave noble service and are being jibeJ at that Mr. Glover 
and T only used them for our own political purposes.
Your kind help at this moment would complete our triumph and 
confound the Tories who have played the dirtiest political games 
ever waged in this district.&
The Irish vote was crucial in St. Helens, where the Irish, according to the 
United Irish League, constituted one-fifth of the borough population (some
2 i  q30,000). In 1909 and 1910 the effort of the League to have Irish Nation­
alists appointed to the bench was consequently supported by Thomas Glover, 
Labour member for St. Helens. In a deputation to the Chancellor in November 
1909, Glover recommended Drs. O'Keefe and Dowling. Although the Liberal 
Association had endorsed both nominees, senior magistrate William Pilking- 
ton thought they were unsuitable. The Chancellor saw both J.A. Seddon 
and T.P. O'Connor for information, but still did not appoint the two nominees. 
In April 1910, the Chancellor asked Fred Burn, secretary of the Lancashire 
and Cheshire Liberal Federation, to make enquiries. Dowling was reported to
be a good Liberal and O'Keefe as having fought four municipal elections,
220three successfully. Finally, in June 1910, Joseph Leach wrote to
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Sir John Brunner to tell him that both men had been placed in the commiss­
ion for St. Helens,
through some special influence in London (through Nationalist 
Channels I should think)...Mr. Glover, our member, remembering 
the great help they gave him at the last Election, has also been 
doing his best to get them on...22i
Outside Lancashire, parliamentary members were as deeply involved in
the nomination procedure. In reply to the Keighley Trades and Labour Council
in 1907, Ramsay MacDonald stated that in magisterial appointments:
222Most weight is attached to the views of the local representatives.
The Royal Commission on Justices evidenced the same. More than one Member 
before the Royal Commission referred to the excessive efforts needed to 
promote candidates to the bench, and showed willingness to transfer this 
form of patronage to an advisory committee, if only a general moratorium 
could be declared. In Newcastle, the clerk to the justices said that one 
or the other Member brought names before the Lord Chancellor - notab'y 
Sir Charles Hamond, senior justice of the peace and long-standing Conser­
vative member for the borough, who took a keen interest in the personnel 
22 ^of the bench. Sir Kenneth Mackenzie told the Royal Commission that app­
lications to the Lord Chancellor for new borough justices usually came
224from the sitting member for the borough. And significantly, it was
the Royal Commission which finally spoke out against members forwarding
recommendations for justices, although in the hiatus before full implement-
225ation of the recommendation of advisory committees, old habits died hard.
In the appointment of justices, then, the influence of the sitting 
member was a decisive one since it ensured that this form of patronage con­
tinued to be dispensed. How could requests be refused when political 
opponents were renowned for their lavish remuneration? The Liberal party, 
renowned for its advocacy of pure government, was often less prepared to 
make outright party appointments, but Members found it difficult to deny
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these modest honours. Chairman of the Preston Liberal Association issued
a standard inducement to John Bright in September 1880:
Our friends complain that the Liberal party is backward in 
distributing these small honours whilst the Conservatives 
distribute them freely. The bench at present consists of 
10 Liberals and 22 Conservatives; of these the late Govern­
ment made 1 Liberal and 14 Conservatives.226
Sitting members also insisted on their right to influence appointments.
Appointments to the St. Helens Bench in 1906 fell short of expectations held
by the radicals in the borough, and were thought to have strayed beyond party
control. Hence the Labour member for Newton Division, Mr. Seddon, put down
the following question for June 28th:
Whether the appointments made for the St. Helen's borough bench 
were suggested by the chief magistrate, and upon what grounds he 
refused to accept five out of the six names submitted by the 
honourable Member for the borough of St. Helen's.227
Seddcn's initial comment held some substance, since senior magistrate Col.
Wi’liam Pilkington was an energetic scrutineer of recommendations, listing
for the Chancellor those he considered unfit for service - viz, "advanced
228Socialist, very undesirable". As to the second complaint, Herbert Mitchel
secretary to the Chancellor, sent Henry Fowler the proposed Question in
case he wished to discuss it with colleagues "as to an answer that would
229once and for all stop this form of catechism." It is surely significant 
that the parliamentary Question held this set form; that parliamentary 
representatives righteously asserted their de facto legitimacy to influence 
magisterial appointments. J.M. Lee was indeed correct to state, albeit 
rather baldly,
A member of Parliament supporting the Government would 
have considerable influence over borough appointments.230
The member of Parliament was obviously supplied with nominations on a
significant number of occasions from the party organizers who had secured
his election. One presumes that this form of nomination increased as the
parties later in the century became more fully organized at ward level.
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party overlords would take advantage of recent success in a general election 
to pressure their candidate to ask favours of the government's legal patron. 
This form of nomination to the bench was superficially revealed before the 
Royal Commission in 1910. Mr. Herbert Mitchell, secretary to the Chancellor 
of the Duchy, although veteran of magisterial patronage in Lancashire 
boroughs, said only that the majority of applications for borough magistracies 
came from purely political bodies, and that this posed problems for the Chan­
cellor in scrutinizing the recommendations:
...he could get no help from the other side as a rule, which­
ever side the man nominated was on. The other side would take 
no part in it.231
Two witnesses before the Royal Commission described their own borough pro­
cedures more precisely. A former mayor and present justice of Hereford con­
demned the appointment procedure whick secured batches of magistrates which,
as he said, "accurately reflect...the political complexion of the Government
232at the time they were appointed." He spoke of a permanent channel whereby 
names went from the party leaders to the parliamentary candidate or represen­
tative, and finally to the Lord Chancellor. Without exception - "It is the
233party who recommend in the first place." In Bristol, according to the
clerk to the justices, the practice was duplicated. Speaking in 1910 he 
said:
For 35 years they have been selected by the leaders of either 
political party and the tradition of my office is that it goes 
back very much longer...not by conferring with the town council, 
but the chiefs of the political parties conferred with each 
other, each supplying a list of names...234
The etiquette surrounding this patronage was that a joint list was arranged 
between the two party leaders, generally town councillors, with a customary 
weighting on the side of the party in office at Westminster, whether or not 
this reflected the political strength in Bristol. A minority party in Bris­
tol Council would equally receive the bonus of an additional magistrate in 
the joint list submitted. The system was disturbed in 1889 when shock-waves
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from the Home Rule Bill affected Bristol. At this time the Liberal Union­
ists "apart from either party", pressured the party leaders over the joint 
list recently submitted to the Lord Chancellor. The traditional method was 
further threatened when Lord Halsbury suggested that the names he had receivec 
should be introduced to the Town Council. The Council qua Council had never 
usually been consulted; and the party leaders were reluctant to change the 
practice. In fact, the pattern was not entirely subverted since a comprom­
ise was arranged whereby a committee of the Council inspected the list "so
235that there was no public discussion upon the matter." But, excepting
1889, the two party leaders in Bristol controlled nominations to the bench.
Persons active in political life desirous of the reward or honour, would
advance their claims through them. As T.H. Gore said of the party managers
2 36- "They are the fenders or the buffers who receive the pressure."
Local party organizations were also extremely active in Lancashire 
boroughs. Archibald Salvidge, Conservative wirepuller in Liverpool, and 
organizer of the working-class vote on Merseyside, was renowned a : controllor 
of magisterial appointments in the 1890s and 1900s. As Sir Edward Russell 
said of anonymous correspondence which appeared in his Liverpool Daily Post 
(Liberal):
what is suggested is that all the magistrates referred to are 
J.P.'s in consequence of your political position and power.
In Preston in 1880 it was the Chairman of the Liberal Association who prom­
oted "a few Gentlemen of liberal opinions" to the Chancellor, John Bright.
He concluded his missive, "I need scarcely say that I have consulted several
2 38of my fellow magistrates and liberals before completing the list." In 
St. Helens at the turn of the century the Liberal party was faced with 
competition from labour organizations. Thomas Glover, miners' agent and 
former Liberal, was elected as Labour member for the borough in 1906, and 
two years later the Labour party sent a list of nominees for the bench to 
the Chancellor of the Duchy. Joseph Leach, chairman of the Liberal Associate
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in St. Helens immediately drafted a letter to the Chancellor opining that
the Association should be consulted on any additions, "remembering what a
239large part we as Liberals took in returning Mr. Thomas Glover M.P."
Again in 1910, Leach complained to Sir John Brunner (President of the Liberal 
Association) that the Labour party had the right to be consulted through theii 
member, but, he continued:
I do think...that the Liberal Party through their President or 
Chairmen should be the channel through which all party business 
should be done.^40
The indefatigable Leach was a diligent worker for the Liberals in respect 
of magistracies. He seems to have viewed magistracies as essentially a 
function of party unity or electoral success. His letters are startling for 
their impassive and naked tone of request. Following the first election in 
1910, he sent a list to Herbert Samuel, appending the party debts which 
would be defrayed:
We are delighted with our success in St. Helens and Newton, and 
under much obligation to each ci: the Gentlemen referred to in 
the complete list herewith. Without the Liberal 5 Nationalists 
Messrs Glover and Seddon could not have retained their seats.
In the same letter he signed ofi by saying - "If the appointments were made
now our friends in St. Helens § Newton would be greatly encouraged." Cabinet
changes foiled Leach in February, hence in April he wrote to J.A. Pease, the
new Chancellor, very much concerned for the next election:
We are very anxious about the next Election and are doing all we 
can to make things as sure as possible for the sitting member,
Mr. Glover, to be returned. Much depends upon the Catholic vote, 
about one third (30,000) of the population being of that persuasion 
and out of the full list they have only four Magistrates.¿42
Two of the names on the list were Roman Catholic Nationalists, who "did us
splendid service at the last Election"; another was J.A. Seddon, member for
the Newton Division - "his appointment will help us and is well deserved".
Magistracies were thus, for Leach, essential tonics for electoral energy,
especially when the town council provided no electoral assistance:
Our Borough Council is conservative and shows our party no
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favour. Out of nine aldermen we had only one with us at
the last E l e c t i o n . 243
Preparations for elections were strengthened by bench appointments, in
particular in marginal seats like St. Helens where heavy Irish immigration
and the consequent religious conflict confused basic voting patterns. As
Leach openly declared to Sir John Brunner:
We must win St. Helens § Newton next time but to do it we 
must have all the help our friends at Head Quarters can give 
us.244
It was expected that magistracies would be political appointments and 
that the party which had a spasm of righteousness would be electorally dam­
aged. In Wigan at the same time, the Liberal party was hopelessly divided. 
Unlike in St. Helens, Tory hegemony was untouched in 1906 because of a
three-cornered contest in which the Liberal candidate was opposed by an
245independent Women's Suffrage candidate. According to Richard John.on, 
leader of the Liberal Party in the Wigan Council, the 'Official Liberals' 
had deserted Colonel W. Woods, "and nominated ?. man run by the wild women 
of Manchester", Mr. T. Smith, who failed to receive the support of the trade 
unions.246 The confused electoral situation was reflected in the applic­
ations for new magistrates. Richard Johnson warned the Chancellor to 
guard against nominations from the "Liberal Two Hundred" (the 'official 
Liberals'), the Irish Association, and the Trades and Labour Council.
Several members of the Liberal party in the Town Council had asked to be 
nominated, but, said Johnson, "their service to the party has only been 
short", and instead he sent five names to Henry Fowler;
four of whom were working for Liberalism so long back as when 
you addressed the great meeting in the Drill Hall here, and 
who are still quietly working for the cause.247
John Cheetham, a few days later, similarly warned the Chancellor against
the recommendations sent by the 'official Liberals', who had deserted the
party. For Cheetham, party duty was a pre-requisite for magisterial appoint
ment:
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I believe before Men are appointed to such Honourable positions 
they should be able to prove that faithful service has been put 
in on behalf of the Party of progress § reform to justify the 
appointments being made.21*5
The list of proposed new justices for Wigan submitted by the 'official
Liberals' was supported however by Stephen Walsh, member for the Ince
division. Further, William Johnson, chairman of the 'Liberal Two Hundred',
who arranged the 'official' list, was declared to be the accredited agent
249of the Liberal Party by the Chief Whip, Whitely. ' As if these competing 
claims were insufficient, the Chancellor of the Duchy was also faced with 
recommendations from opponents of the bre-wery trade (which was well repre­
sented on the Wigan bench) . Separate temperance nominations were made as 
the only way of securing appointments unconnected with the 'trade'. As 
Alfred Davies explained:
Frankly, the politicians and party leaders are not trusted in 
this matter, and the fiasco at the poll at the last Genera]
Election appears to sh~ew that they are not very successful in 
uniting the party in their own particular field.250
The confused situation at Wigan temporarily hindered Liberal party control
of nominations, and was in part an interesting effect of the njection of
Labour party claims into the area of magisterial patronage. Elsewhere,
the election of the Radical government in 1906 seems to have released a
stream of nominations down channels somewhat dusty after years of Tory govern
ment, but nonetheless available for party officials to claim magistracies 
251for party workers. As Lord Loreburn correctly perceived:
party managers use this object of ambition as a means of keeping 
their party together and of rewarding political services.252
Persuasion was deeply rooted that the bench of magistrates was the perquisite
of party, adjunct to electoral activity. Local political associations argued
their case before the Chancellor on grounds of utility to party, and at the
end of the day were dissatisfied if the Chancellor was over-discriminative
in his expected role as registrar of party selections.
New appointments to the borough bench were monitored not only by
political party agents, hut also by the representatives of two major press­
ure groups in nineteenth century political life, the Drink trade and the 
temperance lobby. Whilst other departments of borough government were 
placed under elective control, the contentious administration of the licen­
sing laws was still committed to the magistracy. No disqualification from 
the bench existed by statute for any member of the drink trade, but in prac­
tice only wholesalers (such as brewers and distillers) who did not hold a
253retail licence, found their way on to the Bench. Licensed victuallers and
wine-merchants before 1948 were not appointed, despite lobbying the Royal 
254Commission in 1910. Before the Commission both 'Trade' and temperance
delegates discussed the propriety of vested interests adjudicating on the
bench. The 'trade' protested the injustice of those with any 'pecuniary
interest' in liquor being debarred from serving on the licensing bench,
whilst at the same time temperance extremists could indulge their prejudices
Temperance advocates indicted those «.owns where brewer magistrates influenced
watch committee and magisterial policy on licensing, and where the 'trade'
255effectively controlled appointments to the bench. The pervasiveness of
this conflict, and particularly the way it reinforced political divisions
in the appointments to the bench, warrants separate treatment.
The permanent rivalry between temperance advocates and supporters of the
liquor trade had close political affinities. At the national level there
was a tightening linkage in the 1870s and 1880s of these two interests with
the political parties. In 1872, the Liberal Licensing Bill was so resented
by the 'Trade' that in the 1874 election contest, they rallied to the
256Conservative party to forestall further legislation. Thereafter, the 
political alliance remained close. And, on the other side, the Nonconformist 
Liberals throughout the 1880s moved closer to the temperance organizations.
At municipal level, the conflict was even severer. In response to the hive 
of vested interests which sat on many town councils, the temperance societies
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(particularly the United Kingdom Alliance) launched campaigns to cleanse 
the councils of brewers and publicans. A good number of ward elections in
Birmingham, for example, were essentially beer versus temperance struggles.
The two groups attracted each other in municipal contests. A candidate of
the Licensed Victuallers Defence League deserved opposition from a repre-
258sentative of the Band of Hope Union. There was more than ideological riv­
alry involved. Economic interests were being defended by licensed victuallers
who recognized the importance of packing the watch committee which, after
2591872, had responsibility for licensing offences. Consequently, the unpaid
tasks of a councillor were worth assuming for this influence. In Leeds,
Wolverhampton, Exeter and Newcastle-U-lyme the drink trade was well repre-
260sented on the council in the 1870s and 1880s. In Leeds however the drink
interest was closely watched by a large teetotal group, a crucial component
of Leeds Liberalism, especially in the Leeds Liberal Association fiom 1876
and on the town council. Under the direction of the local branch of the
United Kingdom Alliance, the radical wing of Leeds Liberalism argued on the
261council for a licensing policy distinguished by local option. Temper­
ance advocates in other towns similarly sought greater local control of 
the liquor 'trade', to curb its consumption, and to reduce the number of 
convictions for drunkenness. The watch committee was a vital staging- 
post in any temperance campaign.
The watch committee of the council was one area of influence, the Licen­
sing bench a higher prize. Just how high, can perhaps be gauged by the inter­
est which was aroused by Brewster Sessions. Monro-Ferguson in 1911 recalled
licensing courts "filled with a huge organized mob of justices": "I have
263seen seventy or eighty justices sitting in a licensing court." In Sal­
ford, the application for a license by a brewer and party leader required 
the resiting of the court in the council chamber, where the advocates "add- 
ressed the crowded justices from the aldermanic seats.”
257
In consequence,
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as Sir Edward Russell said, it was inevitable that "the manning of the
bench should be of considerable social moment," especially when "public
opinion supposes there to be a continuous struggle...between the Drink
265interest and the Temperance interest." And the struggle assumed a 
heightened form when it duplicated political rivalries. The complaint of 
an active temperance supporter before the Royal Commission on Justices in 
1910, was that their supporters were inadequately represented, not alone 
on the licensing bench, but in the commission of peace as a whole. He 
ascribed this situation to the appointment procedure for magistrates in 
which the Conservative party were prepared to support the 'trade', and ex­
clude any nominees hostile to it. The Liverpool bench, predominantly Con­
servative, was a case in point. There, Alderman Salvidge, magistrate and 
chairman of the Conservative Working Men's Association, was said to domin­
ate the nomination procedure,
as the association over which he presides was the predominant 
factor in municipal and imperial politics on the Conservative 
side; and during the past 20 years the Conservatives have 
been...the predominant political party in Liverpool.266
Salvidge was also managing director of Brent's brewery, and a large share­
holder, as well as licensee in Birkenhead. The 'trade' was thus well defend­
ed in Liverpool, and temperance partisans excluded. Further evidence was 
presented by Sir Thomas Whittaker who had been told that in Salford the
leader of the local Conservative party, responsible for nominations to the
267bench, when the Conservatives were in government, was the largest brewer.
Sir Thomas Whittaker had been a member of the Royal Commission on Liquor 
Licensing Laws which heard evidence between 1897 and 1899. In Whittaker's 
opinion, one of the most serious statements heard by the Commission came 
from Mr. Herbert Marsden, chairman of a vigilance committee formed in Wigan 
in 1892 to pressure a watch committee and magistracy, controlled by local 
brewers, which would not act to stem abuses in licensing affairs. Such
magisterial abuses in Wigan were later brought before the Chancellor of the
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Duchy. It formed one example of the way that the brewery - temperance 
issue could infuse local political rivalry over bench appointments.
Until 1906, there was evidence that the brewery 'trade' was not embarr­
assed into inactivity by Marsden's evidence before the Commission on Liquor 
Laws. In July 1906, the person who claimed responsibility for the expose' 
before the Royal Commission, and who practised before the licensing bench 
in Wigan, wrote to the Chancellor of the Duchy:
Experience extending over a number of years in connection with 
licensing administration in that Borough has shown that the liquor 
interest and its connections are all powerful among the magistracy 
of the Borough and its domination is responsible not for one but 
a succession of scandals...^69
This was in part reference to the High Court case in 1S01 in which an 
application for a license of the 'Railway Inn' in Wigan was quashed on the 
grounds that, one of the magistrates who held shares in the brewery company 
which leased the house, had adjudicated on the licensing bench when the 
license was granted. Robert Halliweil, the magistrate in question, was sec­
retary and agent of the Conservative Registration Association, and his 
solicitor, in correspondence with the Duchy of Lancaster office had no 
doubt that opposition to his client "was dictated by political spleen":
...at the time the General Election was in progress and party 
feeling was running high and was accentuated in Mr. Halliwell's 
opponents by the bitterness of defeat.^70
Halliweil escaped with a reprimand from the Chancellor, and the temperance
faction in Wigan had to wait until 1906 before the brewers ’lump’, as Alfred
?71Davies described it, could be leavened with new appointments.” One of 
the senior justices in Wigan, Mr. Melling, was anxious to raise the standard 
of appointments in 1906 over those of the Conservative party, for, as he 
said:
272In a word, we have been largely ruled by drink interests.
It had been difficult before 1906 to claim sufficient Liberal appointments 
which would counteract the 'trade's' influence. Wigan Sunday School Union
'0
advanced the nomination of Mr. James Starr, a few years before 1906. It 
had been returned to Wigan Conservative headquarters as a suggested appoint­
ment, "but for reasons only to be surmised was deleted and a name with
273greater sympathy towards the Brewing Interests, substituted." Respon­
sibility for new appointments of the right stamp was taken in 1906 by private 
citizens in Wigan, and by the Free Church Council, who forwarded nominees 
characterized as 'reliable Liberal' and 'sound Liberal', but who were also 
unconnected with the 'Trade', invariably members of the Wigan Temperance 
Council.274
Partisan dispute between liquor and temperance factions surrounded the 
periodic appointments to the bench in a large number of towns. Brewery repre­
sentatives predictably worked through Conservative associations, whilst 
defenders of the temperance cause relied on Liberal party 'caucus' support, 
or personally submitted lists to Liberal Members. Activity in temperance 
organizations served as part-qualification for Liberal nominees to the 
bench, particularly when associated, as it often was, with nonconformist 
religious affiliation. The 'trade' relied upon Conservative electoral depend­
ence on publican and brewers' votes to win sympathetic bench appointments. 
Local concern to maintain the dignity of the bench, as well as the practice 
of the Lord Chancellor's Office of rejecting the retail sector of the 'trade', 
ensured that only wealthy brewers were appointed to the magistracy. But 
suspicions remained that 'trade' interests, for brewer magistrates, took 
priority over impartial administration of the law. And the presumption 
related not alone to licensing laws, but significantly to the administration 
of public order. According to General William Booth, of the Salvation Army, 
temperance advocate pre-eminent, a premium was placed on anti-Salvationist 
'mobbing' in towns controlled by the 'trade'. He struggled throughout the 
1880s to prove a congruence of 'mob' intimidation against his 'soldiers', 
and towns in which the liquor trade was influential on the magisterial bench.
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It remains to examine one other source from which judicial nominations
came. The secretary to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster in 1910
evinced that recommendations from town councils had been few in number over 
2 76the last years. Lord Lorebum before the Royal Commission similarly 
said: "In my experience I have had few communications from borough councils'.'^7 
There was, it seems, an increasing reluctance to encourage lists from borough 
councils, in that council members, elected by popular vote, were considered 
vulnerable to solicitation by constituents or by party supporters for nomin­
ations to the bench. The councillor was particularly compromised when lists
were publicly announced and debated before submission to the Lord Chancellor,
278in that private pledges could be tested. This method was also thought
to deter better candidates for the bench. Publicity was embarrassing to
those rejected by the Chancellor, council debates insulting to nominateons
which were unpopular. This did not however describe the situation which
obtained for most of the nineteenth-century. In the years immediately
following borough reform in 1835, for example, whilst Council iuteforence
in the appointment, of magistrates was formally rejected, it was in fact
conceded by the Whig Home Secretary, Lord Russell. According to Lord Wharn-
cliffe, a circular had been issued from the Home Office in 1836 calling on
town councils to return lists of the individuals elected, pointing out whom
279they recommended to be magistrates. Recommendations from the elected
Town Councils were used by Lord Russell between 1835 and 1839 for the first 
2 80borough commissions. He refused to work through Lords Lieutenant, 
in effect allowing the councils to choose their magistracy.
This practice of asking the town councils to 'publicly nominate' magis­
trates for the bench was abandoned, the Webbs thought, in 1841, during
281Peel's Conservative Ministry. Certainly, Joseph Parkes (one time secretary 
of the Commission on Municipal Government) feared for the Whig reforms, and 
in particular for council control of the bench, when he complained in 1841
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that "Graham [the Home Secretary] is...swamping the Municipal Magistracy."
Yet, the custom of consulting council lists maintained a tenuous existence.
The very first commission for a borough would often be recommended by the
283council, as in Stalybridge in 1859. The appointment of additional magis-
284trates was also requested by Warrington T o m  Council in 1858. Later in 
the century, also, Council lists were a common mode of securing appointments. 
In 1883, the Home Secretary answered a question on recommendations for the 
Portsmouth bench, by stating:
Among the sources to which the Lord Chancellor went for inform­
ation were Corporations and Town Councils...
On this occasion, the parliamentary Member for Portsmouth claimed a de facto
right for the Council to recommend candidates for magistracies. Similarly in
Basingstoke in 1881, there was an outcry at the town clerk's announcement
that a proposal for ne-; magistiates had been submitted by a private individua
without consulting the council. Ibe councillors asserted their sole right
to nominate to the magistracy. As Councillor May, J.P., said:
It has been the custom for the burgesses to elect the Councillors 
and the councillors to elect the Aldermen and Mayor, and select 
the names of new magistrates...
The right of nomination had also, it seems, been accepted:
From time immemorial this goard has nominated the names and 
they have been accepted.
One other council, in particular, defended the right to control appointments 
to the bench, a borough for which council involvement is most fully document­
ed, owing to the informative historian, J.T. Bunce, Birmingham magistrate, 
prominent Liberal and influential editor of the Birmingham Daily Post. For 
Bunce, studied narrative of Birmingham Council's fight to retain the priv­
ilege of nominating to the bench held significance for his interest and 
involvement in local government. The battle to retain council control 
of magisterial appointments in Birmingham, formed an integral part of the 
attempt during the 1860s and 1870s to populate local government with "fit
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and proper persons."
In Birmingham the challenge to the town council nominations first appeared 
in 1849 when Lord Chancellor Cottenham included thirteen names in the com­
mission, on private information from the mayor and ex-mayor. The council in­
sisted that they held the right to forward names; that this had been the 
method adopted in 1841, the last year when appointments were made; and was 
the customary method, they thought, for other towns. Lord John Russell (the 
Prime Minister) suggested that the recent appointments should be cancelled, 
but the Lord Chancellor believed the magistrates to be all eligible justices, 
nevertheless assuring the council that he had thought the nominations proceed 
ed from the council itself, and that:
he approved of the practice of receiving nominations from the
Borough Councils, an^ had himself acted upon them, and should
continue to do so.28
Challenge to the council's right to nominate to the bench came next from 
the borough justices who started, in 1856, to forward a list independent of 
the council. In 1859, separate lists from the bench and the council were 
again submitted to the Lord Chancellor. John Bright and Scholefield, 
Birmingham's parliamentary representatives in 1859, in correspondence with 
Chelmsford (Chancellor in Derby's Conservative Ministry) defended the 
Council's exclusive right to nominate to the bench. But this availed little, 
since only three of the council's eight nominations were accepted, whilst 
eleven magistrates were appointed. Most plausibly, the borough magistracy 
broke with the practice of council nominations at mid-century because of 
the parlous state of council debate and behaviour. Unproductive bickering 
promoted by the 'Economy' party in the council chamber inhibited potential 
councillors from seeking office, and produced a distrust held by the bench 
for council nominees. The dispute thus concerned the personal social status 
and fitness of nominees. Not until the 1860s, when new voices were heard 
on the council were the justices prepared to join with the council in
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nominating magistrates. After 1864, joint lists, agreed by council and
bench, were sent to the Lord Chancellor.
In 1874 and 1880 private nominations again pre-empted the council and
the latter fought once more for what it considered its exclusive privilege.
Lord Cairns in 1874 agreed to receive the council's list and he accepted
their nominees. But the same concession was not advanced by the Chancellor
in 1880. In the death-throes of Lord Beaconsfield's Ministry, Cairns accepted
eleven new nominations from Conservatives in the town; or, as the council's
289resolution phrased it - "at the instance of a defeated political party."
Unable to prevent these appointments, the council temporarily refused to
confer with the magistracy, "as by the recent appointments it is placed in
290opposition to the known opinions and wishes of the town." Instead, it 
prepared its own list of twelve names. A conference was immediately called 
by the borough bench at which delegations from the magistracy and council 
re-affirmed the principle of 'concurrent nomination', whilst agreeing that 
separate lists were again necessary for the moment. From the two separate 
lists, Selborne, the new Liberal Lord Chancellor, in July 1830, appointed 
nine new magistrates. Between 1880 and 1885, Lord Selborne initiated the 
practice of submitting lists which he had received through private corres­
pondence, to the town councils for their observations. This of course was 
a depreciation on actual council recommendation. It was this practice which
Lord Halsbury, in December 1886, continued with Birmingham council - to
291offer observations on nine names which he had privately received. Predict­
ably, the council documented what the customary practice of joint lists entai" 
ed, and insisted further that no extra magistrates were required. Lord 
Halsbury was unmoved, appointing the nine candidates in 1887. Again in 
1890, llalsbury offered the council the opportunity to comment on a private 
submission, and again the council refused to comment, since "the observations 
of the council are to be limited to the consideration of the personal fitness
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of the gentlemen proposed to be appointed."“'
The Birmingham council's fight to retain control over nominations was 
thereafter abandoned, according to Bunce. Lord Halsbury appended twelve 
justices to the commission in 1892 without public complaint from the council. 
In the same year, the Liberal Chancellor, Herschell, appointed fourteen 
magistrates without the request of, or complaint from the town council.
Four years later in 1896 Lord Halsbury returned to the woolsack to appoint 
fifteen magistrates, again without dissent. For over forty years the history 
of magisterial appointments in Birmingham had been dominated by the involve­
ment of the borough council, as it struggled to keep the right to influence 
appointments, either alone, or in concert with the borough magistrates.
Few other borough councils asserted this right as tenaciously as Birmingham. 
Behind the struggle was a distinctive, and largely unique, conception of 
local government and of public service. Birmingham in the 18695 and 1870s 
witnessed a dynamic era of municipal reform normally associated wi'.h Joseph 
Chamberlain and the Liberal 'caucus', the era when the 'civic gospel' dom­
inated recruitment to the council. And it would be surprising if this 
•gospel' had not increased demands to appoint 'fit and proper' persons to 
the bench, rather than party mercenaries. It certainly lay beneath the 
council's insistence to have the right to nominate magistrates. Every 
function the Council held was essential in attracting good councillors. En­
suring the council became the only governing body at local level guaranteed 
293its relevance. But in the long run, Birmingham's attempt to maintain 
the practice, started in 1836 by Lord Russell, was defeated. The council 
failed to stay the hand of the Lord Chancellor who was seemingly more 
willing to consult private (and political) sources in deciding on magister­
ial appointments. Conservative Lord Chancellors in 1859 (Chelmsford),
1874 and 1880 (Cairns), 1887, 1890, 1892 and 1896 (Halsbury) initially ig­
nored the town council, and in all but one case (1874) disregarded the
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council's protests.
Birmingham had displayed a particular faith in the integrity and calibre 
of council nominees for the borough magistracy. Appointments which origin­
ated in council lists, said the Birmingham council, were more certain to
receive "public esteem and confidence, or that respect, influence and auth-
294ority so essentially requisite to their efficiency as magistrates." In 
large part, John Bright's defence of the city council's exclusive right to 
nominate its magistracy was a conviction that one way of avoiding what 
Bright saw as the 'discreditable scramble' for placements, was a return to 
the system he knew operated between 1835 and 1839 - "of allowing the Corpor­
ations to have the recommendations." Council lists would overthrow the
'scramble' characteristic of veiled, 'back-door' appointments through which,
295as Bright said, "many unfit men were placed upon the bench."
The major emphasis, however, even for council nominations, must be placed 
on the political taint of candidates. If there was a history of council 
lists, there was a history of political exclusiveness in council appointments 
Bright himself must have known that council lists, in a context of party 
rivalry, had rarely been considered above party. The first commissions 
appointed after 1835, on the basis of council recommendations, were immed­
iately accused of placing a disproportionate number of Whigs on the bench.
In Leeds in 1838, Lord Whamcliffe listed the active justices as seventeen
296Whigs and one Conservative. Complaints of political exclusiveness were
also sent in the 1830s from Lichfield, Lyme Regis, Great Yarmouth, Warwick,
297Coventry and Stratford-on-Avon. ' By 1859, therefore, the Duchy of Lancaste
office, granted the right to select magistrates for borough commissions,
immediately suspected council recommendations. The Chancellor received the
following from Dawes Danvers with regard to Stalybridge's first commission:
I am uncertain how far your Grace might be disposed to take for 
granted the fitness of the persons named by the Mayor, Aldermen 
5 Burgesses of the Boro'. I therefore await your Grace's direct­
ions before I draw the Commission. ^ 98
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Ten years later, a memorial from Wenlock Council for two new appointments
was referred to A.H. Brown, the Liberal member for mid-Shropshire. Brown
told Peter Rylands in November 1869:
I informed the Lord Chancellor of the politics of those gentlemen 
and their position, and also said that it was thought no more Con­
servatives should be appointed to the office of J.P., as they 
already predominated in the proportion of 8 to 1.^99
Instead, Brown sent two of his own nominees, both appointed by the Chancellor.
Similarly, the secretary to the Chancellor of the Duchy, before the Royal
Commission on Justices, spoke of a reference-back to the member for the
borough (if of the same party as the Chancellor) of the names sent up by a
town c o u n c i l . L i s t s  from the council were in this way vetted by party
members.
Hopes of avoiding party involvement in bench appointments by means of 
council recommendations were thus quickly dashed. The political complexion 
of lists was the complexion of the town council.^*1 It is significant that 
Birmingham could not escape imputations of party influence. The civil gos­
pel of the 1870s was examined for the watermark of party, and an aggressive 
Liberalism located. Advance in efficient city government was via the Liberal 
'caucus', a party machine designed, as lianham said, "to bring all local 
institutions into party h a n d s . T h i s  was compatible with larger con­
ceptions of the scope of local government, but political rivals were less 
charitable. For the Birmingham Liberals it seemed unjust so to compromise 
their struggle for pure local government. But Liberal kinsmen, and coun­
cillors in other boroughs held a political morality which was immodest in 
magisterial appointments. It was this morality which ensured council nomin­
ations could not be trusted, which thus forced the nominations into the
hands of party agents and associations, content to work out of the glare of
„ 302bcouncil debates.
It has been argued that the impossibility of the Lord Chancellor scrutin­
izing more than a proportion of the numerous recommendations, and the com­
plementary problem of finding scrutineers in every borough to provide 
disinterested advice on candidates, compelled reliance on party functionaries 
The latter's conception of magistracies as the kingpin in a system of polit­
ical rewards, defeated the intentions of crown appointment, as embodied in 
the Municipal Reform Act. Successive Lord Chancellors were unable to avoid 
political appointments. Had the Chancellor wished to cut the circuit of 
party appointments, the borough elites, crucial political cadres, would not 
have allowed him. As Lord Loreburn told the Royal Commission in 1910 -
"party claims on both sides are thrust forward, constantly with clamour,
303and sometimes with menace." Party influence was backed by parliamentary
members, provincial notables, ward organizers, political agents, and borough
councillors. Each sustained a system of patronage which appealed to
'nouveaux-riche' appetites for social recognition. Importantly, the contrast
between the counties and boroughs was drawn in terms of accidental as opposed
to naked political appointments. Although the contrast was sustained more
by those who were defending Conservative Lords Lieutenant in the counties
304from accusations of party bias, the comparison was widely accented. Mr.
C.S. Henry, M.P. for Mid-Shropshire, considered that the appointment of
borough justices worked well. At least Liberal dissatisfactions at the
Unionist numbers on the borough benches was considerably less than in the
counties. He was questioned for an explanation:
Do you think that is because each political party has what you 
may call a turn of the appointments? - I think it really is 
because the Lords Lieutenant have not been consulted, and there­
fore the Lord Chancellor at different times...have been able 
to appoint in accordance with the views of the political party 
which is in power for the time being.3133
The President of the Justices' Clerks' Society likewise thought the boroughs
were more evenly balanced politically because the Lord Chancellor, always
changing, ensured each party had its day.306 During discussion in 1911 of
the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Justices, members agreed that,
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on the borough benches, there existed a greater equality of political appoint­
ments. Whilst in Bristol there was an obligatory understanding that the 
friends of the government of the day would have an advantage, albeit slight, 
in the complement of names forwarded; in Hereford, where appointments were
made in party batches, "neither of the parties has anything to complain of,
307because the parties are equally divided upon the bench."
If there was a presumption that magistracies were political rewards, 
there was an associated suspicion that justice ran in political grooves: that 
the magistracy acted in the full light of electoral concerns. Appointment 
of magistrates in batches from each political party in Ashton-under-Lyne,
308for example, was said to enforce a political aspect on court proceedings.
The local political joust influenced bench deliberation. The borough magis­
tracy were accused of leaning in the direction of the municipal party which 
had awarded them judicial power. \nd imputations of political partisanship 
in law enforcement were strongest in the judicial response to public disorder. 
In every conjuncture of social disturbance the law was refracted through 
a magistracy whose mode of appointment, and whose interests in the urban 
political and economic structure, determined a form of public order more 
intimate and involved than traditionally described.
The new standards of law enforcement anticipated in the Municipal Reform 
Act of 1835 thus foundered on the determination to keep the appointment of 
magistrates within the political structure of municipal government. Magister­
ial appointments were the elemental piece of local political patronage, con­
ferred on provincial notables in the urban community. Formal institutional 
attempts to segregate the interpretation and the administration of the law, 
to provide an impartial administration of justice, were disfigured by a 
morality which viewed magistracies as party rewards, and by an intimate 
association between bench and council in terms of personnel. Borough govern­
ment and borough law enforcement manifestly emanated from an integrated
social elite, which held economic and political authority, and which 
claimed a juridical independence, rarely challenged by central government.
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CHAPTER TWO
LONDON'S JURIDICAL STRUCTURE AND PROFESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT
In London, the legal structure was markedly different from that in the 
provincial boroughs. There were two crucial alterations in the juridical 
system. Firstly, the government necessarily played a central role by way 
of the Home Secretary, who held overall responsibility for public order in 
London, and for the actions of the Metropolitan police force and magistracy.
In consequence, Home Office policy was informed by a fluctuating balance of 
legal and political imperatives. Secondly, there was a distinct separation 
between the police force and the magistracy; and this segregation was main­
tained in periods of public disorder. The stipendiary magistracy monopolised 
summary hearings in the Metropolitan courts, but during riots the Home 
Secretary and Chief Commissioner of Police looked after the safety of the 
metropolis. No extra-mural duties were assumed by the magistracy, except 
when they were required to accompany the military. Instead, police officials 
were in charge of crowd control, and of the deployment of the police force 
in times of riot. To understand fully the nature and historical basis of 
the Metropolitan legal structure, there follows an estimate of its different 
elements. There is discussion of the Home Office's authority over the 
police force, and of the debate in the 1880s on continued Home Office control 
of the force. Following this, the expected and actual relationship between 
the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner; the nature of the 
metropolitan police force in the 1880s; and, finally, the role of the stip­
endiary magistracy is examined.*
To the extent that the analysis uses evidence from the unemployed distur­
bances of the 1880s, it is useful to provide a brief sketch of those events.' 
Economic depression seriously affected London in the early 1880s. By 1885, 
a socialist-led unemployment movement was holding regular outdoor dcmonstratioi 
and open-air meetings in the propertied West End. One such meeting, held
8;
in Trafalgar Square in February 1886, was followed by a procession to 
Hyde Park. Moving through Pall Mall, the demonstrators started stoning the 
political clubs, and looting surrounding shops. The day became known as the 
Pall Mall or West End riot. When the Home Secretary, Henry Childers, placed 
the blame for the disturbance on the Chief Commissioner of Police, Edmund 
Henderson, the latter resigned, and was succeeded in March 1886 by Sir Charles 
Warren. For the next eighteen months, there was continued concern for 
public order. The fears came to a head in the autumn of 1887 when unemployed 
workers began squatting in Trafalgar Square, and moving out in small contin­
gents into the West End. The decision was finally taken by the Home Secretary 
Henry Matthews, to prohibit all meetings in, and processions to, Trafalgar 
Square. On Sunday, November 13th, large processions of London's working- 
class tried to enter the square, but were forcefully dispersed by the police, 
under the command cf Sir Charles Warren. In the annals of working-class his­
tory, the protest against the closure of the square became known as "Bloody 
Sunday". These events of the mid-1880s are central to the following examin­
ation of London's juridical system.
The Home Office and the Metropolitan Police
The Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 transformed the local government 
of provincial boroughs, and established a police force for each town under 
the local control of a Watch Committee of the Town Council. London, copiousl 
examined in the second report of the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporatioi 
was not included in the Act of 1835.^ Legislation passed between 1829 and 
1839 instead removed the Metropolitan police from the domain of local govern­
ment.^ Sir Robert Peel was determined to keep the police force from out of 
judicial hands, and without local government reform, there was no authority 
which challenged the only other form of representative control, the Home 
Office.^ The Metropolitan police force thus stood as the exception to the
S3
principle of local control which defined the British police system. London 
as a community was excluded from the management of its police force, with
the exception of the City of London, sufficiently entrenched to resist attack
7on its independent force. For the rest of the century, municipal control 
of London's police was resisted. In part, the explanation for the continued 
absence of local control lay in the timing of police reform. In the first 
half of the nineteenth century, police reform was the one aspect of London 
government which received serious treatment. Consequently, in 1855, at the 
creation of the Metropolitan Board of Works, there was less pressure for a 
searching re-organization of local government which might have resulted in
gmunicipal control of police administration. Not that the demand was 
silenced. Stalwart proponents of local control, in part acting in the inter­
ests of economy (as additions to the force particularly between 187C and
18S0 pushed up police expenditure), maintained a conviction that police was
9a local service and belonged under popular control. Josephine Bu'.ler at
the end of the 1870s wrote at length against what she saw as a semi-military
force acting under a minister of state, independent of the cortrol of the
ratepayers. Comparing London with Paris, she postulated:
The history of the rise and increase of our own centralised 
Metropolitan Police Force points to a corresponding decay of
municipal independence.10
In the early 1880s, London government reform approached the zone of 
practical politics once more, in great part accomplished by the efforts of 
the Municipal Reform League, established in July 1881.** The control of 
the metropolitan police came under immediate discussion. And, interestingly, 
the deliberations within the Liberal Cabinet, at this point, revealed the
differences of opinion held both for the control, and the entire role of
12the metropolitan police.
In the early months of 1883 London government reform was placed high on 
the Liberal agenda for time in the next session. Sir William Harcourt, Home
■">
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Secretary, was the central figure in this proposed reform. Harcourt's pro­
posal, on which he had worked for some years, was an expansion of the City 
of London Corporation into a large central organ for London with over two 
hundred directly-elected members, and district councils, for local adminis­
tration. The metropolitan area was to be a county by itself for judicial
purposes with its own magistracy, but the police were to remain under the 
13Home Office. This last proposal was the major obstacle to Cabinet agree­
ment on the Bill, and this dissension, plus the unscrupulous opposition of 
the City authorities, caused the ultimate miscarriage of the Bill. Harcourt'
sentiments on Home Office control of the police had been stated as early 
14as December 1881. Gladstone referred to this memorandum in his letter to
Lord Granville in January 1883, describing the basis of his own disagreement:
I am...too strongly committed, and too much attached, to decen­
tralising doctrines, to bo a party to keeping the Magistracy and 
Police of the Metropolitan District, in principle, under the Home 
Office. It appears to me that the limited exigencies of Court and 
Parliament as to Police may ant should bo met by special provisions, 
perhaps by a power in the Secretary of State to make demands upon, 
and if needful to override, the Municipal authority within certain 
limits or for certain purposes. I do not mean that all Police and 
Magistracy should of necessity at once be transferred, or placed on 
the footing on which they stand in other municipalities: but a date 
might be fixed in the Act, within which this should be done. I 
hope that Harcourt and the Cabinet generally would take this view, 
for I am very anxious that the Liberal party should be purged of a 
suspicion which more or less attaches to it in respect of central­
ising tendencies.15
Gladstone objected, therefore, to the police force being retained in the 
hands of the Imperial government, especially in a city of four million people 
He felt that any Bill which created a representative municipality, should 
not place‘*the ordinary management" of the police force under the Home 
Secretary. ^
In March 1883 Harcourt expanded his case in the form of a memorandum 
on London police for the use of the Cabinet. ^  He dispensed quickly with 
the City of London police. Its amalgamation with the rest of the Metropolita 
police was long overdue, and was commonly accepted as necessary. The only
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real question was - "whether the united force shall be placed under the
18control of the Corporation or of the Government." His argument for Home 
Office control rested on a number of points, but was encompassed by the 
general theme that London posed particular problems, was distinguished by 
a particular situation which demonstrated "the sheer impossibility of vest­
ing in a popular Council the discipline and administration of such a force
19as the Metropolitan Police." A Watch Committee, said Harcourt, could not
look after the Queen, Court, Parliament and Dockyards. Unlike in Liverpool
or Birmingham, where the executive government had no local knowledge, in
London the Secretary of State in certain emergencies had "far better means
20of judging than the Corporation could have." Harcourt's mind was unduly 
concentrated by the Fenian threat which, he insisted, required secret and 
speedy action, not watch ccinmittee deliberation. He was finally concerned 
that questions of pay and discipline for the 12,000 men of the metropolitan 
force, and for the Chief Commissioner, should not be discussed in open 
Committee; and that the concurrent jurisdiction over the police given to the 
magistracy (under S.191 of 1882 Municipal Corporations Act) would lead to 
conflict between justices and watch committee. Aware that similar objections 
referred to provincial towns, he argued that there was no alternative in 
those areas to local, representative authorities. In London, however, the 
government had the information needed "in a higher degree" to deal with a 
vast population;
The condition of the Metropolis - whose cosmopolitan character 
distinguishes it from other local communities - at once explains 
and justifies, indeed renders necessary, this distinction.¿1
Harcourt's memorandum did not convince Gladstone, who still argued that
"the specialities of the Home Minister's position" should not be provided
22by assigning to him the ordinary police force. Both Gladstone and Charles 
Dilke were of the opinion that a Fenian attack was more likely in the North, 
especially Liverpool, and that previous experience showed that arrests
86
could be made by a force controlled by the corporation. And further, they 
thought that Fenian plots should hardly govern the resolution of an issue
with an import which would stretch beyond the temporary worry of Fenianism. 
The Prime Minister offered a compromise by agreeing that the Home Secretary 
retain his police powers for five years, after which the capacity of the
24new Municipality to acquire the police authority could be better judged.
Harcourt was unmoved, since the City would keep control of its own police
under that arrangement; and he felt it would be tantamount to revealing the
25dissension within the Cabinet. Only a permanent state police for London
satisfied Harcourt, with himself able when necessary to act as a 'Chief of
Police', as he was to do during the Fenian explosions in London in October
1883. Harcourt was nevertheless persuaded, according toDilke, to place
the City police under a new municipality, whilst the Metropolitan police
27remained under the Home Office. The London Government Bill “as introduced
in this form in 1884. Tt struggled through to its second reading, but
opposition from the London Corporation, plus a lack of interest among Liberal
28members, killed the Bill. But before that point, the patched-up arrange­
ment for police control had taken the edge off the original appetite for
29local government reform.
The debate is a significant one for locating the evidence on which Home 
Office control of the police was defended. It was also the last moment in 
the 1880s when London's police could have been placed under an elected Coun­
cil, because from 1884 every incident re-affirmed for Harcourt and many 
others, that a division of power in control of the London police would be 
disastrous; and that London was too essentially the backbone of the country 
to have a police force controlled by local interests. By the same token, 
others interpreted these events as proof of the need for municipal control 
of the police. For the last five years of the 1880s, then, every incident 
of public disorder, or proposal for government reform, re-fired the debate."5
23
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In 1885, when the police harassed socialist open-air meetings in Dod Street,
William Thompson pointed the contrast between London, where the government
regulated all out-of-door life, and Paris, where the municipal council acted
31as a buffer between the people and the police. The Pall Mall riots in
February 1886 entered the controversy. For the Municipal Reform League,
the moral of the riot was that the police should be made responsible to a 
32municipal authority. Following the riots, James Stuart's parliamentary
motion in favour of municipal control of the police elicited support from a
few faithfuls - Mr.Cremer, Mr. Howell. 33 But the typical response, as from
Henry Holland, a member of the departmental inquiry into the riots, was to
34deplore the removal of the police from the executive government. Lord
Algernon Percy prophesied that the riots would have been far worse had the
35police been under a municipality. Stuart's specific motion v;as in fact 
largely ignored, and emphasis given to the correct relationship which ought 
to obtain between police force and Home Secretary. It was considered that 
the time was inopportune for any drastic alterations. As the 'Saturday 
Review' said:
The friends of peace and order, having been surprised by the 
discovery that a London mob may become dangerous, are more than 
usually indisposed to part with any security for the effective 
suppression of violence. ^
Again after Bloody Sunday in 1887 the 'Law and Liberty League', formed on
the initiative of W.T. Stead (editor of the 'Pall Mall Gazette') had as its
'ultimate aim', - "the establishment of popular control over the Metropolitan 
37Police." Home Rule for London as well as for Ireland were twin planks in 
the radical programme. A correspondent to the 'Pall Mall Gazette' furthered 
the comparison:
In Ireland it is Home Rule v. Castle rule; in London it is Home 
Rule v. Home Office rule.38
In the two places where the police were in collision with the population, 
Cunninghame Graham remarked,the police were under the direct control of the
8;
Crown. By 1888 there was fresh relevance in re-publication of Josephine 
Butler's tract on the metropolitan police in which she included up-dated
remarks on the centralized police government which had been fully experienced 
40in recent years. But radical pressure was unrewarded in the county
government reform of 1888, failing to add the police to the London County
41Council's other responsibilities. There was too large a concern that a 
force in the hands of a radical L.C.C. might be used to tolerate, even en­
courage, mob violence as a means of embarrassing central government. As 
Howard Evans said in March 1889, hypothetically posing a left-wing domination 
of the L.C.C;
Assuming that such a Council had had the control of the police 
in the autumn of 1887, there can be little doubt that meetings in 
Trafalgar Square, and, for the matter of that, anywhere else in 
London, would have been not only permitted, but encouraged, by 
members of the Council themselves. The thieves and scoundrels of 
the Metropolis had had in the previous year just sufficient taste 
of the pleasure of plundering with impunity one of the wealthiest 
quarters of London to whet their appetites for more; anq no one who 
carefully studied the constitution of the mobs of roughs that 
assembled ir> Trafalgar Square day after day in November 1887 could 
fail to be convinced that they were bent on serious mischief. If 
proper precautions had not been taken to prevent outbreaks on those 
occasions, London would undoubtedly have been subjected to another, 
and far more serious plundering than that in the spring of 1886.
The fear was of divided counsels in dealing with disturbance. Evans pulled 
back to his farthest point of retreat when he suggested that if the L.C.C. 
took control of the police, the Home Secretary should still retain the 
appointment of the Chief Commissioner, and, "in cases of mass meetings, dis­
turbances, or riots, he [should have] the power to give direct instructions
43to the Commissioner of Police." The years of disorder between 1885 and 
1888 most effectively sustained Home Office control of the metropolitan polic 
The events of the 1880s also promoted a contemporary re-assessment of 
the working relationship between the Home Secretary and the Chief Commiss­
ioner of Police. The Statute 10 George IV. c.44, placed the Chief Commiss­
ioner under the authority of the Secretary of State - "an Office of police 
acting under the immediate authority of one of his Majesty's Principal
39
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Secretaries of S t a t e . W h a t  the relationship looked like in practice, 
was more clearly revealed in the mid 1880s - when a traditional speakers' 
pitch for religious and political debate, Dod Street, became a test of 
strength between the Metropolitan police and the combined force of London 
radical and socialist groups.^ Throughout August 1885, speakers were 
summoned by the police: charged with the offence of street preaching so as 
to cause an obstruction in a public thoroughfare, or with resisting the 
police in execution of their duty. Police officials showed implacable reluc­
tance to back down, aspiring, in the face of mounting opposition, "to be
46allowed to stop any speaking firmly and temperately." Later, when a
demonstration (organized by the Social Democratic Federation) was planned
for September 27th, Sir Alexander Bruce, Assistant Commissioner of Police,
and James Monro, Assistant Commissioner in charge of the C.I.D., called at
the Home Office to put their case for prohibition of the meeting. Together
they argued to Home Secretary Cross that neighbourhood opinion, in fact
generally of the East End", favoured tough police action, as did the public
press; and that to allow the proposed meeting on September 27th was to place
the police and the magistracy in the wrong. As Monro said:
Any weakening of the legal status quo wd. be a mistake, 8 lead 
to grave complications both now 8 in future.47
But the police had already culled temperance and nonconformist preachers 
along with socialist speakers. In time, religious opinion along with elec­
toral concerns, moved the Home Secretary to formulate a different police polic 
Edmund Henderson, the police commissioner was instructed to put out a notice 
which stated that there would be no police interference unless traffic was
obstructed. On the 27th, therefore, a demonstration of 30,000 converged 
49on Dod Street.
What is significant in this incident is that it formed the basis of a 
written 'precis' on the respective duties and areas of responsibility of
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the Home Office and Metropolitan Police. The 'precis' was sent by the 
police office in February 1886 to Godfrey Lushington, the Permanent Under­
secretary of State.^ On the occasion of the Dod Street rumpus, the state­
ment declared, the initial arrangements as to police strength and deployment, 
were not brought before the Home Office. Only when the police were anxious 
to ban the meeting of September 27th, 1885, did they approach the Home Office 
on the question - "how far were the Police to intefere to prevent the Social­
ists from obstructing the streets";
...the Home Office action was entirely confined to deciding the 
question (partly one of law, partly one of policy) of whether and 
how far the meeting was to be allowed. 51
Before the Assistant Commissioners of Police spoke to the Home Secretary, 
then, nothing was known at the Home Office of the police ban on public meet­
ings in Dod Street. In fact, temperance meetings had been held there since 
mid-July, but, as Pemberton (in the Home Office) told the Secretary of State,
"there has been little difficulty in suppressing their, on the ground of the
52obstruction they caused." Stem resistance by the S.D.F. to needless 
interference, and the attraction in a 'sound' cause of the radical clubs, 
forced the issue before the Home Secretary who thereupon decided for the 
first time the policy of whether and to what degree, meetings were to be 
allowed, to which the Chief Commissioner acceded. Discretion, as to enforce 
the law or not, rested with the police authorities. Only the Secretary of
State had any influence, necessarily intermittent and incomplete, on police
.. 53policy.
This outline of duties was the basis of Home Secretary Childers statements 
in February 1886, after the Pall Mall riot, in which he held the Chief Com­
missioner responsible for all police action at street level: and in which, 
it should be added, he thereby absolved the Home Office of blame for the 
West End riot. Childers insisted that the same ground rules had applied for 
the unemployed meeting in Trafalgar Square prior to the riot in February 1886
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Since there was no prior policy intention of interfering with the meeting
it had been unnecessary to liaise with the Home Office, in excess of send-
54ing the printed order detailing the police arrangements made. A Home 
Secretary, said Childers, would be unwise to interfere in police arrangements 
and he need not insist on being sent periodic reports when the police were 
escorting potentially troublesome demonstrations.^ In an important memor­
andum, Lushington had advised Childers on 21st February 1886:
It is essential that the Commissioner should feel that he has 
a free hand, that he must rely solely upon himself, and be ex­
clusively responsible for the result. Any division of respon- 
sibility is, in my opinion, incompatible with the public safety.
Childers abridged the description when, using his War Office experience, he
confirmed - "...the relations of the Secretary of State with the Chief
Commissioner were very much the relations which existed between the Secretary
of State for War and the General Officer of the Army sent on an Expedition
..."' There could be initial discussion between Chief Commissioner and
Home Secretary, but thereafter, responsibility for public order was with the
Commissioner. The upshot of the West End riot was thus to reinforce what
can only be described as a tenuous control over the metropolitan police. In
the parliamentary debates, following the riot, there was definite concern
that the Commissioner should have the power to act on his own responsibility
without hindrance from the Home Office. There was a widespread feeling, it
seems, that Henderson had been sacrificed unfairly to expunge the fears of
disorder, without having been given the independence to act against unemployei
demonstrations. Sir William Russell wrote to Lord Wolseley referring to
the opinion (incorrect in Russell's view) that Henderson was told to desist
from acting against public meetings - "There can be no truth in the theory
59which is common here that Henderson was ordered not to act..." At the 
end of February, Howard Vincent, one-time assistant commissioner in charge 
of C.I.D. nevertheless expressed a representative hope that the outcome of 
the debate on the disturbances would not "deprive the Police Authorities of
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that freedom of action and that unfettered responsibility which was absol­
utely necessary for the efficient discharge of their duty."*’0 And the next 
Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles Warren, had a habit of referring to the publi 
statements made at this point, to the effect that the Commissioner of Police 
was held directly responsible for police action, and that the Commissioner 
held powers comparable to a general in the f i e l d . T h i s  evidence sustained 
his claim between 1886 and 1888 for full discretion to preserve public order, 
unimpeded by the Home Secretary. Even after Warren's departure from office, 
when his independence of civilian control was finally rejected, Walter 
Bartelot was prepared to argue for the Commissioner's supreme command over 
the force, without obstruction from "a dual control, carried out in the way 
it had been carried out, between himself and the Home Office, that he was 
unable to do the work in the way in which he would like to do it. This 
was in fact the nub of James Stuart's contention. Stuart, an ardent propon­
ent of municipal control of the force, felt that there was no real discipline
over the Metropolitan police, for the Home Office exercised "a most inefficie
6 3and superficial control over it." This left only parliamentary enquiry,
and whilst apologists emphasized that governmental oversight of the force
ensured parliamentary control, Stuart replied by doubting that parliament
64should have to act as the Watch Committee of London.
The Metropolitan Police Force
Counterpart to the concern that the Chief Commissioner of Police was 
given too great a discretion in the organization of the police, was the fear 
that the Metropolitan police was not a civil force. Between 1886 and 1888, 
Sir Charles Warren's military administration of the force was described as 
a signal consequence of the powers given to the Chief Commissioner: far 
wider than those allowed chief constables working under municipal government 
in provincial boroughs. Significantly, the indictment pointed to the
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historical lineage behind the centralized and militarized metropolitan 
force.^ From 1886, accusations against the concerted militarization of 
the police often contained reference to a process of militarization and re­
lated centralization, stretching back to the late 1860s. Mr. Lawson in a 
debate on police estimates in November 1888 referred back to criticisms made 
in 1869 by an ex-police magistrate, since which time, according to Lawson, 
the police had been transformed "into a quasi-military force, drilled, dis­
tributed and managed as soldiers", denying all self-reliance or mobility, 
a "cumbrous and badly-organized army, which was never required as a whole, 
and was nearly useless in d e t a i l . M a t c h i n g  evidence was offered by Sir 
James Fergusson who recalled, at the time of the Pall Mall riot, that eighteen 
years earlier, when Under-Secretary of the Home Department, he had drawn up 
(with Sir Henry luring) a report on the organization of the Metropolitan force. 
The exact weak points mentioned in 1886 were noticed then:
The first of these was the excessg^'e centralization, and the want
of superior responsible officers.
The recommendation had been made in 1868, and quickly implemented, to divide 
London into four districts with a superintendent for each one, preferably
68 The CommitteeArmy officers, holding the powers of a county chief constable 
of 1868 said, in anticipation:
the police distgict will form, for police purposes, almost a 
separate town." ®
Of the first four district superintendents appointed in 1869, two were army 
officers, one an Indian police officer.70 They found it difficult to create 
an established role for themselves between the superintendents and constabul­
ary in each division on the one hand and the assistant commissioners of 
police on the other. Attached to Scotland Yard, as the district superintendent 
were, the hopes of decentralization disappeared.71 Fergusson considered that 
the system of district officers had never inured itself;
and that Scotland Yard retained too much of detail in its hands 
and never allowed these officers sufficient discretion.72
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The Committee of Inquiry in 1886 found that only two district superintendents
remained, a situation which forced the conclusion:
The police system which the committees of 1868 and 1879 had wished 
to decentralize has thus gradually been allowed to revert into the 
old grooves. The district superintendents have lost their local 
attributes and have become as it were active officers of the head­
quarters staff, to be sent here or there when occasion demands.73
One of the few concrete changes suggested by the Committee in 1886 was to 
• 74increase the officers once again to four. But this was little indemnity 
for a system which was excessively centralized, with no tradition of dis­
cretion outside Scotland Yard.
Changes subsequent to the West End riot were limited. The appointment
of a few army officers to positions of chief and assistant chief constable
75did not materially affect the actual system of control. Charles Warren's
appointment was however of another order. His reorganisations affezced only
slightly the centralised system which he inherited, but his personal influenc
76assisted a deepening of such tendencies. There was a notorious neglect 
and impoverishment of the Criminal Investigation Department which forced the 
resignation, in mid 1888, of Assistant Commissioner, James Monro. Warren 
was charged with dictating policy to the C.I.D. in matters which previously 
had been seen as the legitimate province of the Assistant Commissioner.
When London was gripped in the throes of 'Jack the Ripper' murders in 1888, 
the signal ineffectiveness of the C.I.D. was attributed to Warren's previous 
interference. Relations with the uniformed rank and file were equally 
baleful. For Warren, the most essential tenet in managing a force of 14,000 
men was administration and discipline: a centralized administration, and a 
rigorous discipline. Morale in the force was quickly drained, as internal 
regulations were severely enforced; and as personal initiative was further 
abbreviated. Warren insisted, for example, that no police application for 
summonses could be sent to a magistrate without first obtaining his approval. 
By the summer of 1887 resentments had advanced far enough for a series of
9 5
public meetings to be held in Hyde Park, largely attended by members of 
the police force, at which resolutions were passed which criticized the sys­
tem of police administration as having demoralised the force, and protested 
against the arbitrary severity of punishments inflicted on constables for 
breaches of the regulations, especially for drunkenness offences. Rank
and file resentments developed also around wages and pensions, and in 1889
81were invigorated by the mass movement in unskilled unionism. The full 
indictment made by the constabulary against the Chief Commissioner could be 
summarized as a policy of militarism - inflexible discipline, denial of 
initiative, employment in large numbers of ex-soldiers, and use of military 
squad drill.
Outside the force, the same criticisms emerged for the creation of an
ambience of militarism in the years, 1386-1888. Warren's administration was
8?disparaged for its policy of 'militaiy repression' against the ’inemployed,
and for his declaration of independence from civilian control and especially
from the permanent officials of the Home Office (and, one suspects, in par-
83ticular from Godfrey Lushington). In Warren's article in "Murray's
Magazine", entitled 'The Police of the Metropolis' (as a result of which his
resignation was accepted), he was at pains to deny that any attempt was made
"to make soldiers of the police," or "to drill and train the police as a
military f o r c e . H i s  defence was in response to a mounting critique
throughout 1888 of his military administration. In the debate in November
on the motion to reduce Warren's salary, Lawson referred to the recent years
when "the military idea had been made the one dominant principle...to the
85danger of the whole social order of London." Warren was usually blind 
to all the accusations. In a typically deficient reply to Home Secretary 
Matthews, commenting on recent articles critical of the organization of the 
force, which appeared in the "Pall Mall Gazette", in October 1888, Warren
said:
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The remarks about centralization I am unable to comprehend.
...then it proceeds to 'Militarism Rampant', in which the 
writer describes a soldier as a man who is never left alone:- 
'he never acts on his own initiative', the only reply to this 
is there are soldiers and soldiers, but I don't see what the 
whole chapter has to do with the Police Force.86
The final act in Warren's Commissionership was the patronizing article in 
'Murray's Magazine' where Warren accused the public of oscillating between 
criticism of the police in moments of social stasis, and defence of the force 
in periods of social disorder; and where he claimed the right to comment on 
the organization of the force without prior sanction from the Secretary of 
State. His resignation followed, but this was the last in a series of occas­
ions when he claimed a position of independence from the Home Office. Home 
Secretary Matthews illustrated his strained relationship with Warren, when in 1 
May 1888 he wrote to Lord Salisbury:
I am bound to say that Sir C's continuance at the head of the 
police becomes daily more difficult, consistently with the exer­
cise of any ccntroul [sic] by the Home Office.8?
Warren carried to its logical point, the division of powers which animated 
London's legal administration. Hence, during the lead-up to the ban on pub­
lic meetings in Trafalgar Square in November 1887, he insisted on 
prohibitory powers in the face of legal opinion, and against the stated
OOopinions of the Home Secretary. As a result of Warren's strident policy
against the unemployed in the Square, the official journal of the Law and
Liberty League, the 'Link', four days after 'Bloody Sunday', asked the
poignant question, who gives orders to London's Head Constable? -
There is no municipal authority in existence, from whom he can 
receive orders. If the Home Office cannot command him, then he 
is an independent authority, resting on no representative found­
ation. . .89
In the mid-1880s this led to a dual control of the Metropolitan police, 
and to a public-order policy which reflected the incompatible springs to 
action with regard to the Home Secretary and the Chief Commissioner of 
Police. The fear of 'divided counsels' in the repression of social disturb­
ance, predicted for municipal control of the administration of public
90order, was thus not absent from the existing legal structure.
The Stipendiary Magistracy
In 1839, the Metropolitan Police Act and the Metropolitan Police Courts 
Act had established a complete division of functions whereby the commissioner 
of police was responsible for organizing the police force in the metropolitan 
area and the metropolitan magistrates were restricted to their judicial
91functions, with no responsibility for organizing or controlling the police.
As Maitland said, the judicial and executive duties of peace conservation 
were parted, "and we are left with learned magistrates and gallant commiss- 
ioners." Behind the separation of executive from judicial duty, was a 
concern to allow the police commissioners the time to build up the force, 
unhindered by judicial duties. But it was progressively revered as an 
issue of principle. The line of demarcation between the magistracy and the
9police was certainly drawn more rigidly in the course of the next generation. 
A system of judicial administration was established in London by which the 
capital was still regulated in 1900. It rested on the stipendiary magis­
trates, trained lawyers and paid functionaries. The Webbs described them 
as"'a set of quiet, gentlemanlike persons'; perhaps the 'failures' of their
profession; concentrating their attention on trying the ordinary cases of a
95London police court; entirely divorced from County Business..." Police
9magistrates were appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Home Secretary. 
They were few in number - in 1881, there were twenty-three police magistrates 
for thirteen police courts; by 1907, there were twenty-five magistrates for 
fourteen courts.97 Each court had a district assigned to it, the combined 
courts extending over almost the whole of the county, but excluding the 
City, of London. The London police magistrates were put into the Commissions 
of Peace of all the home counties after appointment - justices for Middlesex,
The jurisdictionSurrey, Kent, Essex, Hertfordshire and Westminster.
did not apply in return. That is, the district of a London police court was
exempt from the interference of the home county magistrates, except for
99licensing work and other administrative duties. For this reason, summary 
jurisdiction in the Metropolis remained in the hands of a small number of 
professional magistrates.
In 1889, and the formation of a separate county of London, the situation 
was unaltered in the field of criminal jurisdiction.*00 As a result, in 
the 1890s and into the twentieth century, there was continued pressure, not­
ably parliamentary, to adjust the segregated jurisdictions between lay and 
stipendiary magistrates. In the 1890s, the London Standing Joint Committee 
tried to get a change to allow justices to adjudicate on more than they 
were allowed to under section 42 of the Police Courts Act, 1339. In 1SS4, 
the joint committee pressed the Home Office for a Bill to amend the Metro­
politan Police Courts Act.*0* This however resulted only in the Departmental
Committee of 1900 to inquire into the jurisdiction of professional and lay 
102magistracy. There were in fact a series of departmental committees 
which considered whether county justices should be allowed to have summary 
jurisdiction within the limits of the Metropolitan Police Court Districts, 
in particular following the High Court decision of 1894, in 'Dodson v. Will­
iams', which held that whilst lay justices were forbidden from taking court
103fees, they were not thereby deprived of jurisdiction. Soon, county 
magistrates claimed jurisdiction in a number of London divisions. The 
departmental committees thus confronted this anomalous situation of county 
justices acting in some divisions, mainly for offences prosecuted by the 
local authorities. However, they advised no further integration. A full 
system of concurrent jurisdiction of professional and lay magistracies was 
turned down. The report of the 1900 Committee concluded that it was undesir­
able to alter a system, working satisfactorily, "under which the paid
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magistracy are in a large measure responsible for the order and good govem-
104ment of the Metropolis..." Even after 1889, then, when London had its 
own commission of the peace, stocked with lay magistrates, there was still 
no concession to the highly professional form of judicial authority in 
London. On the basis of this description, it is possible to argue, first, 
that the amateur magistracy were overshadowed in London by the stipendiary; 
and, secondly, that the separation of judicial and police functions meant 
that even the stipendiaries had an insignificant role in the preservation 
of public order. The lay magistrates - either of the surrounding home countie: 
or,after 1889, of the county of London - played far less part in the admin­
istration of summary jurisdiction than did their colleagues in provincial 
boroughs: including those towns in which stipendiary magistrates also sat. 
London had been given a set of paid functionaries, selected on grounds of 
professional training, and expected to be independent of local or political 
interest. The latter formed the usual defence put forward by stipendiaries 
when resisting the encroachment of the lay justices. Sir James Vaughan, 
Bow-Street magistrate, frowned on the English gentleman sitting as county 
magistrate, in 1899, in the following terms:
There is such a thing as local feeling existing, and local sentiment 
and prejudice, and if such cases arose where there might be a feeling 
that looking to the local circumstances it would be better for one 
course to be adopted rather than another; it is possible that a course 
might be adopted by the County Justices which would induce a belief that 
there had been favouritism or prejudice. Therefore upon that ground 
I myself am unwilling to entrust the County Justices in London with 
a larger amount of power than at present they possess.10®
As Jeremy Bentham had longed for, the London stipendiary was a judicial 
officer whose work was his only responsibility - unlike the country gentleman 
or borough manufacturer, fitting justice into his other daily concerns. For 
the stipendiary, his existence was a judicial existence. Not for the Metrop­
olis, a judicial structure which was parochial, involved; instead, one which 
stressed uniformity of decision, and professional law dispensed with impar­
tiality.
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The actual involvement of the lay magistracy in the maintenance of pub­
lic order was also negligible. County magistrates were involved during 
1887 in swearing special constables. Before the 1900 Departmental Committee, 
John Pearce, clerk to the justices of Kensington division, and advocate of 
increased jurisdiction for the county magistracy, said:
During the riots of 1887 the Kensington Justices sat for six days 
swearing in special constables, and they have formed a rota of 
Justices to accompany the troops when necessary, which has also 
been done in the other divisions. All this work is of a character 
that a police magistrate cannot be expected to undertake, and so 
interfere with his ordinary jurisdiction.
Pearce later said that in 1887 the country magistracy had taken the work of
swearing special constables 'all over London', alongside the stipendiaries:
I know we sat for six days in it, and sent up some of the lists 
to the Home Office here. We were sitting from 10 to 6, and had the 
greatest difficulty to take down ghe names and swear ¡.hern in, so 
many were waiting at Kensington.^
But the special constables were sworn only after 'Bloody Sunday', when 
public alarm had been stayed by firm police action against the demonstrators 
Vet this was the most substantial role taken by the lay magistracy in the 
preservation of the peace in what was seen as a moment of intense social 
crisis in London. Unlike in the provincial boroughs, where the lay bench 
superintended the interpretation of, and the measures to allay social dis­
turbance, in London, the lay magistracy were divorced from active involvement 
in the maintenance of public order.
Nor were the stipendiary magistracy seen as an integral part of the 
immediate response to social disturbance. In the public inquest after the 
riots of February 1886, no mention was made of the magistracy. In London, 
the accomplished separation of the police and magisterial offices meant that 
the stipendiaries were involved only in the processing of the cases brought 
by the police, occasionally in the cautionary (and often 'post hoc') prep­
arations for the use of the military, but never in the police measures to 
preserve public order. London was thus unique in the faithfulness to the
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divorce between judicial and administrative parts of the legal system - a 
segregation expected of all boroughs, but only substantially adopted in 
the metropolis. It determined that law enforcement was the distinct respon­
sibility of the executive or administrative wing.
The only direct judicial involvement in the formation of the policy of 
public order came through an intermittent correspondence between the Chief 
magistrate at Bow Street, Sir James Ingham, and Godfrey Lushington at the 
Home Office, as to the ways in which public order could best be maintained 
in the centre of London. In early November 1887 'wandering bands' of unem­
ploy ', moving out from Trafalgar Square seemed beyond the reach of the law, 
since their conduct was hardly riotous, and the offence of unlawful assembly 
would have been hard to sustain. In these circumstances, the chief magistral 
made it known that he offered no objection to a police notice based on sub­
section 9 (section 54) of the Police Act, 2 and 3 Viet. c.-17, to prohibit 
109such bands. But the law officers, invariably consulted on important 
points of law, advised against such a course, considering that this would 
be 'ultra vires' of the Statute.^0 Whilst the Chief Magistrate was thus 
anxious to co-operate with the Home Office, it was in furtherance of policies 
which owed far more to the deliberations of the law officers of the crown 
(the Attorney and Solicitor Generals), executive and not judicial officers. 
The stipendiary magistracy were doubtless influenced by the knowledge that 
legal advice was available to the government from the law officers, and for 
that reason showed extreme reluctance, in their deliberations in the 
summary courts, to obstruct the executive's policy in regard to public order 
and public meetings. *** All attempts, for example, to test the sundry legal 
questions raised by the police prohibition of meetings in Trafalgar Square 
in November 1887 were deflected by the courts. In the metropolis, partic­
ularly in the sphere of social disorder, the executive wing of the legal
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structure was rarely impeded by its judicial counterpart.
The juridical structure of London was characterized, therefore, by three 
main features: a pronounced separation of magisterial and police duties; a 
highly centralized police force controlled by a chief commissioner who was 
unhindered by municipal control; and a Secretary of State who extended consid­
erable discretionary authority to the chief of police, but who nevertheless 
held final responsibility for public order. These were the basic elements 
in the apparatus of metropolitan law enforcement. It is the role of the 
Home Secretary, however, which must be singled out as of crucial relevance. 
Public order policy was directly shaped by the Home Secretary, with the ass­
istance of the Attorney and Solicitor Generals, and the permanent officials 
at the Home Office, all of whom were keenly aware of the political repercuss­
ions of social disturbance The concerns of government were thereby char.le 11- 
111into law enforcement. A political aspect was given to every lapse in public
order, especially when London was sui generis, the centre of government and 
1*7of Empire. The political imperatives which informed the process of social 
control in the metropolis, visibly affected the legal response to the unem­
ployed agitation of the mid-1880s. Detailed investigation of the legal 
response is taken up in the final chapter, but the main outline is worth 
sketching, insofar as it derived from the nature of the judicial structure 
described above. The Home Secretary formulated the policy of law enforce­
ment in the autumn of 1887 in the light of conflicting pressures. On one 
hand, Home Secretary Matthews was exhorted by a middle-class constituency 
to adopt a tough police approach to the predatory behaviour of London's 
'dangerous class'. The anxieties of propertied London were authenticated and 
encouraged by the Chief Commissioner of Police, Sir Charles Warren, whose 
claim to be independent of Home Office control led to his public espousal 
of the dangers of hesitancy in the face of social disorder. On the other 
hand, Matthews was advised by his law officers that a sustainable legal
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case for the suppression of street rowdyism was essential, but was unob­
tainable from the extant law. Given the distinct separation of police and 
judicial authorities, it was dangerous to rely on the outcome of hearings 
before the stipendiary magistracy, particularly when police action was in­
adequately supported by law. There were political risks, then, for the 
Home Secretary both in allowing further riots in 1887, as also in the illegal 
suppression of unemployed meetings and demonstrations. In consequence, the 
public order policy in the autumn of 1887 was hesitant, indecisive, and at 
times openly contradictory as Warren impatiently pre-empted the Home Office's 
movements against social disturbance. A unified policy was seriously hinderei 
by the indefinite relationship which existed between the Chief Commissioner 
and the Home Secretary. For all the revered professionalism, then, of a 
legal structure which exhibited the full utilitarian framework, it was 
nevertheless deeply affected by distinct social and political imperatives.
The nature of those influences, and the manner in which they impinged upon 
the enforcement of public order in London belongs to the final chapters.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MAGISTRACY, 'MOB' RIOT AND VICTORIAN ELECTIONS
Prologue
In the next two chapters there is an examination of the form of law 
enforcement in provincial boroughs which were affected by election or rel­
igious disturbances, with particular reference to the 1880s. Chapter three 
examines election riots, and chapter four, Salvation Army riots. In each 
case, an examination is made of the socio-political content of each type 
of disturbance, of the attitude adopted by the magistracy and police author­
ities towards the riots, and of the measures taken to meet the disjunction 
in public order. In chapter three,which represents only a provisional 
assessment of the issues, the emphasis rests on the elections of 1868 (not­
ably in South Lancashire) u.id of the 1880s. In the more detailed chapter 
on the Salvation Army riots, the emphasis is on the years 1878 to 188S when 
most of the religious 'mobbing' occurred. It concentrates geographically 
on the Home and Southern Counties, where the majority of such disturbances 
broxe out. In both these chapters a distinctive form of law enforcement 
is documented. The magistracy responded rather indolently to the periodic 
threat of electoral violence, or to the organized intimidation which met 
the Salvation Army. It was a reflection of their prior experience of elect­
oral and religious riot. More significantly, the adjustments made by the 
urban magistracy in their mode of enforcement, reflect community definitions 
of, and involvement in, such forms of disorder. Further, the legal officials 
were invariably implicated in, and occasionally in conflict about, election 
and Salvationist disturbance. In consequence, magisterial behaviour was an 
important variable in the outbreak and continuance of these disturbances.
On the basis of these two chapters, it is possible to confirm that by no 
means all social disturbance punctured the social structure. It might be 
a form of social control rather than a threat to it.
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It is necessary, first, to deal with the interpretation of election
and religious disturbance which emphasises alone the inadequacies of the
police available to prevent it. As. H.J. Hanham said of election riots,
they often took place "simply because there was no one to stop them."^
It is obviously a persuasive argument. Borough police forces were declared
inefficient as a result of inadequate numbers of constables, notably in the
north-west of the country (Lancashire and Cheshire) and in the south-west
(Devon and Cornwall), both areas where a large number of election and sal-
, 2vationist riots occurred. In small towns, the proportion of police to pop­
ulation was considerably less favourable than in large towns like Liverpool 
or Manchester, where public disorder was less common. In 1885, the proportion 
of constabulary to population for Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham was, 
respectively, one policeman to 406, 555 and 728 inhabitants. In contrast, 
the proportion in the majority of towns affected by election and religious
3riots in the 1880s was between 1:800 and 1:1,000. Such ratios of constab­
ulary to population, however, say nothing about the daily availability of 
police strength. In February 1868, a few months before the outbreak of 
serious anti-Catholic riots, Ashton town councillors criticized the quality 
and strength of the Ashton police force, the full complement being twenty- 
three constables for a population of thirty-two thousand (a ratio of Is 1281). 
Councillor Wilson noted, however, that the actual daily presence was even 
smaller than the ratio implied:
He believed that at times there were only two, at others four, 
and at most about nine constables on duty...4
The response of the Ashton constabulary to the anti-Catholic riots of May
1868 gave complete validity to these earlier criticisms; the small force
utterly overawed by large contingents of working-class English and Irish,
rioting in defence of the Catholic faith, or to protect religion, race and
occupation against the immigrant Irish. Similarly, in early 1881, the
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clerk to the justices of Salisbury said that only a proportion of the 
fourteen constables (for a population of 14,000) were available for day duty, 
and were not sufficient to defend the Salvationists against 'mob' intim­
idation.
Other evidence leads to the same conclusion, of constabularies ill— 
equipped for riot prevention or crowd control. Police inaction during the 
Salvation Army riots in the 1880s was influenced by the inadequacies of a 
small-town constabulary, in the face of large, organized 'mobs'. Many of the 
riots occurred in towns like Basingstoke with a population in 1881 of six 
and a half thousand, reliant on a police force of seven men. The weakness 
of official control was doubtless visible to the demonstrators, who considered 
the strange evangelists fair game. It was the small towns, often old market 
and tourist towns, which figured prominently in the anti-Salvationist riots.
In an assessment in 1883 of the 'mobbing' experienced by his 'troops',
Bramwell Booth (son of the founder of the Salvation Army) pointed principally 
to the undermanned police forces of the Southern and Home counties.^ The 
same applied with election disturbances. During the county election in 1870 
for the Isle of Wight, there was rioting in the borough of Newport. The 
Chief Constable of Hampshire, Captain Forrest, had refused to send a detach­
ment of county police at the request of Newport's mayor, and the borough 
force was unable to quell the riot. As the Home Secretary said:
...he thought these disturbances had partly arisen from the fact 
that some boroughs would insist upon having an independent 
constabulary force of their own.?
Newport possessed a force of five constables. Again in 1874, the most 
aggressive election riots in North Durham, occurred in the small towns out in 
country districts. In 1880 most of the election riots broke out in towns 
with inadequate police forces - Bath, Chester, Exmouth, Leamington, Neston,
gNewton Abbot, Northwich, Rotherham and Shaftesbury. In contrast, Liver­
pool, a well-policed city, was normally free from election and religious
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disturbances, despite the large Irish community and the confusion of 
sectarian religious prejudice with political party spirit.
Undermanned borough forces could, moreover, be confronted by large bodies 
of rioters in election and religious disturbances The town was often the 
focus for surrounding regions on election day, or the first target of an 
’onslaught' by the Salvation Army into a new region, attracting spectators 
from outlying districts. James Briggs, a cotton manufacturer of Blackburn, 
told the Royal Commission on election reform in 1869, that during elections 
people flocked into the town:
We have very populous towns round about who have no elections of 
their own, as for instance Darwen, where there are something like
18,000 or 70,000 inhabitants; many of these people flock into 
the town when there is any excitement going on.10
The task of the police in controlling election rowdyism was often hindered 
by the vast crowds of spectator: at most electoral events. Before the hust­
ings on nomination day in Bradford, in 1863, some 70,000 people we.’j present, 
in the midst of which,the Maysrof Bradford described, "a battle roval ensued 
between some men carrying boards; they broke the boards in pieces, and 
armed themselves with the p i e c e s . I n  areas of urban connurbation like 
Ashton-under-Lyme and Stal ybridge, rioting crowds quickly transferred their 
activities from place to place, linking with partisans in the adjoining
* I2towns.
In addition, in election and religous riots, the scale of violence could
be intimidating to small police forces, terrifying them into inertia. Major
Robert Bush, Bristol councillor, described election day in the city in 1868,
when 'flying columns' of Liberal supporters were employed in driving Tory
voters away from the polling booths. In the different mobs touring the
town, there were, according to Bush, over a thousand men. The police, unable
13to quell such organised intimidation, were mere on-lookers. In the more 
urbanised pockets in rural areas produced by mining works, where the county 
force was insufficiently concentrated, religious violence amongst the
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different racial groups could similarly assume ugly proportions. At 
Cleator Moor in 1884, the local Orangemen arranged to march on Cleator, a 
town of 10,000 population, half of which were Irish, "to beard as they say 
Catholicism in its stronghold." Miners of both faiths, protestant and 
catholic, were involved in disorder which the Chief Constable of Cumberland 
described:
I never saw mobs in all my experience more reckless, savage,
or uncontrollable.14
Attempts to arrest rioters invariably proved abortive. The Mayor of Newport 
explained that during the election riot in 1870 no rioter was apprehended 
since the superintendent and four constables were rendered useless by the 
size of the mob.^ Most constables in the face of sectarian religious riot 
were wisely cautious. When three Protestants, decked in Orange ribbons, 
were attacked by a crowd of Ashton Irishmen in May 1868. P.C. Darlington stood 
anil watched. When cross examined in the course of giving his deposition, 
Darlington said:
I did not arrest the Irishman who used the poker because I knew
better. I was afraid of the excited Irishmen.16
There was also the danger that rescue of the arrested rioters would be 
attempted. In February 1883, the Folkestone mayor told the Home Secretary 
that no arrests were made during the assault on the Salvation Army, "and 
if any person had been arrested, he would beyond doubt have been rescued 
by the mob." The liberation of arrested rioters was a common occurrence 
during election days. In the Durham County (Northern Division) election, 
the police office at Hetton was stormed and the prisoners freed. In 1880, 
seven arrests were made during the election riot at Stoke-on-Trent, where the 
mob then threatened to break into the police cells and release the prisoners.^ 
There was always the danger, finally, that the police force would become 
the focus of mob intimidation if it did try to intervene. After election 
riots at Lye, near Stem-bridge, during the polling for East Worcestershire
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in 1874, the police became the principal objects of attack, harassed all
20the way back from Lye to Halesowen.
In response to the vast concourses of election and religious 'rowdies', 
fired by polling-day excitement or sectarian loyalty, the local police forces 
often sank into performing a mere regulatory roll. They controlled the worst 
excesses, occasionally apprehended some of the more prominent rioters, or 
cleared the streets as the last act on polling day, after the result had 
been announced and actively celebrated. If there was parliamentary com­
plaint against the local authorities, then the explanation was uniform - 
police forces too small for firm restraint of social disturbance. In reply 
to parliamentary criticism of the Ashton magistracy for their laxness in re­
pressing the anti-Catholic riots in 1868, Milner Gibson, M.P. for Ashton, 
referred to the necessarily-unprepared nature of borough police forces for 
sudden outbursts of riot:
It should always be remembered that the police force of a borough 
was not constituted to deal with a riot every day in the week, and 
when a disturbance such as that under discussion sprang up unex­
pectedly and suddenly, of course the magistrates were placed in 
considerable difficulty.22
But the size and quality of the local police force is not a sufficient explan­
ation of the casual approach by the borough authorities to election and 
religious violence. There were, after all, the expedients of drafting in count 
police or requisitioning the military; additional repressive arms to the basic 
structure of law enforcement. A fuller understanding of the attitude taken by 
the legal authorities to election and religious disturbance requires a differ­
ent frame of interpretation: one which emphasises the popular insistence on 
legal permissiveness in the face of election rowdiness; which stresses the 
role of experience, internalized by the local authorities, for the temporary 
nature of such disorder; and which relates magisterial behaviour to those 
religious and party political allegiances which were basic determinants, 
along with social class, in the original elevation of candidates to the
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magisterial bench.
The Election Contest
Election campaigns were intermittent occasions of festivity, entertain­
ment, and combat. Extremely high polls, the conferment of intense loyalty 
on the respective side, and the recurrent bout of election-day rowydism 
amongst warring supporters, testify to the strong and conscious political 
intent and rivalry of the electorate. The density of feelings was nowhere 
more reflected than in the electioneering cavalcades, inspiring and influen­
cing voting allegiance. In the lead-up to the 1880 election, Watkin 
Williams described the Welsh response to the Liberal party 'bandwagon':
A Procession nearly two miles in length accompanied us into 
Llanberis village and the name of Gladstone resounded and echoed 
over the hillsides with canon firing and banners waving, and two 
bands playing.
Rival street processions, the flaunting of party emblems, and disturbed pub­
lic meetings were integtal parts of an election contest. Closer to the 
actual election, there was nomination day (at least until 1872) when the can­
didates bravely confronted the most flamboyant section of tne borough; when 
each party in front of the hustings outbid the other in density of support. 
And the casting of each vote (again, before 1872) was a social occasion, as 
each elector registered his choice before the full scrutiny of the town. 
Election day itself was a public spectacle, comparable to a prize fight or 
a race meeting, the moment when license was allowed for election-day excite­
ment, when political antagonism was expected to flourish. The spirit of 
election day was that of the final joust or tussle; the climax to long months 
of party organization.
It was possible for the local political culture to dominate the style and 
content of the election tournament. This was clearly the case with election 
tactics and corrupt practices. In some boroughs there was such a resilient 
tradition of bribery - interpreted as legitimate 'purchase' of the seat by
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a candidate, or as a just repayment to electors for the loss of a day's
wage - that corruption, as H.J. Hanham said, 'was an integral part of the 
. . . 25political life of the community." The recent historians of Tynemouth's 
voting patterns described bribery as "an expected and even a demanded per­
quisite of electors," and this equally described Beverley, Dover, Lancaster,
26Norwich, Exeter, Maidstone, and a number of other corrupt constituencies.
And not only bribery, but also election rowdyism formed part of the polit­
ical tradition. There was the accepted custom that candidates would receive 
rough usage when parading themselves before the local constituents. An 
unwritten law, respected by candidates, included harsh displays of disapproval 
by rival supporters, when on the hustings. Or again, at public meetings,
there was always vocal rivalry, and occasionally a stormy fight for the 
28platform. At the turn of the century, William Redmond (M.P. for Clare,
Ea;t) showed respect for this tradition when he made it clear that he would
never complain, nor would he support Liberal Members who did complain, of
the storming of an election meeting, and of the taking of the platform:
I think that is one of the most interesting features of election­
eering. If for the future election contests were to be conducted 
without any excitement, and if every election meeting was to be 
conducted with the decorum of a Quakers' gathering...political 
life would have lost much of its charm. ^
The political culture which surrounded election contests not only incor­
porated abrasive barracking of the candidates, but also riot and mob intimid­
ation. 'Mobbing' was interpreted as a traditional feature (like bribery or 
impersonation) of many elections, and seen to recur in certain towns with 
predictable dosage. As with other election behaviour, electoral intimidation 
was invested with a quality of ritual and consistency. A prominent Conser­
vative committee chairman in Boughton, the Irish quarter of Chester, described 
in 1881 an established practice which had occurred since 1868:
I may say for the last 12 years there has always been a sort of 
organised mob at the end of Steam Mill Street - it has been so during 
every election - chiefly composed of Irishwomen and young lads of 
16 and 17 years of age. They collect a quantity of stones, mud,
and dirt and filth, and they pelt everybody who happens to 
vote on the opposite side.^O
A borough like Nottingham was similarly the recurrent scene of election
disturbance, the responsibility of those dubbed the 'Nottingham lambs'.
Disturbances occurred at the Nottingham elections in 1865, 1874, 1880 and 
311885. It was also possible for old political grievances to be re-earthed 
at each election, as described by the Mayor of Devizes, who feared for the 
public peace during the North Wiltshire election in 1865. The three candi­
dates, he said, could all bring large numbers of supporters from different
32parts of the county - "between which an old feud prevails."
More significantly, the election 'rowdies' themselves demanded a sus­
pension of the normal sensitivity to disturbance. In 1911, the 'Times' 
referred to such attitudes held for all election wrong-doings, when it 
commented on the election petitions lodged after the election of December 
1910. In certain towns with a vendible residuum, it said, the tradition had
grown up that, "at election times anything is permissible; that all breaches
33of election laws are venial." There was exactly such an attitude towards 
election disorder, it seems, in the Midlands in the 1874 election. Such 
attitudes may well have held for other regions. There were election riots in 
1874 in Wolverhampton, Wednesbury and notably in Dudley, where organized 
intimidation of voters by both parties was sufficient to void the election 
in the subsequent petition. Interestingly, the riots in Wolverhampton, 
according to the 'Dudley Herald! had been the responsibility of young lads 
who damaged property "under the impression that on polling days 'there is 
no law'." So too, a letter to the 'Herald's' editor referred to the Dudley 
borough riots where "the mob were under the impression that there is no law 
for any depredations that may be done on an Election Day."^ The stipendiary 
magistrate for the area, Mr. Spooner, was concerned to overturn such a 
customary impression. At IVednesbury in mid-February, Spooner was faced with 
one of the Sedgley rioters who admitted throwing stones during the Wednes-
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bury election, and,according to P.C. Moffatt, "said the reason he did so
was because he was told there was no law for that day":
Mr Spooner: Why should you be such a fool? If there was no law 
a man might take a razor and deliberately cut your throat, and 
then cook you; just look at the absurdity of it.^
The stipendiary's logic was out of keeping with local electoral custom, but
the magistrate remained adamant that his view would prevail:
They will be taught that the popular tradition 'that there is no 
law on polling day' is a grievous mistake.36
It is unlikely, however, that the stipendiary successfully challenged pop­
ular definitions of election-day license.
Parliamentary candidates, anxious to be returned, usually turned a blind 
eye to election-day disorder. Typical of the attitude was John Bridge's 
comment on the close-run Bridgnorth election of 1865, in his "Reminiscences 
of a Country Politician". He described the arrival of three brake loads 
of black-country 'roughs', imported by the Tories; and he interpreted the 
Liberal response:
The invasion was more than human nature could stand; the Bridgnorth 
Radicals roused themselves, and made a fierce attack on the new-comers 
...I think the Radicals showed a proper and plucky spirit in forcibly 
objecting to strangers crowing on their dunghill.37
John Bridge later mourned the passing of election disorder, having gone the
same way, he said, "of prize-fighting, cock-fighting, et id genus omne ":
Ruffians the fighters may have been, but there was something manly 
after all in their way of meeting antagonists.
This was much more akin to Bridge's idea of an election contest than what he
considered the new way of fighting elections - "a lie on the eve of the
Election, when it is too late to give an effective answer", a less acceptable
38political morality than down-to-earth combat.
There was, in all, a cavalier attitude to electoral violence, an inter­
pretation which stressed the temporary nature of political excitement and 
warfare. It was known from experience that after the poll,
everything would quickly revert back to normal, as people returned to 
39work. The election riot was seen as an outburst of 'natural' party feel­
ings. During polling for the North-Western Division of Lancashire, three 
hundred 'roughs' had attacked Irish houses in Chorley - otherwise, said 
the "Bolton Chronicle", "the election in this town has passed off with 
the utmost good humour." ® This opinion was held not only amongst the local 
borough elites but also by the Home Office, judging by the departmental 
comment on the Newport election of 1868 after serious rioting in which one 
woman was trampled to death by the military:
This looks like a bit of party strife. Some allowance is always 
to be made for the heat of Election contests.41
A similar recognition of the capricious quality of electoral ill-feeling 
was basic to Mr. John Bridge's approach in Cardiff. Bridge, a metropolitan 
police magistrate, was appointed by the Home Office to investigate the 
accusations of police violence at the Cardiff election of 1886. His report 
established that the police had been too free with the use of their staves, 
and had harassed the election crowds beyond what was needed for their 
mere dispersal. He thought, therefore, that the police action deserved the 
local censure which it provoked, but considered his investigation suffic­
ient to prevent a recurrence. He concluded by saying:
I think there is no fear but that all anger from what took 
place on the night of the election, either o^ one side or the 
other, will soon pass away to be forgotten.^
Experience taught the temporary nature of election riot and of the polit­
ical indignation at electoral violence.
There was perhaps, finally, behind the licensed character of electoral 
riot, a belief that election violence served a function as a political 
'safety-valve'.^ The "Times" came near to the point when it said of the 
election of 1885 (when riots occurred in Guildford, Maidenhead, Penzance 
and Nottingham):
everything would quickly revert back to normal, as people returned to 
39work. The election riot was seen as an outburst of 'natural' party feel­
ings. During polling for the North-Western Division of Lancashire, three 
hundred 'roughs' had attacked Irish houses in Chorley - otherwise, said 
the "Bolton Chronicle", "the election in this town has passed off with 
the utmost good humour. "  ® This opinion was held not only amongst the local 
borough elites but also by the Home Office, judging by the departmental 
comment on the Newport election of 1868 after serious rioting in which one 
woman was trampled to death by the military:
This looks like a bit of party strife. Some allowance is always 
to be made for the heat of Election contests.4!
A similar recognition of the capricious quality of electoral ill-feeling 
was basic to Mr. John Bridge's approach in Cardiff. Bridge, a metropolitan 
police magistrate, was appointed by the Home Office to investigate the 
accusations of police violence at the Cardiff election of 1886. His report 
established that the police had been too free with the use of their staves, 
and had harassed the election crowds beyond what was needed for their 
mere dispersal. He thought, therefore, that the police action deserved the 
local censure which it provoked, but considered his investigation suffic­
ient to prevent a recurrence. He concluded by saying:
I think there is no fear but that all anger from what took 
place on the night of the election, either m  one side or the 
other, will soon pass away to be forgotten.
Experience taught the temporary nature of election riot and of the polit­
ical indignation at electoral violence.
There was perhaps, finally, behind the licensed character of electoral 
riot, a belief that election violence served a function as a political 
'safety-valve'.1*3 The "Times" came near to the point when it said of the 
election of 1885 (when riots occurred in Guildford, Maidenhead, Penzance 
and Nottingham):
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The country was able without danger toaetasif it were moment­
arily insane because it felt itself essentially sane at bottom.
A nation without settled political instincts and habits could 
not have let itself run wild as has been the recent pleasure ofEnglishmen.44
Election 'roughs' were given a momentary licence to abuse, even assault, 
political opponents and candidates, for which the political system was heal­
thier afterwards.^  It was sanctioned violence which allowed the political 
system to function without further challenge. It is impossible to say how 
far this licensed disorder was calculation on the part of the political 
patriciate, and how far a barely-conscious functional adaptation. It is 
nevertheless interesting to speculate that electoral violence was subordinated 
to the political structure. In the orthodox account of British political 
history, only the peaceful and regulated process of political change is 
emphasized. This neglects che success with which, the political structure 
harnessed the potentially opposing forces of popular disturbance so as to 
reinforce itself. Of particular importance, was the way in which election 
riots allowed the unenfranchised 'masses' to have a role in the political 
system and in political change. Their involvement in turbulent proceedings 
was directed by the electoral process, instead of being directed against it.
An integral element of electoral disorder was thus the popularisation and 
legitimation of privileged politics through the involvement of the 'masses'. 
For this procedure to function properly, the legal authorities had a crucial 
role to perform. The rest of this chapter is concerned with the response 
of the magistracy to election disorder.
The Magistracy and Election Disorder
The role of the legal authorities harmonized with the preceding defin­
ition of election disturbance. For a momentary outburst of party excitement, 
advance preparations were rarely taken. Major Robert Bush, Conservative 
councillor for Bristol, complained to the Hartington Commission on Elections
116
that, although it was obvious a week before the election in 1868 that 
there would be disorder, the police authorities made no contingency plans.
Bush also accused the Bristol police force of failing to act decisively 
against the rioting which did take place.^ In such situations, however, 
the chief constable, watch committee, and magistrates were constrained by 
the very attitudes to election disorder. Excessive police action was anath­
ema: and the authorities were sharply criticized when adjudged to have acted 
outside the spirit of election-day. Following the 1874 election in 
Newcastle-under-Lyme, the rioters in court were defended by the Liberal 
agent, who avowed that "the injudicious attack of the police was the cause 
of the riot." He won agreement from one of the two magistrates on the bench. 
The conduct of the police at the Stoke-on-Trent election in 1880 was similarly
alleged to have been too violent, and a large indignation meeting was held 
48in protest. And there were other examples of a heightened sensitivity 
to police conduct during election rows.
Two celebrated cases revealed the severe criticism of police conduct 
which was thought to be unnecessary and severe. They occurred in the mid- 
1880s at Nottingham and Cardiff. Precautionary measures were increasingly 
taken at Nottingham in the 1880 and 1885 elections, in an attempt by the 
Liberal-dominated council and bench to reduce the traditional riotous excesses 
at Nottingham elections. On the day of election in 1885 a large number 
of outside police were drafted in - from Nottinghamshire (60), Derbyshire 
(100), Lancashire (46) and Birmingham (25). There were few disorderly 
incidents during the voting, but after the announcement of the result, in 
which the three Liberal candidates had all been successful, the crowds, 
according to the Chief Constable, became much more disorderly. The Riot
Act was eventually read by the Mayor (leader of the local Liberal party),
49and the police were ordered to disperse the crowds. What followed was later
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described as a ruthless bout of police violence in which the Birmingham 
and Derbyshire police were most responsible. Lord Harry Snell, at the 
time assisting John Bums, the independent Labour candidate (who stood at 
the invitation of the Nottingham Social Democratic Federation) was later 
critical of the magistracy:
The 'Nottingham lambs' were traditionally vocal and impetuous 
at election times; but I saw little that need have caused alarm, 
and I was convinced that had the local magistrates not lost their 
nerve and ordered a police attack on the crowd, there would have 
been no serious trouble.50
Snell's verdict corresponded with the editorials of the town's press. The
Liberal "Nottingham Journal" protested strongly against the police, whom
they considered provoked whatever disorder occurred:
It appears beyond some little horse play of a mild enough character - 
certainly not so rough as often takes place at Goose Fair - there 
was no rowdyism until the constables interfered.51
The Conservative "Nottingham Daily Guardian" was less strident in its crit­
icism although it did carry pages of protest letters against the excessive 
force used. The "Guardian" was also prepared to leave the subsequent enquiry
in the hands of the Watch Committee, and declared its relief that Notting-
52ham's borough force was not to blame, but the 'foreign' constables.
This incident now sparked off a mass of correspondence to the Home Office
protesting against the police action, and demanding proper enquiry. On
November 27th, two days after the election, E. S. Forster wrote to the Home
53Secretary to press for a Home Office enquiry. Three days later, Mr.
Stevenson, Nottingham solicitor, told the Home Office that all the town
'respectables' of both parties wanted an enquiry, but not one inaugurated
54by the watch committee. The local authorities, he said, were too respon­
sible for and involved in the occurrences for them to conduct a proper 
independent enquiry. The watch committee, however, appointed Mr. Horace 
Smith, Recorder of Lincoln, who held court on December 8th, at which anyone
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who had seen the police conduct was invited to give evidence.^ At the 
end of February, the recorder sent his report to the Home Office. It crit­
icized the Chief Constable for not controlling the police more firmly, 
and recorded that the defence of the local authorities was that the police 
were 'imported' and not local men.^ This report neither satisfied nor 
silenced local critics. Nor did the local authority's defence avoid critic­
ism of its role in allowing the police violence. Town meetings continued
to be held, at which dissatisfaction was shown with the Chief Constable
57and borough magistracy. The new Liberal Home Secretary, Henry Childers,
received a letter at the end of February, 1886, from Dr. Ransom of
Nottingham. The latter felt that the local memorialists remained unanswered,
whilst the peace of the town rested in incompetent hands:
We are governed by an irresponsible - for all practical purposes - 
Watch Committee and have an incompetent Chief Constable who lets 
loose upon innocent people a police force who conduct themselves 
like brutes a"d the law is broken by their, in letter and spirit 
apparently without reasonable hope of our securing redress from 
wrong or security in future unless we have help from the Home 
Office.
It seems impossible to interpret the police action in Nottingham, or the
subsequent agitation, along sharp political lines. Supposition has been
made that a Liberal-dominated council was less reluctant to use the police
59against the 'Nottingham lambs' - ardent Tory supporters. If this was tne 
case, there was no consequent party invective, either in the press or in 
correspondence to the Home Office. When the Lincoln recorder transmitted 
his report to the Home Office, he prefaced it by saying that many townsmen 
still opposed the enquiry, wanting the conduct of the magistrates to be 
fully examined. But, he claimed, he could not detect whether this came from 
any political or social prejudice.^ What stands out as of more significance 
was the indignation released by the police conduct. Nottingham was accustome 
to election rowdyism, and to an extended license from the borough authorities
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The latter weathered the local storm of criticism at the excessive use of
the constabulary, but they adjusted their policy of enforcement. At the
election in July 1886, no 'foreign' drafts of police were used.*’1
The Cardiff local authorities made the same mistake at the election of
1886. After the poll declaration, for no objective reasons of riot or
disorder, the police force of county and borough constables roughly dispersed
the departing crowds, and followed through to attack a crowd of supporters
outside the Liberal club. Unlike at Nottingham, the Home Office agreed to
an official enquiry, which confirmed that there had been excessive police
violence. There was again an indignant response to the police behaviour,
notably from Sir E.J. Reed, a naval architect, who was returned at the
election. He felt that there lay behind the police action the false notion
that the police authorities held power to clear the street whenever they
thought it desirable. He hoped that a Home Office enquiry would halt the
practice, which occurred in Cardiff but also elsewhere,
of the very police who are employed in no small degree by the 
people of the towns themselves, and at their expense, to preserve 
order, converting themselves into agents of disorder and of un­
speakable violence against the very people whom it is their duty
to protect.62
The Cardiff incident again revealed that borough ratepayers were especially 
vigilant in defining the limits of police conduct when it came to election- 
day disorder.
Police action in the face of election riot was interpreted on a sensitive
scale, calibrated according to the experience of previous election incidents.
It was this interpretive scale which influenced the deployment of the police
on election day. If the police stood by, inactive, it was not invariably
associated with a weakness in numbers for repressing the rioting crowds.
It owed as much to a series of constraints which impeded the full-blooded
6 3use of the local constabulary against election riots.
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Similar constraints hindered the use of another measure of enforcement 
available to the local authorities - the military. It was the final ex­
pedient if election disturbance went beyond the constabulary's control; 
but it was even more out of keeping with election-day custom. Although 
troops were used on a number of occasions to restrain election riots in 
the last half of the century, their reception was invariably in keeping with 
the celebratory spirit. At the Blackburn municipal election of November 
1868, serious fighting started and the troops were moved out into the streets 
Captain Benthall recorded the reception:
The Troops were received most enthusiastically by both parties - 
continued cheering even when in the necessary act of clearing 
up the streets. 6 4
More importantly, there was criticism of the use of the military as at
Lincoln in 1865. On the sole responsibility of the Mayor, the militaiy were
brought from Hast Retford. He was immediately criticized by three borough
magistrates, who insisted that the requisitioning of military was an insult
to the citizens. The Mayor asked the Home Office to appoint a Special
Commissioner to make inquiry into his conduct which had been condemned as 
65arash and unnecessary. The use of the military was an affirmation chat 
election disorder was to be prevented rather than contained. Its employ­
ment was thus criticized insofar as it challenged the expected approach to 
public order on election day - a mere holding operation. The legal auth­
orities were expected to fulfil only a regulatory function.
When court hearings resulted from election disorder, brought either by 
the watch committee or by the political parties, the established definition 
of election violence was hardly altered. A characteristic feature of 
summary hearings for election offences was the willingness to display 
judicial leniency. Sometimes the cases were withdrawn before hearing, hav­
ing been initiated for riots prior to polling day, and then reconsidered
in the light of electoral success. As the party spirit declined, then so 
would intimidation or assault charges be w i t h d r a w n . i f  the cases were 
actually heard, the prosecution often pleaded for magisterial clemency.
In Bolton, Tory 'roughs' were charged with riot and wilful damage - seen as 
a vindictive Liberal prosecution in response to Bolton's two Conservative 
members - for offences which were committed on municipal election day during 
clashes with the Irish population. Mr. Torr for the prosecution said immed­
iately that a "moderate course" was to be adopted, "particularly when one 
felt that the occasion on which the riot took place was one for which he was 
sorry to say Englishmen had a peculiar kind of indulgence - the election 
of certain persons to public offices..." ® In other cases, the magistracy 
themselves were indulgent. Sir Alfred Pease in "Elections ¿nd Recollections" 
described the North Riding election of 1882, in which ironstone miners, 
decked in Liberal cclours, took possession of Guisbrough, and 'Lowered yellow 
ochre, sods and soot on Tory supporters. Before four county magistrates, 
including Pease, the arrested rioters were informed:
that they 'might have got 18 months and have been fined £100,' 
and we solemnly pronounced the affair 'a disgrace to the t o w . 1 
This leniency was perhaps the natural result of the satisfaction 
of my colleagues with Guy Dawnay's victory, but a 'good row' on 
polling day was then the usual thing.67
And not only the lay magistracy showed such a disposition towards party
political disturbance. At the Manchester Assizes in March 1872, six of the
defendants in the Dilke riot case were acquitted, whilst eight remained to
be tried. The judge's final comments were to the effect that,
he hoped the feeling of the prisoners and the feeling in Bolton 
would improve in the interval, so much as might perhaps justify 
those concerned for the prosecution in not taking any further 
proceedings .68
The magistracy thereby reinforced the notion of election violence as a tempor­
ary and transient phenomenon, a short-lived abberation which was to be toler­
ated. Adjustment of judicial norms was expected for the excitements of
an election struggle.
So far, the impression has been created that election disorder was
allowed to run its unguided course in the knowledge that it was an aimless
temporary outburst of election excitement. But it was often far more than
a spontaneous, and pointless ebullience; a throwing-off of respectability
for at least a day. Election disorder could also be promoted by local party
agents or by party loyalists as one means of fighting the election contest.
Before the 1865 election, the Mayor of Great Grimsby told the Home Secretary
of his fears of election disorder:
It has come to my knowledge that some of the leading partizans of 
the present member have declared that no Voter shall poll for the 
last three hours and I believe that there is an organization for the 
purpose of carrying out riotous proceedings.^^
This was perhaps especially the case in boroughs where the result was certain
to be close-run, or where there was a political community of some complexity
which defied the simple and traditional forms of bribery or work-place
intimidation, and which thus required the use of indigenous or h!r_d 'bullies'
It was certainly an important element in a class of corrupt constituencies,
possessing between one and eight thousand voters, in which mob intimidation
70was but one feature in a whole panoply of corrupt practices. The employ­
ment of 'roughs' on election day was a traditional electoral ploy and so 
afraid was each party to forfeit any advantage that, the appearance of mob 
intimidation on one side called forth retaliation. In the 1874 election, 
Dudley was invaded by an imported Irish mob to assist the Liberals, but a 
gang of Tory 'roughs' was quickly assembled.^ It was usually difficult to 
trace organized intimidation back to any political source. For fear of 
having the election voided in a subsequent petition, the local party agents 
and committee men dare not sail too close to the wind, and covered over the 
traces of payment or encouragement. The public-house usually figured in mob 
intimidation, either because it increased drunkenness, which led by stages
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into rioting, or, more importantly, as the locale where organized disorder
72was prepared and remunerated. That was notably the case in 1874 when 
the beer 'trade' was most fully renowned for electoral pressure through 
treating, bribery and intimidation, in order to return candidates who would 
vote for a reversal of the hated Licensing Bill of 1872. It was follow­
ing the 1874 election that Gladstone uttered his well-known phrase - "We 
have been swept away, literally by a torrent of beer and gin." On other 
occasions it was relatively clear where the encouragement sprang from. In 
1869, Charles Seely was the successful Liberal candidate for Nottingham, 
and a large colliery owner. His friends brought three hundred colliers from 
his Derbyshire pits on election day.^ So too in 1874, colliers from the 
Clifton pit (owned by the important Nottingham Conservative family, the
Cliftcns) were given a day's holiday to support the Tory candidate, and they
7r.indeed paraded the streets, mobbing those with yellow favours.
Rowdyism was sanctioned by those intimately involved in the electoral 
contest for the very reason that it was considered to be an effective elect­
oral tactic. This is not to say that all election disturbance served party 
interests. A number of election riots occurred after the declaration of 
the poll for example. But a considerable proportion of election-day dis­
order arose from the employment of organised bodies of supporters, often 
non-voters, whose intentions were to affect the election result by mobbing, 
demonstrating, or forcibly closing polling booths. And it is useful to 
examine more closely the electoral worth of mob intimidation, since there 
was an important correspondence between the value of election disorder to 
party fortunes, and the indulgent course taken by the magistracy towards 
such disorder. When party interests and the law were at variance, the lay 
magistracy did not invariably choose the latter.
The extent to which rioting could influence the election result appeared 
most visibly when petitions were filed against candidates for 'undue
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influence'. The evidence of undue influence through mob intimidation
was sometimes so clearly revealed that the election was voided. Sir Colin
Blackburn told the Hartington Committee on elections in 1869, that Alderman
Pochin was unseated in the Stafford election, "because I was convinced that
his paid agents instigated the mob to beat and terrify back electors from 
76the poll." In the Dudley election petition of 1874, Mr. Justice Grove 
declared the election void because of evidence which showed that men were
77employed by the supporters of both parties to intimidate and deter voters.
It was clear that regularly organized gangs had been employed by both parties, 
but the Liberal 'roughs' in particular had worked to a definite plan. The 
"Dudley Herald" reported that colliers, Sheridan's supporters (the Liberal 
candidate), struck at the outlying polling districts at Wocdside, Brierley 
Hill and Rowley, frightening away voters of the wrong colour, in order tc 
offset an almost certain majority for the Conservative candidate in Dudley 
itself.-  ^ But election petitions provide an inadequate amount of evidence
to show the true extent and nature of undue influence through riotous intim- 
. 79idation. In using petitions to combat 'undue influence', petitioners
found that they had one major flaw - the level of proof required to convince
the judge that political duplicity was behind the rioting, and, further,
that it had materially affected the election result. As Justice Lush said
in the Chester petition against the 1880 election, it was essential to be
able to prove that the intimidation prevented electors from polling :
Unless it results in such general riot and disorder, that the 
electors were prevented from exercising their franchise, it 
comes to nothing.80
As a result, election petitions could often fail. After polling-day riots 
against the Tories in 1885, in the Thombury division of Gloucestershire, 
an election petition was filed, but no clear connection could be traced 
between the rioting and the Liberal candidate or his agent, and the outbreaks
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were considered to be too isolated to constitute general rather than indiv- 
81idual intimidation. Given the cost of filing petitions, especially in
larger towns, there was an obvious reluctance to press a claim unless the
evidence was overwhelming. As influential to the low number of petitions
filed, was the general contempt reserved for the party which promoted a
petition, and especially in constituencies which were notoriously corrupt.
In "Elections and Recollections", A.C. Pease said that the "more corrupt the
82constituency, the more unpopular was a petition." If a petition was promote 
it was more a sign of virtue, than of corruption.
It is necessary, then, to document by other means than the election 
petition, the conviction that election disorder could influence the election 
outcome, and that it was a conscious tactic in the pursuit of electoral 
victory. It is made easier by the Select Committee on Parliamentary and 
Municipal Elections, the Hartington Commission, which was formed after the 
1868 elections. The Committee's recommendations ultimately went into the 
Ballot Act (Parliamentary and Municipal Elections Act) which abolished pub­
lic nominations (identified by the Committee as the source of much riot),
83and introdo.ced the secret ballot. In the evidence heard by the Committee 
there was ample testimony to the extent of intimidation which had prevailed 
at the elections of 1868. Mr. Thomas Troughton, chairman of the Conservative 
Committee in Gravesend told the Commissioners that when, around lunch-time, 
the Conservatives were one hundred votes ahead in the parliamentary election, 
a gentleman of Northfleet (the predominantly industrial zone of the con­
stituency) "having the command of a great number of men in his employ got 
up a band of music, and they came in a body and smashed all the windows 
of their opponents throughout Northfleet and Gravesend." According to 
Troughton, the Conservative voters, who had quite selectively had their 
window's smashed, would not go up to vote, and, indeed, there were few Con­
servative votes polled thereafter:
Did the arrival of this mob, and the going up in the scale of 
the other party, coincide as to time? - Directly the message 
went over to Northfleet there was scarcely a vote polled after 
that time for the Conservatives, for the mob took possession ofthe booth.
In Bristol, Major Robert Bush, Conservative councillor, said that 
Liberal mobs of non-voters, recruited from the collieries on the outskirts 
of the city, in organized fashion, "almost marching in military form", had 
gone from one polling booth to the next. He told the Hartington Committee 
that the mobs, known as 'flying columns', appeared early on polling day in 
order to operate a previously-devised plan. At the earlier election in 
Bristol in April 1868, Mr. Miles, the successful Conservative candidate, had 
been well ahead of the Liberal candidates by 9 o'clock in *he morning. It 
was generally considered, said Bush, that this early lead "had an effect 
upon many voters who were waverers, and that therefore it was of great impov 
ance to the Liberals to show a large majority at nine o'clock." At the 
November election, therefore, it was rumoured before polling day that, if 
the Liberal candidates were not six or seven hundred votes ahead by nine 
o'clock "then those mobs were to be let loose with a view of intimidating 
the Conservative voters." At the first declaration of the poll at nine 
o'clock, the two Liberal candidates led by only 150-200 votes. At ten 
o'clock, explained Bush, the mobs appeared, driving the Conservative voters 
away from the polling booths. The chairman of the Conservative Operatives' 
Association made three attempts to leave his house to vote, but was driven 
back on each occasion. And it was this devised tactic, finally, of ensuring 
that an early Conservative lead would not predetermine the final result, 
which, said Bush, was suggested by some prominent Liberals, and even
mentioned at a meeting at which Morley, one of the Liberal candidates, was
_ 85 present.
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The extent to which mob intimidation was not solely an expression of 
heightened political temperatures, but related logically to psephological 
considerations also appears from examination of the Lancashire municipal 
elections of 1868. The municipal contest was more highly charged and fierce­
ly contested since it so closely preceded the parliamentary one. Before the 
Hartington Committee, mob intimidation was described for the Bolton, Wigan 
and Blackburn municipal elections. In Wigan, the Liberal press railed against 
the Tory 'roughs', supposedly from Ince, paid 7s.6d. each for rendering 
electoral service:
to 'protect' the polling booth in Scholes...for the avowed purpose 
of closing the poll...From the time of their arrival no person was 
allowed to enter the booth unless he displayed a blue voting paper.^6
Mobs had been out early, preventing the recording of Liberal votes until
the Tory candidates showed j large majority - perhaps, as in Bristol, to
carry the wavering voters by example. In Swinlcy Ward, however, the state of
the poll altered in favour of the Liberals at 3 p.m., and thus, said the
87"Wigan Observer", "another mob came down and stopped the polling by force."
At the municipal election in Blackburn, the scale of rioting was more 
extensive still. Edward Beesly, positivist and labour reformer, visited
88Blackburn in early November, and "found the town on the verge of civil war."
In Trinity Ward, according to the "Annual Register", the rivalry had begun
at 9.30 in the morning, "between two parties who were fighting for the
89possession of the polling-booth." In St. Peter's ward, a gang of Tories 
took control of the polling-booth for one hour, "and the Tories soon headed 
the poll." At the Select Committee, a Liberal cotton manufacturer of 
Blackburn, Frank Johnston, vehemently criticized the Conservative intimidation 
of assembling supporters around the polling-booths to obstruct hostile voters. 
It was an organized obstruction which, he thought, emanated from the local 
manufacturers, lie told of men "headed by their employers", brought to
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'picket' the booths and influence the voting. But both political parties
were in fact implicated. Captain Benthall of the King's Dragoon Guards,
stationed in Blackburn for the expected disturbances, told the military
secretary at the Horse Guards of the Radical party's intentions:
No one was injured by my men, and I believe the fact of our 
being there saved great destruction of both life and property, 
as the Radicals were to have seized all the polling booths to 
the exclusion of the opposite party.
It could be argued that the 1868 elections were untypical of the late
nineteenth-century for organized electoral intimidation. The first elections
under a vastly increased franchise no doubt troubled election agents, and
made them reluctant to rely alone on well-tried expedients of treating or
bribery. These electoral devices anyway were now more costly if they were to
91binclude a substantial segment of the electorate. More importantly, in 1868 
the open form of voting for the last time allowed election mobs a greater 
field of vision, and made voters far mote anxious of mob revengo after cast­
ing their vote. The secret ballot was indeed proposed by the Select Committ:-e 
of 1869 on the grounds that it would reduce intimidation, which had prevailec
92in the 1868 elections, in its opinion, "to a considerable extent." Two
years after the implementation of the Ballot Act, it was put to the test.
At the end of the election of 1874 the "Times" declared that the new electoral
reform was a success, convinced that the end of open voting had brought
the end of mobbing. Or, more to the point, that rioting was now divorced
93from political duplicity.
But accurate measurement is difficult in the sphere of mob intimidation.
It may be that election-day violence figured less prominently in later
nineteenth-century elections than before, when the casting of a vote became,
as O'Leary said, "more of a deliberate political act and less of a social 
94occasion." Yet, better evidence than the election petition should be 
advanced to sustain the conclusion that election mobbing actually declined.
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As we have noted, petitions were hardly an accurate "barometer of polit­
ical morality" in the area of undue influence by riot. As to the influence 
of the Ballot Act, it was unlikely that it produced a drastic reduction in
organized election disorder. Electoral reform in other areas was not re-
95nowned for its immediate effectiveness. It might even be said that the 
Ballot Act ensured the survival of mob intimidation in that no form of 
corruption could now be fully assessed for its electoral effectiveness. But 
more centrally, there was no real motivation for the urban elite, normally 
intimately involved in the election process, suddenly to deprecate election 
rowdyism, particularly when it held an important position in the armoury of 
electioneering devices. "Mob" intimidation lived on, above all, because 
it was thought to hold significance for the election result. In addition, 
there was a continuance of 'mobbing' because it was normally indulged by 
both political parties, and because the legal representatives of the borough, 
when drawn from both political parties, were commonly unable to reach accord 
on the interpretation of election disorder.
It is the last point which is of real concern. Generally, the evidence 
makes it difficult to affirm the partisan behaviour of the magistracy in 
times of election disorder. It is easier to document such behaviour in the 
subsequent court adjudications. But the evidence given in the inquiry into 
the corrupt practices of Chester in 1881 gives a clearer insight into the 
role of the magistracy. The Chester election of 1880, on which the report 
was based, illustrates the way in which the maintenance of public order was 
intimately linked with the party political interests of the magistracy, and 
the way in which the borough bench were prepared to adjudicate according to 
partisan concerns.
Chester was an old cathedral city with a large residential population.
The parliamentary seat also included the industrial suburb of Saltney where
□ t  wrv• •
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there were railway-carriage works and ironworks. Liberal strength, based 
on this industrial element, was augmented by Welsh and Irish immigrants, 
the latter living in large numbers in the Boughton district. In addition 
to the election petition which voided the Chester election of 1880, commiss­
ioners were appointed to investigate the full extent of corrupt practices 
97in the city. Their report documented the scale of corruption indulged 
by both the Liberal Association and the Constitutional Society of the Tory 
party: treating, colourable employment, and payment of out-voters. It also 
referred to the considerable disorder at the election, mainly involving the
ILiberal supporters, "owing to the amount of drink which had been supplied."
A large part of the disorder which affected the city for a number of days 
before the election on April 1st., arose as a result of the independent can­
didate, Mr. Maigarini. The Liberal party suspected he was being run by the 
Tories to split the Irish vote, and as a result, his meetings were disturbed 
by Liberal 'roughs'. Malgarini's headquarters were finally destroyed, and
he was driven out of town to ensure there would be no division of the Liberal 
99votes. Boughton, the Irish area in Chester, was also particularly disturb­
ed. 'Mobs' were collected there, according to Dr. Henry Churton, chairman of 
the Boughton Conservative committee, and subsequently were, "in various 
places endeavouring to interrupt people, or prevent them coming up to poll."10^ 
In the long list of people scheduled for corruption in Chester were three 
magistrates - Charles Brown (Mayor of Chester, a silk mercer by trade),
W.M. Williams (Alderman, tobacco manufacturer, and president of the Constitu­
tional Society) and Enoch R.G. Salisbury (councillor, barrister, and vice- 
president of the Liberal Association). The last two magistrates, both crucial 
political figures, were scheduled for bribery. But in the course of the 
election contest, they also exhibited their judicial talents. A revealing 
aspect of magisterial conduct emerged in the course of Mr. Salisbury's
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evidence.
On hearing that there was a good deal of disorder in the town, a few
days before the election, and that the Conservative committee room had been
attacked, Salisbury asked Mr. W. M. Williams to call and see him:
I said to him, 'I am very sorry to hear about this row in the 
town; now are you anxious to put an end to this kind of thing?'
I put the question to him seriously, for I will tell you my firm 
belief is that whatever rows we had here the Tories were at the 
bottom of them.
Williams said he wanted to keep the town peaceable, to which Salisbury re­
plied:
I suppose it was a very dangerous thing for Liberals or Conser­
vatives to shut up the public houses? - I thought so.
It would have produced a great result on the election? - I 
thought so.
If the Conservatives had shut them up, they would have had 
no chance? - I think neither party would.
Or the Liberals either? - I thought it might have been said 
in this way if I had been a party to it; it might have been 
said I was closing the public-houses. That would have natur­
ally turned away a lot of thirsty men from our side.102
This incident does not prove that mob intimidation, organized by the polit­
ical parties, was allowed to run its course by the magistracy. It illustrates
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more, that election disorder was a consequence of the political decision 
to leave the public houses open, and the fact that the magistrates were al­
ways aware that disorder would follow such a decision. The policy of 
peace preservation for election day was determined according to electoral 
advantage. However, organized intimidation did occur in the Chester election, 
particularly on the Liberal side, and when the magistrates were faced with 
adjudicating on these disturbances, party loyalty determined the result.
The Chester bench as a whole showed itself prepared to put party above 
the law. Mr. W.H. Churton, chairman of a Conservative committee in Boughton, 
when asked about the cases of riot which the chief constable had brought 
before the summary court, stated that the two political parties were so 
equally balanced on the bench that no decision could be reached in the case, 
which was dismissed:
T suppose the Conservative magistrates were- fully impressed with 
the fact that there bad been a riot and the Liberal magistrates 
could not set it? - That was certainly it. There was a quantity 
of evidence given and not an atom called for the defence, and 
the case was dismissed.103
Two of the commissioners were astounded by this evidence. Arthur Collins 
questioned Mr. Churton:
Are you sure of there being an equal number of Liberal and Conser­
vative magistrates, and that all the Conservatives voted one way 
and the Liberals the other? I cannot believe the thing to have 
happened?104
Churton closed his evidence by saying that one of the magistrates on the 
day the case was heard was his father, Dr. Henry Churton.
Dr. Churton, a retired surgeon, and Conservative committee man, filled 
out his son's story. Seemingly, on the first occasion, the prisoners were 
arraigned before seven magistrates, when Mr. Salisbury, as chairman of the 
bench, suggested a three-week adjournment, pending the election petition. 
Churton could not see why adjournment was necessary, but Salisbury was 
supported by five Liberal magistrates, "and they carried the day." for this
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first hearing, the Mayor had been absent, so Salisbury took the chair.
He was not one of the senior magistrates, however, and was in fact seldom 
seen on the bench. When asked why Salisbury had taken the chair, Churton 
said - "He, I may say, was thrust into the chair by his friends." On the 
second occasion, fourteen magistrates assembled, practically the full comple­
ment of magistrates in the Commission. As Churton recognized, there had 
been a whip on both sides. At the end of the case, in which again no evidence 
was given for the defence, seven justices voted for acquittal, the same 
number for committal:
Then the decision was given on party lines, as far as you could see -
7 Liberals voted one way, and 7 Conservatives the other? - Entirely so.
Churton finally confirmed that the prisoners were discharged, but not because 
the bench was divided, but because the Mayor gave a casting vote, which 
tallied with the opinion of his brother Liberals, for acquittal.105
From out of sucv incidents wa.- formed, the traditional premiss that party 
affiliation influenced magisterial behaviour. Differing political loyalties 
at the very least hindered the borough magistracy acting in harmony; but 
they often determined magisterial attitudes to election disorder, on polling 
day and in post-election judicial hearings. In Blackburn, with a predominant­
ly Tory bench, the Liberal party expected judicial bias in proceedings for 
riot or intimidation.Party bias was a natural assumption to make when 
leading Conservatives populated the magistracy. In Ashton, where the bench 
was politically more evenly balanced, court cases similarly assumed a parti­
san aspect. Henry Darnton, the Ashton Mayor, told the Hartington Commission 
that the respective counsels in a prosecution case following an election, 
immediately appealed to the party sympathies of the justices.*07 Local 
council debates after an election often only fed the suspicions. Political 
allegiances were defended when there was criticism of election rowdyism 
having been promoted through party agencies. In December 1868, in a Bolton 
council meeting, Alderman Ferguson referred to a Watch Committee resolution
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critical of the hiring of 'roughs', when he said "that 30 persons, chiefly
colliers in connection with the Bridgewater Trust, came from Farnworth to
Bolton early on the morning of the election, and were paid 7s.6d. for the 
108day." The council debate degenerated into an unproductive wrangle,
as each councillor defended his party on the resolution. What was 'bought'
support, for one side, was spontaneous political enthusiasm for the other.
There was, however, an element of political gamesmanship in all this. The
venality of the 'residuum' was indignantly exposed by those political
interests momentarily hurt by rowdyism: an attitude of mind which could alter
109markedly when that party was assisted by rowdyism. The outcome was a 
distinctive form of law enforcement, administered during election riots by 
an urban magistracy which was frequently implicated in the breakdown of 
public, order. As influential members of the political and social elite, 
the magistracy were in a position to legitimate che moments of temporary 
disorder which sustained rather than challenged the political status quo.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE MAGISTRACY BETWEEN SKELETONS AND SALVATIONISTS
There was a meeting of the Councillors yesterday and from re­
liable information that has reached me the Mayor has promised 
to hold aloof. The leading business men of the Town, with 
few exceptions are members of the Skeleton Army. Their pro­
gramme on Sunday next, at a given signal is to cut open the 
drum end and put in the drummer, cover the processionists with 
red ruddle and flour and keep us from the Barracks Oh!
Hallelujah, the town is on a blaze from end to end, and much 
spiritual awakening in every chapel, glory be to Jesus! His 
name shall be praised! Bless Him! The employers promise their 
people that if they get saved they will not employ them any 
longer. But Hallelujah they are getting saved in spite of the 
Devil. The Superintendent has flatly refused either protection 
outside or inside. The Sergt. but grins and indirectly encour­
ages them. On Sunday last when I got knocked down a policeman 
was by my side. He simply grinned and walked on. 30 Barrels of 
Beer were given to the roughs to prime them. A great many of 
these Dear misguided men have withdrawn and there will be grand 
results shortly Hallelujah! here we have clearly established 
our right of processioning. The publicans grind their teeth uc 
me, their trade here is shaken to its very foundation, it is 
a fact that about 6 p.m. on Sunday last there were not 6 men in 
23 public houses. The week-nigh c services are well at ten tied.
The offerings are better 5 if the police would only do their 
duty, all would be well, as the dear people are just beginning 
to understand us. God is with us. All will be well."
(Captain Lomas to Bramwell Booth, Nov.23rd., 188?, Swan 
Temperance Hotel, Honiton: P.R.O. H.0.45/A22415/1)
The Christian faith has often confronted hostility, 'mobbing' and 
violent persecution. Opposition to an alien faith affected the growth and 
recruitment of early Methodism, Primitive Methodism, the Bible Christians 
and the Salvation Army.* Persecution only strengthened the incipient move­
ments, the preachers eager to confront 'Satan's Children' in the earthly 
guise of the rioter. Anti-Methodist mobs and 'Skeleton Annies' were con­
firmation that at least the religious message was not ignored, and that the 
breakaway sect was reaching the large section of the ungodly, now excluded 
by the increasing respectability of the established congregations. The 
Salvation Army, formed in 1878, provoked widespread opposition throughout the 
1880s from the 'Skeleton Armies' who tried to drive the Salvationists out
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of the towns in the same way that protestant 'mobs' evicted newly estab-
2lished Catholic missions. But the 'officers' recruited by the Army were 
not easily deterred. Captain Lomas of the Monitor. Corps (Devon) bravely 
faced the 'roughs' who had invaded his meeting-hall to demand the 'Army' 
left the town:
I told them the Salvation Army would never leave the town until 
the Judgement Day.^
Other 'officers' provided overdrawn accounts of the 'mobbing' their 'soldiers' 
faced, like Captain Fenny of Basingstoke in March 1882 - "No one killed
4yesterday, but it was hot." And, most of all, General William Booth, foun­
der of the Salvation Army, was utterly implacable, insisting in 1881 that 
his 'soldiers' would not remain indoors whilst 'sinners' frequented the 
tap rooms and music halls - "We must not, we will not, leave these classes 
who detest religious interference, a l o n e . I n  consequence, the Salvation­
ists experienced mob intimidation fcr over five years in a large number of 
towns. And Home Office files in these years expanded with correspondence 
from Salvationists, critical of the protection afforded them by the local 
authorities.^ Borough magistrates were accused of extending official license 
to the 'Skeleton Armies' rather than organizing police protection for Sal­
vationist meetings and processions. The performance of the magistracy in 
the face of riotous opposition to the Salvation Army was notoriously unsatis­
factory. By May 1882, it led John Bright to regret "the foolish and unjust 
magistrates to whom in some districts the administration of the law is 
unfortunately committed." The aim of this chapter is to offer explanation 
for the distinctive behaviour of the lay justices.
The Salvation Army's advance into new territory was publicized in the
most elaborate and aggressive manner. Basingstoke was awakened with:
To all you sinners who it may concern;
Two Hallelujah Lasses,
Being a Detachment of the Salvation Army 
Will open fire on Sin and Satan...®
Imminent 'invasions' were announced with 'military' bravado. In Sheffield
"Shot and shell would be freely thrown into the enemy's camp, and great
gdamage was expected to be done to the devil's kingdom." At the opening of
Attercliffe Hall, posters proclaimed:
Gospel bombshells will be falling in all directions - look 
out - and after an hour's skirmishing the corps will be marched 
through the Enemy's Camp to the Salvation Barracks...
And on the Monday, the troops were to march through the streets "firing at
the devil hip and thigh." To reach the great mass of the urban demoralised,
said Booth, you had to attract them, and then cage them. For contact with
the urban poor, the Salvationists depended on regular street meetings and
processions. An open-air meeting and procession was held on most work-day
evenings, culminating on Sundays with two or even three processions.1* Open-
air preaching was a well-tried form of transmission for religious propaga-ida,
notably for those organizations which sought the conversion of the depressed
12strata of the population. What was described as the 'gutter oratory' of th
Salvation Army 'open-airs', always ended with an invitation to the audience
13to return to the meeting hall for an indoor meeting. Alternatively, the 
procession was used as a 'beat-up' for recruits, collecting a crowd of 
people, as the judges were told in Eeatty v. Gillbanks, "with whom, attended 
by much shouting and singing, uproar and noise, they eventually return to 
the hall, where a meeting is then held."1*1 In the processions there were 
men and boys clad in red jerseys, ornamented with religious texts, and girls 
in coal-scuttle bonnets and draggle-tail dresses. Their processions were 
preceded, according to the Town Clerk of Guildford, "by leaders gesticulating 
and encouraging their followers in singing and excitement."1  ^ They were nois 
and lively affairs, and at first they were considered outlandish. A Guild­
ford Town Councillor complained of "their anticf, buffoonery and irreverent 
proceedings," and detailed the facts that "they bawl out their ribald tunes 
wave their handkerchiefs of all colors, have colored Guernseys on and now
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we have tambourines introduced." In Folkestone, the Incumbent of 
St. Michael's complained to the Home Secretary that the Army had started 
parading the town, "singing and dancing using sacred words to the comic 
tunes sung at the London Music H a l l s . I t  was inevitable that opposition 
to the Salvationists would incorporate parodied elements of these brash per­
formances. The 'Skeleton Army' became, in fact, a well-organized secular 
imitation.
The earliest incidents which revealed an organized resistance to the 
Salvationists were in East London in 1879. By the summer of 1880, Captain 
Payne told the 'War Cry' of an opposition army entitled 'The unconverted
18Salvation Army', which held open-air meetings and processions in imitation. 
But the 'real, original, first skeleton army', according to George Railton,
first Commissioner of the Salvation Amay, was organized in 138] at Weston- 
19super-Mare (Somerset). It possibly derived from groups like the 'Skull
20and Crossbones Boys', organizations which celebrated Guy Fawkes night.
As a term, the 'Skeleton Army' was quickly adopted in other Southern regions 
where the Salvationists were attacked. At the end of 1881, the "Times"
described the Exeter disturbances where the evangelists had collided with
21 ,"a body of roughs calling themselves 'The skeleton Army'" It was suggested
that the skeleton armies supported each other in religious mobbing, as
between towns along the south coast. Worthing 'skeletons' were said to be
in Eastbourne in September 1884. But the "Sussex Coast Mercury" thought
it unlikely that "the branches of the Skeleton Army in the various towns
22are in regular communication." Elaborate costumes were often assumed by 
the 'Skeletons', and their processions were executed with care. In Honiton 
in 1883, the 'Skeleton' procession included flags on which were drawn skel­
etons clutching beer bottles and pipes; printed placards satirising 'General 
Booth and his Sham Army' ; as well as a coffin, carried by four 'Skeletons' 
on the lid of which appeared 'Perjured Salvationist'. The whole was headed 
by a carriage designated 'Mr. and Mrs. Booth's War Chariot', conveying a
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'skeleton' in military dress and medals, representing General Booth.
Such carnivals were naturally watched by all the townspeople, as the pro­
cession slowly moved into collision with the Salvationists. Various tactics 
were used by the Skeleton Army to intimidate the religionists. In Folke­
stone, according to a Salvation soldier and resident of the town, as the 
Salvation Army came out of its hall, seven hundred 'roughs' formed up across 
the street "moving as slowly as it was possible for them to do without 
stopping altogethe r . " R o u g h  music" was often played in front of the 
Salvationist processions to drown their singing, as in Basingstoke where one 
magistrate thought the aim of the opposition army was - "by marching in front 
and at the sides of the Army, making discordant noises, beating old kettles, 
trays, etc., and blowing horns, to bring that body into odium and disrepute 
..." So too in Worthing, at a meeting called to fashion ways of evicting 
the Salvation Army from the town, the chairman v.as convinced that religious
fanaticism buckled in the face of ridicule and sarcasm, "and those were the
26means the Skeleton Army were employing." The 'Skeletons' did not indulge
alone in rough 'horse-play' and fancy burlesque. Brutal assaults were regul-
arly inflicted on the 'soldiers'. But, generally, the intimidation was
meant to insult more than injure. In 1886, the 'Hallelujah Lasses' visited
Ryde, Isle of Wight, where "liquid manure and sewer contents were freely 
28thrown at them." At Honiton, when the Army left a prayer meeting, they
were pelted with turnips, and the female evangelists "not only had their
29clothes smeared with cow dung but their faces covered with mud." In St.
Albans in 1888, the Army officers were ducked in a water-trough.^  The 
'Skeletons' were artists in psychological humiliation, forcibly telling the 
Salvation Army to take its religious excesses out of the borough.
The Salvation Army riots affected at least sixty towns and cities between
7 11879 and 1889. Riots corresponded chronologically with the direction of 
corps expansion, but commonly occurred some months after the arrival of
the Salvationists. In Chester, the Army arrived in November 1881, whilst
the riots broke out in March 1882, when the Salvationists marched into the 
32Irish quarter. Religious disturbances affected the North and North- 
Eastern Counties, South Kales and the Midlands between 1879 and 1881. Riots 
in the Home Counties, Gloucestershire and Devon occurred between 1881 and 
1883, whilst the southern coastal resorts from Ryde to Folkestone were 
affected between 1883 and 1885. Most of the riots, approximately half, occurre 
in the years of greatest Army expansion, 1882 and 1883. The pattern was dis­
rupted by renewed outbreaks of rioting, as at Newcastle (1884) and Northamp­
ton (1885) (sometimes caused by the arrival of a new officer who revived
33open-air processions which had been stopped); and by the delayed arrival 
of the Salvationists, in Stamford (1887) or Eastbourne (1891). The chron­
ological distribution of riots was also affected by the decision in 1885 
to wage 'war' on the villages, reviving antagonism in towns adjacent to 
these areas.
In relation to the distribution of Army Corps, the riots were over­
represented in Southern England - in the coastal regions (Folkestone, Worth­
ing); in Devon and Cornwall (Truro, Honiton); in Somerset (Weston-super-Mare, 
Yeovil); in Hampshire (Basingstoke); and in Kent (Maidstone). In contrast, 
Yorkshire, Northumberland and Lancashire were much less affected by the 
disturbances, although the pattern may be distorted by the greater publicity 
given to riots closer to London and the Salvation Army headquarters. The 
Home Office correspondence on the Army riots, however, similarly referred 
mainly to the Home Counties, Devon and Cornwall. A variety of urban envir­
onments experienced riots, from small towns like Dorking and Frome (6,300
and 9,300 population respectively) to huge industrial cities like Manchester 
34(341,000). Fifty per cent of the riots occurred, however, in towns of 
3-20,000 population, in tourist towns like Worthing, Ryde and Weston-super- 
Mare, and in old provincial capitals like Salisbury. In urban districts
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of 20-50,000 population, where just over 20"o of the riots took place, cath­
edral cities and historic boroughs were again important - Chester, Coventry 
and Exeter. Salvationist riots also occurred in towns with populations of 
50,000-100,000 and 100,000 plus, in industrial 'growths' like Oldham,
Sheffield and Birkenhead. But, in absolute numbers, the riots were a pro­
duct of small and medium-sized towns. These towns constituted, even in 
the 1880s, a vital proportion of urban England, and were only gradually ad­
justing to nineteenth-century patterns of industrial and urban expansion.
Any interpretation of the disturbances must, in consequence, especially ad­
mit such townships, where a large number of the riots occurred, and where, 
significantly, the borough magistracy were deeply implicated in the religious 
disorder.
But first, it is necessary to document the nature of the Salvation Army
as a religious organization. The Salvation Army developed out of the home-
mission evangelism of the Christian Revival Association and the Christian
Mission, an evangelism inspired by the ‘Second Awakening', the American-
35influenced revival movement which affected Britain in the 1860s. William 
Booth, a one-time Methodist and 'free-lance' preacher had originally intend­
ed creating a 'bridge' between the 'unchurched' and the Church, but this 
had adjusted to the formation of a religious organization entirely separate
7/:from the Church. To attract what Booth legendarily termed the 'submerged 
tenth', the Nonconformists were too conventional. Many dissatisfied Method­
ists - William Corbridge, and Elijah Cadman, previously Primitive Methodists
- joined the Christian Mission, anxious to return to early Christian principle
37and to use revivalist techniques to reach the irreligious lower classes. 
Examination of the previous religious affiliation of Salvationist officers 
illustrates the same point. Almost one-third had been members of a Christian 
denomination prior to joining the Army - mainly Wesleyan or Primitive
70Methodists. As the 'Saturday Review' recognized, the Army was 'poaching'
from "the older-established religious societies which have become more 
39conventionalised." The Army was one variant of late Methodist revivalism,
and, as with earlier schisms, there was a charismatic preacher straining
under the old discipline, eager to return again to the outcast and their
purity of heart. Under the autocratic control of William Booth, the
Salvation Army was a continued protest against the religious sects which
remained remote from the lives of the poor, and which stressed man's intellecl
to
above his soul. Army officers, in contrast, were encouragedypush home-missioi! 
evangelism to its logical conclusion, by embracing the plight of the poor 
and relieving their spiritual degeneration. If the Salvation Army was fin­
ally unsuccessful as a Gospel Mission, either in consolidating emotional 
religion, or in recruiting from the urban 'submerged', a »-eligious community
of sorts was formed, dedicated to achieving the religious welfare of the 
40poor.
In 1878, the Christian Mission transformed itself into the Salvation
Army, with a centralized system of organization, and with the full 'military'
trappings of uniform, bands and official titles. Para-militarism was a
common feature of religious organization by the late 1870s, original.;.’ in-
41fluenced by the Crimean War and the Volunteer movement. For the Salvation 
Army, the adoption of the military form took place amid a wave of Imperial­
ist feeling, at the time of the Russo-Turkish war. The origin of the 
Salvation Army must be related to this rediscovery of Imperialism in the 
second half of the 1870s. It was an opportunist extension of this mood; a 
response to the high tide of Disraelian Imperialism.^ It was established 
at the point when intense war fervour, labelled as jingoism for the first 
time, and increasingly harnessed by Disraeli to the Conservative party, was 
disabling the Quaker and pacifist element of Liberal Nonconformism.^^ The 
Salvation Army was a nonconformist adjustment to the imperialist spirit, 
accomodating its religious organization and style to the imperialist form.
But the military stance also assisted Booth's strategy to avoid the delays
inherent in a system of committees, by perfecting an autocratic, centralized
44organization, with a rigid unity of direction. In its early years, the 
Salvation Army must have appeared an awesome organization: a body with 
effective national co-ordination, despatching uniformed and disciplined 
cadres to all parts of the country.
The Army was composed of the General and Chief of Staff, with majors, 
captains and lieutenants responsible for the Divisions and Corps. In 1882 
there were thirteen Divisions, each controlled by a major, whilst the 
divisions were divided into corps, each under a captain and one or two lieut­
enants. From 28 corps before 1878, the number increased to 427 corps at 
the end of 1883; over one-haif established in 1882 and 1883, adding respect­
ively 126 and 97 corps.** There was a widespread geographical location of 
Army corps in England, whilst in Kales they were heavily concentrate-.’ in 
the South. Urban areas were predominantly colonized before 1885, a natural 
focus for an organization in search of the 'unchurched'. Barracks were 
established in different urban environments - in market towns, mining village 
and working-class suburbs of large cities. The largest number of corps how­
ever - over 150 - were in towns of 3-10,000 population, whilst towns of 
10-20,000 and 20-50,000 population, each contained over sixty corps. There 
was a general movement of corps expansion between 1878 and 1883 from the 
North-lVest to the South-East of the country. ^  The early movement from East 
London in 1878 established corps in Teeside, South Yorkshire (Hull, Sheffield 
Central Lancashire (Bolton), and South Wales (Cardiff). The Midlands and 
Birmingham region were pioneered in 1879 and 1880, with extensions to 
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. In 1880-81, the Bristol, Reading and Exeter 
Corps were opened, and in 1882-3, there was expansion into Devon and Cornwall 
as well as new development in London, and in the Southern coastal resorts 
of Folkestone and Worthing. Expansion of Salvationist branches resulted
from central directives (based on estimates of officer strength and loca­
tion of working-class populations); from revivalist contagion (as in South 
Wales and Tyneside amongst the colliers and sailors); and from assistance 
given by Wesleyan and Primitive Methodist bodies who loaned pulpits and
mission halls (as in Bristol, the Midlands, the West Riding, and the North
47Hast). Predictably, the Army was most successful, in terms of recruitment, 
in those corps situated in areas with strong Nonconformist leanings. In 
the Bristol region, notably in the old textile districts, the special strength 
of the Salvation Army owed a good deal to the tradition of radical religious 
enthusiasm which the Army revived. In Macclesfield, the Army was more success 
ful, not encountering the customary mobbing, due to the strength of Noncon­
formity in the town. Whilst in Darlington, a Quaker stronghold, the 'Halle­
lujah Lasses' more easily won converts, and roused the Quietist Friends to 
renewed religious activity.
This perpetual missionary expansion was, however, suspected as a search 
for renewed enthusiasm which had burnt out in the initial areas. Overall 
increase in Army membership was attributed to the creation of new coirs, rot 
to incremental increase at the initial depots. Charles Booth, the social 
investigator, expressed most vividly the diffusive nature of the organization, 
unable to consolidate a body of followers, and the consequent technique for 
reinvigorating local branches:
Its growth has not been that of the rolling snowball, but rather 
that of a plant which contends with other plants of stronger, or 
equally strong, growth, and in its spreading continually seeks fresh 
soil...Constant changes are made in the personnel, partly as a meas­
ure of discipline, no doubt, in order to maintain the feeling of 
dependence on headquarters, but also quite necessarily for the sake 
of vigor, fresh life having to be stirred up every nine months or 
so, by changing the officers in charge.
In direct response to the problem of waning interest, a Flying Squadron of
'Hallelujah Lasses' was sent out. It was meant to keep alive the Salvationist
Corps in each town they passed through.'’^  In large part, this was a product
of a religion which depended on enthusiasm and emotion. Revivalist meetings
fed off a sense of enthusiasm amongst the converts and audience which was
difficult to maintain over an extended period. Initial momentum was soon
lost. Once the novelty of the methods wore off, the converts faded away.
Unconventional techniques attracted the curious, but the religious message
was monotonous from its very simplicity. Theological controversy, doctrine
or ritual were almost non-existent, and the religion in consequence held
few mysteries. As Charles Booth said, allbeit later in the 1880s:
Very seldom have the spoken words either life or power...used and 
heard again and again, as they necessarily must be, they come to 
have no more effect and little more character than the utterances 
of a megaphone.51
Like other Nonconformist sects, the theology of Salvationism was defined
by the emphasis upon a personal relationship with a personal God; and by
an intense persona]-congregational participation in the service. William
Booth advised his son, Bramwell, in 1877:
Ours is the co-operative plan, and the main idea should be to 
make the most we can of every man. People have 100 times the in­
terest in a meeting in which they do something themselves... I 
don't say give up preaching... But you must have a leader and you 
must have a band of men who are 'alive'...
The philosophy of success is 'live' meetings - Let us have them.
Give up the Shopkeepers and Methodists and trust the VULGAR CROWD.
There was no intellectualism and little philosophy in Salvation Army theology
- it was more of an emotion. Nor was there confirmation, communion or other
festivals, preparatory to salvation. The sacraments, and the implication
of a priesthood, were a formal intervention in the only distinction which
Booth recognized, that between 'sinner' and 'saved'. In the Salvation Army,
notwithstanding its hierarchic structure of organization, the stress was
53on a priesthood of believers. The only real theological tenet of 
Salvationism was complete faith in the atoning work of Christ, as the ultimat 
solution for human misery. The remaining ten articles of doctrine, written 
into the 1878 Deed Poll, concerned the authority of Scripture (which would 
instil faith) and the coming of the Kingdom of God (which was however no
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millenium awaited with impatience); but they followed from the central
doctrine - the faith which would lead to conversion and the grace of God.
54Salvation was to be attained through the personal presence of Christ.
Charles Booth described the frugal religious content of a meeting in the 
Congress Hall, London:
The preaching was the same as always. That Christ by His blood 
has saved us and that He stands ready to receive us NOW. No other 
ideas at all are offered...55
In these meetings, emotional appeals were repetitively made for an immediate 
"Closing with Christ".^ In the 'closing' appeared the intense fervour 
characteristic of revivalist meetings, as Ballington Booth described of a 
'Holiness Meeting' in 1878:
'One young man, after struggling and wrestling for nearly an 
hour, shouted "Glory! glory! glory! I've got it. Oh! Bless 
God!" One young woman shook her head, saying, "No, not to­
night," but soon was seen on the ground pleading mightily with 
God...Another brother said, "I must jump." I said "Then jump," 
ar,.i he jumped all round. '57
Following conversion, the Salvationist dedicated himself to the spirit­
ual welfare of other sinners. He was asked to adapt his religious message 
to the requirements of his own deprived inheritance; to call upon his own 
personal experience rather than upon authorised or established learning.
He was thrust forward to testify to the effects of salvation in his indigen-
COous language and style. The public confessional arrayed 'Blood Washed 
Colliers' and 'Hallelujah Fishmongers', with the "Milkman who has not 
watered his milk since he was saved." As the Reverend Randall Davidson 
recognized, the rapid success of the Army was due to the employment of all 
converts in the subsequent work, and to the recognition of the value of
personal testimony, presented on a popular cultural level, and in vivacious
59language "understanded of the people." An essential ingredient of any 
popular religion thus lay at the centre of Salvationism - the interleaving 
of religious and vernacular effect, and a trust in the flexible, anarchic
quality of meetings. Early Army leaders, along with their 'tropies of 
salvation' or new converts, employed lower-class cultural symbolism in 
their advertisements and speeches, setting new words to topical songs from 
the Music Hall. The Salvationists were the showmen of religion, luridly 
dramatizing the contest between Sin and Redemption. No methods were too 
unconventional if they brought men to salvation. Every topical event was 
exploited for religious benefit.^ And, befitting an organization of 
'Christian Soldiers', the dramatic effect concentrated on the 'war' to be 
waged against the Devil and his subordinates, in order to free the demoral­
ized poor in the urban slums. As General Booth said:
' My work is to make war on the hosts that keep the underworld 
submerged, and you cannot have war without noise. We'll go on 
singing and marching with drums beating and comets playing all 
the time'.61
The Salvationists conceived themselves chosen to wage war against the
'dangerous classes' of urban society - "'men as essentially heathen," said
62Mrs Booth "as any in the centre of Africa." It represented a belief that
along with missionary activity in the outskirts of the Empire (and the
Salvation Army, with its laudable internationalist concern, was to be the
most advanced exponent of religious colonization) the mission of civilizing
slaughter against all sinners had also to be carried on at home. As a great
empire required an imperial race, so a Christian empire required a Christian
populace. Salvationist publications argued that the ruffianism met by their
soldiers indicated the existence "of a terrible and growing force of rebels
against all law," and that it was a national benefit to civilize such people
63- "to preserve the country from mob-violence and revolution." The Army
ceaselessly made extravagant claims for the number of criminals and drunkards
which they had reclaimed from the 'dangerous classes'. At a meeting in
the Grecian Theatre, London, Mrs Booth stated,
that in one procession of the Army which she recently witnessed there 
were no fewer than 400 reclaimed drunkards. Burglars, housebreakers, 
robbers of all kinds, and wife beaters were to be counted in the 
ranks of the Army...°^
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In meetings, people were encouraged to admit that they had been gamblers
and thieves. It was all integral to the boast that the Army was reaching
those classes which traditional churchmen, and which the futile methods
of organized Christianity, could never reach. Notable conversions, or
'trophies', were those people, as a Wesleyan teacher of Saltaire described,
"who were the worst characters in the neighbourhood, giving the police con- 
65astant trouble." Ex-Skeletonists were the highest prize of all, and a few
Salvation officers self-confessedly began life in the ranks of the 'Skeleton
Army'.^k There was always an ambiguous relationship between the two parties
- the 'Skeletons' were the harshest critics of the Salvationists, but also
testimony that the missionaries were reaching the "still savage residuun",
as the "Saturday Review" described the opposition armies.^ Mrs Booth often
praised the courage of her female 'soldiers' ir. facing the savage 'roughs'
whom they nevertheless sought to convert:
It was very hard when the members of the Army were facing these 
dangerous classes. They had no other motive but to save them.6"
And in September 1882, whilst the East End 'roughs' waited menacingly out­
side the Grecian theatre, Mrs Booth still said:
They meant to bring to Jesus those people outside who had molested 
the Army that day. They meant to have thousands of them in the 
course of two or three years.68
One is at the heart of Salvationism here. In adjusting to the spirit of 
imperialism, there emerged the distinctive dichotomy of nonconforming imper­
ialism - piety and agression - which made the Salvation Army so specifically 
the work of its time.
The one-sided concern with the 'dangerous classes' centred particularly 
on the cultural distractions to a truly religious life. All symbols of 
spiritual degeneration - theatres, boxing-booths, pubs and music-halls - 
were attacked in print and on the platform. They were also literally 'in­
vaded' like the fairground at St. Giles' Fair, Oxford; or, particularly, the
new havens of cheap recreation, the seaside resort towns where the enter-
69tainments of the music-halls were repeated on the seashore. General
Booth was convinced that the 'Worthings' and 'Hastings' contained their own
social residuum, contaminated by the popular amusements; and he pitted his
Army's songs and music against the attractions of the resort towns. In
other towns, whenever theatres or halls of entertainment were bought up, it
was loudly proclaimed as a victory for Salvationism. A moral imperialism
looked to colonize spaces in which 'savage' entertainments were performed.
Hence, in London, the sharpest attack on popular amusements, and the attempt
to replace them with religious 'free-and-easies', took place around the
Eagle Tavern, with Grecian theatre and dancing gardens, in City Road. In
June, 1882, the Salvationists worked hard to raise the money to purchase the
'Eagle', to which, said the General, they would be able to attract thousands
of people - "folk who had drunk, danced, sworn, and served the Devil there
before, and whom they meant to convert.”^* The 'Eagle' was purchased, and
in September bills announced its re-opening "under Salvation management, to
do you all good." Shopmen and shopgirls who had "danced their way to
destruction", according to Booth, were to be amused instead by apostate
entertainers - the 'Smitten Banjo Player' or the 'Converted Acrobat' - and
71provided with refreshments to produce only spiritual drunkenness. When the
Salvationists took possession of the 'Eagle' , vast crowds in the surrounding
streets hustled them, to declare their opinion of a religion which could find
72a place for the theatre in its scheme for moralizing the poor. The Sal­
vationist warfare might be unconventional in technique and method, yet it 
was one which a respectable Nonconformist audience could still appreciate, 
stressing the irréligion reared by the tap-room and the low music-halls.
But implicit in the Salvationist crusade against the music-halls and 
public houses was an arrogant attack on lower-class 'mores'. None of the 
plebeian entertainments were considered to be humanising, appealing only to
vulgar minds, and invariably associated with the degenerative influence of 
the brewery 'trade'. Such amusements were condemned as distractions to 
religious conversion. The 'Army' insisted instead on a social respectability 
- not for its own sake, but in the interests of salvation. In their 
approach, the Salvationists furthered the traditional attack by social or
73religious philanthropists on popular culture and lower-class life styles. 
General Booth's aspersions on the entertainments previously performed by 
the Grecian Theatre Company in London were contradicted by the Church and 
Stage Guild in 1882:
They can testify to the excellent way in which those entertain­
ments were conducted, and to the healthy character of the amusement 
provided there for hardworking men and women.74
More commonly, working-class resistance to the Salvationist attack on popular
culture was expressed in physical mobbing. In providing an explanation
for the Salvationist riots, therefore, it is crucial to refer to the traditic
of working-class resentment at the self-righteous and alien culture of
'respectability', temperance and thrift. Salvationism offended in relation
to its intrusive espousal of respectability. It was notoriously reluctant
to keep its distance from the poor and the fallen.
Contempt for working-class 'mores' and behaviour-patterns was extended
by the very nature of religious conversion in the Salvationist creed, resultin
in a marked change of social roles Conversion enabled a person to view
poverty stoically, content with the removal of sinfulness and satisfied in
75the search for eternal and not temporal blessings. Yet, the conversion 
usually led to a religious 'self-help' which offset poverty and ensured 
social respectability. In Chatham, a 'sinner', whose suit was always in 
pawn, was affected by conversion, as the "Christian Mission Magazine" reporte 
After he found the Lord he soon found his clothes, getting them
out of the pawn-shop.76
Dramatic conversion, reported to involve an instant switch in life-style
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from drunkard to preacher, was a central feature of Salvationism. Absten­
tion from Sunday labour, from theatre entertainment, and from swearing and
77smoking, were commonly announced to be the results of conversion. In
78Sheffield, there wrs the "Man who when converted hardly knew himself."
Very adeptly, the Army encouraged the renunciation of a sinful past and the
assumption of new standards. The penitent seat itself, placed in front
of the platform, not only tested the sincerity of the 'calling', but also,
as Bramwell Booth noted - "is conspicuous enough to register a distinct break 
79in a man's life." In Stockton, the path to 'rebirth' was symbolically 
represented by a gangway leading from pit to stage. William BootWs descrip­
tion continued - "Penitents have to face this narrow way, and cross what
looks like the Captain's bridge of a river-steamboat, ere they can reach the
80stage, where prayer is wont to be made for them." Outspoken confession
similarly symbolized a ritual cleansing in preparation for entrance to the
community of the 'saved'. Religious allusions to being'bom again' representc
the transformed life-style expected, once the sinner was shorn of his origin-
al social status. An acquired status as soldier of God was confirmed by
a classless military uniform. The new moral and social outlook whicn resultec
from conversion, was then openly announced through the divine calling to
minister to other sinners. On the streets, the 'new person' faced his old
friends with an unnerving determination to convert them. Pett Ridge, a
novelist of the 1890s, vividly portrayed the earnest convert in close
association with an old companion. Miss Gilliken, a friend of the street
arab, Mord Em'ly, was speaking at an 'open-air', testifying to her criminal
past and to her recent conversion, when Mord arrived:
'Many a time 'ave I with my ongodly companions, roamed about these 
streets, seeking what I might devour; and, thank God, I've got the 
candidness to tell YOU , and every one of you 'ere te-night, that 
in my younger days I've knowed what it was to be a THIEF.'
But, at last, said Gilliken, she had been brought to see the error of her
ways:
'and, thank the Lord, I 'ave been washed whiter than SNOW, 
and purified of ray sins...and I do so want all you other sinful 
people to come and do likewise, and not to 'old back, becos' you 
think you're too black, or too wicked, or too sinful; for b'lieve me, 
my friends, BAD as you may be, and no doubt are -'82
It was the espousal of self-righteous unction, the arrogation of a new-found 
respectability which provoked stern resistance from the working-class commun­
ities which the Salvationists entered. And the Salvationists themselves ex-
I I  41pected resistance. The Salvation War, for 1883, pointed to the hostility 
which the new convert aroused, - and the commendable disavowal of such 
plebeian sanctions:
'Praying Joe' is even a greater centre of interest than 'Drunken 
Joe' used to be. He, though, may be very roughly tested at first.
'If I turn religious, I shall have nubs of coal at mv head to­
morrow', says a strapping young coalheaver. But in due time he 
is heard telling how tne nubs of coa^ have failed to 'knock it 
out of him, 'cos it's in too deep.'0
As z~. explanation of the 'mobbing', a conflict between the 'rougn' and 
the 'respectable' working-class was accepted by a number of contemporary 
analysts. Wilson Carlile, leader of the Church Army (the Church of England's 
equivalent to the Salvation Army), had this conflict in mind when he diagnose 
much of the mobbing he received to "the conversion of a man whose 'going 
over' annoyed and alarmed his old m a t e s . A n d ,  it was considered to be an 
important ingredient in the 'Skeleton' opposition to the Salvationists.
The "Saturday Review" identified the hostility engendered between the 'rough' 
and the 'ex-rough', particularly when the latter "trumpets forth the super­
iority of his new self to his old self, and consequently to his old compan­
ions."®^ In the message of 'respectability' there was more than a personal 
guide, but the basis of what seemed a conceited appeal to 'sinners' to 
aspire to the 'saintliness' of the convert. It was a religion which encour­
aged its preachers aggressively to assert their superior piety. As the 
Catholic journal, "The Month", said - "the good example is meant as a warning
to others. Hence the offence." The so-called 'rough' working-class86
were the most offended.
The Salvation Army showed a persistent concern to invade the working-class 
suburbs. Despite sustained opposition met by the Coventry corps, the "Sal­
vation Army Gazette" of November 1879 still instructed its evangelists:
It is your duty to go to every part of every town inhabited by 
the working classes...
In 1884, Brighton Watch Committee induced the Salvationists to confine their
87processions to the poorer streets. In its discriminative emphasis on 
working-class areas and populations, the Army seems to have provoked defen­
sive blocks against its "invasion". In Birkenhead, at trie end of 1882, one 
str~eetful of people built a barricade across the street, women came with
88aprons full "and showered stones at the Salvationists when they came up."
In September 1884, Hounslow Salvation branch left its barracks 'to storm the 
gates of Hell and snap the Devil's chain,' according to the posteri announ­
cing the intention. "The Times" explained:
'The gates of Hell' is a figurative title for the entrance to a 
private lane, known as Lion and Lamb-road, and the 'Devil's chain' 
is the barrier by which the residents have successfully kept back the 
advances of the Salvationists. On this occasion between 200 and 300 
people had collected behind this barrier, and it was thought that a 
rupture between the two bodies would be imminent. Fortunately, the 
Salvationists, seeing the place so well guarded, contented themselves 
with a 'Hallelujah volley,' which was answered by groans and hisses, 
and marched back to barracks. 9^
Again, in Portsmouth, four years later, the Salvationists entered one street 
where they were received "with showers of water, ashes, and flour from win­
dows and a large crowd of soldiers, tramps, and loose women, who resented 
90their intrusion." Complacent religious fervour, uninvited as it was, 
stirred an articulate working-class response. In Chatham, a gang of coal- 
whippers held mock prayer-meetings to register dissent. And at Oldham, in 
1882, labourers standing on chairs imitated a Salvationist open-air. As 
the "Oldham Chronicle" said - "the whole affair was a mockery and burlesque
of the Salvation Army."
To talk in terms of a warfare between 'rough' and 'respectable' working­
men, with regard to personal and cultural 'mores', seems consistent, finally, 
with the occupational data on members of the Salvation and Skeleton 'Armies'. 
The social composition of the leadership of the Salvation Army was solidly 
working-class, occasionally lower middle-class; whilst the 'Skeletons' were
drawn generally from a slightly lower social stratum amongst the working-
92class, predominantly young labouring men and shopmen. Certainly, the cul­
tural analysis could not be extended to include sharp economic and occupation 
al distinctions. Far more the 'rough-respectable' warfare was disagreement 
over cultural values, representing a sharp crisis within plebeian cultuie 
between indigenous working-class 'mores', and imported values of temperance 
and respectability. Established cultural habits - 'beer and baccy', boxing 
booths, Music-Halls - were offensively rejected for the temperance pledge, 
'Converted Dog-Fanciers', and religious 'free-and-easies'. Working-class 
entertainments were always 'picketed' by the Salvationists, notably fairs, 
at which crowd excitement on such celebratory occasions commonly resulted 
in attacks on the preachers. In time, the working man learnt a respectful 
indifference for the Army's activities, even for their songs - "Out of the 
gutter we pick them up". But in the 1880s, the revivalists confronted a 
popular anti-culture in the working-class districts. The cult of "respect­
ability" - straddling class divides - was thought to provide a major support 
for the social quiescence of mid-Victorian Britain - a "socially-soothing 
tendency" in Geoffrey Best's p h r a s e . B y  the 1880s, when the hierarchic
social order was increasingly challenged, so also were the cultural diversion:
93band personal qualities expected of the working-class. In part, the 
Salvation Army riots testify to the resistance put up against the alien 
social values implicit within Salvationism.
The independent working-class response contained sharp religious as well
91
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as secular comment. Religious opposition to Salvationism was, generally,
the preserve of Irish working-class districts. According to the "Christian
Mission Magazine" in i870, 'Romanists' at Canning Town leagued themselves
94with 'infidels' and 'drunkards' to drive the Mission from the field.
By the 1880s, the Salvationists could still arouse Catholic tempers, and
they seemed anxious to do so, setting up preaching stands in Irish streets,
and taking their processions into Catholic areas. At Bolton, in 1882, the
Catholic community was roused by two girls who gave up their beads and
rosary to the Salvation officer after conversion. Later, according to IV.T.
Stead, the Army aggressively marched through the Catholic quarter, and a 
95riot ensued. A month later, in March, the Army's decision to penetrate
96Boughton, the Irish quarter of Chester, led to another disturbance. Twice
in 1883 the Salvationists were involved in faction fights with the Catholics
in the north end of Birkenhead. On the last occasion, in October, it was
revealed in the subsequent court hearings that notices had been posted on
one of the Catholic churches to the effect that it would be wrecked. As
the parish priest, Father Slaughter, said:
•All the week I have been up most of the night with a number of 
dock labourers quarding the church, as I have positive information 
that the Orangemen, who have made common cause with the Salvation­
ists, intend to attack it.'9?
Religious antagonism released the most destructive riots, however, in Tred­
egar in 1882. Two Irishmen joined the Army, and, according to Reverend
Williams, the local Salvationists expressed their delight "at having got
98some Irish blood amongst them at last." When they passed the Irish quarter 
the Salvationists thereafter shouted to the Irish to join their countrymen, 
for which they were pelted with flour by Irish work girls. At this point, 
the continual disorder which disturbed the town, plus the rumour that the 
Irish had poisoned the local reservoir, provoked the Welsh to invade the 
Irish quarter. The Salvation Army, on this occasion, was only the pretext 
for releasing an inveterate hostility between the Irish and the Welsh,
momentarily enhanced by the events in Ireland itself, and by the imminent 
unemployment of the Welsh puddlers once the local ironworks was converted 
into a steelworks. An attempt was now made to drive the Irish out of the
town. Many were made homeless and sheltered about the coalpits or in the
99workhouse, before leaving for Queenstown.' Long-standing social and econ­
omic grievances held by the Welsh were thus released by the initial religous 
clash between the Irish Catholics and the Salvation Army.
It seems possible that the articulate working-class response to the 
Salvation Army was most typical of larger urban areas like London, Portsmouth 
Sheffield and Oldham, where working-class populations, shielded from middle- 
class example, clung to fixed drinking habits and leisure patterns, and, 
incensed by the Salvationist calls for moral and social improvement, resisted 
the Army's advance into the working-class districts of the town by mobbing, 
and even by blocking-off their streets. Additionally, there was an independo 
working-class response i:i those urban areas which contained a sizeable Irish 
population of Roman Catholics; in Chester, Birkenhead or Tredegar. Salva­
tion Army mobbing was only an extension of religious conflict which more 
commonly involved the Protestant Orangemen. But this explanation of the 
rioting, which stresses attitudes held independently by the working-class, 
is less applicable to the provincial market and tourist towns - Salisbury, 
Guildford, Basingstoke and Eastbourne - where a considerable proportion of 
the riots occurred. It was in these towns that the other tradition in 
English rioting was most visible - the submission to brewery control of 
lower-class 'rowdies', employed in the cause of the 'Trade' to silence a rel­
igious organization which espoused the virtues of temperance. The 'Trade' 
was of course well-versed in organizing intimidation during election cam­
paigns, notably in such small-town constituencies. And it was unques­
tionably influential in the Salvation Army riots. Behind the elaborate 
'Skeleton' processions, and the organized intimidation, representatives of
the infamous 'Trade' were supposed to lurk. No explanation of the riots 
was more commonly endorsed by the Salvationists themselves, than the 
bribery of 'roughs' through the public houses. 1001>
The Salvationists castigated drunken habits, reviled the public houses 
and their proprietors, and had the temerity to tout the "War Cry" around 
tap-rooms and Music-halls. Poverty, they largely attributed to drunkenness; 
spiritual and moral weakness they laid at the door of the public house.
For a religious body which thus preached total abstinence in alcohol, and 
which took as a major test of its success - in the reports sent in to "War 
Cry" each week - the estimated decline in public-house patronage, it was 
inevitable that the 'Trade' should be held responsible for organizing oppos­
ition.1^ ** In a memorandum prepared by Salvation Army headquarters for 
the Home Secrecary in April 1881, a comprehensive indiciment was laid:
...in nearly every town where there has been any opposition we 
have been able to trace it, mure or less, to the direct instigation, 
and often open leadership of either individual Brewers or Publicans, 
or their employes.
The plan adopted is by treating and otherwise inciting gangs of 
roughs...to hustle and pelt, and mob the people...1^2
When large numbers of conversions depleted local publicans' takings, it
was said, the 'Skeleton Armies' were organized. From dastboume in 1891,
where the Salvationists experienced months of mob intimidation, a sympathizer
wrote to the Home Secretary:
I believe the drink sellers are at the bottom of these...drunken 
mobs. The publicans know quite well that if the S. Army gets hold 
of the people they will not want their drink.
Local Salvationists accused the publicans and brewers of instigating riots 
in Luton, Salisbury, Stamford, Maidstone and Basingstoke.10/1 Captain of 
Basingstoke corps, Miss Lizzie Rushforth, appealed to the Home Office in 
1881 "to prevent us being the victims of public house spleen and rowdyism." 
Borough publicans had, it seems, offered a reward to any person who stole 
the Army's flag.105 In Honiton, according to court depositions, the public­
ans and leading shopkeepers were employing men for miles around. George Wood
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who let the Honiton corps meet in his cottage in 1882, deposed that the 
'Skeleton Army' was,
supported strongly by the publicans. They have issued papers 
ridiculing the Salvation Army and by their papers as well as by 
words declare their intention of driving the Salvation Army from 
Honiton.
Richard Thom of Honiton similarly deposed,
Skeleton Army consists of about two hundred who wore green cards 
in their hats with skeletgg printed on them. These cards were 
supplied by Publicans...1
It was not only the Salvationists who blamed the 'Trade' for the disturbances 
Five Basingstoke magistrates explained to the Home Secretary that once the 
Salvationists began to empty the public-houses, and diminish drunkenness, 
local 'roughs' were organized in the pubs, the paid agents of some of the 
key brewers in the town.'*^ And finally, Sir V.'iiliam Harcourt, Home Secre­
tary during the years 1880 to 1885, when most of the riots occurred, later
108referred to "the Skeleton Army, who were practically publicans."
This is not to say that publicans were unimportant in relation to some
of the disturbances in the larger towns and cities. In the London district
of Whitechapel, the publicans were renowned for their complicity in the
Salvationist mobbing in 1879. Again in 1883, members of St. Luke's Vestry
condemned the publicans for instigating the 'Skeleton Army' outside the
109Salvation Army Hotel, formerly the Eagle Tavern. But what was important
about the riotous opposition arranged by the drink 'Trade' in the smaller 
provincial towns was that it expressed more than a fall-off in public-house 
attendance. Whilst the brewery trade was often instrumental to the formation 
of the 'Skeleton Army', other town notables worked vicariously through 
the publicans. In Basingstoke, the publicans organized the 'Massaganian 
Army' to intimidate the Salvationists, but the clerk to the justices told 
the Home Secretary in March 1881, that the mob was encouraged by support 
from other townsmen:
There is no doubt that there is an organized opposition to the Sal-
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Salvation Army, and that it is being conducted under the guidance 
and dirgction of some few persons of good average position in the 
town.1
In Honiton, where again the 'skeletons' were inspired by publican largesse,
George Wood, a Salvation Army sympathiser, stated that he had been told about
a "certain wealthy inhabitant" who was heard to say - "If a hundred pounds
worth of drink was needed it should be supplied."*** Tolerance of mob
behaviour from social superiors working through the pubs, naturally gave
extra security to the 'Skeleton Armies'.
But what explains the extension of such tolerance in these towns? For
some boroughs, the complicity of more senior townsmen in the opposition to
the Army's 'invasion' was based on the anxiety that religious processions
112would affect the reputation of their tourist resort. The short fashion­
able season in miJdie-class watering places and seaside resorts increased 
sensitivity to noisy bands, particularly on Sundays. Faced with this 
prospect along the whole south coast, Brighton corporation sponsored a confer­
ence in the Pavilion at the end of 1884, with representatives from Worthing,
Eastbourne and Lewes, to devise ways of controlling Salvationist process- 
113ions. Worthing had been affected in the spring of 1884 when a new 
female officer insisted on holding open-air meetings and processions. The 
local press criticized the decision, considering the town would be ruined 
as a seaside resort, and a subscription list was opened to raise an oppos­
ition army. In August 1884, William Booth sent to the Home Office a letter 
he had received from the Chief Constable of West Sussex, who appealed for 
the continued suspension of processions in Worthing. In his letter, the 
Chief Constable also admitted that besides the opposition from "the rougher 
portion of the inhabitants," the tradespeople and residents protested 
against anything which interfered with the customary quiet of the town, and 
concluded by saying - "the persons who form the 'Skeleton Army' have 
received and do receive considerable encouragement from those in a higher
A
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. . 114social position."
Yet, something larger was involved than the reputations of watering 
places like Folkestone or Torquay. Beneath the 'Skeleton' intimidation 
there was also a town's sanction against an alien and intruding religious 
organization which disturbed customary religious and social patterns. In 
towns which preserved a tighter social structure, less splintered into 
occluded social groupings, characteristic of small boroughs in Sussex, Surrey, 
Dorset, Hampshire, and the western counties (Devon, Cornwall), it was 
possible for the keenly-felt 'invasion', and the 'new religion' to release 
a xenophobic outburst of enraged traditionalism. Salvationist street pro­
cessions and open-air meetings were thought to coarsen religion, and offended 
respectable townsmen by their vulgarity. Of more relevance, in Salvation- 
ism there was a creed which severely challenged the exiscing 'mores' of the 
small-town community. There was the realistic anxiety that families and 
the community would be split by conversions to the Salvation religion. There 
was concern that the evangelists would demoralize the young, the ignorant, 
and the womenfolk. Mob opposition thus expressed a defence against social 
as well as religious change. In the Salvation Army riots there was an early 
exhibition of customary national values - which was to have more authentic 
expression in the jingo riots against the pro-Boers in 1899 which similarly 
occurred in provincial towns, as Dover, Margate, Brighton and Gateshead.
It was in these areas where most of the Salvation Army riots broke out: the 
Conservative South-East, with its weighting of class, wealth and rank; and th< 
South-West, isolated from the main currents of British industrial change, 
where social ties tended to be local rather than national.**
Community hostility to the Salvation Army was intensified by stories of 
strange ceremonials and revivalist extravagances which were said to occur 
inside the Salvationist barracks. Sexual rumours were often rife, sustained 
by the evening revivalist meetings and the 'Great Lovefeasts'. Imagination
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fed the community's fears for established morality - as in the description
of the ritual, 'Creeping for Jesus', when, it was stated, the lights were
turned low, and the kneeling men and women groped with their hands in the
darkness. But the Salvationists opened more fundamental cracks in the
local society. The hostility to the officers could be related to the challen;
made against traditional views of the woman's role in the family and church,
218which the women Salvationists clearly exemplified. The noticeable youth 
of the Army officers heightened concern for the safety of the younger members 
of the town, occasionally injecting a generational conflict into the commun­
ity's attitude to the Salvationists - when young people defied their
119parents' instructions not to attend the meetings. A complainant of
Torquay said to the Home Secretary in 1888:
Many young women of respectability leave a comfortable Home 
and join the Salvation Army against the wish of their Parents, 
and are never able to return again.120
Work relationships in the local society were often strained when employees
were sent packing for participating in the Salvation processions and meet-
121 . . • . . ings. The Salvationists could also splinter settled religious communities
as in Basingstoke when the Established and Nonconformist Churches took
opposite sides. At a more personal level, in Eastbourne, in 1892, when
a woman criticized the clergy for encouraging the mobbing by preaching
against the Salvationists, her local clergyman "got up and walked out saying
. . , 1he would never cross my threshold again, we had formerly been great friends.
Religious dissension was perhaps most easily aroused in Cathedral cities like
Salisbury, Exeter and Norwich, where there was a nonconformist minority,
resentful of the strong clerical influence, and where the rivalry between
124Church and Chapel was an inveterate election issue.
From out of the fears of social change in the traditional structure and 
control of the community and family, and of alteration in established 
religious patterns, the 'Skeleton Army' emerged. In Salisbury in 1881, a
Society for the Suppression of Street Parading was openly established to
do what the local authorities were failing to do, which was to stop the
Salvationist parades. They told the Horae Secretary:
They will cause to be forcibly broken the ranks of the Salvation 
Army when in Procession through the Streets.*25
For this purpose, sympathizers were to be enlisted, and others employed.
In Guildford, in 1882, where the 'Red Army' was formed to mob the Salvation­
ists, well-attended meetings of townspeople discussed how best to suppress 
the Army's religious activities. As Bramwell Booth said - "there can be
no doubt that there is a fully organised arrangement to put an end to our
1services in the Town either out-doors or in." Social legitimacy
was given to the 'Skeleton Army' in other ways. Pulpit speeches were thought
to have given clerical sanction to mob violence in Basingstoke in 1881,
127and in Eastbourne in 1892. In other towns, the recruitment of special
constables illustrated the lack of support commanded by the Salvationists.
In Worthing, local tradesmen, sworn as specials, finally refused to serve.
Again, in Basingstoke, after a Sunday morning's duty protecting the Army
against the 'Massaganians', three-quarters of the specials interviewed the
Mayor, according to the Clerk to the Justices, "and protested against being
required to escort and protect the Salvation Army, and some of them actually
refused to do so." In the afternoon, the Mayor requisitioned the military,
128fearing the specials would sympathise with the crowds. If the 'Skeletons'
were organized to evict the in-coming, or recently-established Salvationists, 
they were significantly directed also against those people in the community 
who welcomed or assisted the Army. George Wood, a Honiton farmer, opened 
his cottage to the Salvationists, but on the following Sunday a 'mob' was 
heard approaching:
My Barton gates burst open again and again and premises ransacked 
and on my going to shut them the mob surrounded me threatening 
with curses to break my neck and pelted me back...^y
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Similarly, George Head, „ , .worthing ironmonger, constructed a meeting-place
for the Army above his premises, and hired a hall for them from a local
company. When the Army began processioning at the end of August, the
Company refused the tenancy of the Hall, and the 'Skeleton Army' ransacked
Head's shop. For the next year, the Worthing 'Skeletons' intimidated Head
and deterred customers from entering his shop, urged on, according to Head,
by the local press. The intimidation was seemingly successful since the
"Worthing Express" at the end of September 1884, reported that the Sunday
130procession contained "not a single Worthing householder." If local
'roughs' formed a large part of the Skeleton Army, instigated by the public-
1T1ans, nevertheless the local community tolerated it and approved of it.
The 'Skeleton Army' expressed a collective sanction against the strange 
rituals and techniques of Salvationism. And for those who wished to join 
its ranks it was the means of aggressively demonstrating their loyalty to 
national values, by assaulting what had become the temporary 'whipping-boy'.
A crucial dimension to the activity of the ’Skeleton Army' in provin­
cial towns was the response of the legal authorities. It was primarily in 
such towns that official legal indulgence of the 'Skeleton Army' led to 
more extensive religious disorder. In Bramwell Booth's assessment of the 
mobbing which his 'troops' had experienced for the four years since 1879, his 
diagnosis referred principally to the display of laxness by the local 
authorities in the small town. In contrast, he said, "in Hull, Bristol, 
Manchester, Leeds, and other large towns where the bench has ever shown the 
same firm front against disorder we have none." In the class of town 
which Booth referred to, judicial and police behaviour was transparently 
sympathetic to the eviction of the Salvation Army. Legitimacy was frequently 
imparted to the 'Skeleton Army' by legal prohibitions on Salvationist 
parades and open-air meetings; or by outspoken attacks on the religious 
parades, delivered in the police court. In Poole, according to a Salvationist
memo itemizing magisterial complicity, the Mayor abused the work of the
Army from the Bench - "The excesses of the roughs have, of course, been
greater than ever s i n c e . I n  part, the magistracy administered a form
of law enforcement demanded by the community, which in most cases meant
leaving the Salvationists to the mercy of the 'Skeletons'. In Guildford in
1882, Bramwell Booth complained that:
A large meeting was held on Tuesday last to protest against any 
protection being afforded to our people.134
In Worthing, in 1884, a public meeting resolved that the justices and the
police give no protection to the Salvationists, which advice, said General
135Booth "has met with only too ready response from the local Bench." But 
the magistracy themselves were responding to the challenge made on the 
community by the Salvationists - evangelists who we re cor.strained by no 
social ties, and answerable to an inner and higher authority in God's will. 
They refused to accept legal sanctions short of imprisonment; they took un­
favourable summary decisions to the higher courts; and they defended their
right to procession and proselytize with inspired confidence , more than
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once transforming a court hearing into a gospel meeting. In consequence, 
the Skeleton Army's 'rough justice' often counteracted the nullity of magis­
terial authority.
In most of the inland southern towns where Salvation Army riots occurred, 
the law enforcement policy traced the same contours. During both outbreaks 
of disturbance in Salisbury in 1881 and 1882 the Bench, composed mainly of 
local 'gentlemen', refused police protection for the Army. On the second 
occasion, the city magistrates concurred that the local police should not 
be strengthened to meet the views of the Salvationists. When a local Army 
sympathizer, Lt. Colonel Pepper, asked the constables why they did nothing
to prevent the throwing of lime-dust, "they informed me that they were not
137allowed in anyway to interfere." Accusations were made by Bramwell Booth
against the Guildford authorities in the summer of 1882 for encouraging 
the 'Red Army', and for refusing protection on the resumption of procession­
ing. The Home Office received 'Captain' Bryan's affidavit, which described 
his interview with Guildford's mayor, in which he was told that the bench 
had decided to give no protection, "adding that he knew the Salvation Army 
had a legal right to procession the streets, which they could exercise if 
they liked, but if they did so it would be on their own risk and responsibil- 
ity.” In Honiton, the two 'ex-officio' magistrates, both tradesmen, were 
equally partisan. 'Captain' Lomas was told by the mayor, after a disrupted 
Sunday procession, "that he would not protect us any more than he would the 
Skeleton Army";
He said that it would be always like that while the Salvation 
Army remained, and he, with the Superintendent of Police would 
like to see us out of the town.*"
Impunity was afforded the Honiton 'Skeleton Army' by the ex-mayor who told
the town council "that if a hundred cases were brought before him by the
Salvation Army he would dismiss them all", and subsequent court cases proved
this was no vain threat. And as Captain Lomas said:
The effect of these statements is that our opponents are made 
bolder and freely assert their insurance that if they are brought 
up they will get off.*40
Coastal boroughs in the southern counties also entered the indictment con­
structed by pro-Salvationists against the legal authorities. Police protecti 
for a squadron of 'Hallelujah Lasses' visiting Ryde was requested and refused 
hence the 'Ryde rabble', said the local paper, "determined to enjoy them­
selves."^'*' In Folkestone, the chief magistrate was particularly concerned 
at the disruption of the town's customary quiet and the importation of endemi 
rowdyism. Since the arrival of the Salvationists, he said:
the working classes appear to have become demoralized, and rowdyism, 
especially on Sunday and at night-time, prevails jn the streets.
But the police were no more vigilant in restraining the rowdyism. A Sal­
vation Army officer complained that the police summonsed none of the mob
although they "know who the individuals are who assaulted us through all 
their disguises as they march about the town nearly every night." ^  By 
May 1883, whilst the riots continued, and the Salvationists remained in 
Folkestone, the Watch Committee debated whether or not to forego police 
protection completely. The police eventually summonsed a number of the 
'Skeleton' rioters, after the Salvationists had refused to prosecute.
Defence counsel for the rioters stressed that they were working men, "ignor­
ant perhaps as to their rights, privileges, and duties" and induced by the 
circumstances into unlawful behaviour. In reply, the prosecutor, on behalf 
of the Watch Committee, agreed to their entering into recognizances to keep 
the peace. ^ 3a gegai clemency was a natural consequence of the attitude 
that the Salvation Army was guilty of all the disorder. in Worthing in
1884, the sitting magistrates encouraged mob intimidation by refusing to 
issue summonses brought by the Salvationists against members of the
'Skeleton Club', and by assuring the Skeletons, according to William Booth
144"of immunity from penal consequences whatever course they may take."
And, finally, in Eastbourne where a corps was established only in 1890, the 
Salvation Army confronted a town council dedicated to the suppression of 
their parades, and a magistracy willing to endorse the administrative policy. 
Before the arrival of the Army, a bye-law was purposely inserted in the 1885 
Improvement Act to prohibit marching bands, and the Eastbourne mayor insis­
ted that if this measure did not avail, the 'Skeleton Army' would be employed 
In 1891, the fate of the Salvationists was indeed placed in the hands of 
the 'Skeletons', urged on, it was said, by the local publicans. A number 
of local residents complained to the Home Office that Eastbourne was in the 
hands of the mob, and that the police were inactive. As Thomas Atkins said, 
in July;
...the constable told me this morning that he could have arrested 
a dozen of the rioters but he says what is the use (They are 
immediately discharged by the magistrates)."
By September, Mr. Bridger of Eastbourne pleaded for the removal of 'these 
old fossils' on the bench, and the appointment of a stipendiary magistrate.
An observable license was extended by the magistracy and watch committees 
to the 'Skeleton' mobbing. Of course, it was part of a tradition of law 
enforcement which laxly controlled social disorder on celebrational or cere­
monial occasions when local inhabitants were allowed to let off steam during 
Guy Fawkes' nights or election days. Contingents of Salvation and 'Skel­
eton' Armies, pressed between crowds of spectators, aroused the small-town 
society to election-day excitement; the disguises and regalia of the 'Skel­
eton Clubs' were often borrowed from those used on November 5th. Signifi­
cantly, in a number of towns - Worthing, Eastbourne, Guildford - bonfire
night rowdyism and election-day intimidation, broadened into Salvationist 
147riots. At this point, the complicity of the legal authorities was a com­
ponent of the regulatory mode of peace preservation assumed on suck occasions; 
a tolej ince based on the experience of the transitory nature of such riotous 
behaviour and its incapacity to become a serious form of social disorder.
But Salvationism was also a challenge to public order and to magisterial 
authority. The preachers were unamenable to the normal patterns of social 
control, and the magistracy were hence prepared to legitimize the violence 
of the 'Skeleton Army' by refusing police protection and by dealing leniently 
with the rioters in court. Judicial sanction to indulge in mob intimidation 
was an integral component of the collective resistance of the small town to 
an intruding religious body, nationally organized, internally disciplined, 
and sending strange evangelists to stir up the poor in settled communities. 
Magisterial sanction of the 'Skeleton Army' cemented social values which 
were felt to be threatened.
But it is inadequate to leave the case there. Magisterial behaviour not 
only consisted in turning a blind-eye to the castigation of evangelists who 
challenged their class and their authority, and to social disorder which
was sanctioned by other social superiors. It was possible for the magis­
tracy to be more deeply implicated in the mob intimidation, as during elec­
tion disturbances. In response to the Salvation Army riots in Gravesend, 
a barrister and a member of the town's Liberal club, described for the Home 
Secretary the recurrent practice of mob intimidation, with river-side 'roughs' 
hired by the publicans, employed in the Conservative cause. At meetings 
where he had spoken in support of Liberal members for the Town Council, "the 
roughs, who are now disturbing the town, directed by the sons of some of 
our local Tories, have literally howled at me for half-an-hour." He went 
on to implicate the chief magistrate, who was engaged in the liquor 'Trade', 
and who "made only a sham effort to suppress the disorder", refusing to 
control the 'Skeleton Army'. The Gravesend Liberal concluded:
in Gravesend our magnates, are for the most part - not all - 
corrupt: drink, ignorance and irreligion abound; flanked 
and supported by the most w’retched clique of Tories I have 
ever known...At Gravesend we live ir. an 'Augean Stable'.
The Salvationists seized upon magisterial negligence which could be traced 
back to the 'Trade'.Political duplicity never usually concerned them, 
despite its obvious relation with the drink and temperance causes. A Salvatior 
ist profile of the riots in 1881, spoke of mobbing directly sponsored by pub­
licans, and then stated:
This is rarely ever attempted in any towns except those where the 
Publican interest is largely represented, either on the Magisterial 
Bench or on the Local Boards...*50
And the Army always submitted evidence to the Home Office to justify their
claim - as the recorded speech of the Mayor of Exeter, at an annual dinner
of the Licensed Victuallers' Association:
He stood before them as chief magistrate of the city, and he 
said this - he was shocked the other day to see them coming down 
the street in what appeared to him to be a regular pandemonium.
To illustrate the full extent of magisterial complicity, it is useful to
examine the Salvation Army riots in Basingstoke in 1881 where the 'Trade's'
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representatives on the bench and watch committee determined the reception 
given to the evangelists - and where the appointment of pro-Salvationist 
magistrates to the Commission, in the midst of the disturbances resulted 
in a conflict between two federations of the urban bench, and between the 
bench and the watch committee, over the use of discretionary legal powers. 
Specific forms of law enforcement bore the traces of the dispute between 
the magistrates, which in itself related to the constitution of the political 
community.
At the beginning of March 1881, Richard Wallis, senior magistrate at 
Basingstoke, complained of the involvement of the liquor 'Trade' in the 
organized opposition to the Salvationists, and of its influence on the Watch 
Committee. The Home Office note said of Wallis' letter; he intimates "that 
the interest possessed by the Liquor Trade in the Town Council induces the 
Watch Committee to prevent the Police from doing their duty for the protec­
tion of the members of the 'Salvaticn Army'."'^ Wallis had been unable 
to secure protection for the evangelists, since the superintendent of police 
had been instructed by the watch committee to provide none. According to 
Wallis, the greatest ineptitude was shown by the mayor, the largest brewer 
in the town, who ignored assaults committed in the streets by members of 
the 'Massaganian Army', and refused to direct the police to protect the 
Salvationists. In reply, the mayor insisted that Wallis represented the 
minority opinion on the Bench, and that three other borough magistrates, 
out of five, supported the mayor's approach of 'quiet influence'. Addition­
ally, he informed the Home Secretary that Richard Wallis was "a supporter
154of the Army, and a tee-totaller, although he was not always one." Later 
events made it clearer what the mayor's policy consisted of. Amongst others, 
General Booth was convinced that the mayor and the other hostile magistrates 
were party to a conspiracy - "to encourage the mob in the creation of a 
state of things which can then be used as an excuse for attempting by law
On March 27th, when the Salvationiststo stop our work in the streets."*^ 
were mobbed by a large crowd of townspeople, the mayor read the Riot Act 
and called out a battery of artillery which was in the town, en route from 
Christchurch to London. In his report to the War Office, however, Major 
Curson said that although he was met by large crowds in the streets, "I 
did not see any rioting, and the mob seemed to me to be remarkably good 
t e m p e r e d . B u t  the day's proceedings validated the proclamation, issued 
at the beginning of April, which forbade the Salvation Army and other denomin 
ations from holding processions or open-air meetings. The proclamation had 
little effect. It soon became obvious that the prohibitory bill was to be 
devalued by the determination of the Salvationists and other Nonconformist 
bodies to test its legality.15  ^ Reluctant to involve the town in the expen­
diture of a higher court case, the watch committee had to allow religious 
processions and meetings to continue.
The Lord Chancellor made three new appointments tc, the Basingstoke bench 
in May 1881, all of whom were known to be sympathetic to the Salvation Array. 
Interestingly, the mayor had been a candidate for appointment, but under 
Lord Selbome, brewers rarely got into the Commission of Peace. Immediately 
the new appointments were known, the Salvationists processioned more vigor­
ously, and the 'Massaganians' intensified their 'rough music'. The new 
appointments meant that the balance on the bench had moved in favour of the 
Salvation Army. In June, the magistracy thus resolved to allow Salvation 
Army processions, overriding the previous prohibitory proclamation. Further 
the mayor no longer controlled magisterial policy. In mid-August, he 
protested to the Home Secretary that as a result of the new appointments, he 
was "no longer supported by a majority on the Bench" in his endeavours to 
deal with the Salvationist parades, and the consequent disturbances, and 
that his recent attempt to re-issue the prohibitory proclamation had been 
outvoted at a magistrates' m e e t i n g . A t  the end of August, in fact, the
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bench went further and suggested that the watch committee draft a bye-law 
which would protect the right of processioning. At the next watch committee 
meeting on September 8th, entitled in the local press, 'The Watch Committee 
versus the Magistrates', the mayor and other councillors vehemently opposed 
the magistrates' recommendation. Anxious now for the watch committee to 
assume responsibility, the mayor argued that to stop the disturbances it was
necessary to re-issue the proclamation, "because by doing so we take the
159power into our own hands." At the same time, it seems, the mayor, or 
watch committee, was taking legal advice as to how to counter the magister­
ial sympathy for the Salvation Army. The opinion of counsel was to the 
effect that in the absence of a bye-law expressly prohibiting the Salvationist 
processions, the only mode o-F redress was to take proceedings before the 
magistrates for obstruction and breach of the peace, which, counsel recog­
nized, were hardiy formidable, "particularly where the bench is constituted 
as that at Basingstoke is." To assist them the legal adviser, Mr. Crump 
of the Temple, drafted a notice, "purposely left vague", which forbade the 
processions. If this had no effect, then he advised that the mayor should 
draft in the county police:
The police should be instructed to select a considerable number 
of those parading all of whom should be summoned and the prosec­
ution be conducted with every show of force and determination and 
in a manner to bring prominently forward the magnitude of the 
nuisance. The magistrates might thus be compelled to take a serious 
view of the matter and to deal with it in such a manner as to con­
vince the leaders of the Salvation Army that it would be unwise to 
continue their proceedings.160
In fact, the advice was not acted upon, but it illustrated the continued 
attempt by the Basingstoke Council to secure administrative control over pro­
cessioning. Their policy was however baulked by a magistracy unprepared to 
provide the judicial authority for prohibition of Salvationist activities.
Following further disturbances on August 30th, ten 'Skeleton' rioters 
had been sentenced by the Basingstoke bench to fourteen days imprisonment
in Winchester gaol. It was stated by the Member for the county, G. Sclater 
Booth, that most Basingstoke inhabitants considered an estreat of recogniz­
ances would have sufficed, and that whilst the Mayor pronounced the sentence, 
he "refused to sign the commitment."*^1 For their firmness, the magistracy, 
especially the Wallis brothers, were abused by the 'Massaganians', escorted 
by 'rough music' to and from the borough police court. Later, the five 
pro-Salvationist magistrates explained to the Home Office - "the object
of the roughs and those associated with them is we believe to intimidate
162some of the magistrates from doing their duty." In the charged atmosphere 
of Basingstoke, it was also inevitable that the publicans and local author­
ities would evidence their sympathies for the convicted rioters. At the 
end of September, when the prisoners were released, the town celebrated 
their home-coming. A colourful procession escorted the,': into the borough, 
accompanied, said Sir Wilfred Lawson "by their .supporters - the brewers and
publicans of Basingstoke," and they filed past the anti-Salvationist coun-
163cillors and magistrates on the balcony of the Town Hall. At the evening 
banquet, it was announced that their wages for the time they were imprisoned, 
were to be paid. Council patronage effectively nullified the judicial 
sanction.
This was not the end of the dispute. In late 1881, the election of a 
staunch Tory and churchman as mayor, and the death of senior magistrate, 
Radical, and pro-Salvationist, Richard Wallis, meant that the bench was 
evenly split over the legal approach to the religious processioning and dis­
order. Once again, the legal policy was characterized by inconsistency.
In February, 1882, when the riots broke out as a result of renewed religious 
parading, one section of the magistracy tried to provide county police 
protection for the Salvation Army, whilst the other section re-issued the 
proclamation banning processions. On February 26th, the county police were 
in fact used, and no disturbances had occurred. Pressed by the Home Office,
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a meeting of magistrates took place on March 3rd, at which the majority
agreed to repeat the expedient on the following Sunday. Disapproving of
this resolution, however, the mayor vacated the chair, the ex-mayor and
another magistrate left the room, "the result being," said the other bloc
of magistrates, "that no additional force was provided and serious riotous
164proceedings occurred on Sunday the 5th." At this point, the documentation 
runs out. But close narrative of the magisterial behaviour in Basingstoke 
illustrates the factors which could influence the policy of law enforcement 
in the face of the Salvationist 'invasion'. Basingstoke was a community 
which was divided, religiously and politically. In comparison with Aider- 
shot, where the military vote was largely Conservative, Basingstoke was 
regarded as a Liberal stronghold, and it had indeed a manufacturing popul­
ation, and a well-established Nonconformist element. Yet in fact, it was 
fairly evenly balanced politically. At the later date of 18'.'2, the "Read­
ing Mercury" said of the town - "the parties there were pretty evenly 
balanced".165 The arrival of the Salvation Army thus freshened these divis­
ions within the political and social community. Established Church and 
Nonconformist Chapel took up opposite sides, whilst political rivalries 
were rekindled. And when the well-established dichotomy between the brewery 
and temperance interests, itself furthered political disagreement, there 
could be no unitary response to a temperance and evangelical denomination.
The Salvationists became the temporary issue around which the continued 
political joust at local level, revolved. And in a borough where the Bench 
was politically balanced, the Salvation Army had to work in a social context 
in which legal policies were fashioned according to political and religious 
allegiance.
In time, the Salvation Army was counted amongst the religious churches 
of most towns, and carried on its work without arousing physical opposition. 
When the Middlesex justices decided in 1886 that the Grecian theatre was a 
place of worship, and thus not liable to poor rates, the "Saturday Review"
concluded;
Its Corybantic excesses are worship. Its volleys of halle­
lujahs are piety. Its 'knee drill' is religion.167
But the Salvation Army's advance between 1878 and 1886 was met with sus­
tained and organized 'mobbing'; impeding, yet also firing its religious 
'war' against the urban 'submerged'. In part, the opposition reflected an 
ingrained working-class reflex to an arrogant religiosity which intruded 
alien social and moral values into working-class areas, and which, in par­
ticular, attacked popular or cultural entertainments in its advocacy of 
religious salvation and related social respectability. Yet the fully- 
organized 'Skeleton Armies' in the small provincial towns were more an ex­
pression of traditional social values; an expression which was sponsored 
by the upper social strata of those towns, acting as a unified social group, 
or, in Basingstoke, as one portion of an urban elite which disagreed over 
the socio-religious benefit of the Salvation Army to the town's 'ur.godly'.
In both instances, the lay magistracy's role was determined by the essential 
social concerns which inspired the 'Skeleton Army'. And in the consequent 
Salvation Army riots, there was frequent illustration how the legal author­
ities could regulate disorder which served as a form of social control rather 
than a challenge to it.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE DANGEROUS CLASSES AND THE THREAT OF SOCIAL DISTURBANCE:
THE MIDDLE-CLASS PERSPECTIVE
Contemporary opinion frequently held that a distinct stratum of urban 
society was accountable for outbreaks of social disturbance. Riots were 
said to be the responsibility of the 'roughs', the 'residuum', and even of 
the 'dangerous or criminal classes'. Election riots were traditionally 
assigned to the bribed 'roughs' - the latter being, according to the "Illus­
trated London News" in 1847, "an electioneering name for ruffians."*
Later in the century, following John Bright, mob intimidation during elec­
tion contests was said to depend on the "residuum of almost hopeless poverty
2and dependence", the lowest social category in the urban social structure. 
Contemporary politicians blamed all types of electoral corruption on the 
'iesiduur.i' of the community - "the lowest scum of Nottingham" - despite 
the evidence that in some constituencies and in many contests, the term 
defined a majority of the electorate. The 'Skeleton Armies' were similarl> 
described as the 'still savage residuum', 'the irrepressible "roughs" ', or 
as contingents of the 'dangerous class': and not only by Salvationist pub­
lications which sought justification for a provocative campaign against the 
urban depressed.** Anti-Catholic rioters, too, as in Birmingham in 1867, 
were said to represent the "pickpockets, swell-mobsmen, and all that body 
of men grouped under the head of 'the dangerous classes'."^ On the Sunday 
after the Murphy riots, Congregational Minister, Reverend Mackie, described 
how "the idle and criminal classes" always came to the surface in such mom­
ents of public excitement.^ In an urban setting, and notably in the large 
cities, it was common to interpret election and religious disorder as the 
overspill of lower-class rowdies, eager for payment or for plunder. Yet, in 
the small boroughs where many election and Salvation Army disturbances
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occurred, and where election venality or riotous behaviour had a traditional 
quality, the terminology was rarely used to express a fear of social upheav­
al. It was doubtless recognized in the smaller provincial towns that if 
the 'Skeleton Armies' or the election bands were made up of the local 
bully-boys, they were hardly on a par with a degenerate city residuum which 
threatened the social fabric. The very nature of election and 'Skeleton' 
disturbances, which retained intimate connections with the political and 
legal structure of urban society, ensured that the participation of the urban 
'residuum' rarely evoked the threat of a predatory dangerous class.
Disturbances associated with labour disputes or strikes were also laid 
at the feet of the urban residuum, as opposed to the respectable working- 
class operatives of the particular industry or trade. Damage to mill property 
or to manufacturers' hemes was seen as mere criminal looting, not purposeful 
industrial vengeance. The riots which coincided with the Leicester hosiery 
strike in 1886 were not the work of artisans on strike, according to the 
"Chronicle", "but of a gang of mischievous lads and idle fellows who would 
not work at any price, led by convicted thieves."^ At a subsequent meeting 
of the hosiery union, delegates argued that few hosiery hands were amongst
gthe rioters, and instead condemned "the action taken by the mob in the town." 
Earlier, in 1878, the riots which formed a central part of the dispute in 
the Lancashire cotton towns had revealed a similar inclination to differ­
entiate the labouring and criminal classes when affixing the blame for labour 
violence. The 'honest cotton operatives', whose virtues of self-respect and 
thrift had been lauded since mid-century, were not to be accused of the des­
truction of the mills which provided their livelihood. The "rough, idle 
people loafing about in the neighbourhood of these towns" were at fault, acc- 
ording to R.A. Cross, the Conservative Home Secretary. In the Lords, the 
Earl of Shaftesbury singled out "the idle, the vagabond, and the worthless, 
of which there is everywhere so large a supply - especially in our large
towns and cities."^ In the Lancashire press, Bishop Fraser of Manchester
was widely quoted when he blamed "the floating scum of our great cities."^
Shortly afterwards, the Weavers' Associations of Blackburn, Preston and
Hast Lancashire acceded to the Bishop's request to exonerate the "fair
average Lancashire man or woman" by criticizing the true culprits, the
'roughs' and thieves. As their statement said:
In all periods of agitation the dregs of society come from 
their dark recesses. Rapine commences with them, and fools 
follow." 12
Labour violence was confronted by an interpretation which divested it of all
support and sympathy. Disorder which resulted from industrial strife was
transposed into criminality, not only as a form of illegal activity, but
13equally as behaviour committed by the criminal stratum of urban life.
It was not always possible, however, to sustain an analysis in terms of 
a criminal or dangerous class, even for labour riots. The cotton disturb­
ances of 1878 were a case in point. Bishop Fraser's evaluation of the riots 
was not widely accepted. The "Times", for example, was sceptical of "so 
comforting a theory" that the damage was caused alone by a small group of 
thieves and unemployables:
It will require a good deal of evidence to show that they have 
not been abetted by the sympathy of many of the persons on strike.14
The "Manchester Guardian" was also unconvinced that only the 'riff-raff' of
the towns was involved:
15If this be so the 'riff-raff' is in a large majority in some towns.
The problem was that any analysis in terms of a vagrant and criminal class
still did not accord with the social facts. Most industrial towns had not,
in general, a vast population living without visible means of subsistence:
large enough, that is, to explain the extensive scale of labour disturbance
in Burnley, Blackburn, and Preston in 1878. A city mass, unattached to the
„ . . . 16industrial economy, was not characteristic of manufacturing townships.
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The basic social structure, dominated by productive labour, did not fully 
support an interpretation of social disorder which stressed the role of the 
dangerous classes, and the related separation of the dangerous and working 
classes.
An analysis of labour disturbance which stressed the role of the slum 
denizens seemed closer to reality in the case of the shipping ports like 
Liverpool and Hull, where there was a casualized dock labour force, and a 
fluctuating sea-going population.1  ^ In 1893 in Hull when the shipping com­
panies attempted to reverse the recent organizational gains achieved by 
the unskilled labour force on the waterfront, the resultant disorder and 
acts of incendiarism were immediately attributed to "a rough stratum of 
population", said to be found in all seaports "ready for outrage at any moment 
when opportunity offers."1  ^ The "Eastern Morning News" reported that,
in all populous towns like Hull there is always a considerable 
section constituting what may be termed the very lowest strata 
of society, or what the late John Bright would call the residuum, 
who are ever ready to avail themselves of the opportunity for the 
display of lawlessness, violence, and theft afforded ’ey such a 
crisis as the present. A period of public excitement and commotion 
is the very thing they want for the exercise of their dubious arts, 
the result too often being that the innocent are blamed for the law­
less acts of these roughs.19
Social and economic conditions were more favourable, then, to a description 
of public disorder which referred to the dangerous and not the working 
classes. But the city and port which was most renowned for its urban resid 
uum of outcast poor was London: its social fabric weighted with a mass of 
unskilled labour, and with the vagrants, criminals and paupers thought to 
be attracted by indiscriminate charity. It was this immense 'submerged' 
population, existing it seemed without proper means of subsistence, which 
periodically cast a menacing shadow across London's social order.
It is essential to emphasize the distinctive position of London for 
the persistent fear of a 'dangerous class' or 'city residuum'. The actual 
structure of the city's industrial economy resulted in a large pool of
unskilled labour, heavily concentrated in the East End, whose employment 
in casual or seasonal trades was characterized by regular spells of unemploy­
ment. The irregularity of work and the level of wages forced them into 
social proximity with groupings more traditionally identified as the urban 
residuum. For many contemporaries, indeed, the London casual poor were 
indistinguishable from criminals. The capital's social order seemed, there­
fore, at the mercy of a stratum which, at least in middle-class mythology, 
amalgamated poverty, crime and riot. But even in London the feared conjunc­
tion of the labouring and criminal classes belonged only to certain moments: 
when the alarm about the dangerous classes was greatest, when the nascent 
belief in the emerging proletarian 'order' was eclipsed. At other times, 
the threat of a dangerous class subsided. At mid-century, in the halcyon 
days of economic prosperity and social equilibrium, the apprehension of 
social upheaval was calmed. Ardent attempts were made by professional in­
vestigators in the East End to surmount the aggravated urban and industrial 
problems, with the result that the magnitude of the threat posed by a dan­
gerous class was reduced. Social investigators recovered the higher echelons 
of a fractionalized working-class from the taint of criminality and mob 
violence. At the same time, they demonstrated that the real problem of the 
'dangerous class' rested in its criminal section, which was progressively 
identified as a distinct 'criminal class': a problem of parasitism on 'honest 
industry', but not of social disorder. The residuum was refined into a sub­
cultural inlier within the urban structure, marked off by distinctive moral 
and physical traits. In the mid-Victorian era, the residuum seemed con­
tainable. Given the implementation of correct relief principles to combat 
pauperism and the demoralization of the working class, there was even the 
promise of the final eradication of the submerged fraction.
Yet all attempts to reduce the size and infection of the dangerous class 
were made difficult by the London environment, and the exaggerated social
problems to be found in a burgeoning metropolis. The extent to which 
mid-century investigation and charitable intervention failed to destroy the 
threat of a dangerous class was illustrated in the 1880s. Optimism for 
the dilution of the residuum faded in face of renewed economic depression 
and increased unemployment, and as a result of social investigation which 
revealed that the residuum was hardly a tiny substratum, but instead a 
substantial proportion of proletarian London. A new investigative outlook 
exposed an urban deposit which welded criminality, abject poverty and the 
unskilled labouring force. The mid-Victorian confidence in being able to 
classify and subdivide the most taxing social problems was disappointed.
What had previously been a largely penological discussion of the ways to 
classify and quarantine an habitual criminal class, an unrcmittent attempt 
to segregate the criminal class from association with honest labour, became 
in the 1880s a renewed discourse on the 'dangeious classes'. The term 
evoked a web of urban inhabitants; a concurrence of pauper, vagrant, criminal 
and idle unemployed. It was a confused and unlikely construct of the middle- 
class mind, but behind the anxieties felt for a dangerous class were the 
objective social and economic facts of the capital city. In the 1880s, 
the permanent feature of seasonal and casualized employment was worsened 
by profound economic depression, further thawing the moral and social barriers 
which were thought to exist between the criminal and labouring poor.
London's residuum was, in consequence, thought to envelop practically the 
whole unskilled labour market. From this swollen and ill-defined aggregate 
were generated the fears of social insurrection.
In the chapters which follow, it is argued that the supposed existence 
of a dangerous class was the main social fact which influenced the interpret­
ation of the West End riots in February 1886, and informed the legal policy 
against the street meetings and processions of unemployed for the next two 
years. Between 1886 and 1888, the legal authorities pursued a policy which
was manifestly founded on the fear of a dangerous class. Legal policy 
adjusted to the predominant assessment of the threat to social order.
There follows an examination of the form in which the public disorder of 
the mid-1880s was interpreted by propertied London; and of the way in which 
the interpretation affected the legal policy. But contemporary evaluations 
of the threat of the residuum are only fully appreciated by an introductory 
sketch of nineteenth-century attitudes to social disorder. In the next 
chapter, an attempt has been made, therefore, to recreate the changeful 
middle-class perspective on the 'dangerous classes' and the threat of social 
revolution.
The Dangerous Classes and Industrial Society
In 1840 there appeared in Paris "Des classes dangereuses de la popul­
ation dans les grandes villes" by H.A. Frcgier, a departmental head at z h e
20Prefecture of the Seine. His work appeared in response to an essay com­
petition on the subject of distress amongst the lower orders, sponsored two 
years earlier by the Academy of Moral and Political Science: "to discover, 
by direct observation, what are the elements, in Paris or any other great
city, which make up that part of the population which forms a dangerous
21class by virtue of its vices, its ignorance and its pauperism." Fregier's 
social survey was deeply influenced by contemporary literary descriptions
of the 'dangerous classes', in the work of Balzac, Sue and Hugo, and by
22the official collections of statistics on crime and distress. Both
influences ensured a changed approach, away from the traditional early
nineteenth-century conception of a self-contained dangerous class. Previous
observations had described an autonomous social group, detached from the
prevailing economic and social structure, surviving on the outskirts of
Parisian society, alien to all, including the labouring classes; as remote
from everyday knowledge, "as far outside civilization", as Sue said, "as
23the savage tribes so well depicted by [James Fenimore] Cooper." In
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contrast, Fregier's survey began with the unexpected assumption that from
the poor and vicious of the operative classes, the criminal portion of
the community was chiefly recruited. Whilst Eugene Sue had modified his
original intentions to depict a savage and barbarian race in his "Mystbres
de Paris" only when it was apparent through correspondence that the labouring
classes recognized themselves in his criminal portraits; for Fregier in 1838
the labouring classes provided the immediate starting point for his study
of the dangerous classes.^ This was testimony to the dramatic changes,
notably demographic, which had affected Paris since the late eighteenth
century. Subjected to the strains of population increase and the wave of
provincial immigration, the physical fabric of the city had been unable 
2 5to cope. Squeezed into the already-cramped quarters in the centre ana east 
of Paris, breeding-grounds for heavy mortality, the poor were destined to a 
iife of moral and physical degeneration in which crime was an integral fact 
of life. The labouring classes were now seen to be rubbing shoulders with 
the criminals of the dangerous class. Crime was no longer described as 
something exceptional, on the fringes of society: it was now seen to per­
meate the mass of poor people, it was an integral part of working-class 
existence. The bourgeoisie were obsessed with the new dangers. Vicomte 
de Launay in December 1843 wrote:
For the past month the sole topic of conversation has been the 
nightly assaults, hold-ups, daring robberies...Friends and rel­
atives are not allowed to go home without a regular arms inspec­
tion.26
The Parisian bourgeoisie was no longer able to distinguish between the
’industrious' and the 'dangerous' poor.
"Des classes dangereuses de la population dans les grandes villes",
according to Louis Chevalier, marked the half-way point in the transition
in nineteenth-century French social investigation from the dangerous to
27the labouring classes, from the criminal to the social theme. Fregier's 
inability to delineate clearly the labouring from the dangerous classes,
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in a study which had as its brief, the dangerous classes alone; and the 
confusion between poverty and crime which he described, illustrated the 
passing of criminality as a characteristic of a segregated caste. It estab­
lished that the threat to society lay now in the poor and the vicious, as 
well as in the actually criminal. As Chevalier said:
The danger lay not in crime, but in the relationships between 
the underworld and the world of labour.28
There was a moving frontier between the different social sections, set in 
motion by economic crises, epidemics (as the cholera outbreak in Paris in 
1832) and revolution. During such events there was cross-mobility. Cheval­
ier described the interpenetration in the following way:
Crises, riots and epidemics suddenly filled the ranks of the 
dangerous masses with new recruits, or rather mustered criminals 
and workmen, people and populace into a single mob bent on the 
same sort of acts of public or private violence.
The facts are not so relevant here as the belief that destitu'ion, 
sickness and riot, which contemporaries were prone to pri down :o 
the same causes and to view in the same light, gave rise to acts 
of violence that were regarded as outgrowths of crime and were 
invariably attributed to the criminal classes.29
The labouring and criminal classes were now thought to be moved "by the 
same economic, political and biological imperatives."^0 It was this image 
of the lower stratum of urban life which the French social investigators 
loaned to England in the phrase, 'the dangerous class': an image of a threat­
ening urban social category in which the labouring section blurred into the 
criminal classes.
By 1848 the phrase, 'the dangerous classes', had become a commonplace
of English middle-class usage. It was in widespread use by the late 1840s
, 31in periodical articles, and in studies of criminality and prisons.
Fregier's publication, 'Des classes dangereuses..' had been reviewed at
length in a number of periodicals between 1840 and 1842, and his statistics
32of the Parisian criminal, poor, and violent reproduced and assessed.
The terminology and interpretation were quickly employed. In 1844 an anony­
mous contributor to "Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine", surveying the reasons
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in a study which had as its brief, the dangerous classes alone; and the 
confusion between poverty and crime which he described, illustrated the 
passing of criminality as a characteristic of a segregated caste. It estab­
lished that the threat to society lay now in the poor and the vicious, as 
well as in the actually criminal. As Chevalier said:
The danger lay not in crime, but in the relationships between 
the underworld and the world of labour.28
There was a moving frontier between the different social sections, set in 
motion by economic crises, epidemics (as the cholera outbreak in Paris in 
1832) and revolution. During such events there was cross-mobility. Cheval­
ier described the interpenetration in the following way:
Crises, riots and epidemics suddenly filled the ranks of the 
dangerous masses with new recruits, or rather mustered criminals 
and workmen, people and populace into a single mob bent on the 
same sort of acts of public or private violence.
The facts are not so relevant here as the belief that destitu-ion, 
sickness and riot, which contemporaries wore prone to pr: down to 
the same causes and to view in the same light, gave rise to acts 
of violence that were regarded as outgrowths of crime and were 
invariably attributed to the criminal classes.29
The labouring and criminal classes were now thought to be moved "by the 
same economic, political and biological imperatives."^0 It was this image 
of the lower stratum of urban life which the French social investigators 
loaned to England in the phrase, 'the dangerous class': an image of a threat­
ening urban social category in which the labouring section blurred into the 
criminal classes.
By 1848 the phrase, 'the dangerous classes', had become a commonplace
of English middle-class usage. It was in widespread use by the late 1840s
31in periodical articles, and in studies of criminality and prisons.
Fregier's publication, 'Des classes dangereuses..' had been reviewed at
length in a number of periodicals between 1840 and 1842, and his statistics
32of the Parisian criminal, poor, and violent reproduced and assessed.
The terminology and interpretation were quickly employed. In 1844 an anony­
mous contributor to "Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine", surveying the reasons
for an increase of crime, pointed to the manufacturing and densely-peopled
districts as the most criminal:
...destitution, profligacy, sensuality, and crime, advance 
with unheard-of rapidity in the manufacturing districts, and 
the dangerous classes there massed together combine every three 
or four years in some general strike or alarming insurrection, 
which, while it lasts, excites universal terror...33
The urban and industrial populations were demoralized, the essayist said, 
due to the congregation of the working-classes in city areas bereft of res­
pectable influence, to the large number "who are reduced to a state of des­
titution, and precipitated into the very lowest stations of life", and to
34strikes which produced idleness and insubordination. His concern was not
alone for crime, but also for labour disputes and strikes. The central
problem for the author of the 1844 article was the close relationship between
the working classes and criminality. This analysis, which seated that
social disturbance proceeded frem a confusion of the criminal and labouring
classes, was persistently applied. Criminality was seen as an integral part
of political upheaval in the late 1840s. Captain W.J. Williams, prison
inspector for twelve years, when asked before the Select Committee on the
Execution of the Criminal Law in 1847 whether transportation could to safely
dispensed with, answered by saying that, had it been stopped some years ago,
the state of the country would have been dreadful:
I certainly consider that the State of this Metropolis and of other 
large towns would have been similar to that of Paris; for we know 
that a criminal Population collected together in Hordes are 
always the ready Instruments of popular Violence.35
French example was at work again in 1848 when the political crisis of that 
year was interpreted in England as a manifestation of criminality. English 
commentators played up the key role which criminals and 'forçats' (ex­
convicts) played on the Paris barricades, opportunists receptive to design-
36ing agitators, and a crucial component of popular upheaval. The lower 
classes, in this interpretation, were infected by the epidemic of crime.
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In the early 1850s, criminological treatises emphasized a similar con­
fusion of social groupings. On Jelinger Symons' opening page of "Tactics 
for the Times", a description was given of the 'dangerous class':
It consists not only of criminals, paupers and persons whose 
conduct is obnoxious to the interests of society, but of that 
proximate body of the people who are within reach of its contagion, 
and continually swell its number.^7
For Thomas Plint, population growth and its dense aggregation in large cities
had been accompanied "with a corresponding, or perhaps larger growth of
the criminal or dangerous classes" - inclusive not only of the professional
criminal, "but the whole rabble of the vagrant and dissolute classes, who
labour by fits, and eke out subsistence by pilfering, and who are ever on
38the verge of a more serious breach of the laws." The moral contamination 
given off by those designated as 'dangerous' was fundamental to Plint's 
analysis of crime:
The criminal class live amongst, and are dove-tailed in, so to 
speak, with the operative classes, whereby they constitute so 
n.-ny points of vicious contact with those classes - so many ducts 
by which the virus of a moral poison circulates through and 
around them.^
Criminological analysis was informed by contemporary anxieties for the 
overlap of the criminal and labouring class. In England, as in France, in 
London as in Paris, middle-class society was perplexed by the seeming contra­
diction between rapid economic growth, and increased standards of living on 
one hand, and a threatening 'residuum' of criminal and labouring poor on 
the other. Massed close together in large, discrete areas of proletarian 
housing, the depressed strata of the industrial cities were devoid of 
'civilizing' influence, cut off from traditional methods of social control.^ 
Imagination built on this urban reality. The unregenerate poor were progress 
ively defined as a social cancer to the body politic. By the 1840s the
urban slums were revealed as the retreats of the 'dangerous classes', the
41foci of pauperism, crime and Chartism.
The heightened sense of alarm at urban crime and disorder was histori­
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cally sited in the first half of the nineteenth century, and involved 
within the class antagonisms of early industrial capitalism. The industrial 
process had increasingly assembled workers in large towns, alluring peas­
ants from the surrounding rural areas, and immigrants from further afield.
For many immigrants the movement into the towns was a social transition
which they could not understand: impoverished, exploited and herded into squal,
42id slums, they sank into a state of demoralization. There were no support­
ive institutions nor traditional guides to behaviour in an urban society 
patterned along sharp class divides. The structure of urban development in 
the 1830s and 1840s resulted in distinct areas of class segregation: the 
'good' west and 'poor' east ends of large cities became a universal division. 
Well away from middle-class residential areas, the new labouring poor were 
massed together in their own quarters, left to suffer the invariable compan­
ions of uncontrolled industrial and urban growth: alcoholism, infanticide,
43suicide, crime, violence, and mass epidemics of contagious disease.
Numerous contemporaries were anxious about the new society which was the
direct product of industrialization. Mounting concern for urban deterioration
in particular, infused the official enquiries of the 1830s into the living
and working conditions of the labouring poor. The 'Condition of the People'
question became a set topic for early Victorian investigation: the subject
44of statistical analyses; royal commissions; articles, sermons and novels.
Exact knowledge about the condition of the urban and industrialized poor 
was forced by the bad conscience of the rich, and by the physical proximity 
of the poor to the propertied bourgeoisie. Mass social revolutionary unrest 
was thought to be inevitable unless ways were devized to re-establish 
social discipline over the urban poor. If the enquiries of the 1840s had 
one guiding spirit, it was to forge the means of recreating a contented and 
disciplined urban workforce.”*5 In the early nineteenth century, then, 
fears about the consequences of industrial society and urban existence
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centred on the growing industrial regions, particularly the northern coun­
ties. At the height of the Chartist movement especially, when there was a 
coincident recognition of the numbers which could be hurled into unemploy­
ment by economic depression, the conditions and outlook of the northern
46urban proletariat evoked grave apprehensions of social upheaval.
In addition to the threat posed by the factory proletariat, there was 
the singular problem of an urban sub-proletariat: the large mass of populatioi 
which remained as yet unabsorbed by the new industries or cities. They form­
ed a permanent substratum or 'residuunf of the pauperized and helpless in the 
lees of most urban complexes. But they seemed a particular ingredient of 
metropolitan society. A large part of the new urban population of London
seemed ominously unattached to the industrial economy, a mass 'without visible
47means of subsistence", unrestrained by the forces of economic compulsion.
In the 1830s and 1840s, they continued to enter a city already reeling 
under immigration and population growth, forming a city poor which could only 
scratch a living from the peripheral occupations necessary to the city's 
sanitation and food provision. Their danger lay in their ostensible work- 
lessness, in their independence from and their potential antagonism to the 
social structure, and in their ill-defined confederacy on their different 
margins with the labouring poor and the criminal. Of course, the threat of 
workless men, without habit or restraint, was not a new phenomenon. The 
sturdy beggars and vagrants of the sixteenth-century were available to illus­
trate that the fear of the 'unemployed' was not a product of modem capital­
ism. But in 'pre-industrial' society the threat was of mere parasitism, 
not of an organized and concerted attempt to overthrow the social order. 
Early industrialism not only inflamed anxiety for what George Mainwaring 
described as "a large mass of unproductive population...without occupation 
or ostensible means of subsistence",^ but indeed invented the image of 
a "dangerous class" - dangerous because of the manifest difficulty in definin
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the boundaries of the labouring and criminal classes, the proletariat and 
the sub-proletariat, political activity and criminality. The earlier con­
cern with mere anarchy - "Moody beggars starving for a time of pell meli, 
havoc and confusion" - was now joined to a prospectus due to Marx of 
organized overthrow of the existing social and political structure.More 
specifically, it was a metropolitan fear of a 'dangerous' confluence of 
artisan socialists, the 'rabble' of urban street life, and the large number 
of common thieves. In the concept of the 'dangerous classes', depredation 
was confused with confiscation; robbery with revolution. And, with 
immense significance for the future, whilst the 'dangerous classes' of the 
northern industrial regions were to emerge as a respectable working-class, 
to exhibit increasingly their loyalty to the social order, the 'submerged' 
population of London remained as a standing menace to the propertied middie- 
class.
But by the ea'‘ly 1850s, at the very moment when the term 'the dangerous 
classes' entered English vocabulary, the tone of middle-class disquisition 
was different. Concern for an unmanageable dangerous class at the base of 
society, for a conjunction of the labouring and criminal sections of urban 
society, was diluted in the repentant mid-century years following salvation 
from Chartism. Almost immediately after the last act of the Chartist move­
ment, Lord Shaftesbury wrote in his diary for June 19th 1848:
It is becoming worse S worse on the Continent...This is our 
breathing-time; but do we use it?...Talk of the dangerous 
classes indeed! the dangerous classes in England are not the 
people; the dangerous classes are the lazy Ecclesiastics of 
whom there are thousands, 5 the rich who do no good with their 
money! I fear them more than whole battalions of Chartists.^2
Increasingly, the language of class softened, as the threat of social up­
heaval subsided. Contemporary perspective was adjusted as a result. By 
1856, Andrew Wynter described the divisions within, and the fractional char­
acteristics of the 'lawless classes'. Only in the dockside areas of the
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east of London, he said, was a 'formidable riot' possible, where 12,000 
sailors could combine with 7-8,000 dock labourers and lightermen. But this 
was a decided amelioration:
Those who shudder at the idea of an outbreak in the metropolis, 
containing two millions and a half of people and at least fifty 
thousand of the 'dangerous classes', forget that the capital is 
so wide that its different sections are totally unknown to each 
other. A mob in London is wholly without cohesion, and the indiv­
iduals composing it have but few feelings, thoughts, or pursuits 
in common...53
No longer was concern focussed on the amalgamation of the labouring and crim 
inal classes: but increasingly upon the isolation of a criminal fraternity, 
encamped in its segregated 'rookerits', and already experiencing encirclement 
by the new constabulary. A complete supervision of the criminal class exist 
ed, said Lord Houghton in 1868 during discussion at a meeting of the Social 
Science Association:
Was it possible for any person to go about with the police through 
the criminal portions of London without saying that these danger­
ous classes were as completely in the hands of the police?... The 
very fact of these dangerous classes living so much together, and 
of their being consolidated in certain districts, gave the police 
absolute power over them.5“*
Not only had the confidence ebbed back - the dangerous classes were, short 
of incarceration, utterly circumscribed - but also the terminology referred
to a parasitic criminal class, distinct from liaison with the labouring
sspoor.
The essayist for "Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine" in 1844 had pointed 
to the refined interpretation of the urban danger. Whilst describing a 
dangerous class, an association of crime and labour, he had nevertheless 
taken comfort from the fact that crime emanated mainly from the lowest and 
most destitute class:
If we examine who it is that compose this dismal substratum, this 
hideous black band of society, we shall find that it is not made 
up of any one class more than another - not of factory workers 
more than labourers, carters or miners - but is formed by an aggre­
gate of the most unfortunate or improvident of all classes, who, 
variously struck down from better ways by disease, vice, or sen-
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suality, are now of necessity huddled together by tens of 
thousands in the dens of poverty, and held by the firm bond 
of necessity in the precincts of contagion and crime.®”
One senses the development of a sublimated problem of criminality alone.
Re-consideration of the work of J.C. Symons and Thomas Plint leads to the
same conclusion. Symons' early reference to the dangerous classes, and the
potential recruitment from the labouring classes, was increasingly incongruous
in a heavily-empirical analysis of the traditional spurs to crime and the
different types of crime, particularly juvenile delinquency. As befit a
recently-appointed Inspector of Schools, Symons provided a critical synopsis
of continental experiments in industrial reformatories for juvenile crimin- 
57als. Thomas Plint similarly revealed his engrossing concern with a new 
approach to the theory of the criminal class; one which emphasized the 
description of a class segregated from society, a caste in itself. For 
Plint, there was fundamental error in any diagnosis of the origin of the 
criminal class which referred to the ills of the factory system, the want 
of urban sanitation, the "deficiency of the means of employment" or the 
quality of education:
May it not be said of the class that it is i^ the community, but 
neither of it, nor from it? Is it not the fact that a large majority 
of the class is so by descent, and stands as completely isolated 
from the other classes, in blood, in sympathies, in its domestic 
and social organization...as it is hostile to them in the whole 
'ways and means' of its temporal existence? If this view be correct 
in any great degree, is it not wide of the subject to seek for its 
source, either positively in the direct action of the social in­
stitutions which surround it, or negatively, in the deficiencies and 
omissions of those institutions?®®
The criminal class, according to Plint, was parasitic upon the industrial
cities, a "pariah and exotic tribe";
No exact analysis of crime can be obtained, until the exact pro­
portion of this class to the indigenous and really working popul­
ation of the respective groups, which is separate and distinct 
from what must be considered a foreign, or, if a new compound may 
be ventured, a non-indigenous body - is ascertained.
This necessitated, he thought, an accurate recording of the data of those
59passing through the courts - a "'Natural History' of the class."
The image of a distinct class of criminals, parasitic upon society, 
imbued and indeed confused criminological analysis for the rest of the cen­
tury. Criminological debate rested on the assumption of a criminal class 
with its own rookeries, 'flash-houses', receivers, 'nurseries' and 'patois'.
It was this criminal superstructure and culture which supposedly detached 
them from the economy on which they preyed. ^  There was a mental construction 
of a standing army of criminals, studiously detached from kinship with hon­
est labour. As an essayist for "Chamber's Edinburgh Journal" said in 1841, 
of the criminal class:
It is a definite and well-marked portion of the community.
So clear was the distinction that when Henry Mayhew's analysis of metropol­
itan criminal statistics, to find the percentage of offenders in each trade, 
returned the finding in 1849 that labourers were the most criminal, -- police 
magistrate wrote to correct him:
...the fact is that nine out of ten of those whose regular occup­
ation is crime, are brought before the magistrates under the com­
prehensive designation of labourer. Of course, when asked for a 
description of themselves, they do not declare themselves in their 
true characters...Most of them never think of doing an hour's honest 
work, and they are a very different class from those who really 
form the labouring population of the metropolis.62
The honest labourer was not to be confused with the incorrigible offender,
even in the 'sweated' trades of London. Mayhew's own work, whilst pointing
to the fusion of labour and crime in the study of London's sweated trades,
and though sensitive to crime as a social phenomenon, encouraged the growth
of the notion of a separate criminal class. Contemporary reviews patronised
most Mayhew's portrayal of the criminal class, through artistic summaries
63of autobiographical evidence. His sociological explanation of the communal 
character of crime, perpetuated by transmission of a code of social values 
and behaviour from one generation to the next, within a social context of 
poverty and economic insecurity, established professional crime as the root 
problem for criminologists.^
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Mayhew showed how the juvenile offender evolve
into the professional thief through a process of social evolution; how
crime was a profession into which children were b o m  and bred. In his
joint work on the criminology of London prisons, Mayhew insisted on the
separation of habitual and casual criminals:
The habitual c r i m i n a l s a r e  a distinct body of people. Such 
classes appertain to even the rudest nations, they being, as it 
were, the human parasites of every civilized and barbarous comm­
unity. .. '^5
Later, he reiterated his belief in a criminal 'profession':
Again, we say the great mass of crime in this country is committed 
by those who have been bred and b o m  to the business, and who make 
a regular trade of it - living as systematically by robbery or 
cheating as others do by commerce or the exercise of intellectual 
or manual labour.66
It was the class of habitual offender, "the most dangerous portion of the 
predatory class," according to Matthew Davenport Hill, Recorder of Birmingham 
"the worst and most dangerous class of the community", according to Samuel 
Smiles - which was progressively revered as the fundamental criminal problem, 
against which the occasional or temporary offender was u n i m p o r t a m C r i m :  
as a social institution or as a trade, set off from crimes of accident or 
passion, was thus clearly recognized.
At mid-century, then, there was a return to an older concern with crimin­
ality; with crime as a trade, a vocation, a profession. It was a reversion 
to an image of criminality which saw crime as an activity detached from 
the prevailing economic and social condition, in no way part of the life­
style of the honest labouring poor. A distinction was increasingly drawn
6 8between the criminal and industrious class. There was a complementary
adjustment in the middle-class impression of the proletariat. Vast tracts
of the labouring class, notably its skilled and factory sections, were with-
69drawn from the slur of criminality, from membership of the dangerous class. 
Divisions within the working-class were pointed to with relief: a huge gulf 
was said to lie between the 'industrious' and 'idle' poor.'*0 In the
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volumes which proclaimed the gospel of mid-century improvement, "Meliora: 
or Better Times to Come", contributors revealed a social hierarchy with
distinct strata - the 'industrious classes',the 'workhouse- poor', the 'quiet
71poor', and the 'criminal poor'. The heterogeneity of working-class com­
position, its inherent disunity, drugged those who only a few years earlier 
had been terrified by the threat of Chartist revolution. Revealed social 
heterogeneity was, by its verydivisiveness, a prophylactic for social fears.
Mid-century attempts at a redefinition of the dangerous class
In the mid-Victorian period, the conception of a criminal class, a separ­
ate trade or profession, segregated from the labouring force, was heightened 
and hardened from two major directions, each reinforcing the other. They 
were, firstly, the ending of transportation and the re-appraisal of habitual 
crime which it forced; and secondly, the actual nature and scope of mid- 
century social investigation. The effect was f> concentrate the vision more 
determinedly on a distinct criminal body, to declare its separateness as 
a social problem, to urge the formulation of new measures which would ensure, 
a tight surveillance over the professional convict, and his divorce from
7;the labouring poor. It is useful to examine further these two developments.
The end of the system of transportation and the new task, as a contemporar)
essayist said in 1869, "of washing our foul linen at home, instead of putting
it out to be done by others", forced a re-appraisal of urban criminality.^3
It naturally focussed on the hardened 'recidivist'. It was this category
which constituted nine-tenths of the entire criminal body, according to the
author of an article on the control of the criminal classes in 1869:
They are brought up to crime; they follow it as an avocation; 
they practise it regularly for a livelihood; it furnishes their 
daily bread; it is to them a profession with its regular steps.
Such offenders, it was said, could be distinguished by their haunts, assoc­
iates, life-style, and by their previous convictions. The upshot was a more
searching examination of the criminal class, and tentative provision made 
for identifying and isolating the persistent offender. The mid-century men­
tality comes through in Harriet Martineau's review of Mary Carpenter's "Our 
Convicts" (published in 1864), in which the author was said to have provided 
full description of the life-style and culture of the criminal class; to
7chave disclosed "the entire natural history of the lawless classes." 
Carpenter's study had most fully examined the habitually corrupt - "those who 
are members of a sort of criminal race, - an order as clearly marked to the 
eye of the police and the prison-inspector as the gypsies are to us all." 
Their particular demeanour marked them out, most notably "'a peculiar low 
expression, unlike that of the labouring portion of society'"^ Throughout 
the 1860s, there was unabated interest in identifying the nature of profess­
ional criminality, and the features of the integrated society formed within 
the contiguous streets tenanted by habitual offenders. There was the grow­
ing conviction that the solution to criminality would emerge by detecting 
the socio-cultural and economic supports to a criminal way of life. The 
public, said the clergyman, H.W. Holland, had to penetrate this 'imperiuin 
in imperio' which allowed security and success to criminal operations, and 
to grapple with "the vast and subtle machinery of thievedom":
Men and women get so linked in and interlaced with the general 
colony, that it is almost impossible to escape to honest circles 
and industrial life.77
And there was also an emerging faith that the correct form of imprisonment 
would be found, as a result of the need to deal with a resident criminal 
class. Our ability to delineate the separateness of the criminal class, to 
gain "a more distinct notion of the conditions, and quality, and specific 
attributes of the lawless class", and to devise "a specific and determinate 
method of treatment", had been made possible, according to Harriet Martineau 
by the settlement of the transportation issue:
We are arriving at something like an agreement as to the
principles on which their prison life must be organised, now 
that we are all convinced that prison at home, and not the 
colonies, must be the scene of their penal life.?**
In fact, there was less certainty about the practical means of disposing
with the habitual offender. Being able to exporc the country's criminal
problem had forestalled investigation into the possible forms and durations
of penal treatment. The wrangle between the silent and separate systems of
79penal regime had fettered previous penological enquiry. Slowly, however,
distinctive methods of dealing with the habitual offender emerged. The
immediate substitute to the run-down of convict transportation was designed
in the form of penal servitude established in the Penal Servitude Act of 1853.
This only spurred public debate on the future disposition of convicts. The
ticket-of-leave system, or release of convicts on license (introduced into
the 1853 Act) caused the first public outcry, during which the demand was
put instead for the perpetual imprisonment of 'incorrigibles', or at least
80for indeterminate prison sentences. Faced for the first time with the
full dimension of the problem of habitual crime, semi-permanent institutional
quarantine was the most common prescription. If the challenge to build a
new penal system to deal with recidivist offenders was impeded in the 1850s,
the events of the early 1860s only reinforced public concern either to deal
more severely with those sentenced to penal servitude, or to re-establish 
81transportation. Robberies with violence in the winter of 1862-63, the 8234
82'garotting' episode, threw London into panic. Harsh expedients were
demanded, notably stiffer sentences, which resulted in Mr. Adderley's Private
Member Bill, the 'Garotters' Act', which allowed fresh powers to act against
83robbery with violence. The system of penal administration for habitual
offenders was especially criticized, since the garotte outbreak was attrib-
84uted to the ticket-of-leave men. As a result, the Royal Commission on 
Transportation and Penal Servitude was appointed in 1863 to investigate the 
Penal Servitude Acts of the 1850s. Predictably, it proposed a tighter system
of penal servitude, and a strict police surveillance of convicts on licence.
In consequence, the Penal Servitude Act of 1864 made it more difficult to 
secure release on licence, and established a stringent code of police super­
vision after release. Conditions for a licensee convict now included, for
example, the avoidance of a dissolute life "without visible means of obtain-
85ing an honest livelihood." The Act of 1864 was a landmark in that it was 
the start of a concerted attempt to impose official identity over the habit­
ual offender. In 1869, and again in 1871, the attempt was elaborated through 
longer police supervision of released convicts, and by means of a register
of habitual criminals. In the register, photography ensured identification,
86and recorded previous convictions guaranteed cumulative sentencing. Once 
the anodyne of transportation was finally rejected, a series of penal measures 
were implemented which intended the identification and treatment of the 
habitual offender.
Instrumental to the detailed observation of the habitual offender was a
distinctive form of social investigation which characterized the mid-century
3/years. Debate on problems of criminality and imprisonment formed one
wing of an increasingly fragmented form of investigation into poverty and
the poor. Less concerned with the total incidence of various types of
crime, or with the relationship of crime to broad economic and social variable
- basic to the government and statistical society surveys of the 1830s and
40s - the mid-century ambience was for classification and quantification of
88distinct social problems: education, health and crime. In the halcyon 
days of the 'age of improvement', the small pockets of social malfunctioning 
which remained were best approached, it was thought, with professional 
expertise. Lawyers, medical officers of health, and prison chaplains pub­
licized their image of philanthropic public service through joint discussion 
of housing, sanitation or delinquency, most notably in the peripatetic meet­
ings of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science. Specifi
investigation shared an arena for discussion, under the arch of the Society, 
without abrogating its independence. In the Punishment and Reformation 
section of the Social Science Association, practical workers were to the 
fore - T.B.L. Baker, Walter Crofton, Davenport Hill, and Mary Carpenter, 
all intimately involved in practical experiments or public service in the 
field of penology. An important concern of this group was with the pre­
vention of criminality by intervention in the problem-families of the 
'perishing and dangerous classes'. The children of these classes were the
particular worry, who needed to be caught before they were indicted for 
. . 90criminal offences. This preventive interest in rescuing the 'perishing'
- those who were exposed to criminal temptations by virtue of their upbring­
ing and environment - was closely related to the Punishment Section's isola­
tion of the habitual offender, which they saw as the central problem of 
criminality. In the 1860s the Social Science Association was a central focus 
of deoate on the question of habitual crime. Sir Walter Crofton in "The 
Present Aspect of the Convict Question" (1864) listed the aims of the 
Association in this investigative sphere - longer sentences, a more deterrent 
initial stage of imprisonment, better classification of prisoners, a stricter 
supervision of the ticket-of-leaves, and the use of photography in the 
identification of habitual offenders. Crofton proceeded with immodesty to 
show how the Association had influenced, or were at least in accord with, 
provisions ventured in the Royal Commission on Penal Servitude (1863), and 
the House of Lords Committee on County and City gaols. Thus, the Royal 
Commission had urged the need to bring before the court the previous convic­
tions of habitual offenders, and both government enquiries had recommended 
criminal photography.*** The Social Science Association was convinced that 
in the 1860s they contributed to the location of a criminal class, and to 
informed investigation of its features. Moreover, they insisted that the 
penal measures taken or proposed, now that transportation was abandoned,
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depended on a platform where professional penologists and prison officials 
could launch their ideas.
The annual summaries of the Association's debates, cardinal documents 
for any study of mid-century social research and policy, evince the approach 
to the criminal class. Firstly, there was the conviction that the social 
investigator was dealing with a separate army of offenders. William Pare 
told the Association in 1862:
Their organization is as complete, perhaps, as that of any other 
class in society, both in their business and social arrangements.
There was even the suggestion that an habitual criminal class was unique to
England. Sir William Crofton informed the Association in 1875 that the
foreign representatives to the International Prison Congress in London in
1872 had said "no such class - as a class - was to be found ir. their various 
95countries. ' ' Secondly, within the Association tnerc was t:-.e insistence
that the recent years, especially the 1360s, had produced better data on
the criminal class, and witnessed the recognition that particular machinery
was required to deal with it. William Pare said in 1862:
It is a fact that, until a comparatively recent period, we had 
no positive and reliable data as to the numbers, the organization, 
or the habitat of the criminal classes.94
The most satisfactory remedy had been found in more rigorous official stat­
istics. Coincident with the termination of transportation came the develop­
ment of a body of criminal statistics, reorganized in form by 1856. In the 
Police Returns, one item significantly was the size in each district of the 
criminal class.^ Mid-century social investigation looked back on this 
statistical signpost which allowed compilation of the criminal classes, and 
the measurement of the efficacy of penal provision for the criminal predator 
on the industrial economy. By 1875, Edmund Du Cane could tell the Associa­
tion, with the Habitual Criminals Acts of 1869 and 1871 in mind, of the 
advances made in the administration of the law, and in prison reform:
In this department very great advances have been made of late
years; we have in principle recognised the existence of a crimin­
al class, and directed the operations of the law towards checking 
the development of that class, or bringing those who belong to it 
under special control.^
In the search for the means of defending the community from those whose
true offence was the habit of persistent criminality, the Social Science
97Association's meetings were an influential forum.
Within the debates of the Association, the permanent complement to an 
analysis of the habitual offender was the declaration that the honest indus­
trious labourer was in no way part of the criminal community. Mary Carpenter 
was convinced that the children of the perishing and dangerous classes stood 
aloof from the offspring of the labouring classes - "I have been very much
struck with observing the strong line of demarcation which exists between
98the labouring and the 'ragged' class." The Hills of Birmingham regularly 
insisted on this in their advocacy of reformatory science. When M.D. Hill 
opened the Free Industrial School in Birmingham, his paean to instruction 
in labour rested on his contention that the children would learn "the res­
pectability of labour, the rank, that it gives, the immediate distance
99that divides the humblest day-labourer from the criminal." Frederick 
Hill believed there were few "skilled artisans or well-trained husbar.dmen" 
amongst the criminal c l a s s . I n  this area, the representatives of the 
Social Science Association were building on well-established attitudes. Ther; 
was a commonly held assumption, part accurate, largely presumptive, that 
the honest labourer closed the workshop door on the ex-prisoner. Before 
the Select Committee on Police, in 1838, a London magistrate thought a strike 
would be the recurrent consequence of the attempt to employ a convicted 
felon. *  ^ In 1863 before the Select Committee on Gaols, an Inspector of 
Prisons referred to the objections of other workmen in urban factories as 
one reason why it was more difficult for discharged prisoners to find work 
in the towns. “ In 1854 W.R. Greg similarly said of the prisoner, "scarcely 
any labourer will knowingly work along with him." It is interesting that
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this posed problems for Greg's major concern, to ensure that released pris­
oners merged into "the mass of honest and industrious men, instead of falling 
back into the ranks of the criminal, the dangerous, the idle, and the de­
bauched."*^ There was a basic contradiction here of course. The more the 
habitual offender was stigmatized by the prison system, the more he was 
chaperoned under police supervision, the harder it became for him discreetly 
to pass back into the labouring force. Such incompatibility between the pro­
tection of the prisoner by veiling his antecedents, and the protection of
the community through police surveillance of the released, was not lost on 
104contemporary opinion. But the dilemma was resolved by emphasizing what 
was of greatest concern: the chasm which parted, and ought to part, the 
labourer and prisoner. The difficulty this posed for a successful return 
to industrial life was left largely to resolve itself. It was more important 
to establish the divorce between the honest poor and the criminal poor.
Later in the century, W.D. Morrison, Chaplain of Wandsworth Prisor, stressed 
that the opinion which said crime was committed by those willing to work 
but unable to find any, was utterly false, and that the equation of econom­
ic adversity fostering crime, itself encouraged crime:
...it is apt to make the working population imagine that there 
is a community of interest between them and the criminal classes 
which does not in reality exist. From the point of view of public 
policy nothing can be more pernicious than to propagate such an 
idea; and no artisan who values his own dignity should ever allow 
any man, whether on platforms or in newspapers, to identify him 
in any way whatever with the common criminal.105
These attitudes were in harmony with, and often a product of the compart­
mentalizing mind of mid-century social investigation. Members of the crimin­
al class, either occasional or habitual, were said to be unwelcome in the 
workshop. W.D. Morrison encapsulated the attitude, which was commonly held 
by the 1860s, towards the petty offender, the persons released from prison 
after a committal for begging or minor theft:
These men hang upon the skirts of labour and seek shelter under
its banner, but it is only for short and irregular intervals that 
they march in the ranks of the actual workers. The real working 
man knows such people well, and heartily despises them.106
As to the more important category of habitual offender, he was segregated 
within the prison walls through cellular confinement and the rule of silence, 
and through restrictions on visits and letters. He was classified by entry 
on the register of habitual criminals, and restricted when outside prison 
to reliance on other prisoners for support, because of tight police super­
vision. The intention was to cut him away from real contact with the work­
ing-class. As Morrison firmly stated:
Habitual criminals are not to be confounded with the working or 
any other class; they are a set of persons who make crime the ob­
ject and business of their lives; to commit crime is their trade; 
they deliberately scoff at honest ways of earning a living, and 
must accordingly be looked upon as a class of a separate and 
distinct character from the rest of the community.10/
It was the mid-Victorian years which established such a clear-cut categori­
zation, and basic to the demarcation was 'reformatory science' and prison 
legislation, influenced by a specialized form of social enquiry. Mid-century 
investigation served to splinter what had been in the earlier decades of 
the century, associated apprehensions. A dangerous class which had prev­
iously amalgamated the trepidations of crime, povert/, riot and revolution 
was reduced in size, as it were, by a stroke of the investigator's pen.
There was a hardening of social classification amongst political economists 
and commentators, as also amongst criminologists. The habitual criminal 
class was defined as a distinct caste, and slowly stretched to cover the 
previous, diverse fears of a dangerous class. The 'criminal class' was in 
fact substituted for the 'dangerous class' in the minds of many mid-Victorian 
And this class was carefully separated from contact with the labouring force.
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legislation, influenced by a specialized form of social enquiry. Mid-century 
investigation served to splinter what had been, in the earlier decades of 
the century, associated apprehensions. A dangerous class which had prev­
iously amalgamated the trepidations of crime, povertv, riot and revolution 
was reduced in size, as it were, by a stroke of the investigator's pen.
There was a hardening of social classification amongst political economists 
and commentators, as also amongst criminologists. The habitual criminal 
class was defined as a distinct caste, and slowly stretched to cover the 
previous, diverse fears of a dangerous class. The 'criminal class' was in 
fact substituted for the 'dangerous class' in the minds of many mid-Victorian 
And this class was carefully separated from contact with the labouring force.
From the other side, social enquiry reduced the extent of the dangerous 
class, by recognizing the existence and the proportionate size of the 
'respectable working class': skilled and hard-working mechanics and oper­
2C1
atives, with better and more regular wages, a capacity for collective or­
ganization in benefit society or trade union, and an improving moral rect- 
itude. Further social investigation also rescued from the reproach 
of criminality, the vagrant - or, at least, separated out the mobile honest 
from the habitual vagrant. In addition, by a sharper classification of 
occupations, irregular employment was used in explanation of some urban 
destitution. Alsager Hill, working in an economically-depressed London in 
the late 1860s, identified those trapped in seasonal employments, classified 
by Hill as casual labour, and those in 'decaying and underpaid trades', 
displaced by technological innovation, such as Spitalfield's hand-loom weav­
ers . More elaborate classification, Hill believed, would in this way sift 
the industrious unemployed from out of the dangerous class.
Nevertheless, the recognition of the social and political integrity of 
the skilled artisans and factory operatives, and the pinching out of some of 
the remaining portions of the urban working-class from membership of the 
dangerous class, did not eradicate the inveterate and ill-defined problem 
oi the city 'residuum': a term used from the 1850s interchangeably with 
the 'dangerous c l a s s ' . A l s a g e r  Hill's occupational classification had 
still contained a semi-criminal residue, 'the incompetent class' composed 
of " the great mass of the weakly poor, as well as the rough, idle and unem­
ployed fellows whom the accretion of great, cities, the inefficiency of our
Poor Laws, and the want of a thorough system of industrial training have
. . 112bred up in our midst", morally obnoxious and economically parasitic.
No amount of sublimation was able further to purify this "growing pauper 
semi-criminal class", in Sir Charles Trevelyan's words, which was discovered
by the professional charity investigators in London's East End in the late 
1131860s. It is significant that it was the least provincial in outlook, 
the metropolitan investigators, who stressed most the urban destitute.
The East End was a demanding test-ground for charitable work or for social
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enquiry, dominated by low-wage jobs for casual, unskilled labour; drenched 
by the problem of seasonal employment. The taxing duty of directing charity 
to the most promising claimants in this confused environment, as opposed to 
the investigation and management of a captive population of habitual offend­
ers, significantly promoted differences of opinion within the Social Science 
Association. The Reverend Henry Solly was particularly concerned with the 
unemployed poor, 'roughs' and criminal classes of London. He was alive to 
the danger of confounding the honest but unemployed poor with the criminal 
classes, but he immediately spoke about all three groupings in the same 
breath, when he addressed the Society of Arts in 1868:
Those who compose them live in close proximity to each other, 
members of each frequently living in the same house, and the 
ranks of the more degraded being continually swelled by additions 
from the destitute poor.
Closer delineation of the London 'roughs' similarly emphasised the fusion 
of labouring and criminal groups:
Strictly speaking, the term 'roughs' would generally be understood 
to include many of the Criminal class, bat it would also comprehend 
large numbers of the honest industrious poor, such as bricklayers' 
labourers, navvies, costermongers, and so forth, having no refer­
ence, in fact, to honesty or dishonesty at ail, only to the social 
condition, appearance, speech, and manners of the class thus 
designated. “ 4
In contrast, the professional, penal administrator, Sir William Crofton,
in his "Address on the Criminal Classes" in 1868, referred to "a dominant
criminal class" able to throw London into panic as had occurred that year
in the spate of robberies with violence. Taking note of Henry Solly's
paper on the management of "the Unemployed Poor of London and with its
'Roughs' and Criminal Classes", Crofton argued:
...it would be most desirable to keep the subject of the treatment 
of the 'unemployed poor' and 'roughs' - a class which it is diffi­
cult to accurately define (sic) and acknowledge - quite distinct 
from the treatment of persons known to belong to the 'criminal 
class'.
Whilst Solly and the professional charity investigators based in London,
found it impossible adequately to demarcate the groupings; Crofton, the 
professional penologist, insisted on it. Whilst in the Penal and Reformatory 
section of the Social Science Association, the problem of habitual crime 
was more sharply identified, the metropolitan situation confounded such opt­
imism, and defied the forecasts of those myopically involved with the 
'criminal class'. If any one area defied the segregation of the working 
and criminal classes, it was London's East End. It was due to this fringe 
of the economic population that the fear of the dangerous classes prevailed.
London's 'Dangerous Class'.
Throughout the nineteenth-century, London crystallized the fears of 
urban existence, urban deterioration, and a city-bred dangerous class.
The fears were doubtless enhanced by the unchallengeable size and the strat­
egic importance of the capital city.**^ Occasionally, a sympathetic hand 
like Dickens's could sculpt an image of this homeless povert>, when he 
described the poor "cowering in the black tenebrae of dark entries, in 
the dank shows of railway arches, and under arches of bridges: under the
lee of tilted carts and timber stacks: rolled up like hedgehogs before the
l* 1 7daily warmth of brick and lime kilns." * More often there was only the
euphemistic language of the social investigator or magazine critic. In 1855
the "Quarterly Review" described the class "lower in the social scale than
the labourer", the street people not even enumerated in the census returns;
...very many have besides their acknowledged calling, another 
in the background in direct violation of the eighth commandment; 
and thus by gradations imperceptibly darkening as we advance, we 
arrive at the classes who are at open war with society, and pro­
fessedly live by the produce of depredation or the wages of 
infamy.’
London not only spawned its own outcast poor, but, according to the middle-
class construction, was the magnet for the 'clever pauper' in search of
119indiscriminate charity, of the idle and the criminal. In 1870, Sir 
Charles Trevelyan, an old campaigner in the field of charitable relief,
depicted the metropolis as a "gigantic engine for depraving and degrading
120our population", a "common sink" for the nation's deposit. It was 
impossible in this urban reality to compartmentalize social problems, to 
train the mind on the habitual criminal class, to trust in the rigours 
of the penal system to prevent contamination with the honest labourer.
The very breadth of the dangerous class in London - an urban deposit which 
confounded the criminal, the vagrant and the pauper, and which shaded into 
the unskilled labouring class - frustrated the severance of an habitual 
criminal class from contact with the 'honest poor'.
Anti-urbanism was a persistent theme in the century and the country pre­
eminent for city expansion. The 'natural' purity of the countryside con­
trasted with the features of city existence: "the devil's hotbeds of 
crime and evil."11'* For the urban middle-class the countryside symbolized 
simplicity, deference and loyalty. The anti-urban bias was in large part 
a 'feudal' contempt of industrial civilization and the anonymous :ity.
From out of the deteriorating conditions of urban slums, contemporary im­
agination pictured the creation of a degenerate urban race, a constant
122drain upon racial strength and purity. Such worries were most excessive,
however, in London: the cardinal city for wealth as for poverty, for Christ­
ianity as for crime; the arena of the basic conflicting social forces.
A latter-day representative of the anti-urbanist tradition, C.F.G. Masterman, 
recognized that whilst other urban centres had "a population in manageable 
aggregation", London was unique:
a population, a nation in itself; breeding, as it seems, a special 
race of men; which only is also produced, and that in less inten­
sive cultivation, in the few other larger cities - Glasgow, Man­
chester, Liverpool - where the conditions of coagulation offer some 
parallels to this monster clot of humanity. F.verywhere, indeed, 
this million-peopled, exaggerated London sets at defiance the 
generalizations drawn from the normal town areas.123
And it was London which symbolized, for the last half of the century, the
anxiety about social disorder which could emerge from an indigenous dangerous
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class, in a city where the class structure was physically substantiated,
and where the propertied were increasingly outnumbered. It was Masterman
again who, in the early attempt to sketch a psychology of crowd behaviour,
noted the critical volatility of 'The Multitude' - "one feels that the
smile might turn suddenly into fierce snarl or savagery
London's dangerous class was thus a problem of social disorder, as much
as of stagnant poverty or criminality. Henry Solly's lecture on the
unemployed poor, 'roughs' and criminal classes, extended beyond the recent
spate of robberies in 1868 to the new political developments encompassed in
the recent extension of the franchise. The shift in political power,
argued Solly, should cause concern, when
that great mass of rough, unmoral, and uneducated physical 
force which we have been contemplating, some portion only half 
employed and half fed, another portion already cair.ted with 
dispositions to crime, is always in danger, under provocation, 
of combining with the actually criminal and violent classes for 
the illegal assertion of its pever, or for purpose of plunder.125
A force of nine thousand constables was no match for"the 150,000 roughs 
and ruffians whom...the metropolis might see arrayed against law and order." 
And considering, said Solly, "how different a London mob is from a docile 
agricultural peasantry or orderly Lancashire operatives, we must not conceal 
from ourselves the possibility of Londoners having to live from time to time 
under the protection and even rule of the military. Allowance has to be 
made for Solly's eye for the impassioned line, for the arousal of fear as 
a device calculatingly used by social reformers in London in the late 1860s. 
The usefulness of the term 'dangerous class' lay in its capacity for con­
juring up such anxiety and dread. For Solly, the embroidered argument was to 
motivate "remedial and preventive measures in time." But Solly's categories 
throughout were significantly confused and imprecise - vagrants, mendicants, 
paupers and criminals shared the same designation. Further, their very 
proximity to, indeed their involvement in, the casual labour market fed
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the anxiety for social disorder. It was this aspect of the capital's 
social structure which engendered the imagery of a dangerous class. London's 
residuum included often in practice, but always potentially, the whole 
casual labour pool of dock workers, building labourers, and those in the 
finished consumer goods industries like clothing and furniture. The very 
pattern of London employment, distinguished by small-scale production, ex­
cessive subdivision of work processes and seasonality of employment determine!
an economic and social structure which was overshadowed by a surplus labour 
127force. And it was this glut of unskilled labour in Victorian London
which predisposed the confusion of the labouring and dangerous classes.
There were no insurmountable moral or social barriers between the casual
labourer and the habitual thief, certainly none which could withstand a slump
in the labour market. Seasonal adjustments in trade promoted oscillation
128in ar.d out of work and crime. Middle-class anxiety about the dangerous 
class ».'as based, therefcie, in large part on the socisl proximity of the 
criminal and pauper to casual labour, and on the knowledge of the seasonal 
nature of London's 'pre-industrial' economy and its prevalence of casual 
trades.
This is not to say, however, that propertied London lived in permanent 
dread of a residuum of the city slums. Mid-century reinterpretation of the 
"dangerous classes" had also taken place, after all, in the 'laboratory' 
of the East End. And whilst London's professional investigators had warned 
of the consequences of neglecting such an 'underclass' of criminal, pauper, 
and unskilled (often immigrant) labour, there was still the confidence 
that it was a containable social stratum: a residual inlier within the 
social structure. The residuum was not yet considered to represent an over 
whelming proportion of London's proletariat. Only at certain periods, 
then, did London's urban problems coalesce to cause fear of a marauding 
'dangerous class'. The major instant was in the 1880s when the rediscovery
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of a 'dangerous' stratum of the criminal and labouring poor burst through 
the conceptions of mid-Victorian ideology. But there was an earlier instant 
- the Reform Act disturbances of 1866 and 1867 - when events provoked a 
temporary but profound scepticism amongst London's propertied class for the 
mid-century redefinition of the dangerous class. The surrounding context to 
the social disorder was the parliamentary controversy over whether to give 
the vote, and thus political power as the middle-class saw it, to a large 
section of the working class. The debates themselves were characterized by 
political disagreement on an acceptable rental qualification before the 
franchise was granted. If the figure was set too low, it was feared that 
not only the skilled working class would gain political power, but also the 
city residuum. There was a collective uncertainty during the Reform Act 
debates in 1866 and 1867 as to the boundary which parted the residuum from 
the honest industrious workman. This uncertainty was fed most by the social 
structure of urban Lcneon. If those favourable to reform pointed to the 
northern factory operatives, political opponents emphasized the dangers 
of giving the vote by mistake to the metropolitan residuum, politically 
volatile and susceptible to corruption. Whilst casting a shadow across the 
whole political spectrum, the residuum fed particularly the arguments of 
critics of franchise reform. Consequently, the reform riots of July 1866, 
and the defeat of the government's prohibition on Hyde Park meetings in 
May 1867, were vivid reminders of the risk in extending political power 
too far down the ladder of the working class hierarchy, as well as of the
danger posed to social order by a dangerous class of the criminal and labour- 
129ing poor.
The Reform Act debate and London's dangerous class
At first everything conspired to illustrate the influence of mid-century 
attitudes. The impulse for reform, unprovoked by hard necessity, reflected
the years of social reconciliation, and the tuition in the heterogeneity 
of the lower classes. The lessons of the Social Science Association seemed 
to have been well learned, in particular the need and the ability to segre­
gate the 'respectable' from the 'dangerous' proletariat. From its found­
ation in 1857, the Social Science Association had encouraged the group
activity of the working-class through benefit or cooperative societies,
130and even trade unions. Collective self-help by way of cooperative enter­
prise and 'new model' union were the means and the gauge of improvement 
amongst the labouring class, as they were also a balance-sheet of the extent 
of investment by the working-class in the security of law and order. In 
April 1866, Mr. A.H. Layard maintained that the working classes had the 
greatest stake in the country, having the most to lose from an erosion in 
prosperity:
And will anyone say in the face of these facts, that the working 
classes have no interest in the well-bein^, prosperity, and peace 
of the country?131
Such attitudes were common currency during the debates in 1866 after the
introduction in March of the Russell-Gladstone Bill. What has been termed
"the 'Rochdale' argument" was given regular airing, to instil confidence
in the safety of enfranchising a large section of the urban labouring 
1 *52force. ‘ To the argument was appended the patience-in-adversity of the
working class as evinced in the behaviour of the Lancashire operatives
during the cotton famine of the 1860s. Confidence in conceding reform
was also established by reference to the subdivisions which riddled the
working class, and the political moderation to be found in its higher
reaches. W.E. Forster was convinced that unless the Reform Bill was denied,
134a heterogeneous work force would not strike for political power. A 
final plank in the argument to extend the vote to the 'honest' working 
class was the faith in the isolation of the dangerous class. Enfranchise­
ment of the respectable operative was in fact canvassed as a means of
further divorcing these social groupings: a political act which required 
confidence not only in the loyalty of the 'respectable working class' but 
also in its segregation from the urban residuum.
In the first flush of enthusiasm for reform, the 'respectable working-
class' was defined in contrast to the 'dangerous class'. It was argued
that extending the franchise to the 'industrious' would isolate, in Forster's
words, " the dangerous classes in our large towns", and validate more
135effective movement against them. Those members in support of reform 
demonstrated their responsibility by assuring the faint-hearted that it was 
the 'decent mechanics' and not the dangerous classes who would be given 
power under the Reform Bill. Provincial examples of the temper of skilled 
workmen was set against the behaviour of groupings manifestly unfit for in­
clusion. Mr. Leeman told other Members that they should not be alarmed that 
they were enfranchising,
the class of persons whom they saw at the comers of the streets 
of the Seven Dials; nor the stalwart navvies with red handker­
chiefs and nailed boots who made our railways; nor the miners of 
Cornwall, Stafford, and Durham; nor the hordes of Irish labourers 
who were to be found on the quays of Liverpool and Glasgow, and 
in all the great seaports and towns; nor, in a word, any of that 
class which, in common Parliamentary language, was designated as 
the dangerous class. 136
Outside the political chamber, the same hem-line was traced between the 
'manual labour class' and the other sections of the town population, with whor 
it was said, the former should not be confounded. That inveterate campaigner 
Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth, addressed the fourth Department of the Social 
Science Congress in October 1866 on the political capacity of the 'manual 
labour class', and cut away from association with it, the residual city 
population:
'The hereditary vagrant and pauper; the men of the rudest forms 
of labour, like some of the colliers, the navvies, the brickmakers, 
and hodmen, who are the hardy pioneers of material progress, but 
often gross in their habits, and generally without social or polit­
ical aspirations; the classes who stagnate, like the lees of society, 
in the obscure and unhealthy parts of our great cities... 137
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"Pioneers of material progress" they may have been, the Irish migrants
in particular, but they were considered to be untouched by the material
improvements of the nation, a savage and unthinking 'residuum', incongruous-
ly attached to the ranks of the working-class. It was this urban poor
"of almost hopeless poverty and dependence" which, John Bright believed,
Parliament should avoid enfranchising, and whom the Reform League itself
was anxious to omit from the 'Registered and Residential'working man on
139whose behalf it was fighting. The recognition of the political moderation 
of the skilled working man, and a redefinition of the working class which 
separated the 'respectable' from the 'dangerous' portions of that class, 
were the basis of franchise extension in the late 1860s.
In the Reform Act debates, therefore, we see the extent to which the 
early nineteenth century fear of a dangerous class which was ce-extcnsive 
with the whole working class had been altered by the mid-Victorian years 
of economic prosperity and social balance. It was now possible to win 
parliamentary support for an extension of political power to the higher 
echelons of a working class which was felt to have proved its stake in the 
developed industrial society. On a scale vaster than that possibly en­
visaged by the social investigator, the advocates of reform intended tak­
ing respectable labour away from inclusion within the dangerous class.
The Reform Act was to serve as re-affirmation of the social investigator's 
labour to reduce the size of the dangerous class.
But one outstanding problem remained: the varying definitions of the 
residuum, and the uncertainty as to its size and its constituent parts.
If it was agreed that the sub-proletariat must be excluded from political 
reform, there was no agreement over its range and reach within the working 
class. The act of enfranchisement was a dangerous expedient in the con­
ditions of knowledge as to where the 'underclass' was finally exhausted.
A pure seam was easy to detect. But the residuum was an ill-defined group
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and notably so in London where it merged into the seasonally-uncmployed 
in the labour market. As already emphasized, the metropolitan social 
structure defied neat political surgery. Working class respectability had 
not clearly taken itself away from the unregenerate poor. At what point, 
then, was the political incision to be made? At the very period, moreover, 
when the residuum's boundary was being anxiously traced, the metropolis 
was afflicted by economic and social conditions which further confused 
clear demarcation, and which were capable of dissolving the barriers between 
the dangerous and working classes. General trade depression in the winter 
of 1866 increased unemployment, affecting in particular the Thames ship­
building industry; sufficient, as Engels said, "to reduce the whole East
140End of London to chronic pauperism." By January 1867, large numbers in
Poplar, Limehouse and Shadwell were receiving parish relief, mainly the samt
141areas which had been affected by cholera only a few months earlier. 
Illustrative of the marked distress was the bout of food rioting at tbe ena 
of January in Greenwich and Deptford when bread shops were attacked. 
Correspondents to the 'Times' eagerly exonerated 'our poor starved mechanics' 
and put the blame for the riots on "some 600 or 700 roughs and juvenile 
thieves from Kent-street and the Mint."^”^  But a wox'sening economic climate, 
bread riots, and harsh weather harmful to winter casual trades, augmented 
the inherent fear of the dangerous class, and of its contaminating effect 
on industrious labour.
The observed thaw in barriers between proximate social categories influen­
ced the response to the 'Hyde Park railings' affair - when Reform League 
demonstrators forced their way into the Park in the face of a police prohib­
ition - and to the following days of riot, in July 1866. There was a shared 
attitude to these events, which were blamed on the 'roughs' and criminal 
classes. According to the leading article on the riots in the "Times", 
the "decent mechanics" were lost in "a surrounding and interpenetrating mass
of the coarsest mob":
The great majority of the people in the crowded streets were the 
usual slouching, shambling man-boys who constitute the mass of the 
ordinary London multitude.143
More strictly, the riots forced recognition of the dangers of an urban resid­
uum which was receptive to the designs of political agitators, and emboldened 
by demonstrations of the weakness of authority. In the parliamentary dis­
cussion of the riots, members expressed the view that the reform meetings had 
provided an occasion for all the urban scum to take advantage of the situation 
Turbulent democratic activity was bound to release to the surface what Samuel 
Smiles later described as "the idle and desperate classes of the metropolis." 
In the same article, the Reform Act riots inspired Smiles to say:
The Finlans, Beales, and Bradlaughs may come with their following 
of 'reformers', but there invariably come with them in still greater 
numbers the roughs, and the dregs of the rougns...The security of 
London consists in keeping those roughs apart, anu the dangei of 
London consists in concentrating them in mass, where they may feel 
themselves sufficiently strong to pick pocket«, smash windows, pool 
down railings, or stone the police with comparative impunity.145
It was tne transition from democratic to criminal activity which conformed
to the sort of expectations present in the idea of a 'dangerous class', and
which defied the argument that political reform was needed to separate the
'respectable' from the 'dangerous' section of the proletariat.
The uneasiness expressed in the political debates at an act of reform 
which might grant political power to the residuum was thus validated by the 
July riots - as again by the defeat of the government's prohibition on meet­
ings in Hyde Park in May of the next year. Both incidents confirmed for 
many that the London authorities were impotent in the face of a city residuum: 
what Matthew Arnold specified as "those vast, miserable, unmanageable masses 
of sunken people. " * 4 6 In the mid-Victorian era, encouraged by economic 
stability, social enquiry had sanguinely established moral and political 
barriers between the criminal and working classes. Established confidence 
in the divide was always troubled by the problems of unregenerate poverty
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and unemployment in the metropolis. But the disturbances in the late 1860s 
further undermined the faith in a diminishing dangerous class, and moment­
arily disappointed the mid-Victorian separation of the dangerous and labour­
ing classes.
The Reform Act riots of 1866 were disturbing signs of the temper of the 
dangerous class. On this occasion, however, the threat of social disorder 
only hastened the demarcation of the dangerous and working classes by confer­
ment of the vote on the 'respectable' portion of the proletariat: an attempt 
to establish a political apartheid between them and the urban residue. Once 
reform was won, indeed, the crisis at a political level evaporated. The 
events in London in the late 1860s were, more importantly, a rehearsal fcr 
the serious social crisis of the 1880s. Already it was possible to detect 
the extent to which the metropolitan social and economic structure defied 
the classifying confidence of the political debates in 1866. The mental 
imagery which gave pride of place to the Lancashire cotton operati’ e was dis­
turbed by the East End of London, with its vast casual labour market, which 
traced an indistinct passage into the semi-criminal paupers and the habitual 
criminals on one side, and into the respectable poor on the other. Accepted 
and wooden configurations of the 'residuum' and the 'respectable working- 
class' were contradicted by the blurred social hierarchy located in London. 
Those who lived by crime, casual labourers forced into crime, and in moments 
of cyclical depression, 'honest industrious labourers' temporarily unemployed, 
were all found in close social proximity. Throughout the 1870s, however, 
there was a continued faith in the diminishing quality of the 'dangerous 
class'. Resilient application of the discriminative techniques of the 
Charity Organization Society was thought to be sufficient to halt the growth 
of the residuum. The fear of social unrest expressed by the London invest­
igators was still out of accord with basic political and social belief. If 
the social investigators described a sediment which was settling in the
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East End, as yet it was used to underscore the virtues of the 'respectable 
working-class'. But the onset of economic depression at the end of the 
1870s announced the striking evaporation of the faith in mid-century assump­
tions. In the early 1880s, London's residuum was more closely examined in 
the context of unsettled economic conditions, and found to be more extensive 
than at first thought. Octavia Mill's evidence before the Royal Commission 
on Housing in 1884 illustrated the change in attitude. Doyen of the moral­
izing approach to the poor, and author of a number of housing schemes, Hill 
was questioned on the proportion of those who lived below the artisans and 
respectable labourers:
I am afraid it is a large part, a very large part, I should have 
said, if you take the destructive class. I hope that the criminal 
class is not so very large; but in the case of the dertructive 
class I do not think you know how high it goes up.148
By the mid-1880s, the residuum was thought to be almost co-extensive with
the labouring force in those East Lnc industries which were characterised
149by seasonality and casualization. Under the scrutiny of a new interpret­
ative lens, the dangerous class had its indefinite boundaries widened to 
absorb the casual pool of labour. In the middle-class perspective, there was 
the recognition of an immense 'social residuum' which confused criminality 
with intermittent labour. At the end of the decade, William Graham in 
"Socialism, New and Old", tried to provide an exhaustive description when he 
referred to a "somewhat indefinite class, half labourers, half idlers... 
the class of casual labourers who live by occasional spells of work...eked 
out sometimes by out-door relief or by other charity, sometimes by the 
labour of wife or children", a numerous class, notably in London:
On its lower side the class is in contact with, or shades down 
into, the lowest social deposit, composed of criminals, semi­
criminals, tramps, professional mendicants, etc., and it and these 
last together constitute the social residuum.
The mid-Victorian tenet that the dangerous class was largely a social prob­
lem encompassed by habitual criminality, a social stratum distinct from the
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labouring poor, was nullified by an investigative mentality which revealed 
that the urban residuum was a significant fraction of working-class London: 
so large that it seemed capable of further contaminating the industrious poor. 
It was this enlarged residuum of the outcast which, in the 1880s, over­
shadowed contemporary disquisition on the social problems of the metropolis 
- poverty, bad housing, unemployment, and the threat of mob rule. In the 
space of a few years, the sense of insecurity felt for the volatile mood of 
the urban poor broadened into a predominant attitude of mind amongst London's 
middle-class. The ideology of the mass of the middle class was progressively 
in close tandem with that of the social investigators; notably in the 
expression of fear in the 'grande peur' of ]8 8 6 .^ '’^  At that moment, when 
disorder which stemmed from the unemployed agitation occurred in the heart 
of the West End, ir was the sharpened perspective on the resident 'dangerous 
class’ which infused the contemporary interpretation of the riots, to be 
examined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE 1880s, THE WEST END RIOTS, AND CONDON'S DANGEROUS CLASS
What, then, it may be asked but crime and misery can 
grow in such soil as that furnished by ''he ever-widen­
ing areas of London's want and misfortune? What but 
the lowest type of physical life can be expected to 
spring from such sources? And be it remembered that the 
genus produced amidst these conditions grows more and 
more criminal in its instincts and desires - that, left 
to itself for generations, it has gone on emphasizing its 
own peculiar progeny, till at length, both in numbers and 
ferocity, it constitutes a grave anxiety and increasing 
danger to the State. Ugly rushes are sometimes talked 
about, dark hints of widespread incendiarism whispered 
abroad. Let the inhabitants of this great city make no 
mistake; there are here ample materials at hand for well- 
nigh universal destruction.
Smouldering in our midst are all the elements for conflag­
ration and social upheaval. We start with horror when con­
templating the bloody furies of '92 in France; but let us 
not be deceived; the capabilities exist in this vast city.
A resort for refugees and desperadoes of all nationalities, 
London contains, in addition to our own dangerous classes, 
a large number of foreign adventurers and restless spirits 
....Many, no doubt, are men of quiet and harmless disposition, 
but others are notoriously desperate and unscrupulous. 
Preaching the most revolutionary doctrines, filleu with a 
violent hatred of all constituted government and authority, 
they must not be left out of account when considering the 
elements of possible disturbance existing around us...The 
fires of insurrection, the furies of anarchy, are their 
daily dreams and desires. To them a city wrapped in flames, 
streets filled with confusion, riot and bloodshed, would 
be a delight. From the throes of such a convulsion these 
men expect a new birth, a new order of liberty, equality and 
fraternity amongst men. To this class new recruits are 
daily added, and on we go manufacturing materials for our 
own destruction.
H. Hargreaves, London: A Warning Voice 
(1887), pp.11-12
The long period of "Great Depression" in Britain, affecting the last 
three decades of the century, was broken by bouts of real slump with mass un­
employment, as in the years 1885 to 1887.1 The severe cyclical depression was 
the culmination of six years of indifferent trade. A large range of London 
occupations was hard hit. Unemployment increased in the shipwright and 
ironfoundry trades, in printing and cabinet-making, but was profound in the
•J
brick-making and building trades, and in the docks. For the casual docker 
or builder's labourer, an unemployment crisis was not a sudden choice be­
tween work and idleness. It merely intensified a regular situation of long 
spells of under-employment, as when winter weather halted work in the brick 
and building trades. In addition, London's principal role as a finishing 
centre for consumer goods determined the small-scale production of many work­
shops and factories whose small overhead costs led to their closure whenever 
trade slackened appreciably. Seasonal unemployment and the prevalence of 
fitful casual work was the norm in numerous London trades, now aggravated by 
the cyclical depression.^ Writing at the start of 1886, Engels described 
the depth of the depression, and the recent reversal of small signs of 
trade improvement:
Now this has all faded away again, the distress is greater than 
ever and the lack of prospects, too, added to an unusually severe 
winter. This is now already the eighth year of the pressuie of 
over-production on the markets and instead of getting better it 
is steadily getting worse.'*
As a result, London was afflicted by social distress which over-burdened 
the traditional relief agencies, and challenged the principles on which their 
charitable donations were based. ^ At a more fundamental level than in the 
late 1860s, unemployment, poverty and social discontent returned. Of necess­
ity, in the course of the next decade, these inveterate social problems were 
scrutinized with an adjusted focus.
Worsening economic conditions coincided with, and gave the spur to, an 
altered outlook on the problem of the urban 'residuum'. No longer was it 
calmly viewed as a small substratum in the social hierarchy. It seemed not 
to fit the mould designed by mid-century opinion. Adjustment to the problem 
of a 'dangerous class', which seemed to be enveloping larger sections of 
the labouring poor in the East End, developed in particular through study 
of a besetting metropolitan problem, that of inner-city housing. The rigid 
demarcation which middle-class observers expected in the social hierarchy
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was challenged by the revealed proximity of the criminal and labouring 
classes in their living arrangements; forced together by the crisis in the 
provision of working-class housing. This was the major strand in the renewed 
debate around 1883 on working-class housing, a theme familiar since Bea~mes' 
"The Rookeries of London" (1850) : the herding together of the labouring and 
criminal classes.^ First stressed in George Sims' articles (collected to­
gether in "How the Poor Live") it was given widespread publicity in the 
legendary pamphlet, "The Bitter Cry of Outcast London", in which the Congreg- 
ationalist minister, Andrew Mearns, was unable to document any social barriers 
between the casual poor and the criminal poor.^ Such was the housing problem 
that the labouring poor necessarily reared their children in a tainted moral 
environment. Overcrowding and high rents pushed the industrious and honest 
poor to lodge with the criminal. And the commonest contemporary remedy, of
gslum clearance of the crowded inner-city areas, only intensified the problem. 
The Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes, appointed in
1884, fully confirmed the worst fears about the interpenetration of the crim-
9inai and labouring poor.
Considered now as an authority on slum conditions, particularly the 
Mint district and Southwark, George Sims gave evidence before the Royal 
Commission;
In these districts the criminal classes and working classes are 
absolutely intermixed; the criminal classes prefer these places 
...in as dirty a hole as possible; and the poor people are driven 
to herd with them and they become a mixed class.
Confirmatory evidence came from Reverend John Horsley, Chaplain of Clerken-
well prison, when he was asked to describe overcrowding in those districts
occupied solely by the labouring population:
They are unfortunately very much mixed up, the criminal class 
is not a very homogeneous entity.
—  a remarkable admission, in utter contrast to mid-century confidence in the 
isolation of the criminal class.Inevitably, the political effect of hous-
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ing inadequacy was approached. In the course of Andrew Hearns' testimony
before the Royal Commission, Cardinal Manning asked whether such housing
conditions were productive of social discontent. Meams replied that this
was the case particularly in the East End. Manning went on:
And next it takes a political form in the more educated amongst 
them? - It does so, undoubtedly. 12
Overcrowded and insanitary housing was the most tangible form of evidence in 
the early 1880s to illustrate the contamination of the 'honest labouring
iclass; the increased size of the 'residuum'; and the incubation of social 
discontent. In a context of bad housing provision, and worsening unemployment 
amongst the unskilled work force, the East End slums threatened social equil­
ibrium. In the sensational words of Frank Harris, re-housing "may also
13be regarded as an insurance paid by the rich against revolution."
Social disorder was at the root of the new attentions paid to the urban 
'residuum'. Awareness of the dangers in the urban environment i:i the 1880s 
emerged through a 'potage' of religious zeal, secular humanitarianism and 
class guilt, but it was barbed by the fear of social anarchy. George Sims 
exposed the nerve-end in the contemporary consciousness when he described a 
degenerate, racially-mongrelized mob, product of the ennervating slum con­
ditions of the metropolis:
This mighty mob of famished, diseased and filthy helots is ^  
getting dangerous, physically, morally, politically dangerous.
Inherent anxiety for social discontent was fed by the unemployed agitations, 
organized from 1884 by working-class membex-s of the Social Democratic Feder­
ation in Battersea, Camberwell and Bermondsey. Processions of unemployed 
workers visited the local authorities demanding of them higher relief scales, 
or employment on public works such as housing. * 5 What seemed more disturbing 
in the mid-1880s was that unemployment affected not only the casual labourers 
but also the 'respectable working-class'.*^ Already, London's middle-class 
was concerned to find that the respectable working-class, notably those who
were members of the plebeian political clubs, were attracted to the radical 
ideas of the early 1880s. Prior to the unemployed agitation, there were 
disquieting signs that the highest reaches of the respectable working-class 
were sharpening their traditional radicalism, particularly apparent in the 
response to Henry George's "Progress and Poverty" whose proposal for a Single 
Tax aimed at making land common property. In 1882, George, a severe critic 
of classical economics, was well-received by the radical working-class in 
London when he spoke out against the accepted permanence of the capitalist 
system. ^  It was most discomforting, therefore, when the traditional distinc­
tion between the residuum and the respectable was endangered by their joint 
involvement in the unemployed agitation. Here was undeniable evidence of 
the possible combination of the respectable and casual poor. The socialist 
organizations were not unaware of the distinctions between the residuum and 
the skilled working-class (and were indeed to have their political analyses 
confounded by the existence of such distinctions), but their social surveys 
of poverty, as in 18S5, were unalloyed with comforting references to an 'idle' 
and an 'industrious' poor. In the 1885 survey, poverty was described as a 
common feature of large portions of the working-class, respectable and casual. 
And in their propaganda they referred to 'the unemployed', whether of casual 
labourers or of the respectable working man, temporarily and exceptionally 
unemployed. This was anathema to contemporary belief. As Charles Booth, the 
social investigator, said at the end of the decade:
It is the plan of agitators... to confound the two in one, to talk 
of 'starving millions' and to tack on the thousands of the working 
classes to the tens and hundreds of distress.
Booth had internalized the contemporary distinction, ardently maintained in
the 1880s, between the 'dangerous class' and the 'respectable working-class'.
Unemployment, poverty and distress were the permanent characteristics alone
of the city 'residuum'. As the "Times" argued, two days prior to the first
material outburst of popular disturbance, in February 1886, "the great store­
house of the unemployed" was the residuum, "content to work as little as 
possible and almost always in distress". It was a moral category, of men 
who preferred casual labour, pauper 'aristocrats' whose work rhythm was in­
tentionally relaxed; a sediment supplied by premature and improvident marriage 
and by the habit of drunkenness, to which the unthrifty gravitated:
Some of its members are born into it, but it is chiefly recruited 
from the incapable or immoral who have fallen out of the ranks of 
respectable labour. 2 0
It was the residuum which, in the 1880s in London, was augmented by inclusion 
within it of practically the whole of the casualized labouring poor. The 
casual poor were considered to be so intertwined morally and socially with 
the criminal classes and idle unemployed, that they were given as hostage 
to the 'dangerous class' to forestall the more pernicious contamination of 
the 'respectable working-class'. Confronted by an unrelieved mass of East 
End poverty, unsettled by economic depression, provocatively displayed by 
the Socialist organizations, the terminology of a 'dangerous class' was applied 
to an immense stratum of crime, indigence and casual labour.
The 1880s were, in all, a turning-point in British history. Economic 
depression, intensified by foreign competition and imperialist rivalry, and 
the manifest failure of traditional institutions to repair the consequent 
social distress, undermined the theoretical certainties of the mid-Victorian 
era. It became obvious in the course of the decade that the available social 
theories, in explanation of social action and social infirmity, did not corres­
pond to material conditions. In response to this discrepancy between social 
theory and social fact, old assumptions were made to yield to a new formul­
ation of urban problems, and to the attempt to find new avenues for their 
solution. In the 1880s, the intellectual tradition of economic liberalism, 
of 'laissez-faire' individualism, struggled with the emerging concepts of 
social organization. As a result, historians have interpreted the social 
crisis which affected middle-class London as the earliest penetrating attack
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on established liberal ideology. The propertied were most directly worried,
however, by the internal cracks in London's social tranquility. The capacity
for orderly absorption of internal conflict, which had been strong during
22the mid-century years of economic expansion, contracted in the 1880s. At 
the beginning of 1886, when the unemployed agitation in London finally 
resulted in a spontaneous outburst of rioting, the apprehensions of a maraud­
ing dangerous class, moving out from the East End, were confirmed. The riots 
released an involuntary spasm of middle-class panic, at this practical demon­
stration by London's 'underclass'. In 1887, Henry Solly spoke on "Our 
Vagrant and Criminal Classes" before the Charity Organization Society, and, 
with familiar rhetoric, interpreted the riots:
If the 'dangerous classes' were taught by that outbrea'« that they 
have only to get a few hours' start of the police for looting on 
a large scale, and the respectable classes were not taught on how 
thin a crust our boasted civilization and security rest, as well as 
what volcanic fires underlies that crust, rather serious earthquakes 
may come when unexpected, and because they were unexpected.23
At last Solly had an audience which was unduly attentive to the threat posed
by the dangerous class.
The West End Riots
In January 1886, the newly-elected Liberal Government prepared to replace
24the defeated Conservative ministers, and to start the parliamentary session.
At the very point of change-over, there occurred the unexpected bout of riot­
ing in the centre of London. During 1885 and 1886, Socialist organizations 
working around the issue of unemployment had been challenged by a protection­
ist agitation under the auspices of the Fair Trade League. Financed particul­
arly by the large sugar-refineries in St. George's-in-the-East (and also not 
averse it seems to accepting Tory party money), the Fair Trade League respond­
ed to foreign 'dumping' by using the unemployed dockers and waterside workers
25of the East End to fabricate working-class support for protectionism. Tne 
campaign was organized through a number of bogus labour unions such as the
21
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General Labourer's Amalgamated Union. The meeting in Trafalgar Square on 
the afternoon of February 8th was called by the Fair Trade League, in support 
of protectionist tariffs. On hearing that the meeting was convened by "four 
of the most infamous scoundrels that ever wore boot-leather in the streets 
of London" - reference to Peters, Kelly, Kenny and Lemon, the agents of bogus 
unionism and the protectionist agitation - John Bums, engineer and member
of the Social Democratic Federation, resolved to address the assembled unem-
26ployed on the merits of socialism. In the Square, between ten and twenty 
thousand unemployed dockers and building workers were grouped either around
2the banner of the Labourer's Union, or listening to the speakers of the S.D.F.
The afternoon meetings ended when fights broke out between the two contingents,
at which point members of the S.D.F. suggested another meeting in Hyde Park.
A group of four thousand moved off towards Pall Mall, "the street of the big
28political, aristocratic and high-capitalist clubs", as Engels described it.
The straggling march-past brought the members of the Carlton and Reform Clubs 
to their windows to deride the 'great unwashed'. At the Reform Club, Hunter 
Watts of the S.D.F. spoke:
' We have come up here in order to show these men who call themselves 
our Governors and Rulers how they have mistaken us...We must tell 
these men who live in these Clubs that they can no longer be allowed'
The outcome was extensive damage to the clubs from stone-throwing, a mere pre­
lude however to a general attack on visible wealth in the form of shops and 
passing carriages. By the time the Achilles Statue was reached near Hyde 
Park Corner, the ardour of the S.D.F. had cooled. John Williams' speech at 
the Statue was recorded by the journalist, William Barking:
'Kindly go home - for the simple reason that there are a number 
of roughs who take delight in smashing windows - and don't do it 
because they want work - don't attempt a rebellion when you are 
not organized for it.' 30
After a meeting in Hyde Park where, according to the Metropolitan police,"the 
leaders condemned any plundering although using very seditious language", the
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crowd continued its shop-raiding down South Audley Street and Oxford Street 
before moving back to the East End.^ The black banner of the unemployed 
lent its name to 'Black Monday', in the annals of propertied London: a few 
hours of rioting within the hallowed region of Pall Mall, productive of an 
estimated £50,000 damage. ^
The news of the disorder only slowly filtered out from the West End.
Lord Herschell, recently sworn as Lord Chancellor, had taken his seat as
Speaker of the Lords in the afternoon of February 8th. Afterwards he, Lady
Herschell, and Victor Williamson drove to Brooks' Club. Williamson recorded
their drive which passed into the damaged streets:
'A strange sight presented itself on our arrival in St. James's 
street. The windows of all the Clubs and most of the shops were 
smashed, and the pavements littered with the fragments of broken 
glass. The lower windows of Brooks' were completely v.'recked. There 
had been a meeting of the unemployed in Trafalgar Square, which had 
resulted in a progress of a disorderly mob through Pall Mall...It 
was a scandalous incident for which the apathy of the police was much 
blamed* 33
On the same day, around lunchtime, the new Home Secretary, Hugh Childers, had
been assured at the Home Office by the heads of police that all preparations
were made for the meeting in the Square, and, as he told his son a few days
34later, "I could not have made any changes even had I wished." At 6.30 in 
the evening, his private secretary, Stephen Simeon, brought a message from 
his wife in Piccadilly;
'I know how deeply you will grieve to hear of the death of Uncle 
Childers. Our windows have escaped, but those of our neighbours
have suffered'33
The Home Secretary asked to know the meaning of the last sentence, which, said
Simeon,"fI was unable to do, having had no communication from the police, and
having no idea that any riot had occurred. I at once telegraphed to Scotland
.» 36Yard. No one in the Home Office had the remotest idea of what had occurred. 
Frederick Engels was not alone in suggesting, on the basis of the inertness
of the police, that "the row was wanted" by Conservative police commissioners,
baptising the incoming Liberal Government. The evidence points rather to
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the incapacity of the Metropolitan force to communicate with itself, and
for smaller sections to act on initiative and not on command against the demon 
38stration. The most decisive police action against the crowd which moved 
off towards the West End was to send a detachment of police to Pall Mall, 
but a confused message led them instead to the Mall. Elsewhere, the inferior
officers seemed reluctant to act against the visible rioting which was taking 
39place. As the "Times" said - "the West End was for a couple of hours in 
40the hands of the mob."
Worse riots had occurred in most years in coal-mining disputes, anti- 
Catholic affrays, or even at election times, but not in the heart of the cap­
ital. London was not only the centre of the country's commercial and finan­
cial system, but in recent decades had acquired a reputation as the special 
home cf security and property. Disturbances which revealed that the prin­
cipal thoroughfares of the West End were left without adequate police protec­
tion naturally sent shock-waves through the nervous system of the propertied 
middle-class. There followed the days of February 9th and 10th, when, accord­
ing to Bernard Shaw, there was ample material for "a study of West End mob
41panic", as the normally-repressed class-fears of the bourgeoisie surfaced.
As Charles Warren later recalled: "London was subject to a three days' reign 
of abject terror, pitiful and ridiculous."^- Rumours of predatory mobs march­
ing on the West End were fanned by the heavy fog of the following days. On 
uFeb^ary 9th, rumour had it that dock labourers from the East End were massing 
for a second attack on property in the West;4  ^ whilst on the 10th in the 
East and North of London, "the small shopkeepers and the real working men", 
according to the "Times", were warned to beware of the rough gangs said to be 
marching in each near neighbourhood. " 4 4 The panic spread out from London, 
causing Nottingham Watch Committee to prohibit demonstrations "of the persons 
styling themselves 'the unemployed'," and to strengthen their police force, 
rendered necessary by "the recent events which have taken place both in the
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Metropolis and in other p l a c e s . I n  Birmingham, public meetings in open 
spaces after dark were stopped, and labour disturbances which resulted from 
a 10% wage reduction at Nettlefold of Smethwick, were watched with anxiety.^ 
In Leicester, riots occurred as part of the strike of hosiery workers, for 
which, the local paper argued, "the riots in London.. .were much more respon­
sible than the Trade Unionists."  ^ And there were fears of imitative out-
48breaks in Bristol and Manchester. But it was London which reacted most 
sharply.
For the whole of the week following the riots, there was a self-inflicted
'reign of terror'. Press reports were underpinned by correspondence expressive
49of the collective bourgeois indignation. The genre had no richer form than
in Beatrix Potter's diary.^ tor days she could think of little else. The
day after the riots, on the strength of her father's account, she wrote:
Not a shop open Hast of Albert Gate. The shopkeepers in Kntgfcts- 
bridge were strengthening their shutters with planks. He could 
hardly get through to the Club, the streets were thronged with 
dirty roughs. He was so alarmed that he came home at once.
She also queried - "...are we to have something like the Gordon Riots again?"
On February 10th she made the following entry:
The authorities yesterday frankly admitted their inability to keep 
order, and advised the shops to close, posting extra police at some 
of the jewellers.
The consequence was recorded by her on the 11th - "There seems to have been 
a perfect panic yesterday. All Southwark and the East End shut up and barri­
caded, from the rumours of a mob of ten-thousand roughs from Greenwich and 
Deptford, who however, did not arrive, and the police managed the local rabble 
after a fashion.
The bridges were guarded, the troops held in readiness at the 
barracks, and a guard at the banks. The shops in the Strand and 
West End closed in the afternoon. The alarm spread even to this 
part, the shop-keepers in the Fulham Road at one time believing 
the Mob was coming."51
Another facet of the middle-class reaction to the riots was the outpouring
of charitable donations. For all the bluster of Beatrix Potter's father, 
he contributed £30 to the Mansion House Appeal fund. The startling increase 
in subscriptions to the fund in the days after the riots reflected the attempt 
of propertied London to disarm the menacing discontent of the urban poor. In 
the attempt, the lessons taught by the Charity Organization Society, partic­
ularly the prescribed distinction between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving'
52poor, were entirely ignored. For the immediate protection of property, ran­
som payments seemed the best insurance against futher disorder.
In the following weeks, the 'reign of terror' of those first few days looked 
slightly incongruous as it became clearer that the dangerous class of the East
End had not been near the verge of mass uprising, but that middle-class London
53had only exposed its fear of such an event. But if there was confusion as 
to what should be the correct response to the riots, if London had not in fact 
narrowly escaped social upheaval, the disturbances nevertheless left a perman 
ent scar on the middle-class mind. The West End riot cast a shadow, for 
example, across the articles on London's destitute which appeared in the "Globe 
throughout February 1886. The publicist, Alexis Krausse,consistently argued 
that misery and want could push the distressed poor in*-o open rebellion; and 
concluded the instalments by reminding his readers of the possible conjunction 
of the depressed urban strata:
We have in this London of ours a vast criminal population. It was 
a section of this fraternity who sacked the West-end a few weeks ago.
We have a number of unprincipled individuals who ply their trade by 
preaching revolution and inciting riot. We have, as I have so indubit­
ably shown, a vast number of hungry men, men with wills of their own, 
with honest hearts and of respectable antecedents, their stomachs 
empty, their children sickly, their future a blank. What if these 
three elements were to come together?... The people of Starving London 
are suffering in silence. They may not always do so. 5 4
In the interpretative framework adopted by the propertied in explanation of
the West End riots, there was continued proof that they believed London was
still faced with potential social disorder from a degenerate urban residuum.
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The Middle-Class Interpretation
The fear of social anarchy released by the riots in 1886 deeply influen­
ced the literary contribution of the 1880s. W. H. Mailock in "The Old Order 
Changes" and George Gissing in "Demos" both incorporated the West End riots 
into their novels. The incident formed part of their evaluation of the 
revolutionary threat in the 1880s, and their interpretation pointed to the 
tenour of contemporary judgements made immediately after the riots. In 
Gissing, the riot at the close of "Demos" was laid at the feet of "the raff 
of a city, anticipating with pleasure all uproar which would give them unwonted 
opportunities of violence and p i l l a g e . F o r  a careful (yet unsympathetic) ob 
server of working-class life and of the issues involved in the unemployed 
agitations, Gissing nevertheless interpreted the riot as an outburst of the 
"dangerous class", London's barbarians, potential iconoclasts of West End 
civilization. For K. H. Mallock, foremost Conservative theorist of the 1880s, 
energetic pamphleteer of the Liberty and Property Defence League, the threat 
posed in the West End riot was similarly that of the city 'underclass'. In 
"The Old Order Changes", the unemployed mob marching past the clubs, as they 
had done on February 8th, was "a black advancing mass, moving like some great 
volume of semi-liquid s e w a g e . I m m e d i a t e l y  after the riot, Mallock has 
Carew pen a letter to a contemporary journal warning against what the latter 
terms "explosive misery". Those who fell into privation, the "diseased 
secretion", became by the "laws of social chemistry" a source of social dyn­
amite, whose fuse was available to the agitator.^ For both novelists, the 
emphasis was on a vast urban lumpenproletariat. Their view mirrored what 
was the general exegesis of propertied London. The latter, however, stressed 
not only the fear of a dangerous class, but also continued confidence in 
the 'respectable working-class' of London. Bona fide workmen were said to 
have largely shunned the Trafalgar Square meeting, and certainly took no part 
in the subsequent riots. Beatrix Potter abstracted the gloss - "No one seems
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to lay the blame on the working men, it is the Jacobins, roughs and thieves.
58The papers unite in condemnation."
This was the pre-eminent response to the riots: the comforting assertion 
which refused, as the "Times" said, "to believe that the riot was the work 
of bona fide unemployed workmen."'’" "G.W.C." of Park Lane reassured the 
Editor that a real working man would no more destroy property than "a banker 
or a Cabinet Minister. They leave that to the brigands and the ruffians who 
are always with us."^ Mr. C.T. Ritchie, member of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the riots, insisted that it was unjust "to charge the unemployed working­
men in the East End of London as being in any degree the authors of these 
riots."  ^ The blame fell squarely on what the "Fortnightly Review" called
"the vile residuum which underlies the healthy life of the community," the
6 2"professional scoundrelism of city life." In the Lords, there was agreement
according to Viscount Middleton, that the disturbances "were not tie work of
the honest working man, but were perpetrated mainly by the criminal class.
Robert Walker, District Superintendent of Police, on duty inside the Square
on the 8th, considered that the unemployed had not come "for mischief":
But it is easy to understand that there would be five to one
who did come with evil intent - the male representatives of 'honest
labour' being howhere' in that mass of the scum of the Metropolis.64
Police reports were bolstered by indignation meetings, particularly of the 
bogus General Amalgamated Labourers' Union (front for the Fair Trade League).^ 
Patrick Kenney, general secretary of the union, accused the S.D.F. of lead­
ing "the Scum and the Criminal Classes from the purlieus of Westminster, the 
Seven Dials, Flower and Dean Street, and the sweepings of the Common Lodging
• i ( 6 6Houses of the Metropolis," and of inciting "the Dangerous Classes to riot.
The London unemployed workmen were urged to attend the Clerkenwell Green 
meeting on February 14th to protest against the riots and "the Wealthy Leaders 
of the Social Democratic Federation." Seeking working-class support for 
protectionism, the "Fair Trade" journal firmly supported the view that the
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disturbances were the responsibility of "the roughs of London who had
turned out from the lowest slums... those who batten on other men's labour":
The working men of London, whether employed or unemployed, had 
no part or lot in such a mode of exciting popular attention.67
The immediate response to the event of social disturbance in 1886 con­
firmed the emphatic desire to separate out the "dangerous" from the working 
classes; to portray the riots as part of the predatory inclinations of the 
former class. It was the "seditious" unemployed and not the "real" unemployed 
who were responsible: the riots indeed were said to be prejudicial to the 
relief of the "true" unemployed. Evidence was also amassed to show working- 
class indignation at being thought the author of the social disorder. And 
when the continental press took advantage of the rare occasion to lead on 
'revolutionary London', the "Times" correspondent quickly corrected the 
erroneous assumptions to be found in the Berlin press, "that those who looted
the shops at the IVest-end were poor and starving but honest working men, and
68not. the criminal riff-raff of Whitechapel and the Seven Dials." In a metro­
politan industrial and economic context which defied clear-cut social categor­
isation, the attempt was nevertheless made to delineate clearly the residuum 
from the 'honest working-class'. The result of such distinct categorization 
was to reinforce the abandonment of the casualized workforce to membership 
of the urban residuum. Included within the residuum, as a constituent part 
of the threat this social group represented, was the vast pool of unskilled 
labour. Its potential for social disorder was uppermost in contemporary 
publications. Samuel Smith's investigations, by way of example, gave warning 
for the social fabric from "the great floating element of casual unskilled
„69labour which abounds in our large towns, and especially in the metropolis.
A signal ignorance of the London industrial structure, and notably of the cas­
ual labour market, fashioned a dangerous class of intimidating proportions.
The contemporary framework of interpretation could not, in consequence, claim 
the vast unskilled workforce of the East End for the side of public order.
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The Socialist Interpretation
The middle-class interpretation of the Pall Mall riots was based on con­
fidence in the possibility of differentiating the working-class, including 
those who were unemployed, from the 'residuum' or casual poor. But what of 
the socialists, the organizers for over a year of the unemployed agitation?
Did they rally to the defence of the unemployed, the "poor and starving but 
honest working men", provoked by social distress to an outburst of rioting?
Did they insist that the riots showed the depth of the unemployment crisis 
in London; or suggest that London's working-class was at last beginning to 
move towards a socialist critique of capitalist society? In fact, they dis­
played an attitude towards the riots which affirmed, paradoxically, the 
contemporary distinction between the true working-class ar.c the large resid- 
mmi of unskilled and criminal poor. It is important to reflect on why their 
judgement of the riots approximated the standard interpretation, and from 
what imperatives their judgement derived. Despite their conviction that 
the riots were a sign of the desperate plight of the workless, the early 
socialists were ultimately confused by the spontaneous outburst of disorder.
As with the middle-class evaluation of the riots, the socialist interpretation 
was overshadowed by the fact that their followers, both in Trafalgar Square 
and during the riots, were predominantly recruited from the casual poor.
Initial reaction from H.H. Champion and Henry Ilyndman was delight at the 
prominence the S.D.F. now claimed in the unemployed campaign, and satisfaction 
that at last their predictions for the breakdown of the old order, manifested 
in unemployment, poverty and the concomitant attacks on property, were shown 
to have substance.^70 But the initial bravado was replaced by an equivocal 
attitude to the r i o t s . I n  the subsequent trial of the leading members 
of the S.D.F., Henry Hyndman seemed eager to transfer responsibility for 
the riots. The crowd which he had led down Pall Mall became the 'bought' 
minions of the Fair Trade League. The rioters were transposed into the
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city lumpenproletariat, renowned as the malleable constituents of spontan­
eous outbursts of rioting; the 'bribed tools' (as the "Communist Manifesto" 
reminded) of Conservative and protectionist intrigue. Other members of 
the S.D.F. seemed anxious to avoid a recurrence of such disturbances. II.W.
Lee, secretary to the S.D.F., asked for police assistance for the meeting 
in Hyde Park on Febrary 21st, "as a repetition of the proceedings on the 8th 
is what we specially wish and which we'll do our utmost to avoid (sic)"^ 
William Morris of the rival Socialist League was less ambivalent. He in no 
way countenanced a permanent policy of disorder; he described the riots, at
a speech before the Hammersmith Liberal Club, as "lamentable occurrences"; and
75he was rattled "that it rather rehabilitates Hyndman." Even so, he felt 
it was a "revolutionary incident", "the stir in the dry bones of labour.
And he was far less hasty to dismiss the unemployed who had assembled in the 
Square:
The mass of the crowd, from what I can hear (I was not present), 
was composed of workmen, but of course there were bound to be a 
certain number of professional thieves (who after all are a necess­
ary product of our Society).??
It was Frederick Engels's commentary on the riots, however,which was most
opinionated, and most intense in its criticism of the S.D.F.'s foolishness
in involving itself in the riots. And Engels sharply revealed the Socialist
insistence on distinguishing between the 'residuum' and the working class.
His letter to Laura Lafargue, the day after the riot, reflected his contempt
for crude street looting by the outcast poor:
Of course you know what a meeting at 3 p.m. in Trafalgar Square 
consists of: masses of the poor devils of the East End who vegetate 
in the borderland between working class and Lumpenproletariat, and 
a sufficient admixture of roughs and 'Arrys to^leaven the whole into 
a mass ready for any 'lark' up to a wild riot a propos de rien.'
His attitude hardened as he learnt from Karl Kautsky that "the mass of the real
workers" had been around the fair-trade platform, "whilst Hyndman and Co. had
u79a mixed audience of people looking for a lark, some of them already merry."
The 'unemployed’ who followed the S.D.F. out of the Square, according to Engels
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"were mostly the types who do not want work anyhow, hawkers, loafers, police
spies, pickpockets..." The following procession to Hyde Park had been composed
of "the masses of the Lumpenproletariat whom Hyndman had taken for the unem- 
80ployed." The premature bust-up had made possible, he thought, the linkage 
of Socialism and looting, and damaged the incipient movement. In this 
particular judgement Engels was hardly excessive. The riots stiffened the sus­
picions held for the Socialist movement by the skilled working class, more 
inward-looking and cautious in the trough of severe economic depression. The
Amalgamated Society of Engineers immediately disclaimed John Bums and his 
82politics. And there was, perhaps, some truth in the Fair Trade journal's
statement - "there is not a workshop in London this week from which an indig-
83nant protest against the scene of Monday may not be heard." The riots,
for Engels, were a far cry from a serious working-class movement which,a
month earlier, had seemed feasible to him, once it became apparent that there
was a drastic alteration in the intensity of economic slump, and that Britain's
84industrial monopoly was nullified by foreign competition. Instead, the
disturbances had closed the avenues into the skilled working class which
were opening for political education.
But what was the basis of Engels' rejoinder that the riot had nothing
to do with the unemployed agitation of the working-class; that the rioters
85were of the lumpenproletariat, not unemployed working men? First, was he 
correct to segregate the rioters from the unemployed working class? Evidence 
from court appearances on the following days is an uncertain guide, but it 
lends confirmation to Engels' judgement that the working-class of London, 
by his definition, were not involved. Instead the rioters were drawn from 
typical London casual trades, and associated residual occupations: exactly 
the social categories which, along with the beggar, huckster and jailbird, 
Engels included in or on the border of the lumpenproletariat. In comparison, 
the 'exceptionally' - unemployed working men, the 'reserve army of labour',
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were clearly not of this grouping of the slum proletariat. The distinction
was prominent in Engels' mind. Castigating the involvement of the slum rowdy
in the riots, he nevertheless wrote to Bebel on February 15th, delighting
in the powerful ferment amongst the unemployed masses. Engels' genuine
working men might be victims of a slump, but their normal situation was to
be in work. The casual labourers, however, were in seasonal trades with
built-in and regular periods of unemployment. These last-mentioned conditions,
he believed, dragged the metropolitan unskilled into close social proximity
with the lumpenproletariat. Engels thus betrayed his feelings towards the
casual labouring poor: a workforce, unlike a proper industrial proletariat,
existing precariously on intermittent earnings, and only one-remove from the
street people more customarily associated with the lumpenproletariat. In
keeping with this differentiation in terms of regularity of employment, went
an attitude of suspicion for the organizational and political worth of the
'lumpen'. The criminal, loafer, and slum rowd" were the unpredictable and
unreliable actors in the arbitrary violence of street rows. They were r.ot
88the recruits vital to an organized labour movement. The Pall Mall riot, 
for Engels, thus contained all the features which he deplored - aimless vandalisr1 
devoid of political purpose, unreflective of mass working-class organization. 
Engels' response, in all, confirmed the Marxist definition of the lumpen-
prletariat - "which in all big towns forms a mass sharply differentiated from
89the industrial proletariat."
But this was a categorization founded on observation of fully-industrialized 
urban areas, and not on London's 'pre-industrial' structure. In moderacapit- 
alist society the point of production was the crucial arena for working-class 
struggle; the industrial proletariat was the agent of socialist transformation.
In London, however, it was with great difficulty that an industrial proletariat 
could be located. The metropolis was the haven of casual labour; of small, 
disunited workshops, characterized rather by undercutting of wages amongst
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the 'sweated' workers - in all, conditions of work which did not promote a 
permanent class-consciousness. Yet Engels was not to be forced into a specific 
political analysis for London conditions. The 'true' working-class, in Engels' 
opinion, had the chance of pulling itself clearly away from the ill-defined 
'gutter proletariat' in the Dock Strike of 1889. Engels' applause for the 
arrival on stage of the unskilled dock labourer reflected his concern with 
an organized working-class movement. His hope was that casual labour would 
'decasualize' itself by entering the ranks of the organized working-class.
At the same moment that the dock workers formed into an unskilled union, Engels 
pointed the political moral:
This is cf enormous value for the movement. Scenes like those 
which occurred during Hyndman's procession through Pall Mall and 
Piccadilly will then become impossible and the rowdy who will 
want to provoke a riot will simply be knocked dead.90
The city residuum was, in all, denied any role in the socialist movement. In
their assessment of the West End riots, the progressive left as much as the
conservative right insisted on distinguishing between the labouring force and
the 'unemployables' or residuum. Only sections of anarchism, notably the
grouping around Frank Kitz of the Socialist League, seriously reflected on
apolitical campaign directed towards the 'lumpenproletariat', and reserved
91a strategic role for the residuum in its revolutionary prospectus. Engels, 
doyen of the developing socialist movement in London in the 1880s, mentally 
compartmentalized the industrial working class and the slum proletariat, des­
pite the consequent consignment of a large proportion of London's unskilled 
labouring poor into the bourgeois construction of an urban residuum. From 
the standpoint of the incipient socialist organizations, the exacting nature 
of political work amidst London's casual poor led them to concentrate even more 
on those sections of the working class which were capable of organization.
It was finally ironic that in the consciousness of propertied London in the 
mid-1880s, the cutting edge of working-class political activity was represented!
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by the dangerous class: a vast, segregated stratum of criminals, unemploy­
ables and casual labour which was thought to dominate the working class 
regions of the East End.
It has been argued that the 1880s in London witnessed a recrudescence 
of the fear of social disorder posed by a dangerous class concentrated in 
the 'barracks’ of the East End. The threat was enhanced by the deteriorating 
economic outlook and the rise in unemployment in an industrial setting domin­
ated by under-employed, unskilled labour. Ardent attempts made at mid-century 
to reduce the size of the urban residuum foundered on a renewed recognition 
of the confusion of crime, poverty and labour in the East End. In February 
1886, the riots confirmed the mounting fears about the revolutionary threat 
of the residuum. The interpretative response of propertied London to the 
momentary challenge to public order in the mid 1880s ill.-strafed the re-awak­
ened apprehension for the swelling aggregates of outcast poor. It was no 
coincidence that in a city which maintained a ’pre-industrial' structure of 
economic production there was a 'pre-industrial' definition of the urban mob: 
one which stressed the 'riff-raff' theory of urban violence. Yet, in res­
ponse to the bourgeois description of meaningless mob behaviour, the socialist 
and radical bodies failed to put forward an alternative interpretation. Their 
failure was testimony to the way in which the whole political spectrum was 
infected by London's unskilled labour market and its mass of distressed poor.
The Dangerous Class and Juridical Policy
The discovery in the 1880s of a dangerous class, swollen in size, and 
an ominous threat to London's social order, naturally redounded on the author­
ities responsible for law enforcement, and in particular on the policy demanded 
of them after the West End riots. Insurance against disorder was sought, in 
part, in a tougher policy towards outdoor demonstrations: that radical activ-
(
ity which was thought to be the stimulus to the 'roughs' and criminal classes.
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The details altered, but the council was unvarying. Viscount Cranbrook
urged the prohibition of assemblages of mobs in the centre of London, whilst
Lord Lamington wanted all meetings and processions in the squares and parks
93on Sunday declared illegal. And the Queen concurred:
Her Majesty believes that, strictly speaking, a public meeting 
in Trafalgar Square is illegal; and, if so, asks whether after the 
recent riot you would not be justified in forbidding tumultuous 
assemblages in that place?94
The lesson of the West End riot was also to recognize the threat that had
been posed by the street and park meetings over the previous few years. When
measures were taken to break up Sunday morning socialist meetings in Dod
Street in the summer of 1885, "the police were employed in preventing a very
95real danger", according to the "Saturday Review". Retrospective justific­
ation was brought to the original instinct to ben the Dod Street meetings. 
Firmer provision for future security was sought, however, in structural 
changes within the metropolitan police. Whilst the first Committee of Inquiry 
as to the origin of the disturbances was sitting, the Marquess of Salisbury 
referred to "an absolute breakdown of the machinery for the maintenance of 
order." His censure of police efficiency was not accepted by everyone.
Sir William Harcourt saw tne riot as a "most lamentable accident", unlikely 
to recur, and insufficient ground for an alteration in the system of police
administration.^ He was joined by R.A. Cross, Home Secretary in the previous
98Tory administration, who similarly discouraged "thorough re-organisation". 
Nevertheless, revision was recommended in the report of the first committee 
of inquiry when it urged the formation of another committee to investigate 
police organization more fully. There followed, in consequence, a slight 
re-adjustment in the structure of the force. The first committee of inquiry 
in February 1886 had criticized the defective "chain of responsibility" in 
the force and regretted the shortage of superior officers with education, or 
with "experience in the habit of command." Action taken on the recommend­
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ations of the second committee led to the revival of the moribund posts
of District Superintendent, designed to connect the police divisions more
intimately with Scotland Yard. In addition to these two new appointments,
three assistant chief constables were appointed - all five positions filled
with previous military officers. ^  These appointments seemingly exhausted
the drive for re-organization since no further changes were made. It was
widely announced that the police deficiencies, revealed during the riots when
it was clear the metropolitan force was not equal to a sudden and emergent
call, had been remedied. As one publicist recorded:
The force has been overhauled and re-organized, and arrangements so 
made, that a repetition of the late disturbances is practically im­
possible. 1 0 1
But by no means all observers were convinced that the repressive force was
102any more adequate for the control of riot and ruffianism. The ur.entnusinst- 
ic attempt at decentralization to replace the flexibility in the force's move­
ments was indeed stifled by a cumbrous police structure which had always been 
characterized by excessive centralization. Basic to that structure, as 
detailed in the earlier chapter, was the large discretionary authority held 
by the Chief Commissioner of Police over the actual form of law enforcement 
in the maintenance of public order. For this reason, the immediate practical 
response to the riots, the appointment of Sir Charles Warren as the new 
Commissioner, summoned from a military command in Africa, was instrumental in
bringing a firmer policy to repress social disorder.
A diverse number of candidates were available for the post of Chief Comm­
issioner. The Liberal Home Secretary, Hugh Childers, was said to have scrut­
inized over four hundred candidates for the job, although there were far 
fewer 'front-runners'.^^ In March 1886, the three 'favourites', according 
to "Moonshine", were Lord Wolseley (the army reformer), Captain Shaw (Chief 
of the Metropolitan Fire Brigade), and Sir Howard Vincent (previously Assistant 
Commissioner of police and director of the C.I.D., then member for Sheffield
Central). The Home Secretary himself, however, considered that of those 
eligible,the best suited for the office were Sir Redvers Buller, Lord 
Charles Beresford, James Monro, and Sir Charles Warren. ^ 0 8 The post, of 
course, fell in the end to a stem disciplinarian and a hardened soldier.
It was applauded as an appointment to restore public confidence, and initiate 
re-organization of the force to deal with mob violence in the streets. The 
"Times" welcomed the appointee - "precisely the man whom sensible Londoners 
would have chosen to preside over the Police Force of the Metropolis.
Warren himself gave the impression of one who had taken on a military assign­
ment for the special purpose of re-organizing the force, and meeting the
107threat of mob violence. Between 1886 and 1888, the enforcement policy
devised to contain the unemployed agitation was in part a direct reflection 
of Warren's individual approach to social disorder. All street activity was 
seen as a potential danger, an encouragement to the East End residuum.
Every unemployed meeting was a 'rough mob'. As the "Link", a radical paper 
established in November 1887, said:
Sir Charles lives in a London fog, through which he sees gorgons
and chimeras dire threatening the metropolis with ruin.
The onset of Warren's 'mental distemper' was attributed by the "Link" to 
the stories told him on his return from Suakin, "as to the terrible doings of 
the 'London mob' in February, 1886.”108 In the next two years, Warren used 
his powerful position to convince the Home Office, and notably Home Secretary 
Matthews, that London's social order was threatened by the street activity 
of a depressed residuum, inspired by socialist agitators who sought their 
organization. Warren spoke for propertied middle-class London when he pressed 
the government to combat the unemployed agitation with real force. And, indeed 
spurred by the disturbances in 1886, a policy to combat the threat was grad­
ually formulated. It was a policy, as Sir William Harcourt said two years 
later, "founded upon fear of the dangerous classes";
104
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that, apart from the criminal classes, there is a large floating 
population of what is called 'the dangerous classes'.1 0®
The formation of public order policy in the mid-1880s, however, deserves 
more detailed treatment. It is essential to examine the way in which a legal 
policy for the 'dangerous classes' was arrived at. The two years which 
followed the riots in February 1886, and in particular the next major social 
crisis in the autumn of 1887, provide a means of estimating how such a public 
order policy was devised, and in particular how the distinctive social press­
ures of the Metropolis refracted themselves through the juridical structure 
to influence policy formation. The essential aim of such an analysis will 
be to merge the conception of London's juridical structure, presented in 
chapter two, with the heightened perspective on the dangerous classes and 
the threat of social disorder.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE DANGEROUS CLASSES IN TRAFALGAR SQUARE: 'BLOODY SUNDAY' AND 
LONDON'S JURIDICAL SYSTEM
What is the true view of Home Office history for the last 
six years I do not know - that history remains to be written 
at a date safer for sound judgment than the present. At 
all events no chronicle will be of value unless it relies 
upon the testimony which you and I alone can supply
The fear of social insurrection remained close to the surface in the 
first two years of Warren's commissionership, discharging whenever the unem­
ployed took to the streets. The Social Democratic Federation continued to 
organize protest marches among the unemployed workmen, reviving the old 
Chartist tactic of church parades, to Westminster Abbey and other London 
churches.'" Trade conditions in the winter months of 1886 invigorated 'unem­
ployed' direct action. At the end of Septembei, Charles Warren informed the 
Home Office that instruction in military exercises was being given by the 
socialists to the unemployed in Clerkenwell and Battersea. Both James Monro,
of the C.I.D., and Warren himself urged the Home Secretary to choke the move-
2ment before it gained strength. The Under Secretary of State at the Home 
Office, whilst of the opinion that the present drilling was unlikely to be 
dangerous, similarly felt that "even the announcement of drilling keeps alive 
the feeling - the unwholesome feeling - of the possibility of violence.""*
A few weeks later, however, Monro reported that the exercises had stopped. 
Open-air meetings at numerous street corners remained the most common form 
of advertisement for the socialist cause. These also were closely watched 
by the metropolitan police, and periodic reports sent on to the Home Office.
(A fellow-secretary at the Home Office to E. Ruggles 
Brise, 1892; in Sir Evelyn Ruggles Brise. A Memoir, 
compiled by Shane Leslie (1938), p.79)
It was clear from reports of the meetings that the next trial of strength 
was to be on November 9th, when the Socialists intended organizing an unemploye
demonstration to follow the Lord Mayor's procession. At an evening meet­
ing at Bermondsey square in mid-October, the socialist, Marsden, reminded 
his audience of the late West End riots, of the fear this had provoked in 
the hearts of the Aristocracy, and of the resultant boost in Mansion House 
subscriptions. But, he added, "unless something of a more permanent and 
profitable nature resulted from their Demonstration on Nov. 9th there would be 
not only breaking of windows but breaking of heads":
He thought the time was not far distant when the Socialist 
body would be strong enough to make their demands in unmistake- 
able words, and if they did not get what they wanted, then by God 
he said, they should take it by force if necessary.^
Surrounding information, available to the government, gave cause for concern. 
At the beginning of November, C.T. Ritchie of the Local Government Board 
transmitted to the Prime Minister one informed view of the working-class tem­
per which was received from Samuel Barnett, warden of Toynbee Hall. Barnett, 
in close touch with a number of East End districts, thought that winter 
distress was less harsh than in the previous year, but that discontent was
greater, and the sense of injustice at trade recession was developing to
7such a pitch that renewed rioting was possible. In the light of such evid­
ence, the Home Office advised the Commissioners of Metropolitan and City polic
g
to forbid all other public processions on Lord Mayor's Day. Meanwhile, 
the rich in London's propertied quarters became anxious at the projected 
counter-procession lest serious riots again resulted. In a typical letter 
from Frank Holl, Lord Wolseley was asked on November 4th., whether the mob, 
frustrated in the West End, might move on to unprotected areas like Hamp­
stead:
There is as you know a good deal of valuable property about 
here. Tell me what you think. Should two or three of my 
neighbours...and myself write to Sir Charles Warren drawing 
attention to this- fi asking for protection in the event of any 
attempts of the mob? It was suggested to me by one of the 
Cabinet who was saying to me to-day that I should call attention 
to the fact.9
In the end, Lord Mayor's day passed off without a repetition of public dis­
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turbance, even though, according to the "Spectator", "a few Socialists, 
many roughs, and great numbers of the criminal classes thronged to the West 
End."1® Yet November 9th hardly restored middle-class confidence in London's 
legal guardians. If the Socialist procession was prohibited, they were 
still allowed to meet in Trafalgar Square in defiance of the police ban.11 
As Engels said later, the government spotlighted the S.D.F. "by first announ­
cing that artillery should be brought out to S. James's Park in readiness
o 12to act, and then countermanding this ridiculous plan." The event, in con­
sequence, merely reinforced middle-class unease at the irresolute approach 
to social disorder which the legal authorities still seemed to be displaying.1
Social tension climaxed, however, in the autumn months of 1887, when 
Trafalgar Square became the camp-site of the homeless unemployed, and simul­
taneously the forum of the S.D.F.'s daily meetings. The encampment of the 
outcast poor in the centre of the West End in the summer and autumn slowly 
revived fears of renewed disorder. More severe enforcement of the vagrancy 
act by the metropolitan police was failing to clear the Square. When, there­
fore, the socialists varied open-air meetings with unemployed demonstrations 
into the surrounding West End, the government resolved to act against threat­
ened disturbances by prohibiting meetings in Trafalgar Square. A radical 
and socialist challenge to this ban was immediately organized by the Metro­
politan Radical Federation, and on 13th November 1887, the attempt was made, 
without success, to open the Square by mass action. It is through this 
crisis-point in the relations between propertied London and the metropolitan 
working class that one can examine the way in which the juridical structure 
formulated a policy founded on fear of the dangerous classes, and the effect 
of such a policy in reinforcing the confusion of the dangerous and labouring
poor.
244
Trafalgar Square and the homeless unemployed
Beginning in the warm summer nights of 1887, homeless unemployed and
14vagrants camped out in Trafalgar Square and in nearby London parks. The 
depression was too severe to take up the slack of winter unemployed. Pover­
ty so rudely exposed, awakened concern for the outcast poor. Mr. Cavanagh, 
an ex-Inspector of 'A' Division, told Warren at the end of July that he had 
seen two hundred 'outcasts' in the Square, "making I should say about the 
most terrible sight of open-air human misery to be met with in Europe; and 
this under the eyes of the wealthiest visitors to L o n d o n D i v i s i o n a l  
superintendents of police were initially reluctant to interfere. The Chief 
Superintendent of 'A' Division said in early August that the 'houseless 
creatures'were rarely moved on - "in fact it would be sa d, I think, to do 
so after wandering all day, probably without food":
This is one of the phases of life in great cities that no poor 
Law or any other regulations can meet.^6
At the end of that month, the scale of squatting in the Square increased
after Plunkett, First Commissioner of Works, announced in the Commons that
he had neither the power nor the will to remove the vagrants from the Square.
This was followed by indiscriminate food donations, "by van loads of bread
sent by charitable persons", which the police considered had the effect of
attracting 'roughs' and 'loafers', and depriving the 'deserving poor' of
■J O .relief. In these early months, Sir Charles Warren was quite inventive.
At first, he decided to enforce firmly the Vagrant. Act which gave the police
power to send the homeless poor to the casual wards. If they refused, they
19were charged with wandering without visible means of subsistence. Later,
when enforcement of the Act was hindered by over-stocked casual wards,
Warren recommended that the Unions should give applicants a ticket for a
night's lodging. He used the constabulary, in fact, to distribute such
20tickets to the poor in the Square. When reprimanded by the "Times" for
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sponsoring a system of relief that was undiscriminating, Warren suggested
instead a register of 'real' unemployed, designed to apportion relief more
21strictly,via the police offices. Yet none of these schemes was capable 
of stemming the problem of vagrancy. The police officials thus turned away 
from social assistance, and concentrated instead on firmer measures of 
social control.
Police documents reveal the gradual formation of opinion during September 
1887, that leaving the casual poor in the streets and squares was a mistake
which would prove troublesome 22 As early as mid-September there were
parliamentary complaints that evidence in recent Bow-street cases revealed
23a state of brigandage existed in the Strand. Police anxiety was freshened 
in the first week of October when the leaderless unemployed were joined by 
the Social Democratic Federation. The superintendent of 'A' division re-calle 
the occasion:
This was a golden opportunity for the agitator not to be let 
slip, and one morning, two or three of them appeared on the Square 
to follow in procession to the Offices of the Local Government 
Board, and from this small procession the whole of the subsequent 
events that alarmed the West End of London for many weeks sprang.24
Unemployed meetings were held daily by the S.D.F. Their audience, according
to the journalist, Bennet Burleigh, was "the shiftless flotsam and jetsam 
25of the community." There were comparable police descriptions of these
meetings. Superintendent Sheppard, a long-serving West-End constable, with
experience of the 1886 riots, considered that the people attending the meet-
26ings were "generally of a very dangerous class." At the major trial 
which followed 'Bloody Sunday', Sheppard reiterated his opinion, and challengec 
Howard Vincent's purported statement that eighty per cent at the Square 
meetings were genuine unemployed. In the course of his evidence, the super­
intendent revealed a novel rule-of-thumb:
There were none of the class at those meetings who would join 
the police if out of work.27
In addition to the daily meetings, begging forays were launched by the
unemployed into the surrounding streets; and unannounced processions went
from the Square to Bow Street police court, or to the Mansion House to can- 
28vass the Lord Mayor. These events resulted on October 17th, in the Square 
being cleared. The decision was taken by Colonel Roberts and Chief Con­
stable Howard, who subsequently advised Warren to prevent "these roughs
29from entering the Square at all." On the 18th, Warren kept the Square 
30clear all day. The decision to act against the disorder by stemming the 
aggregation of outcast in the centre of the West End appeared to have been 
made by the metropolitan commissioner. In the next few weeks Warren's en­
grossing concern for the comprehensive eradication of social disorder was
strongly manifested, sustained by the reports of his Chief Constables whose
31terminology pointed to an anticipated incursion by the dangerous poor.
Warren followed his decision on the 18th with a letter to Hoir.e Secretary
Matthews on Saturday October 22nd, urging him to close the Square for the
next day's meeting, rather than risk disturbances both then and during the
following week. His argument was firmly expressed:
. ..we have during the last month in my opinion been in greater 
danger from the disorganized attacks on property by the rough 
and criminal element than we have been in London for many years 
past.
It is not that I apprehend any organised movement from the Social­
ists themselves or from any other organised body, but it is from 
the roughs and criminals who always attach themselves to large 
processions and meetings that I anticipate serious damage to prop­
erty__
The roughs congregate with and personate the unemployed and seem 
to be bent on mischief. 32
Pressed by the Home Secretary to allow the meetings for the next few days,
Warren,on October 25th,again claimed the right to disperse what he described
as "the veriest scum of the population":
...a mob of these people may be innocuous in their own district; 
but very dangerous when among the houses of the opulent classes 
to which they do not belong and to which they have no ties.33
The Chief Commissioner was obviously anxious to avoid being caught by a
spontaneous burst of rioting as had occurred in 1886. Warren contended that
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whilst the law officers could not sanction stem measures to prohibit the
present tumult, yet if a riot occurred it would be said that there was
34every indication to warrant earlier intervention. Three days later, Warren
counselled the issuance of a notice allowing dispersal of the wandering bands
which, he now believed, were obtaining an element of organized cohesion in 
35their demonstrations. Before receiving a definite reply from the Home
Secretary as to this draft notice, and without prior submission to the Home
Office, Warren went ahead and issued a notice on November 1st., which warned
that crowds or bands rushing through the streets would be deemed disorderly
meetings and accordingly dispersed. ^  At the same time as the notice was
placarded, Warren wrote to Home Secretary Matthews rudely criticizing both
the delay over the draft notice, and the content of the prepared case sent
37to the law oificers for their legal opinion. For the purpose of seeing
if che Metropolitan Police Act of 1339 (2 and 3 Viet, c.47 s.52) could serve
as authority to disperse the wandering bands, the case sent by the Home
Office assumed that dispersal of the wandering bands could not rest on the
38common law of unlawful assembly. Unable to appreciate this assumption 
in the legal argument, Warren betrayed his opinion or how to deal with the 
threat which faced propertied London: in the absence of legal justification, 
where the mob terrorized the West End the police should vigorously disperse
7 Qthem. The incident illustrated the Chief Commissioner's approach. He 
was essentially a military campaigner who desired to eradicate mob violence 
in the streets by a rigid policy of repression. But Warren also presumed 
to deal with those aspects of public order policy which required legal know­
ledge. He found it unnecessary, significantly, to appoint a legal adviser
after the death in July 1887 of Mr. Davis, legal adviser to the Chief Commiss
40ioner since 1874. Warren himself took over Davis' work. The duty of 
counselling on questions which in the autumn of 1887 were excessively legal 
was thus discharged by a commissioner who had no legal training. It was
illustrative of the unremittent centralization of authority in the metropol­
itan force, and of the discretionary power which could be claimed by a 
chief commissioner of London's police force. It meant that different mental­
ities were at work in Scotland Yard and the Home Office. In the face of 
public disorder which was so embroiled within the sensitive area of the 
right of public meeting, a unified legal approach was essential. Instead, 
there was a veering and hesitant policy. Between mid-October and mid- 
November, meetings and demonstrations in the Square were alternately allowed 
and dispersed. The inconsistency in policy towards public meetings reached
its apogee on November 6th when the morning meeting was banned, whilst the
41one in the afternoon was allowed. At the base of this discordant policy 
was a dispute as to where authority over the police and over public order 
policy finally lay - with the Chief Commissioner or the Home Secretary.
In the autumn of I£87, the obseivable discrepancy in the implementation 
of public order policy was due in large part to the continued existence of 
an ill-defined relationship between the two executive elements of the 
legal structure. L
Home Office policy and the repression of disorderly mobs
The Home Office was not entirely unsympathetic to Warren's interpretation
of the threat to public order. Henry Matthews wrote to Salisbury on October
22nd, to gain Treasury backing for an increment to the police force which,
said the Home Secretary, was under excessive strain in dealing with the
socialist Sunday meetings and with "a continuance of this Carnival of roughs
43urged on by statesmen to set law and order at defiance." Internal delib­
erations at the Home Office similarly reflected deep concern at the condition 
of the West End. Godfrey Lushington's view of Warren's letter of 25th Octobe 
was that
The state of things depicted...is a chronic condition of semi­
disorder in the streets.
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Along with the unemployed, the Under Secretary thought, there was invariably 
a portion of "ill-disposed Socialists, roughs, thieves and wild mischievous 
youths;" and, as evinced in the riots of 1886, "in a town like London full 
of shops, it requires but a very few minutes for a very few men to do a vast 
amount of actual mischief." He was convinced that the matter should not 
drift, especially considering the possible political effects of disorder 
in the metropolis:
The political consequences that may arise might of course be most 
serious looking to the strong party animus now existing. Any 
disorder or looting of shops arising from the inactivity of the 
police on the one hand or any violent conflict with the mob on the 
other, would undoubtedly lead to grave political embarrassment 
to the Government.44
But Lushington still thought that meetings in the Square should not be inter­
fered with, there being no power to prohibit them. This seems to have been
45the predominant opinion held at trie Heme Office. Organized meetings and 
processions could always be managed by the police. In contrast, the unpred­
ictable rushes of the wandering mobs of vagrants and 'unemployables' posed 
a larger threat. The most satisfactory legal policy, in consequence, was 
one which put down the disorderly bands without at the same time interfering 
with public meetings in the Square. In all, Home Office acceptance of a 
prohibition on meetings in, and processions to the Square seems to develop 
out of the legal difficulties experienced in dealing with unruly bands 
drawn from "the lowest class of the population." The hesitancy in Home 
Office policy resulted from an inability to find legal backing for the 
immediate dispersal of mobs in the streets, and the prolonged reluctance 
to sanction a permanent prohibition on meetings and processions.
In order to disperse the disorderly groups, the Police Office clearly
stipulated what legal authority it required:
What is necessary in order to meet the practical difficulty in 
which the police now find themselves is that the Police should 
feel themselves authorized to interfere, without the risk of being 
called upon to prove that the action of the bands was actually 
creating alarm.46
The Home Office, however, was concerned that bands whose conduct was not 
riotous, and which could only with great difficulty be proved to be unlawful 
assemblies, were really beyond the reach of the law. But there was always 
the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839 (2 and 3 Viet, c.47): a statute which 
allowed police interference with a wide array of street activities for the 
prevention of obstructions, nuisances or breaches of the peace. ' Ingham, 
the chief magistrate at Bow street, informed the Home Office that he had no 
judicial objection to a police notice based on section 54 (subsection 9),
which would declare that for the space of a month, such bands would be dis-
48persed and malcontents arrested. The law officers, Sir Richard Webster and 
Sir Edward Clarke, disagreed with the chief magistrate's law, insisting that 
the notice would be 'ultra vires' of the statute, since it would practically 
prohibit groups of men wandering through the streets. Their formal opinion 
continued:
Tne section above referred to does not justify any such general 
prohibition; its object was, in our opinion, to enable the police 
authorities to make special arrangements on particular occasions, 
when the streets were liable to be thronged or obstructed.49
The law officers reiterated their opinion when asked to consider the prohib­
itory notice of 1st November which Warren had peremptorily issued. They 
cautioned that the police should not disperse processions, crowds, mobs or 
wandering bands, as intended in the notice, unless the disorder was sub­
stantial; and only then upon the receipt of evidence from independent wit­
nesses which referred to the terror caused by past events, "and stating the 
grounds of apprehension of future disturbance."^ They also felt that the 
evidence upon which Warren proposed to act should be considered first by the 
Home Secretary. Above all, they still considered that the objective facts 
were insufficient to justify the Home Secretary "in giving general instruc­
tions that the police shall interfere with meetings or processions coming 
within the description which the letter contains. The law officers
remained unconvinced that the Metropolitan Police Act, in particular, could 
authorize a general prohibitory sanction against disorderly mobs.
It was becoming evident, however, that the Home Office would have to
remedy the deteriorating state of affairs. Lady Monkswell expressed the
heightened fear caused by the unemployed when she recorded in her diary:
The so-called 'unemployed' and a good contingent of roughs had 
taken possession of the space round Nelson's Column in Trafalgar 
Square since the middle of October, § had persistently slept 
there 6 held meetings assisted by the Socialists § the extreme 
Radicals. They became such a first-class nuisance that all law- 
abiding people began to fear that any day we might have an incur­
sion by the roughs as we had 18 months ago when they broke the 
windows in St. James's Street § Pall Mall, 5 looted shops.52
Increasing pressure was put on Matthews, therefore, to close the Square 
permanently to all meetings. It came from within the Cabinet, and from the 
organized opinion of the West End propertied. The conviction was forming 
within the government that Matthews was too indecisive. Salisbury, in partic­
ular, was apprehensive about his firmness. In a letter to W. H. Smith on 
October 24th, the Prime Minister said:
' I pressed Matthews strongly both as to the reinforcement of the 
Police: S, as to the prosecution of any attempts to incite people 
to break the law.'53
Salisbury also discussed with Matthews the possibility of railing in Trafal­
gar Square, the former considering that since it was the Queen's property, 
such a procedure would be quite legal.54 The pressure from West End tradesmen 
and property-owners came in the form of memorials and deputations, complaining 
of the effect on trade of the riotous proceedings. Warren usually received 
the memorials first, forwarding them to the Home Office as proof of his own 
assertions. Complaints came largely from ratepayers and trade associations. 
The ratepayers of St. George's and St. James's referred to the spasmodic 
arrival of disorderly mobs in the streets on which their business premises 
fronted, "mainly composed of those known to the Law as Rogues and Vagabonds."5 
On October 22nd, all the business concerns near Trafalgar Square endorsed a
memorial which insisted that meetings were invariably attended by "a 
considerable number of roughs and thieves whose only object is to promote 
disorder for their own purpose."66 Two days before 'Bloody Sunday', the 
Home Secretary met a deputation of West End tradesmen whose aim was to stren­
gthen the hands of the government in whatever action they proposed to take.62 
In addition to exerting pressure by means of memorial and deputation, the
West End shopkeepers, according to "Commonweal" (organ of the Socialist League)
58were threatening to employ armed vigilante bands to clear Trafalgar Square. 
Press editorials increased the pressure on the government to repress the 
disorderly mobs. The "Times" was rabid in its denunciation of the demon­
strations of the 'unemployed', more correctly seen, according to its reports, 
as "the idlers and loafers of London". As early as the middle of October, 
leading articles had urged a more decisive policy:
What justification is there for collecting near the seats of 
Government and the wealthiest and least protected parts of the 
metropolis crowds of the most dangerous classes?^
Predictably, the "Times" was later to endorse the firm police measuies to
deal with social disorder, and to snipe at Matthews' failure to recognize
the strength of Warren's opinion on the likelihood of riots.6® It was this
barrage of political, business and press opinion which forced the Home
Secretary to accede to the total closure of Trafalgar Square to meetings and
processions. Yet even when the Cabinet on 7th November resolved to accept,
as government policy, the prohibition of meeting, the Home Secretary remained
61hesitant in the absence of any solid legal justification.
A police notice was issued on 8th November, prohibiting all meetings in 
Trafalgar Square.62 Significantly, the notice seemed to have no definite 
legal basis. It was certainly not founded on the Police Act, 2 and 3 Victoria 
(section 52). This became apparent almost immediately when, on 11th November, 
William Saunders, late M.P. for Hull, addressed a meeting in the Square. He
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was cautioned by Superintendent Sheppard that meetings were prohibited, 
and arrested when he declined to end the meeting. Saunders was charged 
with disorderly conduct and obstructing the police while in execution of 
their duty in Trafalgar Square.^ In effect, that is, he was charged with 
a breach of the Commissioner's notice of 8th November. Yet this notice 
made no reference to any statutory regulation which, when knowingly dis­
obeyed, could be dealt with summarily. The day after Saunder's arrest, 
therefore, the case before the stipendiary was started without knowledge 
of the summary offence for which he was to be prosecuted. Ingham wrote 
to Lushington on the same day to say that, being unaware of the legal 
position the government intended to adopt, he had only examined the wit­
nesses "in support of the preamble of Sir Charles Warren's Notice which 
was produced before me":
I made no comment but adjourned the further hearing of the 
case until Thursday, when I p-esume legal grounds for the 
arrest will be substantiated.64
At the adjourned case on November 17th, when Poland, acting on behalf of 
the Treasury, was challenged to defend the prosecution in terms of Warren's 
notice of November 8th, he could only explain why he intended to withdraw 
the case:
I admit it is not a regulation under the Police Act, but a notice.
The charge is erroneous, because they charge him with violating 
the notice of Sir C. Warren, and there was no penalty for breach 
of that particular notice, and therefore the reason why I with­
draw it is because there is no penalty attached to it.65
Since the government had no summary charge, the case had to be dismissed.
It was clear that no statute authorized the prohibition of Saunders' meeting. 
Saunders could have been indicted for attempting to hold an unlawful meeting, 
but for a summary prosecution there was only the charge of obstruction. For 
such a charge, however, the admission would have been necessary that Trafal­
gar Square was a thoroughfare. But the government were reluctant to give 
such an admission, since at this juncture they thought they would ultimately
have to argue that Trafalgar Square was Crown property, and that the 
Crown had the right to prohibit meetings held there. Indeed, in Saunders' 
case, before dismissal was conceded, Poland had argued that the Square 
was absolutely Crown property.® The Saunders case, above all, illustrated 
that, despite an ardent search, the Home Office was failing to find legal 
authority for its prohibition. The law of public meeting allowed the regul­
ation of meetings; it allowed control of unlawful meetings through the 
cumbrous process of indictment: but it did not allow permanent prohibition, 
for which there was power of arrest and summary disposal of offenders. Nor 
could the issue of a police notice provide a substitute merely by declaring 
meetings to be unlawful. Godfrey Lushington later admitted, in fact, that,
it is not pretended that the S. of S. or anvone else could by 
an Order make illegal a meeting which by law was not so. In 
fact the so-called Order never could have amounted to more than 
a warning that the meeting, if held, would be treated as an 
illegal meeting.67
But the challenge had been made. Already the radical and socialist 
bodies had called a meeting for Sunday the 13th, to protest against the pro­
hibition of meeting in the Square. The Home Office had now, therefore, to 
consider whether the processions should be turned back before they arrived 
at the centre of disturbance. On the eve of Bloody Sunday the law officers 
were asked if processions en route to the Square the next day could be dis­
persed, and whether legal statute or common law would authorize such action. 
The officers were again unconvinced that section 52 of 2 and 3 Victoria c.47 
referred to the case in question. But, "having regard to the purview of 
the Act and the duty cast upon the authorities of maintaining the public
peace and order", they accepted that a police regulation could be made prohib
6 8iting processions from approaching Trafalgar Square. Hence, the notice 
of 12th November, issued by Warren, mentioned the Police Act for the first 
time, in regard to the prohibition of processions. The law officers post­
poned giving their view as to the Commissioner's legal right to prevent
H I
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public meetings in the Square, and concentrated instead on the hard fact 
that,
...as it has been determined to prevent the holding of the 
meeting proposed for to-morrow, the proper course is for the 
police to occupy the Square in force, and to prevent any persons 
entering the space vested in the Crown.69
Not until 17th November did the law officers offer an opinion on the right 
to prohibit meetings in the Square. Their decision was that the Crown had 
no proprietary rights, nor the Police Commissioner the power to prevent 
use of the Square as a public place. But they considered that section 3 
of the Trafalgar Square Act (7 and 8 Viet, c.60) put the Square in the 
position of a thoroughfare for the purpose of the Police Act. As such, if 
the Commissioner felt the meetings had caused and were causing serious ob­
struction to the thoroughfare, directions could be given under section 52 
of the Police Act to prevent such meetings.' Hence, on 18th November, 
the police notice prohibited "until further notice" meetings and speeches 
in Trafalgar Square, and processions from approaching the S q u a r e . A  
permanent ban on meetings and processions had been finally worked from the 
existing statutes. A police order which applied a general prohibition, 
and which created an offence summarily punishable, had been twisted out of 
the law. As a matter of strict law, the law officers estimated it was 
défendable. But it was hardly authorized by statute in the comprehensive 
form it took. The whole process illustrated the decisive role that the 
executive or political wing of the metropolitan juridical system played in 
the formation of legal policy, and more specifically, in the abrogation 
of the civic rights of meeting and processioning. Purely legal considerations! 
were of course influential, and led to the prolonged Home Office deliberations 
in October and November. The sharp division between the judicial and admin­
istrative wings of London's legal structure enforced a scrupulous attention 
by the Home Office to the legal validity of police prosecutions, in order
m
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to secure magisterial endorsement. But legal decisions were shaped by 
essentially political needs. The Home Office received advice principally 
from the government's law officers, and considered the opinions in the light 
of the political effect of renewed rioting and of the political feasibility 
of banning public meetings. Such imperatives overshadowed the maintenance 
of public order in London in the mid-1880s. The outcome in the winter of 
1887 was a law enforcement policy which largely accommodated the middle- 
class fear of a raid on the West End by London's dangerous classes.
To what extent, however, did the judiciary comment on this executive 
act of law-making? To what extent, for example, did the stipendiary magis­
tracy or the high-court judges allow a re-evaluation of the threat of public 
disorder which had served as immediate legitimacy for the executive policy 
in November 1887. Any assessment of the unhindered role of the executive 
in the administration of public order policy requires answers to such 
questions. There were, after all, numerous legal imponderables in the 
prohibitory notices, which the judiciary should have been prepared to deliber­
ate. There was the question as to whether Trafalgar Square was a thorough­
fare. Under the police notices of November 12th and 18th, the offence 
created by the use of 2 and 3 Victoria had to be committed in a street or 
thoroughfare; and as Lushington said:
it would have to be established that Trafalgar Square is a
thoroughfare de facto if not de jure.^2
In addition, other questions remained. It was not clear whether the sections 
in the Police Act authorized (a) the regulation of the route of processions,
(b) the prohibition of processions, (c) the prohibition of meetings, and (d) 
the issuance of regulations or directions for other than a special occasion. 
From the government's viewpoint, the police ban also had the weakness that 
the necessity for such a regulation was a question of fact: and as the law 
officers recognized, "its existence rather invites question as to its legality?
But this last statement was made in December 1888. Between November 1887
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and that date, many attempts were made to raise the specific question of 
the legality of the Chief Commissioner's notices. On each occasion, the 
objection to the powers of prohibition was deflected by the courts. The 
process of law provided no remedy to ensure that unresolved legal issues 
were raised.
Trafalgar Square and the process of law
From the beginning, the initiative in judicial proceedings on the
prohibition of meetings and processions was taken by the Home Office. The
Home Secretary seemed anxious to force the issue to an unchallengeable legal
verdict. Matthews made it clear to Lushington the day after 'Bloody Sunday',
that he wanted a jury's decision on the side of the government. He insisted
that a case "of an aggravated kind" for which there was sutficient proof
should be sent to the Old Bailey. As he explained:
Throughout all these meetings I have not had brought beiore me 
a report of a single case of the kind one would wish to try. It 
will not do to rest on decisions of Police Magistrates. I see 
that today Vaughan imposed fines in all cases while Ingham gave 
imprisonment. ™
Inconsistent stipendiary judgements could be subdued by way of a high court 
pronouncement. The anticipated prosecution became R. v. Cunninghame Graham 
and John Burns. Both defendants had tried to force their way through 
the police barriers into the Square on November 13th. They were arrested, 
and charged with riot, unlawful assembly, and assaulting the police in the 
execution of their duty. At the trial, the Crown's case put by the Attorney- 
General, Sir Richard Webster, was that there was no right of public meeting 
in the Square. H.H. Asquith, for the defence, concentrated on the uncertainty 
shown by the authorities as to the legal basis of Warren's notices of Novembei 
which prohibited meetings. But detailed legal arguments fell on deaf ears.
The trial judge, Justice Charles, accepted that Trafalgar Square was placed 
under the control of the police, as any other thoroughfare or public place.
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The Chief Commissioner, the officer responsible for peace preservation, 
was thereby justified in issuing the notices that public meetings would 
not be allowed "in any place of public resort under his control, where he 
has reasonable grounds for believing that a breach of the public peace is 
likely to result from the holding of any public meeting in such places.
The police notices were justified on the ground that it was Warren's duty 
to keep the peace. Both defendants were found guilty of unlawful assembly 
and not guilty of the other offences, and were sentenced to six week's impris
onment without hard labour.^ A legal judgment had been successfully ob-
78tained for the Home Secretary. It was still open to valid criticism in 
that the question of the right of public meeting specifically in Trafalgar 
Square had not been decided in the case. The decision, more strictly, 
referred to the right to meet anywhere under circumstances wilier, made riot 
probable. A similar conviction would have followed if the meeting had been 
held in Hyde Park under cognate circumstances. Graham and Burns were con­
victed only of assembling in a place where the Executive had forbidden them 
to assemble for fear of a riot. Nevertheless, it was a decision obediently 
followed by the police court magistrates in the following months.
The decision in "R. v. Graham and Bums" was held as authority for decis­
ions in a batch of cases which followed in 1888, principally at summary level 
The cases arose generally as a result of efforts by those radicals and
socialists associated with the Law and Liberty League, to challenge the
79police ban on meetings in the Square. Further mass attempts to enter the 
Square, as on 'Bloody Sunday', had been projected, according to William 
Saunders. He told the Home Secretary that these would have been carried 
through "but for the via media proposed of holding conversational meetings", 
whereby people held an indefinite 'meeting' in the Square by walking round 
‘conversing' with each other. The 'conversazione* was one way that the
right of public meeting could still be claimed. But the greatest energy
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went into obtaining a legal judgment in favour of an absolute right of
public meeting, and which would demonstrate the illegality of the police
ban. The first challenge was prepared when Mr. Hicks, a cabinet maker,
was arrested when speaking in Trafalgar Square on 22nd January, 1888, and
charged with inciting to a breach of the peace, and obstructing the police
in the discharge of their duty. In radical circles it was expected that
the illegal decree would, at last, come before the court instead of the
case being withdrawn by the government, as in Saunders' prosecution in
November 1887, or the issue evaded as in "R. v. Graham and Bums". At Bow
Street court, however, police magistrate Vaughan categorically decided that
meetings in the Square were against the law, reference being made to Mr.
82Justice Charles' decision that all meetings were 'ipso facto' illegal.
On other occasions, too, the stipendiaries were reluctant to allow the
government's prohibition to be challenged, or to sanction a further high-
court ruling on the issue of meeting in the Square. In February 1888, at
the Middlesex Sessions, Mr. Commissioner Kerr and Mr. Vaughan re-affirmed
that the question of the right of public meeting in the Square had already
83been decided by "R. v. Graham." The latter case was given further support 84
84 . .by the decision in ex parte Lewis. Mr. Edward Dillon Lewis, solicitor, 
applied in February for a summons against Sir Charles Warren and Henry 
Matthews for using violence to prevent meetings in Trafalgar Square. Summary 
magistrate,Vaughan,rejected these applications, so Lewis applied to the 
Divisional Court for a 'mandamus' to compel Vaughan to issue the summons.
In June, Lewis argued his assertion that the three police notices were 
"absolutely illegal". But again, the issue was not raised. Their lordships, 
Wills and Grantham, held that the summary magistrate had 'bona fide' applied 
his mind to the subject, that he had taken the law to be laid down by Justice 
Charles as to right of holding public meetings in Trafalgar Square, and 
that consequently he had decided that Warren and Matthews had committed no
legal offence. The Superior Court, the judgment continued, was not 
an Appeal Court and held no jurisdiction to compel the exercise of the 
magistrate's judgment in a particular way - "we have no jurisdiction in 
such a case to correct his law, even if wrong and to direct him to alter his 
decision." The rule of 'mandamus' was thus refused; but not before the 
justices declared their opinion on the issues raised by Lewis. They re­
affirmed that there was no right on the part of the public to occupy Trafal­
gar Square for the purpose of holding public meetings, by arguing that 
since the Square was completely regulated by statute, whatever rights were
claimed had to be found there. In their opinion, there was no right of
86open-air public meeting to be found in statute.
Within the judgment, their lordships Wills and Grantham interestingly
suggested that by the 1844 Trafalgar Square Act (7 and 8 Victoria c.60 s.2)
and by 14 and 15 Victoria c.42 s.22, the Commissioner of Works and Public
Buildings had the power to determine the usage of Traialgar Square, and
87hence the authority to prohibit or regulate the holding of meetings. The 
judgment in 'ex parte Lewis', then, not only sustained the previous law on 
the subject, but also held out legal validity to have the Commissioner 
of Works determine what the Square could be used for. This part of 'ex parte 
Lewis' was instantly seized on by the critics of the police ban on meetings. 
James Stuart gave notice in the second week of July that he would introduce 
a Bill for the regulation of meetings by the Commissioner of Works, as
OOexisted for Hyde Park. The "Bill for the regulation of meetings in Traf­
algar Square" was prepared and brought in by Stuart, Lawson, Pickersgill,
89Rowlands, Howell and Cremer. It was a significant attempt to put meetings 
in the Square under defined regulations in order to release the total pro­
hibitory power claimed in November 1887. But the attempt by the advanced 
Radicals was blocked by the government. Only later, in 1888, when the 
Home Office themselves examined the regulation, as opposed to prohibition,
of meetings in Trafalgar Square, was the reference in "ex parte Lewis" 
of rules framed by the Commissioner of Works, scrutinized more closely.
Before that, however, the courts and the Home Office were involved in July 
with the case of Antonio Borgia.
Borgia, member of the Clerkenwell Patriotic Club, alleged an assault
was committed on him by a constable, in Trafalgar Square. His prosecution
case was dismissed, Vaughan again declaring that meetings in the Square
were unlawful. Dillon Lewis intervened, therefore, and submitted a draft
case to the Treasury Solicitor which he wanted to go before Vaughan, in the
hope that the latter would state a case for the opinion of Queen's Bench on
90the question of meetings in the Square. At first, there seemed every 
chance of success. The Home Secretary, himself, was encouraging the pro­
cedure. Unknown, of course, to Dillon Lewis, Ruggles Arise had written 
to the Treasury Solicitor on July 21st., to say that,
...Mr. Matthews wishes me to tell you privately that he would 
be extremely glad if the question of a 'right of public meeting' 
in Trafalgar Square could be directly raised in a special case.
However clear this point may be, it will do good to have an 
express adjudication upon it.91
In addition to the right of public meeting, Lewis' draft submission raised
all the questions which the Home Office recognized were unanswered: viz, can
a general proclamation for an indefinite period prohibit meetings and
processions; does 2 and 3 Victoria c.47 allow such prohibition; and are the
three police notices void as not being warranted by Common Law or Statute?
Godfrey Lushington, in particular, was aware that the case presented by
Lewis raised these additional questions. And in an internal memorandum he
expressed the Home Office reluctance to air such issues:
The Government whilst willing to submit the first question as 
to the alleged right of meeting in Trafalgar Square would probably 
not be anxious to give facilities for the discussion of the other 
more doubtful questions.9^
Lushington was too much of a lawyer to neglect that, whether and what ques­
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tions were raised, was for the determination of the magistrate. But he
estimated correctly that, since counsel's defence in the case was that
Borgia was inciting to a breach of the peace which justified the constable
in pulling him from the balustrade, then it was not clear whether even the
right of meeting in the Square was involved. As Lushington said:
His [Vaughan's] remarks in dismissing the charge brought by 
Borgia plainly declare his opinion that the Question as to the 
legal right of meeting in Trafalgar Square has been concluded: 
if so he would probably not be willing to allow it to be raised 
over again.®3
Vaughan did indeed reject Lewis' application. The simple right of public 
meeting in the Square failed to gain further audience in the higher court, 
let alone the additional questions which challenged more directly the police 
notices, which remained the only basis of the general prohibition.
By September 188S, the courts had resisted all attempts to challenge 
the notices put out under the Metropolitan Police Act, 2 and 3 Victoria, 
c.47. Yet, concern remained within the Office of Treasury Solicitor and 
in the Home Department at the strength of the prohibition, and the legal 
basis of continued police action to prevent meetings. In mid-September, 
the Treasury Solicitor sent a memorandum on Trafalgar Square written by 
Harry Poland to the Home Office. In it, Poland disclosed the continued un­
certainty as to whether the police notices of November 1887 still allowed 
closure of the Square, given that they referred to a state of public unease 
specific to November, and considering that they had not been placarded since 
then, despite the ruling in subsection 9 of section 54 of the Police Act 
which said the people must be acquainted with the regulations. Poland's 
memorandum dispensed first with the question of whether the Highway Act 
applied to the Square. In his opinion,it did not apply, and,therefore, 
could provide no authority for police interference with meetings in the 
Square. Further, whilst 'ex parte Lewis' favoured regulations put out by 
the Commissioner of Works, since such regulations had not in fact been made.
there was no consequent authority to allow the police to prohibit meetings,
especially for an indefinite period. Equally, the Police Act allowed them
no right to exclude the public for all time. As a result of this legal
deliberation, Poland submitted his suggestion that the Commissioner of
Works should frame regulations to prohibit public meetings and addresses,
and which authorized the police to enforce them. The police, said Poland,
would in this way be taking civil proceedings against trespassers on Crown
property, by means of a writ of intrusion in the name of the Attorney General
whilst retaining their common law powers against those committing breaches 
94of the peace. Godfrey Lushington was not in agreement, however, with 
Poland's memorandum. The form of prohibition, especially, was not to 
Lushington's taste, in that it did not incorporate what he considered the 
two essential points: that the police should have the power to arrest without 
warrant those who disregarded the prohibition, and secondly, that the per­
sons arrested could be proceeded against summarily. He was unsure himself 
whether these two essentials could accrue from the 183S Highway Act; from 
regulations made by the Office of Works; or from the Metropolitan Police 
Act. But he was convinced that Poland was wrong to suggest that fresh auth­
ority be obtained by the Commissioner of Works issuing an order under the 
Trafalgar Square Act:
'This would be an admission', said Lushington, 'that hitherto 
the Police had been acting without sufficient authority: § it 
seems to me very doubtful whether the Trafalgar Square Act gives 
this power to the Commr., § at all events the point would be
disputed.'^
What especially attracted him was new legislation: a Bill to prohibit all
meetings in the Square. He was aware this would attract stem opposition.
In default of that, Lushington favoured a Bill placing Trafalgar Square under
96the Parks Regulation Act. If such a Bill held any chance of success, how­
ever, he recognized that it would have to contain a pledge that meetings 
would be allowed, subject to regulation, "and such a pledge", he minuted
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for the Home Secretary, "I presume would not be given."
Lushington decided to prepare a detailed case for the law officers,
98raising most of the questions inherent in the above reflections. The 
judgment of the law officers, in December 1888, stated that they thought 
it unwise to rely solely upon the police regulation of 18th November 1887. 
Instead, they put forward an argument for new legislation, inspired by the 
view contained in 'ex parte Lewis' that the Commissioners of Works held power 
to control and regulate the user of the Square. They were not convinced 
that the Trafalgar Square Act alone gave explicit authority to the Commiss­
ioner of Works to make regulations, so they suggested that the Commissioner 
be given statutory power to make regulations, with a summary remedy for breach 
of such regulations. Whatever parliamentary difficulties there might be in
securing the Bill were offset, ir. their judgment, by the drawbacks in the 
99present situation. At last, it seemed that the regulation of meetings 
in the Square had become the only way out of a situation in which permanent 
prohibition hung upon the weak thread of a police notice which was in no 
way authorized by the Metropolitan Police Act. The law officers, however, 
were unable to convince the Home Secretary and Godfrey Lushington. The 
latter considered that legislation allowing the Commissioner of Works to 
make penal regulations was almost identical to his suggestion of placing 
the Square under the Parks Regulation Act, to which the same objection applied 
the government would be asked what they intended to do in respect of public 
meetings if the Bill passed.*00 No immediate action was thus taken upon 
the law officers' opinion.
Not that there was unanimity in forestalling executive action. The next 
Chief Commissioner of Police, James Monro, added his voice to the demand 
to establish clarity on the issue. At the beginning of December 1888, he 
questioned Lushington on whether the original proclamation was still in 
force, and whether its re-issue was not necessary.*0* Doubtless afraid
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that this would only rekindle the issue, Lushington informed Monro - "Reissue 
• 102is unnecessary 5 inexpedient." At the end of the same month, Monro 
wrote again, this time displaying scepticism that Sir Charles Warren's pro­
clamation could be legally construed as a perpetual injunction to prevent 
the holding of 'bona fide' political meetings, when there was no reason to 
apprehend disturbances. If the proclamation of November 18th allowed such 
a prohibitory enforcement, then, Monro recognized, "the police practically
acquire the power of stopping meetings anywhere in London at discretion,
103and this is a power which will not I take it be conceded to them." The
Chief Commissioner maintained pressure on the Home Office throughout the
first few months of 1889, as a result of fresh moves within the radical and
liberal clubs to secure access to the Square. At the end of February, 1889,
the Metropolitan Radical Federation met at the Borough or Hackney Club to
104project the holding of a meeting in the Square. Reports of the Federation'
discussion showed that the London Literal M.P.'s were reluctant to adopt
this strident policy. Such dissension within the Federation convinced Monro
that this was an opportune moment for legislation. In the face of proposed
legislation, the moderate Members would most certainly back down and the
extremists would be isolated. Consequently, Monro said,
the hands of the Police will be enormously strengthened, as they 
will then only have to deal with the faction of disorder, who 
apparently will not be content with any course but asserting their 
supposed right by force to hold meetings in the Square.105
But Monro's counsels failed.*0  ^ There was little further discussion of the
issue, in fact, until 1892 when the new Liberal Home Secretary, H.H. Asquith,
required the First Commissioner of Works to make regulations which permitted
107the holding of meetings on specified days and under certain conditions.
The order of November 18th 1887 was revoked, and regulatory powers substituted 
for the powers of prohibition which had been claimed for the last five years. 
Whilst the feasibility of conceding regulatory control over the Square had 
been closely examined in the final months of 1888, it had not
been accepted. In default of a sustained popular challenge to the police 
notices of November 1887, the government had been able to conceal their 
weakness. In the subsequent years, the courts had provided no avenue for 
any kind of challenge to a prohibitory policy administered by the Executive.
The right of public meeting in Trafalgar Square had been settled without 
reference to the many subsidiary questions which surrounded permanent pro­
hibition under the Metropolitan Police Act. The magistracy and high court 
justices took the opinion that the duty of preserving the peace fell upon 
the Chief Commissioner who, in consequence, had the right to issue police 
notices prohibiting meetings and processions. In July 1888, William 
Saunders argued that the question of Trafalgar Square ought to be settled 
on the principle that "the Government may regulate but not prohibit public
meetings"; and insisted that the government should not attempt "to make o’-
108administer law by proclamation." But the magistracy were reluctant to 
control this formation of law by administrative decree. The stipendiaries 
did not allow a uirect challenge to the legality of the police notices. No 
criminal proceeding directly involved the terms of the Commissioner's inst­
ructions. Instead, the magistrates acted on the basis of the facts in each 
case, in particular on the constable's evidence as to anticipated obstruction 
or breach of the peace. The Square was seen as a direct responsibility of 
executive government. Ministerial responsibility was left to safeguard the 
right of public meeting. For a right graced with such immense ceremonial 
value, advertized as a real civic freedom, it was rather painlessly silenced.
In the absence of statutory guarantee, it proved a fluid right, within the
109discretion of the executive, inadequately upheld by the judiciary. Its
bestowal, it seemed, could be denied in certain circumstances, notably those 
existing in November 1887, when it was believed that there was the threat 
of mob riot. Yet even when the circumstances were manifestly unsupportive 
of permanent prohibition of meetings, when it was difficult to argue
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convincingly that the threat of a dangerous class existed, there was no 
judicial avenue through which a re-interpretation of the threat could be 
established. An executive policy which was framed in direct response to the 
need to combat the disorderly bands of unemployed, 'roughs' and vagrants, 
resulted in the prohibition of all open-air activity at the focal point 
of disturbance. Restoration of the right of public meeting had to wait on 
the discretion of the executive.
In the preceding analysis of the manner in which the juridical 
system formulated a policy to deal with the criminal and dangerous poor, the 
one moment of mass-challenge to that policy has been neglected. It is 
essential to provide a closer.account of the battle of Trafalgar Square on 
November 13th, in order to illustrate how the executive policy necessarily 
reinforced the confusion of the criminal and labouring poor, and thereby 
sustained the supposed existence of the dangerous classes. i
The Dangerous or Labouring Poor in Trafalgar Square?
The Sunday meeting called by the Metropolitan Radical Federation was
in protest against the imprisonment of O'Brien, an Irish M.P., for seditious
language, and against the prohibition of public meeting in Trafalgar Square.11
Contingents of demonstrators marshalled at various greens and parks in the
East and South of London, and listened to addresses from radical and socialist
speakers before wending their way to the Square.111 Some twenty-thousand,
for example, came from Rotherhithe, Bermondsey, and South-East London. The
contingent formed at the Irish Club in the early afternoon, being joined en
route by the Bermondsey Radical Club, the Catholic Club, the Bermondsey
Gladstone Club, and local branches of the S.D.F. At the Old Kent Road,
112it linked with detachments from Woolwich, Greenwich and Deptford. Another
contingent had assembled at Clerkenwell-green, the responsibility of the
113London Patriotic Club. A correspondent from "Reynolds' Newspaper" was
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there:
Most of those who joined the Clerkenwell contingent had the 
appearance of being respectable artisans. They were in most 
cases neatly dressed and they assembled without noise or disorder 
...Just before three o'clock, other bodies of men came, with 
banners of the East Finsbury Radical Club and of the Clerkenwell 
branch of the Social Democratic Federation...Shortly after three 
o'clock, the procession began to form, and by this time, the crowd 
was a very large one.114
There was never any likelihood that Trafalgar Square would be successfully 
entered. Warren had arranged his police force too well for unarmed and 
unorganized demonstrations.^*^ Ernest Bax described the subsequent scene when 
the constabulary halted the processions in Northumberland Avenue and Parlia­
ment Street:
The police were in strong force and the military behind. As the 
contingents of the various Radical clubs, branches of the Socialist 
organizations, and Irish Societies of London debouched through the 
streets leading into the Square, they were actackeJ and mostly dis­
persed by the police.
Hie result was a sense of shock at the rapidity with which the police achieved 
their success. So great was William Morris' astonishment at "the ease with 
which military organization got its victory" that he lost all confidence in 
the power of unorganized crowds to resist the State's repressive force and,
thereafter, became more convinced of the need to create a disciplined cadre 
117party. Other participants likewise reconsidered the feasibility of 
violent revolution and re-assigned their energies into constitutional paths 
towards social democracy.****
The West End rejoiced at such vigorous police deployment in the eradic­
ation of the threat of the dangerous poor. Members of the Stock Exchange
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reports on the demonstrations which conceded that 'respectable artisans' 
were to be seen, the terminology which entered editorial comment coincided 
with that in the reports on the riots of February 1886. The genuine unem­
ployed, the London working classes, were said to be out of sympathy with 
the demonstrations. They involved only the members of radical working 
men's clubs, "in no way representative of the localities in which they are 
situate," and even these were overshadowed by what the "Times" considered to
be the 'active portion' of the Bloody Sunday crowd - "all that is weakest,
122most worthless, and most vicious in the slums of a great city."
The ambivalence which the Socialists had betrayed in their attitude to 
the 1886 riots, based on political difficulties in the recruitment and organ­
ization of the casual poor, did not recur in the struggle for Trafalgar 
Square. In the main this was because the contingents which filed to the 
West End were a conspicuous product of the political ferment within the
radical and liberal clubs in plebeian London, which had been spurred by
123socialist speakers at their evening meetings. The prohibition of meeting
also aroused the fervour with which radical working men invariably defended
public speaking, as they had done in the metropolitan parks in the early
1880s, and at Dod Street in 1885. Home Office acceptance of the prohibition
of Square meetings in order to forestall the threat of the 'wandering bands',
provided the basic issue which could unite the radical and socialist bodies,
in a way which the unemployment issue could not. 'Bloody Sunday' itself
further estranged the London working class from sympathy with the metropolitan
police, which in turn intensified political radicalization by temporarily
124splitting artisan Radicalism away from bourgeoise liberalism. The police 
brutalities, Engels said, "have worked miracles in helping to widen the gap 
between the working-men Radicals and the middle-class Liberals and Radicals."^ 
On the basis of such evidence, the socialist and radical left was aroused 
to insist that there was a complete misunderstanding of the supposed threat
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to London's social order. The effect of a legal policy designed to count­
eract the dangerous classes was, in its opinion, to array the metropolitan 
police against the London working class.
Inherent within the physical contest on Bloody Sunday, then, was a clash 
of interpretation as to the nature of social disorder in the metropolis: a 
conflict over the threat posed by the homeless unemployed and outcast poor 
who colonized the central parks and squares. This ideological division is 
worth further emphasis. The spectre of a 'dangerous class' pervaded the 
response of the legal authorities to the actual social disorder in late 1887. 
Police attitudes were revealed most lucidly in the testimony of Superintend­
ent Sheppard at the trial of Graham and Bums, when he said of the meetings 
in the Square:
A large number of those who took part in the meeting of 'unemployed' 
in the square were, certainly, of the criminal classes, and those 
he called the 'dangerous classes.' There might have been cne or two 
here and there genuine unemployed, but very f e w . 126
Periodic reports sent by the Chief Commissioner to the Home Office in the
course of 'Bloody Sunday' epitomized the interpretation: marginalia which
read like a contrived vindication of Warren's opinion on the potentiality
of mob disorder. At 5.15 p.m., he reported that a squadron of police were
patrolling Pall Mall "to prevent clubs being attacked with stones when
roughs leave Trafalgar Square":
127...some of the lowest class of roughs have been about this afternoon.
It was this interpretation which entered the official submission to parliament 
in defence of permanent closure of Trafalgar Square. In the most crucial 
debate on the government's policy, in March 1888, Home Secretary Matthews 
reconstructed the terror created by the demonstrations, sufficient to warrant 
police interference. The organizers of the meetings might be perfectly 
respectable, he argued,
but they cannot help the dangerous classes coming uninvited, 
though I think that all the speakers were not reluctant to see 
the dangerous classes t h e r e . 128
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And it was this evaluation of the danger posed by the urban residuum
which was re-earthed on later occasions when the 'conversazione' meetings
were staged in the spring and summer of 1888, and again when Asquith in
129October 1893 re-opened the Square.
It was against this explanatory construction that the radical and 
socialist groupings defended the London unemployed. Contemporary accusations 
against the integrity of the unemployed were immediately answered. At a 
Square meeting on November 7th, 1887, Annie Besant offered her support to 
the unemployed, because she disbelieved that those men meeting day after
day were "the scum of the earth”, as Press reports described them, "but were
130genuine, needy, unemployed workmen." On the day before 'Bloody Sunday',
"Justice" (organ of the S.D.F.) argued that the involvement of the radical
clubs, associations composed "almost entirely of the aristocracy of labour",
that section of the working-class most unsympathetic to "mere loafers and
scoundrels, such as the Trafalgar Square demonstrators are said to be,"
substantiated that the unemployed demonstrations were genuine, since "these
131clubs are passing resolutions of sympathy with them..." This opinion
was fuelled by those Liberal M.P.s who were convinced that the existing
system of police administration, highly centralized and militarized, and
lacking municipal control, was responsible for the inflated response to the
unemployed meetings and demonstrations, in that there could be no objective
local assessment of the ostensible threat to social order. The founder
member of the Municipal Reform League, J.F.L. Firth, contended in November
1888 that the police had been mistaken in believing they had dispersed
the criminal and dangerous classes:
There came from every part of London on that day representative, 
responsible men belonging to the industrial classes... 132
In the same debate, Mr. Conybeare insisted that the meetings which had been
dispersed "were not those of a dangerous class, but were composed of
respectable workmen and artizans living in different parts of the Metro­
polis."133
But to what extent did the social reality of the metropolis correspond 
to the differing interpretations: to the dangerous or the labouring poor?
The conventional resort to evidence collected from summary court hearings 
could never provide a convincing judgment, but it is an available form 
of evidence from which to estimate the 'threat' which London faced in Nov­
ember 1887. Between mid-October and mid-December, over one hundred cases 
were heard, mainly at Bow Street, as a result of disturbances in or around 
Trafalgar Square, including the fifty-five whose offence was committed on 
Bloody Sunday. The charge in almost all cases was "disturbing the peace 
and assaulting the police." Of all these cases, occupations were mentioned 
in approximately eighty individual instances, thirty-eight of whom committed 
their offence on November 13th.13il In a small number of cases there was 
additional evidence on the offender. James Allman, listed as a trousers 
presser, was an unemployed worker on the Council of the Socialist League, 
and a central figure in the unemployed agitation conducted from Trafalgar 
Square. Alfred Oldland, painter and general labourer, was a member of the
S.D.F. at Peckham. William Curner, a stonemason, was a prominent Deptford 
radical and secularist, and one of the three who died as a result of 
Bloody Sunday. For the other defendants, there was only their occupational 
description. On the basis of the eighty cases, a sample that cannot claim 
to be representative, there was a preponderance of workmen in staple East 
and South London trades and industries. Most represented were the building 
industry and the finishing trades, where jobs were normally subject to some 
form of casualization or sweating. In the building industry there were 
carpenters, bricklayers, painters and general labourers; in the small-scale 
production finishing trades there were shoemakers, tailors, brassfinishers, 
basketmakers, bookbinders, printers and hatters. A few were also employed
273
in residual occupations such as woodchopping and dealing. What is most 
significant is that the summary of occupations leads to that very area of 
social imprecision which shaped the differing convictions: the sweated, casual 
and unskilled labour market. For the one beholder, they were working-class 
seasonally-employed or unemployed workers; whilst for the other they were semi 
criminal paupers and casual loafers, male representatives of the outcast poor 
which stagnated in the East End slums. London's social reality was so over­
shadowed by a 'residuum' of criminal, pauper and casual or sweated worker, 
that it defied neat social categorization. The reality gave latitude for the 
differing conceptions of the size, constitution and threat of the dangerous 
classes.
In the days following Bloody Sunday, there was no doubt as to which mental 
construction informed legal policy. A state of crisis gripped the West End 
for weeks afterwards at the possibility of a retaliatory outburst from the 
'dangerous' quarters of the East End.^"^ The Chief Commissioner of Police 
prepared for renewed hostilities. Warren feared an attempt would be made 
to enter Trafalgar Square on November 20th, following the scheduled meeting 
in Hyde Park. He requested 3,000 special constables to occupy the Square, 
therefore, and 20,000 more for ordinary beat duty to protect the suburbs, 
whilst the official police held the approaches to the Square and kept the 
mob moving:
I think that if anything does take place on Sunday it will either 
be something small by way of protest, or else it will be organised 
on a very extensive scale as a supreme effort; and I think it is 
necessary to be prepared with an overwhelming force to frustrate 
the most vigorous effort that the combined roughs and anarchists 
can possibly make.137
There was, of course, an energetic response from the expected quarters.
Howard Vincent contacted the Home Office the day after 'Bloody Sunday' to
say: "...could doubtless raise thousand picked and drilled men in forty
138eight hours without expense to public." On the day the advertisements 
for enrolment appeared in the press, Mr. Davy of the Savings Bank Department 
sent a telegram to the Home Office: "Large number of Colleagues desirous.
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Doubtless thousands in City."*^ Yet it was with difficulty that six 
to seven thousand specials were sworn; and the working classes were less 
than fervent. There was certainly no ’levee en masse', no re-enactment 
of the impressive attestations which defended London against the Chartists 
in 1848, and against the Reform Leaguers in 1866. In part, that was because 
special constables were recruited after 'Bloody Sunday', and not before, when 
the public instinct would doubtlea have been keener. But it was also re­
flective of the extent to which government policy had become estranged from
141large proletarian sections of the community it was allowed to police.
Traditions of urban social and political protest were ignored by a legal
system sensitive only to the middle-class interpretation of the character
of social disturbance. An inflexible implementation of a public order policy
which defined all social protest as mere criminality worsened relations be-
142tween the police and the London working-class. The folly incident to 
such a legal policy was acknowledged as early as 1889. James Stuart, a 
resilient critic of executive oversight of metropolitan order, emphasized 
what he considered to be the deficient effect of London's juridical constit­
ution, and resultant policy. To the heads of London's legal system, said 
Stuart, every large assembly assumed the shape of a dangerous mob:
They do not recognize, and seem incapable of recognizing, that 
the greatest folly in the world is to pursue such a course as 
oorer classes and the criminal classes in the same
In the mid-1880s, the London authorities pursued a policy which reinforced 
the confusion of the dangerous and industrious poor.
At the very moment, however, when the fear of the dangerous classes had 
influenced the formation of a distinctive public order policy, the middle- 
class perspective was adjusted. After the winter of 1887, the immediate 
danger of violence subsided as the trade depression wore off, and the 
numbers of unemployed decreased. As a result, the momentum of the unemployed
places the^g 
category.*
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movement was lost. By July 1888, Charles Warren was of the opinion that 
the Socialist movement, "as apart from that of Anarchists, has become more 
and more feeble during the last few m o n t h s . T h e  issue of the right 
of public meeting was still unresolved, but was watched over mainly by a 
small coterie of radical and socialist diehards; and, from the middle- 
class standpoint, was a depreciation on the threat from disorderly 'roughs' 
and 'unemployables'. At the end of the decade, two other influences assisted 
the re-appraisal of the urban residuum.
Re-assessment of the 'dangerous classes' and the threat of social disorder 
At the end of the 1880s, there occurred two important events - the Dock 
strike of 1889; and the start of Charles Booth's comprehensive social in­
vestigation, "Life and Labour of the People in London" Both were crucial 
to a re-definition of the 'dangerous classes'. The authors of the contem­
porary history of the Dock Strike, H. Llewellyn Smith and Vaughan Nash en­
capsulated the revision that took place in consequence of the mass demon­
stration through the West End, of 100,000 unskilled workers. It proved,
Smith thought, that the East End was not such a "God-forsaken, foreigner- 
ridden refuge of the destitute" as the middle-class imagination had con­
structed. And it proved also that,
the hordes of East End ruffians who have been supposed (did they 
but know their power) to hold the west in the hollow of their hands, 
were a fantastic myth: for this Great Strike would have been their 
opportunity.146
An almost identical opinion on the 'submerged' population of the ’East End 
was conceded by less sympathetic voices in the same year. Charles Booth had 
published in April, 1889, the results of his initial, copious investigation 
of the East End - homes, families, streets, and work conditions. His social 
classification significantly filtered out from the mass of the unskilled worke 
in the casual labour pool, a substratum known as Class A, "the lowest class 
of occasional labourers, loafers, and semi-criminals:
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From these come the battered figures who slouch the streets, 
and play the beggar or the bully, or help to foul the record of
the unemployed.1^7
For Booth, this category was a problem of disorder, not of poverty. It 
aroused a fear of social disorder at a much depreciated level, as Booth 
was to explain:
Whatever doubt there may be as to the exact numbers of this class, 
it is certain that they bear a very small proportion to the rest of 
the population, or even to class B with which they are mixed up, 
and from which it is at times difficult to separate them. The 
hordes of barbarians of whom we have heard, who, issuing from their 
slums, will one day overwhelm modern civilization, do not exist.
There are barbarians, but they are a handful, a small and decreas­
ing percentage: a disgrace but not a danger."148
This paragraph was seized on in subsequent discussion of Booth's persuasive
document. His study was reviewed in the "Spectator" in the month of its
publication. More than any other single issue - poverty, housing, sweating,
the review singled out the following:
The information that he has collected proves, in a word, that the 
physical force of the mob - the rabble ready for violence and plunder 
- is, in relation to the total population, absolutely insignificant. 
Even in the poorest portion of the capital - the waste of brick 
that spreads eastward undiversified by a single rich man's house, 
through seven parishes, and comprises within its boundaries nearly a 
million souls - the class from which mobs are drawn reckons little 
more than one in a hundred...If Mr Booth's calculation that the mob 
class is only 1.23 per cent in the East End can be sustained, then 
most assuredly it does not amount to more than 1 per cent of the 
total population of London, - or only fifty thousand in five 
millions.449
The figures danced on the page: 1.23 per cent of a residuum which threatened 
violence, as the conclusion of the closest social interrogation of the East 
End population. Whilst Booth, despite himself, offered inherent proof of 
the vast numbers in dire poverty, caused by 'employment'(lack of work and 
low pay) or by 'circumstances' (large family and sickness), the "Spectator" 
was more interested in his solution to the problem of the 'mob class':
The residuum - the criminal scum - he would leave to the police
to be harried out of existence.450
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There were other expressions of the influence which Booth's study had
upon the consciousness of propertied London in the 1890s. In 1892, the
"Fortnightly Review" published an article by a proprietress of a lodging
house whose inmates were dock labourers, both regular and casual. After
detailing their work patterns, entertainments, and attitude to law and
order, she reflected introspectively:
I ask myself sometimes whether such as these constitute what have 
been called 'the dangerous classes'...I feel more and more con­
vinced of the truth of Mr. Charles Booth's assertion that - 'the 
lawless hordes who are supposed by some to be lurking in dark 
places, from which they will one day issue forth and overrun London, 
simply do not exist.'-^l
Throughout the 1880s, the 'dangerous class' had been an ill-defined, and 
grossly-inflated threat to the social order of London, merging the apprehen­
sions of crime and unemployment; confusing the criminal and labouring classes 
Recognition of the mistake which had been made of forcibly associating crime, 
riot and casual labour, came through the disciplined order of the riverside 
work-force in 1889, and through the 'eviathan survey of East London's working
class. Booth's evidence provided a substantial boost to the acceptance of
152collective or social responsibility for unemployment and poverty. But, 
more importantly, in the context of an analysis of public order, it allowed 
the disintegration of the undoubted fears which,in the 1880s,had directly 
affected the assemblage of legal measures to deal with social disorder.
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CONCLUSION
In the previous chapters an attempt has been made to draw together the 
pincers of social and legal history, or, more stictly, to trace the connexions 
between the social and legal components of popular disturbance. What emerges 
of most relevance is the diversity of urban disorder and elite response in the 
1880s. At the same moment as the small-town authorities exhibited their 
capacity to interpret the meaning of riot which did not directly challenge the 
hegemony of the urban propertied, the social and political rhetoric used in 
explanation of metropolitan disorder repudiated the possibility of legitimate 
protest, and referred only to the riotous threat from a "dangerous poor".
In the provincial boroughs, the social elite of more closely-integrated 
communities were still sensitive to the tradition of urban violence which was an 
expression of articulate protest: be it a reaction to change in customary 
social arrangements, provoked by an alien religious body; or the 'mobbing' 
periodically aroused when candidates, members of the elite, sought political 
support. Magistrates were invariably influenced by the community consensus as 
to the role expected from judicial authority in the face of such disorder. There 
were strains of popular violence, then, which the urban authorities were able to 
absorb. Election disorder was usually integrated into the political system: 
'mobbing' by electors and non-electors alike was harnessed to serve the purposes 
of the political patriciate. During disturbances inspired by the Salvationist 
'soldiers', a similar elite tolerance encouraged what were essentially reactionar} 
'Skeleton' protests, disorder which emanated from those anxious to defend 
national social and religious values. At the end of the century, jingo distur­
bances, aroused by critics of the Boer War, were again sustained by members of the 
social elite. On the basis of this evidence, it is possible to suggest that the 
older forms of reactionary collective violence, largely dependent on elite 
responses, have been prematurely assumed to perish in the face of a policed 
society.
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In contrast, London's social elite - professional, political and legal - 
saw only the pathological features of the subordinate strata which overshadowed 
the city. They transposed all manifestations of protest activity into incursions 
of the 'dangerous classes'. The predominant mentality defined as 'disorderly 
mobs', what was authentic protest forced by the plight of the unemployed poor.
The view of the propertied classes was distorted by the spatial barriers which 
divided them from the poor. Only closer social examination of London s working 
class at the close of the 1880s revealed the stratifications within the unitary 
social construct, 'the dangerous classes', and thereby deflated the long-standing 
unease. At a time when the terminology of a 'dangerous poor' has returned in 
relation to urban violence, it is worthwhile to record that in the 1880s the 
imagery described the destructive intentions of the 'urban residuum' far less 
then it reflected the ill-informed diagnosis of propertied London.
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A P P E N D I X  I
The following Tables and Graphs are based on evidence drawn pricipally 
from Parliamentary Returns: either of the number of magistrates in 
Borough and County Commissions, or of the ratios of urban police to 
population. The magisterial returns are supplemented by the Miscellaneous 
Books of the Crown Office, in Chancery Papers (Public Record Office).
Graph 3, on the appointment of Birmingham magistrates, is based on fig­
ures taken from J. T. Bunce and C. A. Vince, History of the Corporation 
of Birmingham, vols. 2 - 4  (Birmingham, 1878 - 1919).
The map on the geographical distribution and chronological outbreak of 
Salvation Army riots in the 18S0s is based on references drawn from a 
wide selection of secondary documents, and from the Home Office files, 
H.0.45, Registered Papers.
TABLE 1
(A) NUMBER OF MAGISTRATES IN BOROUGH COMMISSIONS OF PEACE, IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES
YEAR 1866 1875 1885 1892 1910 1947-8
NUMBER 2062 2860 3658 4309 6896 5100
CB) NUMBER OF MAGISTRATES IN COUNTY COMMISSIONS
YEAR 1893 1911 1947-8
NUMBER 11462 16396 11700
CC) NUMBER OF MAGISTRATES IN COUNTY AND BOROUGH COMMISSIONS
YEAR 1893 1911 1947-8
NUMBER 15771 23039 16800
Sources of Table 1 (A), (B) and (C)
PP. 1867, LVII. 467
PP. 1875, LXI. 397
PP. 1886, LIII. 237
PP. 1893-4, LXXIV part I. 231; 297
PP. 1910, XXXVII . Appendix III
PP. 1911, LXIV. 730
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TABLE 2
RETURN RELATIVE TO ATTENDANCE AT PETTY SESSIONS OF BOROUGH 
MAGISTRATES IN TEN ENGLISH 
COUNTIES IN 1910
Counties Number of 
(in which Justices in 
boroughs the Borough 
were Commiss-
situated) ions
(col.a)
Number 
attending 
Petty Ses­
sions Reg­
ularly 
(col.b)
Number 
attending 
Petty Ses­
sions occ­
asionally 
(col.c)
Total 
of cols.
(b) and
(c)
Col.(b) as 
a percent­
age of (a)
cols. (b) 5  
(c) as a per­
centage of 
(a).
Cheshire 230 177 35 2 1 2 76% 91%
Cornwall 1 2 2 63 39 1 0 2 51 83
Devon 238 144 43 187 60 7S
Durham 2 85 176 56 232 61 85
Lancashire 1527 1089 276 1365 71 89
Lincoln­
shire 95 59 23 82 62 83
Northumber­
land 152 1 2 1 16 137 79 90
Surrey 123 81 27 108 65 89
Sussex 123 64 36 109 52 89
Warwick­
shire 260 184 46 230 70 8 8
TOTALS 3155 2158 597 2755 6 8 % 87%
Source of Table 2: PP. 1910, xxxvii. Appendix III.
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THE BOROUGH MAGISTRACY IN ENGLAND AND WALES,YEARLY 
SUMMARIES, 1880-1916
TABLE 3
Year
Appoint­
ments to 
the Com­
mission
Deaths
Removed
from
Commiss­
ion
Year
Appoint­
ments to 
the Com­
mission
Deaths
Removed
from
Commiss­
ion
1880 432 1899 282 175 32
1881 299 1900 265 186 1 2
1882 168 1901 225 190 1 2
1883 127 1902 107 160 31
1884 192 1903 187 191 25
1885 325 1904 240 189 29
1886 420 1905 295 186 15
1887 282 1906 799 177 119
1888 204 1907 247 187 64
1889 204 1908 192 204 36
i890 317 1909 269 195 55
'891 140 1910 2 2 2 0 1 1
1892 814 1911 130 180
1893 219* 1912 179 177
1894 - 1913 213 174
1895 180 173 1914 338 195
1896 321 133 1915 251 -
1897 206 171 1 2 1916 263 187
1898 191 174 29
*To February 1893 only
Sources of Table 3: PP. 1893-4, LXXIV. 227.
PP. 1910, XXXVII, R.C. on Selection of Justices, 
Appendix I.
Chancery Papers, C.193/124, Miscellaneous Books 
of Crown Office
TABLE 4
THE COUNTY MAGISTRACY IN ENGLAND AND WALES,YEARLY 
SUMMARIES, 1880-1893; and 1902-1909
Year
Appoint­
ments to Deaths 
Commission
Year
Appoint­
ments to 
Commission
Deaths
1880 579 1891 499
1881 445 1892 648
1882 441 1893 71*
1883 496 1902 509
1884 397 1903 508
1885 525 1904 511 407
1886 604 1905 516 437
1887 587 1906 1273 388
1888 510 1907 1225 434
1889 620 1908 658 521
1890 558 1909 700
*To February 1893 only.
Sources of Table 4: Same as Table 3.
TABLE 5
NUMBER OF MAGISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS ACCORDING TO MIN­
ISTRIES, IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 1880-1893
Ministries Boroughs Counties
April 1880 - June 1885 
Gladstone's 2nd. Ministry. 
Liberal
Juie 1885 - Feb. 1886 
Salisbury's 1st. Ministry. 
Conservative
311
Feb. 1886 - July 1886 
Gladstone's 3rd. Ministry. 215
Liberal
July 1886 - August 1892 
Salisbury's 2nd. Ministry. 
Conservative
1628
August 1892 - Feb. 1893 
Gladstone's 4th Ministry. 652
Liberal
2512
269
286
3437
331
Source of Table 5: PP. 1893-4 LXXIV.227
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RETURN SHOWING THE AUTHORISED STRENGTH OF THF. POLICE FORCES OF THE 
BOROUGHS LISTED, IN 1881, AND THE RATIO OF POPULATION TO POLICE.
TABLE 6
Borough Date and 
type of riot: 
Election (E), 
Salvation (S)
Strength
of
Police
Population
1881
Ratio of 
Population 
to Police
Maidstone 1883 S 30 29623 987
Monmouth 1880 E 6 6111 1018
Bath 1880 E 8 6 51814 602
Guildford 1882 S 1 2 10858 905
Brighton 84 S 153 107546 703
Salisbury 81 S 14 14792 1057
Cardiff 80 S; 8 6 E 96 82761 862
Reading 81 S 40 42054 1051
Truro 83 S 1 1 10619 965
Exeter 81 S 62 37665 607
Dorchester 80 E 8 7567 946
Poole 82 S 14 12310 879
Basingstoke 81 S 7 6681 954
Portsmouth 8 8 S 130 127989 984
Ryde 85 S 14 11461 818
Folkestone 83 S 2 0 18986 949
Gravesend 83 S 29 23302 803
Hereford 82 S 30 19821 661
Buckingham 80 E 4 3585 896
St. Alban's 8 8 S 1 1 10930 993
Stamford 87 S 1 0 8775 877
Norwich 82 S 97 87843 905
Northants 83 S 52 51880 997
Coventry 79 S 40 42111 1052
Leamington 79 S; 80 E 28 22976 820
Kidderminster 82 S 2 1 24270 1155
Birkenhead 82 S 1 1 1 84006 756
Chester 80 E; 81 S 42 36794 876
Carlisle 80 S 38 35884 944
Derby 85 S 90 81168 901
Blackburn 84 S 1 0 2 104014 1019
Bolton 82 S 113 105414 932
Oldham 82 S 1 0 0 111343 1113
Notts 85 E 2 0 0 186575 932
Rotherham 80 E 35 34782 993
Sheffield 81 S 341 284508 834
Barrow 80 E 49 47259 964
Source: PP. 1886, XXXIV, pp.102, 203 and 304: "Reports of the
Inspectors of Constabulary for the Year ending 29 Sept. 1885."
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Ca) POPULATION SIZE OF TOWNS IN WHICH SALVATION ARMY RIOTS OCCURRED
TABLE 7
3-10,000 1 0 -2 0 , 0 0 0 20-50,000 50-100,000 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  +
Basingstoke Folkestone Carlisle Bath Blackburn
Crediton Guildford Chester Birkenhead Bolton
Dorking Hereford Coventry Cardiff Brighton
Frome Ilkeston Exeter Derby Leicester
Honiton Poole Eastbourne Norwich Manchester
Overton Ryde Gravesend Plymouth Newcastle
Romford
Stamford
Sudbury
Sevenoaks
Thombury
Yeovil
Shoreham
St. Albans 
Sheerness 
Salisbury 
Truro 
Warwick 
Worthing 
Weston-Super- 
Mare 
Watford 
Tredegar
Hastings
Kidderminster
Leamington
Luton
Maidstone
Reading
Northampton Oldham
Portsmouth
Sheffield
(b) SALVATION ARMY RIOTS PER URBAN DISTRICT
Urban Sanitary 
Districts
No. of Riots Percentage 
of riots
3 - 10,000 13 23
1 0  - 2 0 , 0 0 0 15 27
20 - 50,000 1 2 21.5
50 - 100,000 7 12.5
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  + 9 16
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Number of Magistrates Appointed
I
cs co 
m »e
Town Date of Hiot Town Date Town Date
I. London 1879-81
Romford 1885
Gravesend 1883
Sheerness 1882
Sevenoaks 
Maidstone 1883
7. Dorking
8 . Guildford 1882
9. Reading 1881
10. Basingstoke 1881
II. Whitchurch 1888
12. Salisbury 1881
13. Frome 1884
14. Bath
15. Thornbury 1883
16. Weston S.M. 1882
17. Yeovil 1882
18. Honiton 1882
19. Crediton 1882
2 0 . Truro 1883
2 1 . Plymouth
2 2 . Torbay
23. Exeter 1881
24. Poole 1882
25. Portsmouth 1888
26. Ryde 1885
27. Worthing 1884
28. Shoreham 1884
29. Brighton 1884
30. Eastbourne 1891
31 . Folkestone 1883
32. Cardiff 1880
33. Tredegar 1882
34. Hereford 1882
35. Luton 1883
36. Watford 1883
37. St. Albans 1888
38. Sudbury 1883
39.
40. 
41 .
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50
51 .
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
Norwich 1882 
Northampton 1883 
Warwick 1886 
Leamington 1879 
Kidderminster 1882 
Coventry 1879 
Leicester 1885 
Stamford 1887 
Ilkeston 1882 
Derby 1885 
Sheffield 1881 
Chester 1881 
Birkenhead 1882
Manchester
Oldham
Bolton
Blackburn
Carlisle
Newcastle
1832 
1882 
1884 
1880 
! 87.
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The Borough Bench and Labour Riot
One important category of social disturbance which affected provincial 
boroughs has been neglected: the labour or Strike riot. It is relevant to 
provide a brief estimate of the response of the borough magistracy to labour 
disorder since it usually contrasted with the approach to religious and 
election riot. In the face of labour disturbances, the Bench in provincial 
towns revealed their capacity to act firmly in the preservation of social 
order.
Representatives of the labour movement argued, in fact, that there was a 
double standard of law enforcement administered by the lay magistracy. In 
Norwich, for example, whilst a traditional licence was extended to election 
disorder by a Tory-dominated Bench, the unemployed food riot of January 18?7 
was firmly repressed. A Radical Norwich paper pointed this contrast between 
the tolerant police attitude to election riots, at which the constabulary were 
"insulted and assaulted by the drink excited Tory residuum of the slums", 
and their coercive response to unemployed disturbances.* On other occasions, 
notably in the Lancashire cotton disturbances of 1878; in the South Lancashire 
colliery riots of 1881; and in the Hull dock dispute of 1893, the difference 
in forms of law enforcement was apparent. Troops were quickly requisitioned 
by the magistracy, often in advance of actual disorder, and provocatively 
exhibited. During the 1878 strike in the cotton-weaving towns of Blackburn, 
Preston and Burnley, the magistrates, many of whom were cotton manufacturers 
themselves, were encouraged by the Employers Association to call in detachments 
of troops. The Burnley mayor later documented the scale of military requisi­
tion he had enforced, and recorded his satisfaction with the effects:
The Display we have made of military strength has apparently done 
much good, and imparts a greater Feeling of security to the 
Inhabitants of the Town ...
APPENDIX II
Daylight, 22 January 1887. 
2 P.R.O., 11.0. 144/73872/13.
Police and soldiers were also employed in forestalling picketing, dispersing 
strike meetings, or protecting the introduction of "free labour". In 1881, 
troops were on the ground in large numbers around Wigan and St. Helens to 
prevent disorder amongst the colliers on strike. The Lancashire Chief 
Constable reported to the Home Office that the military authorities had been 
co-operative, "and to the ready way in which Troops have appeared at threatenec 
points I must attribute the fact of several meetings of Colliers being renderec 
harmless." In addition to their preventive role, the military assisted the 
return-to-work. The Captain of the 18th Hussars advised the War Office that 
the detachments should remain in the district, although the threat of disorder 
had subsided:
So long as the Tj/jops remain, the Colliers finding themselves
powerless, will gradually resume work from day to day.
In 1893 the Hull magistrates, drawn largely from the Shipping and mercantile 
sectors of the city's economy, similarly extended protection to the imported
free labourers; and instructed the constabulary to disperse pickets in the 
4dockside streets. It was this predominant approach of the urban magistracy 
and watch committees to labour disputes which formed a crucial spur to the 
demand, made strongly in the 1890s, for independent labour representation on 
the Town Councils, and for a larger share of working-class magistrates. The 
moral drawn was the need for Labour to have a voice in the judicial delibera­
tions of urban law enforcement.
Reservations remain, however, for an interpretation which stresses a clear- 
cut contrast between election and religious riot on the one side, and labour 
disturbances on the other, especially since different types of urban environ­
ment were involved. The greater recourse to the military could have depended 
less on the 'labour' character of the disturbance, and more on the association 
of high proletarian density; the difficulty of recruiting special constables, 
and the relative financial weakness of these municipalities. Permanent Under-
3 P.R.O., H.O. 144/A1196/18 & 27. 
4H.O. 144/X41472/143.
Secretary of State at the Home Office, Godfrey Lushington, took the view, 
indeed, that where a prolonged and quarrelsome strike of five to ten thousand 
labourers occurred, the military would always be required: "The difficulties 
are beyond what the Police, both local and those borrowed, are able to cope 
with."'* According to his internal memorandum on the Hull dispute, Lushington 
was in favour of an uncompromising requisition of military, and opposed to the 
use of special constabulary:
I feel very strongly that in any case Special Constables are not 
the proper material for dealing with an extensive Strike. They 
would aggravate whatever class animosity exists - but above all 
they would be inadequate - they would inevitably be overpowered 
by such a number of Unionist Labourers as are now out on strike 
' at Hull.
The altered character of the Labour Movement from the mid to the late Victorian 
period - a movement increasingly of the unskilled, with its greater mass 
character - led to preventive and inhibitory measures being taken in which the 
military played a decisive role.
But objective measurement of the scale and consequences of disorder was 
often less influential to the legal response than the ease with which business 
interests could pressure the local authorities so far as to claim support for 
measures which were calculated to weaken the strike: and which also escalated 
the level of disorder. Business pressure was sustained by the financial 
involvement in local labour disputes of many of the borough justices; inevit­
able when Benches were recruited from the industrial and commercial middle- 
class. In addition, the Home Office were prepared to renounce their tradi­
tional 'laissez-faire' policy with regard to urban legal jurisdiction, and 
prompt the 'unpaid' to take stern measures against strike violence. The urban 
elite, in their role as magistrates, took and were encouraged to take, substan­
tial provisions against the threat of social disorder posed by industrial 
conflict. Class solidarity ensured that they were rarely hindered by those
partisan rivalries on the Bench which determined a more lenient attitude to 
election and religious riot.
5P.R.O., H.O.144/X41472/148 
6H.O.144/X41472/7I & 115
2 >15
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APPENDIX III
DOCUMENTS ON TRAFALGAR SQUARE AND THE PROHIBITION OF PUBLIC MEETING AND
PROCESSIONING
(i) Police Notice issued by Charles Warren, Commissioner of Metropolitan 
Police, 1st November 1887.
Should a procession, crowd, mob, or wandering band, perambu­
lating the streets, break into a run, or make rushes, or 
terrorise the inhabitants by hooLing or yelling in any thorough­
fare, the Commissioner deems it to be a disorderly meeting, 
and directs that it shall be dispersed and the principals 
arrested. Should it come to a standstill or block the road­
way to the interference of traffic, and refuse to act under 
the instructions of the police, who are responsible for the 
regulation of the traffic, it, on the other hand, is an obstruc­
tion, and should be treated accordingly.
(ii) Relevant sections of the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839 (2 & 3 Viet. . .47
S.52. It shall be lawful for the Commissioners of Police from time 
to time, and as occasion shall require, to make regulations 
for the route to be observed by all carts, carriages, horses, 
and persons, and for preventing obstruction of the streets 
and thoroughfares within the metropolitan police district, 
in all times of public processions, public rejoicings, or 
illuminations, and also to give directions to the constables 
for keeping order and for preventing any obstruction of the 
thoroughfares in the immediate neighbourhood of Her Majesty's 
palaces and the public offices, the High Court of Parliament, 
the courts of law and equity, the police courts, the theatres, 
and other places of public resort, and in any case when the 
streets or thoroughfares may be thronged, or may be liable 
to be obstructed.
S.54. Every person shall be liable to a penalty, not more than
forty shillings, who, within the limits of the metropolitan 
police district, shall in any thoroughfare or public place 
commit any of the following offences (that is to say) ....
(9) Every person who, after being made acquainted with
the regulations or directions which the commissioners 
of police shall have made for regulating the route 
of horses, carts, carriages, and persons, during 
the time of divine service, and for preventing 
obstructions during public processions and on other 
occasions herein-before specified, shall wilfully 
disregard or not conform himself thereunto.
(13) Every person who shall use any threatening, abusing, 
or insulting words or behaviour with inront to 
provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach 
of the peace may be occasioned.
2 9 7
....And it shall be lawful for any constable belonging to 
the metropolitan police force to take into custody, with­
out warrant, any person who shall commit any such offence 
within view of any such constable.
S.64. It shall be lawful for any constable belonging to the
metropolitan police to take into custody, without a warrant, 
all loose, idle, and disorderly persons whom he shall find 
disturbing the public peace, or whom he shall have good 
cause to suspect of having committed or being about to 
commit any felony, misdemeanour, or breach of the peace, 
and all persons whom he shall find between sunset and the 
hour of eight in the morning lying or loitering in any high­
way yard, or other place, and not giving a satisfactory 
account of themselves.
(iii) Police Notice issued by Charles Warren, 8 th November, 1887.
In consequence of the disorderly scenes which have recently 
occurred in Trafalgar Square, and of the danger to the peace 
of the metropolis from meetings held there:-
And with a view to prevent such disorderly proceedings, and 
to preserve the public peace
I, Charles Warren, the Commissioner of Police of the Metro­
polis, do hereby give notice, with the sanction of the Secretary 
of State and the concurrence of the Commissioner of Her Majesty's 
Works and Publi. Buildings, that until further intimation, no 
public meetings will be allowed to assemble in Trafalgar Square, 
nor will speeches be allowed to be delivered therein; and all 
well-disposed persons ate hereby cautioned and requested to 
abstain from joining or attending any such meeting or assemblage; 
and notice is further given, that all necessary measees will be 
adopted to prevent any such meeting or assemblage, or the deliver 
of any speech, and effectually to preserve the public peace, and 
to suppress any attempt at the disturbance thereof.
This notice is not intended to interfere with the use by the 
public of Trafalgar Square for all ordinary purposes, or to 
affect the regulations issued by me with respect to Lord Mayor's 
Day.
(iv) Police Notice issued by Warren, 18th November 1887.
Whereas the holding of meetings and the passage of processions 
have caused, and are liable to cause, public tumult and dis­
order in Trafalgar Square, and have created and are liable to 
create obstruction in the streets and thoroughfares adjoining 
and leading thereto, I, Charles Warren, the Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis, for the prevention of such disorder 
and obstruction, pursuant to the powers vested in me by 2 & 3 
Viet. c. 47, and 7 & 8 Viet. c. 60, make the following Regu­
lations, and give the following directions to the Metropolitan 
Police Constables:- No meeting shall be allowed to assemble 
nor shall any person be allowed to deliver a public speech in 
Trafalgar Square or in the streets or thoroughfares adjoining 
or leading thereto. No organised procession shall be allowed 
to pass along the streets or thoroughfares adjoining or lead­
ing to Trafalgar Square. These regulations and directions are 
to continue in force until further notice.
(v) Regulations made for Trafalgar Square by G. Shaw-Lefevre, First 
Commissioner of Works, 26th October 1892.
Whereas by the Trafalgar Square Act, 1844, and by the Crown 
Lands Act, 1851, the care, control, management, and regulation 
of Trafalgar Square are vested in the Commissioners of Her 
Majesty's Works and Public Buildings,
And whereas it is expedient that public meetings should be 
permitted to be held in Trafalgar Square subject to such regula­
tions as may be necessary with a veiw to the public convenience 
and safety and to the due observance of order;
Now I, on behalf of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works 
and Public Buildings, in exercise of the powers vested in them 
as aforesaid, do hereby make the following regulations with 
regard to the holding of meetings in Trafalgar Square
1. No public meeting shall be held except between 2 p.m. 
and sunset on Saturdays, or between sunrise and sunset 
on Bank Holidays or Sundays.
2. No public meeting shall be held unless written notice 
shall have been sent four clear days beforehand by the 
promoters to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 
specifying the object of the meeting, and the day and 
hour when it is proposed to be held.
3. Speeches shall not be delivered except from places 
authorised by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works 
and Public Buildings.
4. Not more than one meeting will be allowed at the same 
time; and if notices of two or more meetings are given 
for the same day preference shall be given to that 
meeting of which notice shall have been first received.
These regulations shall come into force on the 31st Day of 
October, 1892.
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pp. 1839, VII. p.7o3 : Report from the Select Committee appointed to
inquire into the present state of the Education of tu* People 
in England and Wales...
pp. 1837-8, XV. p.321 : Report from the Select Committee appointed to 
inquire into the provisions of 3 and k Will. c.19, 
(Metropolis Police Offices)...
pp. 18^ +7, VII. p.1 : First Report of the Lords' Select Committe on the
Execution of the Criminal Law, especially respecting Juevenile 
Offenders and Transportation.
pp. 1 8 5 0 , XVII. p.1 : Report from the Select Committes on Prison 
Discipline.
pp. 1852, VII. p.1 : Report from the Select Committee on Criminal and 
Destitute Juveniles.
pp. 1852-3, XXXVI. p.1 : Report of the Select Committee on the
Expediency of adopting a more Uniform System of police in 
England and Wales and Scotland.
pp. 1 8 5 6 , XVII. p.1 : Select Committee on Transportation : Three reports 
with Minutes of Evidence.
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pp. 1863» IX. p.1 : Report from the Select Committee of the House of 
'Lords, on the Present State of Discipline in Gaols and 
Houses of Correction...
pp. 1868-9, VIII. p. 1 : Report from the Select Committee on Parliamentary 
and Municipal Elections, ...with Minutes of Evidence.
pp. 1887, X. p.13 : Report from the Select Committee on London
Corporation (Charges of Malversation), with Minutes of 
Evidence.
pp. 1892, XI. p.553 : Report from the Select Committee cn the Easttourne 
Improvement Act (1885) Amendment Bill; with the proceedings 
of the Committee.
pp. 19C8, VII. p.365 : Report of the Select Committee on Employment
of Military in Cases of Disturbance, with Minutes of Evidence.
(c) Reports of Royal Commisions
pp. 1835j XXIII. part i. p.1 : First Report of the Commissioners 
appointed to inquire into the Municipal Corporations in 
England and Wales.
pp. 1839» XIX. p.1 : First Report of the Commissioners appointed to 
inquire as to the test means of establishing an efficient 
Constabulary Force in the Counties of England and Wales.
pp. 1863, XXT. p.1 : Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire 
into the Operation of the Acts 16 and 17 Viet. c.99t and 
20 and 21 Viet, c.3, relating to Transportation and Penal 
Servitude, with Minutes of Evidence.
pp. 1881, XL. p.1 : Report of the Commissioners to Inquire into the
Existence of Corrupt Practices in the City of Chester, with 
Minutes of Evidence.
pp. 1881, XXXIX. p.1 : Report of the Commissioners to inquire into the 
Existence of Corrupt Practices in the City of Canterbury,'dth 
Minutes of Evidence.
pp. 188^-5, XXX. p.1 : First Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for 
inquiry into the Housing of the Working Classes, with Minutes 
of Evidence.
pp. 1886, XXI. p.1 : First Report of the Royal Commission appointed to 
inquire into the Depression of Trade and Industry, with 
Minutes of Evidence.
pp. 1897, XXXV. p.1 : Second Report of the Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing Laws, with Minutes of Evidence.
PP* 1906, XCV. p.A-73 : Report of the Royal Commission appointed toinquire into the existence of Corrupt Practices at the last 
Election for the City of Worcester, with Minutes of Evidence.
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pp. 1908, LI. p.1 : Royal Commission Upon the Duties of the Metropolitan 
Police.
pp. 1930, XXXVII. p.647 : Report of the Royal Commission on the Selection 
of Justices of the Peace, with Minutes of Evidence.
pp. 1947-48, XII. p.733 : Report of the Royal Commission on Justices of 
the Peace, 1946 - 48.
(d) Parliamentary Returns
pp. 1840, XLI. p.5'|5 : Returns of Towns or Boroughs which have petitioned 
for Corporations, Towns and Boroughs to which Commissions of 
the Peace have been granted, ...1840.
pp. 184-2, XXXIII. p.445 : Persons Appointed to act as Justices of the 
Peace in Counties in England and Wales, since the 21st. July 
1836.
pp. 1842, XXXIII. p.473 • Names of the Magistrates in the Eoroughs in
England and Wales, 1st. February; with the Dates and Names of 
subsequent appointments to the Borough Magistracy.
pp. 1852-3, LXXVIII. p.329 : Returns of the number of justices in the 
Commission of Peace for each County in England and Wales who 
have qualified.
pp. 1865-9, LI. p.151 5 Return of all Magistrates crested for the County 
Palatine of Lancaster during the Years, 1859 - 1869».•
pp. 1873, LIV. p.333 ! Return of all Places in England and Vales having 
Stipendiary Magistrates...
pp. 1874, LIII. p. 175 • Return of all Election Petitions Tried in England 
by Election Judges ... Durham County (Northern Division) 
Election, 1874.
pp. 1875, LX. p.644 : Return of the Names of Lord Lieutenants of Counties in England and Wales, as the same stood on the 1st. day of 
January 1875-".
pp. 1881, LXXVI. p.287 : Return giving the Names and Professions of all Justices of the Peace in the Eoroughs and Cities of England 
and Wales, on 1st. May 188O...
pp. 1882, LIV. p.17 : Return containing Copies of any Correspondence which has passed betveen the Home Office and the Local 
Authorities of Basingstoke, and other Places, with reference 
to the Suppression of Disturbances.
pp. 1888, LXXXII. p.665 : Return of Policemen Injured on 13 November1887, giving the Name, Rank, and Number of the Person Injured, 
the Nature of the Inquiry, and the Time and Place at which it 
was sustained.
pp. 1888, LXXXII. p.673 : Return of the copy of the "Police Orders", 
dated the 17 July, and issued 21st. of July 1866.
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pp. 1889, LXI. p.265 : Return giving the Regulations issued by the
Chief Commissioner of Police with respect to Trafalgar Square, 
issued on 12th and 18th. November 1887 respectively.
pp. 1892, LXV. p.115 : Eastbourne Improvement Act, 1885 (Prosecutions 
for Open-Air Services, etc.). Return showing (1) the Number 
and Particulars of the Charges brought from the 1st day of 
June 1891, to the 18th day of February 1892, before the 
Justices in Petty Sessions at Eastbourne, for Offences under 
'The Eastbourne Improvement Act, 1885', or otherwise, committed 
by Persons taking part in Open-Air Services or Meetings, or 
Processions, with or without Music, or for Unlawful Assembly...
pp. 1892, LXV. p.355 : Return showing Names of Places in the Metropolitan 
Police District where Open Air Meetings have, since 1st. March 
1891, been held, and have not been interfered with by the 
Police...
pp. 1893-94, LXXIV. part i. p.167 : Return of the Memorandum of the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, made in 1870, and of 
the letter addressed by him to the Lord Lieutenant... with 
reference to the Nomination of Justices of the Peace for the 
County Palatine of Lancaster.
pp. 1893-94, LXXIV. part i. p.195 • Return of the Number of Justices of
the Peace appointed for Countries and Boroughs in England and
Wales, from the year 1880 inclusive.
pp. 1895-94, LXXIV. part i. p.229 : Return giving names and professions,
or descriptions, of all Justices of the Peace for Cities and
Boroughs of England and Wales on the 30 June 1892...
pp. 1893-94, LXXIV. part i. p.76? : Return giving names of petty sessional 
Divisions in Lancashire... how often such Court is held... and 
the boroughs having a separate Commission of Peace...
pp. 1895, LXXXI. p.351 : Return showing the Names, Addresses, and Date of 
Appointment of all Magistrates appointed in each Borough and 
County in England and Wales between the 1st. July 1892 and 
31 August 1894...
(e) Other Papers
pp. i860, LIII. p.121 : Printed Correspondence regarding Disturbances in 
St. George's in the East, 1859-60.
pp. 1864, XLVIII. p.787 : Copy of any instructions given to the Police 
with reference to the Suppression of Meetings for Public 
Discussion in the Public Parks of the Metropolis.
pp. 1876, LXI. p.277 : Copy of Correspondence between Mr. Whalley M.P.,
and the Secretary of State in reference to Public Meetings held 
at Ipswich, Colchester, and Bury St. Edmunds in October last.
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pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
pp.
1880, «LVII. p.^51 ■ Copy of the shorthand writer's notes of the 
Evidence and Judgement on the trial of the Chester City 
Election Petition.
1886, XXXIV. p.102 : Reports of the Inspectors of Constabulary for 
the Year ending 29th. September, 1885.
1886, XXXIV. p.38l : Report of a Committee to Inquire and Report as 
to the Origin and Character of the Disturbances which took 
place in the Metropolis on Monday the 8th. of February, and 
as to the Conduct of the Police Authorities in Relation thereto; 
with Minutes of Evidence and Appendix.
1886, XXXIV. p.i+93 : Report of the Committee appointed by the
Secretary of State for the Home Department to Inquire into the 
Administration and Organization of the Metropolitan Police Force
1886, LIII. p.351 s Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department on the Report of the Committee appointed to 
Inquire into the Origin and Character of the Disturbances that 
took place in the Metropolis on 8 February 1886, and as to the 
Conduct of the Police Authorities in relation thereto.
1887, XXXVI. p.227 : Sixteenth Annual Report of the Local Government 
Board, 1886-87 : Appendix B. Pauperism and Distress.
1887, XL. p.319 : Report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropol 
for the year 1886.
1887, XL. p.375 : Copy of the Report of the Receiver of the Metropoli­
tan Police on the proceedings under 'The Metropolitan Police 
(Compensation) Act, 1886'.
1888, VII. p . : A Bill for the Regulation of meetings in Trafalgar 
Square.
1888, LVII. p.3^9 : Report of the Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis, for the year 1887.
1888, LXXXI. p.333 : Correspondence from October 1878 to March 1888 
between the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the 
Metropolitan Board of Works, relating to the Right of Public 
Meeting in certain Open Spaces subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Board.
1890-91, LXIII. p.699 : Correspondence between the Secretary of
State for the Home Department and Northampton Magistrates with 
reference to the prohibition of a Meeting in Market Square, 
1890-91.
1893-9k .  XVII. p.381 : 'Report of the Departmental Committee appointed 
to inquire into the Circumstances connected with the Disturbance 
at Featherstone on 7th. September 1893.
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pp. 1893-9^, LXXII. p.209 : Report of a Committee appointed by the
Secretary of State to inquire into the best means available 
for Identifying Habitual Criminals; with Minutes of Evidence.
pp. 1893-9^, LXXIV. part ii. p.23 : Report of the Departmental Committee 
of 1892-3 upon the number and limits of the Metropolitan 
Police Court Districts and the arrangements for service of the 
Courts by the Metropolitan magistrates.
pp. 1895, XXXV. p.605 : Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Riots...
pp. 1895, LVI. p.1 : Report from the Departmental Committee on Prisons.
pp. 1895, CVIII. p.9 : Report of the Committee appointed to revise the 
Criminal Portion of the Judical Statistics.
pp. 1898, CIV. p.11 : Introduction to the Criminal Statistics for the 
Year 1896.
pp. 1900, XL. p.659 : Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department to inquire into 
the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police Magistrates and 
County Justices respectively in the Metropolitan Police Court 
District.
pp. 190^, XXXIV. p.3^3 : Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to Inquire 
into the Question of Metropolitan Police Court Jurisdiction 
in Middlesex.
pp. 1909, XXXVI. p.83 : Report of the Departmental Committee on the
Duties of the Police with respect to the Preservation of Order 
at Public Meetings.
pp. 1919, XXVII. p.709 : Report of the Committee on the Police Service of England, Wales, and Scotland: Part I.
pp. 1937-8 , IX. p.i+61 : Report of the Departmental Committee on Corporal 
Punishment.
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78 Dudley Herald, 7 February 1874; 28 Feb. 1874. Cf. Nottingham election of 
1865. Sir Robert Clifton, successful Tory candidate, lost seat because he 
had urged his supporters to prevent the Liberals packing the polling booths:
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8 Ibid., p.5. One contemporary historian has accepted the nineteenth-century 
evaluation of labour disorder to explain industrial violence after 1889.
He has referred to the increased role of the unskilled in strike action who, 
in the large towns, "would always be intermingled with 'the mob', the des­
tructive and predatory men and women of the slums, who when the crowds were 
out in a strike would seize their chance to smash, loot and bum": E.H. 
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